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Abstract 
Made in the Images of God:  
A Pedagogy for Converting Imaginations in the Postmodern World 
by 
Patrick R. Manning 
 
Dr. Thomas H. Groome 
Dissertation Advisor 
 
What is at the root of the struggles in faith of today’s American Catholics? What can 
Catholic religious educators do to promote faith in the present postmodern context? In an 
effort to address these pressing questions, this dissertation argues for the central role of 
the imagination in human cognition and living, faith, and religious education. Following 
an initial survey of sociological data that points to disruption of traditional Christian 
patterns of imagining as a major factor in Catholics’ current struggles in faith, subsequent 
chapters analyze how the human imagination functions and malfunctions and how 
religious education can help to reintegrate it when it is disrupted. Building upon these 
findings, later chapters lay out a pedagogical process whereby religious educators can 
invite learners to participation in the reign of God and to greater integration in their lives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Margaret, 
through whom I fell in love 
in a quite absolute, final way 
and who so seized my imagination 
that I can now imagine no better life. 
True to Fr. Pedro Arrupe’s warning,  
it has decided everything. 
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Introduction 
 
“I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly” (Jn 10:10).1 Such was 
the alluring promise that Jesus made to his disciples. In so doing, he conveyed what God 
had hoped for human beings from the beginning—a life in which they might enjoy not 
only the particular goods of God’s creation but also (and more importantly) the 
unsurpassable good of loving relationship with God and one another. Jesus fulfilled 
God’s hopes for humanity as no one had been able to do before. The “image of the 
invisible God” (Col 1:15), he manifested before human eyes what life in abundance looks 
like and provided a model to which they might aspire in their own lives. Imitating Jesus, 
following after him in this way of life, human beings are able to experience in this 
lifetime peace and joy, which—comforting though these experiences—are only a 
foretaste of the fulfillment of the longings of the human heart that they will enjoy in the 
world to come.  
The common desire of all human beings, this life in abundance and the practices 
that contribute to it have been described in myriad ways—the good life, human 
flourishing, etc. Christians, who have found imitating Jesus’ example to be the key to 
peace and happiness, for their part describe this way of life as the path of “discipleship”. 
This life of Christian discipleship is an all-encompassing affair. Jesus makes clear in his 
life and teaching that following after him makes demands on the whole person—head and 
heart, body and soul, affect and will. He summarized this imperative to total commitment 
in the words, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
                                                
1 All biblical quotations from NRSV unless otherwise stated. 
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soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself” 
(Lk 10:27). Discipleship, in other words, requires devoting one’s whole life—everything 
that one is and does—to God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. Although some 
might perceive such an absolute commitment as limiting, nothing could be further from 
the truth. Far from inhibiting genuine human development and flourishing, the way of 
Christian discipleship in fact makes it possible for people to achieve their full potential as 
beings created in God’s own image and likeness.  
The perpetuation of this way of life depends upon followers of Jesus handing on 
their Christian faith from one generation to the next. For this reason Jesus commanded 
his disciples, “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name 
of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything 
that I have commanded” (Mt 28:19-20). Jesus’ phrase “make disciples” appropriately 
indicates the holistic nature of this endeavor. If discipleship is rightly understood as 
following Jesus into the life in abundance that he promised, then the work of forming 
disciples must involve, not merely handing on information, but, more broadly, leading 
others into this way of life. It involves helping others to respond to God with all their 
heart, soul, strength, and mind. 
Challenges abound amidst disciples’ efforts to persist in this way of life and to 
help others do likewise. All human beings yearn for the sense of wholeness and 
integration to which God calls us, but the sometimes misguided ways in which we pursue 
fulfillment can often leave us feeling empty and divided within ourselves. We desire the 
perfect love only God can give, but the many lesser substitutes we desire—pleasure, 
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wealth, esteem—tear us in competing directions. This perennial battle for the human 
heart has been immortalized in the Hebrew Scriptures’ account of the Israelites’ constant 
struggle with idolatry, of how they repeatedly found solace in God’s tender care, turned 
away out of fear or lust or hunger, and always eventually returned to God. Even if most 
of us have never seen a golden calf, there is no denying the fact that the battle rages on in 
our own time. Indeed, single-minded love of God may be harder to achieve today than 
ever before. 
This dissertation is about this struggle of Christian disciples to achieve wholeness 
in their lives of faith (and their lives in general) in today’s world and the role religious 
education might play in promoting this integration. More specifically, it is about Catholic 
Christians and Catholic religious education in the United States context. In so defining 
the scope of this project, I do not mean to suggest that the matters treated herein do not 
concern non-Catholics. Indeed, many Christians—I might even say many who practice 
some form of religion and/or spirituality—will recognize the situation and challenges 
described in the following pages as their own. Insofar as this proves the case, I expect 
that Christian educators working in a variety of traditions and contexts will benefit from 
this investigation. I address this work primarily to Catholics in the United States because 
this is the context, the tradition, and the population within which I have been formed and 
have conducted my own teaching ministry. Therefore, writing from the vantage point of 
my Catholic tradition and community, I hope to offer something that will serve that 
community but also many others besides. 
It is possible, even likely, that some Catholics will not recognize the situation and 
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challenges I describe here as their own. For example, my account of the secularization of 
Western culture and dissolution of a spiritual view of reality will likely not ring true to 
the experience of Latino-American Catholics who live and practice their faith in Christian 
communities that remain permeated by the ethos of their native cultures. 
Notwithstanding, historical trends suggest that even those populations who are not 
presently confronting the challenges of postmodern culture to Christian faith may find 
themselves facing those challenges soon enough. As such, this dissertation may hold 
valuable lessons for these audiences as well. 
As a doctoral dissertation, this project is highly academic and technical in nature. 
It is therefore most appropriate for scholars of Christian religious education and perhaps 
research-minded leaders in Catholic religious education. Nevertheless, my ultimate aim 
in this dissertation is to develop pedagogical guidelines that will support the praxis of 
those responsible for the formal education in faith of Christian disciples, that is, parish 
catechists and religion teachers in Catholic schools. As such, I intend for this dissertation 
to provide the foundation for future works more appropriate to this larger audience.  
As an interdisciplinary project, this dissertation will draw upon research in 
multiple fields to the extent that each illuminates some aspect of the issue at hand. I take 
as my point of departure a body of empirical sociological research, which offers a 
glimpse of the lived reality of Catholics in 21st-century America, and the questions that 
arise from this research. I will subsequently draw upon psychology, cognitive science, 
educational theory, philosophy, and theology to address questions that the tools of 
sociological investigation are not equipped to answer. These preliminary discussions will 
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serve as an entrée into the primary focus of this dissertation, namely, a pedagogical 
approach for religious education capable of promoting vibrant Catholic faith in the face 
of the challenges identified by research in the aforementioned fields.  
My argument in this dissertation is essentially the following: The particular 
challenges presented by postmodern American culture to Catholic faith necessitate an 
approach of handing on the faith that attends more carefully to the role of imagination in 
people’s cognition and living and that intentionally facilitates the formation (indeed the 
transformation) of imaginations in a authentically Christian manner. In one sense, 
appealing to the imaginations of disciples and would-be disciples is nothing new. Two 
thousand years ago, when Jesus walked the shores of Galilee teaching about God and the 
life God wants for human beings, he did so in a highly imaginative manner. Recognizing 
the value of his example, we will look to the Master Teacher to learn what lessons we can 
about teaching for faith in the present context. Still, each age brings its own blessings and 
challenges. As we will soon see, one of the greatest challenges of the present age is the 
challenge modern technology, advertising, and pluralism pose to people’s efforts to 
imagine reality in a coherent way. Jesus may have been the definitive revelation of God 
and a master teacher, but he never had to contend with Facebook and smartphones. 
Christian educators must appropriate anew the lessons of faith and teaching in every age. 
In this dissertation, I strive to contribute in some modest way to this work of re-
appropriation for our own time. 
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Introduction 
For all its joys and grace-filled moments, the work of forming disciples has 
always been fraught with challenges. While the joys have in no way diminished, the 
challenges seem to have intensified for modern disciples in this regard: In the past, 
Christians’ lives were much more of a single piece. The world they—and just about 
everyone, for that matter—lived in was simply a religious world. Few people thought to 
envision it otherwise. This remained the case for most American Catholics up through the 
early half of the 20th century, but today it is a different story.  
As a teacher, I see that my students do not experience the world in the same way 
that their forebearers did. Take Thomas, for example. Several years ago Thomas was the 
brightest student in my freshman Confirmation class at a parish in Boston. His knowledge 
of Catholic teaching exceeded that of any of his high school-aged peers. Yet he found the 
teachings he had learned from his parents and from formal religious instruction 
incommensurate with his own lived experience and with the world he knew from his 
reading and study of science. He knew full well that the world was supposed to be 
created by a loving, omniscient, omnipotent God. However, Thomas could not reconcile 
these beliefs with scientific accounts of an evolving universe or the never-ending reports 
of natural disasters and human-initiated violence around the world. Faced with these 
seemingly contradictory visions of reality, when forced to choose, he found himself 
unable to affirm the Christian account and the vision of discipleship that follows from it.  
Thomas’s experience would have been virtually unfathomable in ages past, but it 
is typical of our own. For many today, God no longer occupies the center of their lives 
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and their faith is no longer the determining principle in their experience of the world. 
Ours has been called a “secular age,”1 a time in which “sectors of society and culture are 
removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols.”2 Social theorists like 
Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim have contended that this decline in 
religiosity, as evidenced in the experiences of people like Thomas, is the natural result of 
an increase in scientific knowledge and a corresponding decrease in superstition. Some 
would go so far as to call the current U.S. culture “post-Christian.”3 Headlines about the 
“decline of American Catholicism” and the “fall of the Church” have been common fare 
in recent decades. These tales of decline are often accompanied by diagnoses (sometimes 
accusations) of what has gone wrong and prescriptions for what Church leaders or 
parents or religious educators ought to do to remedy the situation. 
 Yet assessing the health of a religious way of life is tricky business. Who is to 
say whether one Catholic’s choice to forgo Mass on a given Sunday in favor of spending 
time in private prayer will bring them closer or separate them further from God, or 
whether their dissent from official Church teaching is an act of immorality or of moral 
integrity? What is clear when we compare the lives of Catholics in this country to those 
of their counterparts from a century or even 50 years before is that a significant change 
has taken place. Still, this observation raises more questions than it answers: Are today’s 
Catholics living the life of Christian discipleship less fully than previous generations of 
Catholics, or are they just living it differently? Though some old habits of devotion have 
                                                
1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007). 
2 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), 107. 
3 See, e.g., John Meacham, “Meacham: The End of Christian America,” Newsweek, April 3, 2009, 
http://www.newsweek.com/meacham-end-christian-america-77125. 
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faded, new expressions of spirituality and greater attention to social justice might be 
signaling the emergence of new forms of faith. Who or what is responsible for these 
changes? Is it Church leaders, educational models, parents, or wider social changes? 
I will argue below that something has indeed gone amiss in the Church’s work of 
forming disciples. While one could point to numerous current challenges to this work, I 
believe that inadequate formation of Christians’ religious imaginations is one of the most, 
if not the most, pressing. It will be my aim in this dissertation to elucidate the nature of 
this problem and to present Christian religious educators with pedagogical guidance for 
addressing this challenge.  
I begin in this chapter by describing how certain elements of modern and 
postmodern culture have caused a fragmentation of American Catholics’ imaginations, 
which underlies many of the problems adverted to by journalists, scholars, and concerned 
Catholics. As a first step in this chapter’s inquiry, I will examine sociological data on the 
faith lives of American Catholics through the latter half of the 20th century and the 
beginning of the 21st. I will then contextualize this data relative to significant historical 
happenings in 20th-century American Catholicism and to trends in the general 
population’s religious attitudes and behaviors during the same time period. Following this 
discussion of the relevant data, I will present my interpretation thereof, corroborated by 
those of other cultural observers. In the final section, I will draw several conclusions 
about the possibilities and challenges of forming disciples today and present a proposal 
for addressing these challenges that will guide the rest of this project. The remaining 
chapters will then explore in depth why the imagination is so crucial to people’s living, 
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including their lives of faith, and develop this proposal for what Christian religious 
educators can do in the classroom context to form imaginations adequate to the 
challenges of living as Christian disciples in the 21st-century United States. 
 
The Changing Lives of American Catholics 
Whence has the narrative of Catholic decline originated? The quality of a person’s 
or group’s religious practice is difficult to quantify, yet it is unlikely that this alarming 
account would have gained traction if it were totally unfounded. Fortunately, we have at 
our disposal today an abundance of sociological data concerning American Catholics’ 
beliefs, religious knowledge, practices, and patterns of (dis)affiliation. While survey data 
never gives the full picture of historical phenomena much less spiritual ones, it does 
provide some basis for assessing how Catholics’ faith lives have changed across 
generations and why some people have perceived a decline within American Catholicism. 
A comprehensive analysis of all available data is neither within the scope of this project 
nor necessary for its aims. My more modest aim is to understand what (if anything) 
undergirds this narrative of decline in American Catholicism. It will thus suffice for the 
purposes of this chapter to assess (a) if American Catholics are in fact failing to live out 
their call to discipleship in ways that go beyond the quotidian lapses and shortcomings to 
be expected of fallible human beings and (b) to what extent it might be possible to 
improve this situation through efforts in Catholic religious education.  
I will examine the data on Catholics’ religious beliefs and practices as they fall 
under four categories—knowledge of the faith, participation in the Christian life, 
 11 
celebration of the sacraments, and prayer. My choice to employ these as my organizing 
categories is in keeping with a longstanding tradition in the Christian community, which 
since the first century has invoked them in its efforts to articulate what constitutes the 
fullness of the Christian life. They are reflected in New Testament accounts of the 
nascent Christian community (see Acts 2:42) and in the traditional “four pillars” of 
catechesis—professing the faith, living the faith, celebrating the faith, and praying the 
faith.4 While the faith can be expressed in as many ways as there are Christians, one 
would be hard-pressed to argue that Catholics are acting as faithful disciples of Christ if 
they are neglecting any of these four elements.  
 
Catholics’ Knowledge of the Faith 
In his Great Commission, Jesus charged his disciples with teaching the people of 
the world everything he had commanded. Knowledge of Jesus’ teaching and that of his 
Church is thus foundational to the life of discipleship. Unfortunately, the common 
opinion nowadays seems to be that Catholics—young Catholics especially—are 
“religiously illiterate.”5 Many Catholic educators will readily offer anecdotal evidence 
testifying to the same. Nevertheless, while researchers like Christian Smith have 
corroborated some of these general impressions,6 it is more difficult to find reliable 
                                                
4 Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd Revised (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 2000), no. 3. Henceforth “CCC”. 
5 See, e.g., Heidi Schlumpf, “Stemming Rampant Religious Illiteracy,” National Catholic Reporter, March 
6, 2010, http://ncronline.org/news/stemming-rampant-religious-illiteracy, and Rachel Zoll, “Religious 
Literacy: Americans Don’t Know Much About Religion,” Huffington Post, September 24, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/28/religious-literacy-americ_n_741391.html. 
6 Christian Smith, Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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longitudinal data to support the more sweeping claims.7 Very little data exists for the 
years prior to Vatican II, perhaps because people generally assumed that Catholics knew 
their faith. The matter is further complicated by the fact that no one measure or survey 
was used consistently through the later half of the past century. Still, it is worth 
examining the little data that exists. 
In 1979-80 the NCEA administered the REOI and REKAP exams (predecessors 
of the ACRE) to students in Catholic schools and parishes, recording 64% accuracy for 
eighth-graders (REOI) and 63% accuracy for eleventh- and twelfth-graders (REKAP).8 
Results from the 1994-5 NCEA ACRE may reflect gains in students’ knowledge of their 
faith with eighth-graders achieving 72% accuracy and eleventh- and twelfth-graders 
achieving 68%.9 The ACRE results several years later in 2011-12 reflected modest gains 
with eighth-graders achieving 73% accuracy and eleventh- and twelfth-graders achieving 
71%.10 Given this data, we are unable to make any certain claims about changes in 
Catholics’ religious knowledge since the ‘60s, though we can at least assert that students 
in Catholic schools and parishes have grown more knowledgeable in the past two 
                                                
7 In the preface of a 2010 study, the Pew Forum likewise notes the dearth of data on levels of religious 
knowledge during the middle part of the 20th century. (See the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 
U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, September 28, 2010), 4, 
http://www.pewforum.org/U-S-Religious-Knowledge-Survey.aspx.) 
8 John J. Convey, Catholic Schools Make a Difference: Twenty Five Years of Research (National Catholic 
Educational Association, 1992), 72.  
9 John J. Convey and Andrew D. Thompson, Weaving Christ’s Seamless Garment: Assessment of Catholic 
Religious Education (Washington, DC: National Catholic Educational Association, 1999), 43. As with the 
REOI and REKAP, the ACRE was administered to students in both Catholic schools and parish programs. 
Though the 1994-5 ACRE scores are clearly superior to the 1979-80 REOI and REKAP scores, we cannot 
determine conclusively that student knowledgeability increased in those years since different instruments 
were used. 
10 National Catholic Educational Association, “2011-12 ACRE Results,” National Catholic Education 
Association Testing, 2012, http://ncea.caltesting.org/docs/ACRE%20National%20Scores%202011-
2012.pdf. 
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decades.11 When it comes to adult Catholics, even less data is available. Andrew 
Greeley’s analysis of General Social Survey (GSS) data reveals a decline in knowledge 
levels between 1963 and 1974.12 As to how adults’ knowledge of the faith has improved 
or declined since then, however, we are in the dark.  
If knowledge of the faith is indeed declining among Catholics, this does not bode 
well for their ability to live out that faith. However, the data examined here should make 
us hesitant to declare any such diagnosis or to prescribe better teaching of doctrine as the 
clear solution to the ills of American Catholicism. There is no hard evidence (at least that 
this author could find) that Catholics are less knowledgeable today than they were at mid-
century.13 Assertions that more thorough indoctrination will provide the silver bullet are 
likewise undermined by research showing that knowledge of the faith is not strongly 
correlated with religious commitment.14 Clearly, then, we have to look beyond measures 
of religious knowledge in order to understand more fully the current health of American 
Catholicism. 
                                                
11 Another study of Catholic knowledge levels was conducted in 1962 by the University of Notre Dame. 
This survey found that 88% of the 14,519 eighth- and twelfth-graders surveyed in Catholic schools 
provided “acceptable” answers to questions about teachings of the Catholic Church. (Reginald A. Neuwien, 
ed., Catholic Schools in Action: A Report (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 167.) 
Unfortunately, these figures are somewhat inflated and so do not offer a reliable basis of comparison since 
(a) the study only surveyed students in Catholic schools and (b) the survey questions were written in such a 
way that students had a 3-in-5 chance of providing an “acceptable” answer to any given question as 
compared to one acceptable option on REOI, REKAP, and ACRE exam questions.  
12 Convey, Catholic Schools Make a Difference, 73;  cf. Andrew M. Greeley, William C. McCready, and 
Kathleen McCourt, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976). 
13 Peter Steinfels, citing reports from catechetical directors and pastors, asserts the opinion that current 
efforts at Catholic religious education are as rigorous as ever and that today’s students may yet prove to be 
more knowledgeable than the generations raised on the Baltimore Catechism. (See Peter Steinfels, A 
People Adrift: The Crisis of the Roman Catholic Church in America (Simon & Schuster, 2004), 229.) 
14 In its 2010 study, the Pew Forum found that atheists and agnostics were more knowledgeable about 
religion than any other religious group. (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious 
Knowledge Survey, 17.) Furthermore, in the same study people with low levels of commitment actually 
averaged more correct answers (16.0 / 32) than those with medium commitment (14.8 / 32) (Ibid., 39). 
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Catholics’ Celebration of the Sacraments 
In the Christian (and especially Catholic) view, the sacraments play a crucial role 
in the economy of salvation. The Catechism of the Catholic Church states 
unambiguously, “for believers the sacraments of the New Covenant are necessary for 
salvation.”15 Yet the available data appears to indicate that the sacraments are playing 
less and less of a role in American Catholics’ lives. In 1945, over 60% of Catholics 
attended Mass nearly every week.16 By 1963, weekly Mass attendance had risen to an 
astounding 72% (though no more than 29% of those in attendance were actually 
receiving Communion).17 However, by 1977 attendance had dropped to 42%, where it 
remained through the early ‘90s.18 After this period of relative stability, Catholic rates of 
Mass attendance again began to dip in the late ‘90s, this time dropping below historic 
averages. According to Gallup, in 1999 weekly attendance dropped below the 40% mark 
for the first time to 37% and continued to drop to 34% in 2005 and 31% in 2011.19 
                                                
15 CCC, no. 1129. 
16 Andrew M. Greeley, Religious Change in America (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
45.  
17 Andrew M. Greeley, Crisis in the Church: A Study of Religion in America (Chicago: Thomas More 
Press, 1979), 10; James M. O’Toole, The Faithful: A History of Catholics in America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 214. More difficult than comparing rates of Mass attendance is quantifying 
Catholics’ participation in the Eucharist. As rates of Mass attendance declined in the wake of Vatican II, 
weekly reception of Communion increased (from 29% in 1963 to over 50% and growing by 1976). In 
addition to encouraging more frequent reception of Communion, the Council encouraged the “full and 
active participation” in the Mass of all in attendance through singing, more frequent responses, and 
increased opportunities to serve as liturgical ministers (Sacrosanctum Concilium, no. 14). Yet it would be 
inaccurate to describe preconciliar Catholics as totally passive during the old Mass. Though seldom 
engaged in the ritual action, many Catholics of the time engaged in a variety of devotions during the Mass. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The Pew Forum put Catholic weekly Mass attendance in 2008 a bit higher at 42% (The Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Beliefs and Practices: Diverse and 
Politically Relevant (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, June 2008)). 
However, in a later analysis of the General Social Survey, Pew corroborated observations of this downward 
trend, recording a decline in weekly Mass attendance from 47% in 1974 to 24% in 2012 (Michael Lipka, 
“What Surveys Say About Worship Attendance – And Why Some Stay Home,” Pew Research Center, 
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When we look to the other sacraments, the pattern of declining participation is 
more consistent. In the year of 1945, there was one baptism for every 31 Catholics.20 As 
the century wore on, that ratio declined to 1:33 in 1965 to 1:51 in 1985 to 1:64 in 2005. 
Catholic marriages followed a similar pattern, declining from one for every 99 Catholics 
in 1945 to 1:130 in 1965 to 1:151 in 1985 to 1:323 in 2005. While data for Confirmations 
is not as readily available, Gallup records that reception of that sacrament dropped from 
one for every 99 Catholics in 1995 to 1:104 ten years later. No national statistics exist for 
Reconciliation, but regional figures consistently reveal a drastic decrease in reception of 
the sacrament beginning in the 1960s. For example, in 1944 some Milwaukee parishes 
would receive as many as 1,300 or 1,800 penitents a month.21 Compare those figures with 
those of two decades later when between 1965 and 1969 recipients of the sacrament at St. 
Therese’s Parish in Milwaukee dropped from 405 to 100 a month. Our Lady Queen of 
Peace saw its numbers drop from 1,200 to 300 a month in the same time period. In both 
cases, these decreases occurred despite gains in parish membership. 
Looking at these statistics, the trend is overwhelmingly clear. Celebration of the 
sacraments declined dramatically among American Catholics in the latter half of the 20th 
century. Confronted with this data, one must ask, if the Catholic magisterium has not 
changed its teaching on the necessity of the sacraments for salvation, why is it that 
American Catholics have availed themselves of the sacraments less and less over the 
                                                                                                                                            
September 13, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/13/what-surveys-say-about-worship-
attendance-and-why-some-stay-home/. 
20 William V. D’Antonio et al., American Catholics Today: New Realities of Their Faith and Their Church 
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 55, citing data from Gallup. 
21 James M. O’Toole, “In the Court of Conscience: American Catholics and Confession, 1900-1975,” in 
Habits of Devotion: Catholic Religious Practice in Twentieth-Century America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 134–85.  
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course of the past half-century? 
 
Catholics’ Participation in Christian Living 
As religious educator Thomas Groome has noted, “Although our beliefs are 
integral to our faith…how we live our faith is really the nub of Christian discipleship.”22 
Affirmation of official doctrines and attendance at weekly worship tell us something 
about religious affiliation, but how people spend their time and make decisions tell us 
more about which commitments and values have truly penetrated to the core of their 
being. Even more so than the previous two categories, this dimension of people’s lives of 
faith is difficult to assess. It is highly contestable which measures or questions will give 
us the best basis for assessment. Since my own research has not involved collection of 
sociological data, I am limited here to examining data that others have collected in 
response to the questions they believed to be significant. Given my interest in long-term 
trends, I am further limited to survey questions that have been asked consistently over the 
course of multiple decades. The selection of survey items examined below reflects these 
limitations.23 Limited though this analysis may be, it may yet reveal telling trends in the 
lives of American Catholics. 
I begin with American Catholics’ perceptions of their own commitment to living 
the faith. In this area numerous surveys indicate that the importance of the faith for 
Catholics has declined in recent decades. According to Gallup, the percentage of 
                                                
22 Thomas H. Groome, Will There Be Faith?: A New Vision for Educating and Growing Disciples (New 
York: HarperOne, 2011), 114.  
23 For example, the survey data below does not adequately reflect the strong support among American 
Catholics for social justice issues like fair labor practices, care for the poor, and war. Unfortunately, 
reliable data for such issues is difficult to come by. 
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Catholics who rank the Catholic Church among the most important parts of their life 
decreased from 49% in 1987 to 43% in 1993 and has remained at that level since.24 The 
percentage of people who identify themselves as “strong Catholics” has steadily declined 
over the years from 46% in 1974 to just 27% in 2012.25 
Other measures provide a picture of how Catholics’ flagging commitment has 
affected their lives of faith and the life of the Church as a whole. The decrease in Catholic 
vocations to the priesthood and religious life has been widely noted. In 1965, 58,632 
priests, 179,954 sisters, and 12,271 brothers were serving the American Church. By 2014 
those figures had dropped to 38,275, 49,883, and 4,318, respectively.26 On this point it is 
important to note that, while Catholics left the religious life in droves following Vatican 
II, the number of lay ecclesial ministers exploded and has continued to grow. In the past 
two decades alone, over 16,000 new lay ministers have been added to the ranks.27 These 
gains in lay ministry are often overshadowed by the rate at which Catholics have not just 
left the religious life but left the Church altogether. In 1972, the Catholic Church in the 
U.S. had a retention rate of 85%.28 Thirteen years later it dropped slightly to 84%. 
Accounting for converts and other newcomers to the Church, these figures translate into a 
net loss of 2% of Catholic membership, which Andrew Greeley notes is consistent with 
                                                
24 D’Antonio et al., American Catholics Today, 40. 
25  The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “‘Strong’ Catholic Identity at a Four-Decade Low in U.S.,” 
Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, March 13, 2013, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/03/13/strong-catholic-identity-at-a-four-decade-low-in-us/. 
26 Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, “Frequently Requested Church Statistics,” Center for 
Applied Research in the Apostolate, 2014, 
http://cara.georgetown.edu/caraservices/requestedchurchstats.html. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Greeley, Religious Change in America, 45. 
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attrition rates in previous decades.29 However, by 2008 the retention rate had dropped to 
68%, translating into a net loss of 7.5%—a significant shift from previous decades.30 In 
its 2008 report on religious affiliation, the Pew Forum notes that Catholicism has endured 
the greatest net loss of members of any Christian denomination in recent years.31  
What about the people who have remained in the Church? A comparison of a 
1964 NORC study and a 2008 Pew study might suggest that Catholic participation in 
church activities has increased since mid-century.32 According to the NORC study, in 
1964 23% of Catholics reported being “active” in at least one church organization.33 In 
2008 a larger percentage (31%) reported participating at least monthly in congregational 
activities.34 Though these figures may suggest increased participation among Catholics 
over time, Catholics still lag well behind other denominations in terms of their activity at 
their local church. In the same year (2008), Pew recorded a 37% participation rate among 
the general population and 49% among Protestants.35  
If these statistics are ambiguous in their implications, other measures are less so. 
For example, Catholic financial contributions to the Church declined between 1963 and 
1983 from 2.2% of household income to 1.1% and has remained at low levels since 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation: 
Diverse and Dynamic (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, February 2008).  
31 Ibid., 5-6. The report further notes that the losses would have been even greater were it not for the influx 
of Catholic immigrants into the country. 
32 Again, I employ tentative language in this case and any other when comparing data that was collected by 
different agencies or that was collected using different instruments on different occasions. 
33 Andrew M. Greeley and Peter Henry Rossi, The Education of Catholic Americans (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1966), 70. 
34 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Beliefs and 
Practices: Diverse and Politically Relevant, 42.  
35 Ibid. 
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then.36 A more recent study found that in 2001 Catholic giving averaged out to 1.5% of 
household income as compared to 2.9% among mainline Protestants.37 Some estimate 
that Catholic giving as declined by as much as 20%.38 Are we to infer from these 
statistics that today’s Catholics are less convinced than Protestants of the worth of 
investing their hard-earned money in the institutional Church?39 Statistics on enrollment 
in Catholic schools raises similar questions. Today the nation’s 6,594 Catholic schools 
educate a total of 1,974,578 students.40 Those figures reflect a dramatic decrease since 
early ‘60s when Catholics sent over 5.2 million children to 13,000 schools.41  
As suggestive as these findings are, they may still be considered somewhat 
removed from the heart of Catholics’ everyday concerns. In this regard, survey data 
concerning Catholics’ moral attitudes may provide us a better understanding of how their 
faith really affects their living.42 For example, American Catholics’ support for the death 
penalty, which official teaching effectively condemns, has diminished in recent decades. 
Excluding a temporary rise in the late ‘80s, the percentage of Catholics who favor the 
death penalty for murderers has continued to fall over the years—from 68.5% in 1976 to 
                                                
36 Greeley, Religious Change in America, 68.  
37 Julia Duin, “Giving in Different Denominations,” Philanthropy Rountdable, June 2001, 
http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/topic/excellence_in_philanthropy/giving_in_different_denominatio
ns. 
38 “Earthly Concerns,” The Economist, August 18, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21560536. 
39 This is a legitimate question. The disparity in contributions between Catholics and Protestants may be 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that many of today’s American Catholics are immigrants from cultures 
where little emphasis is placed on financial contributions. 
40 National Catholic Educational Association, “Catholic School Data,” National Catholic Education 
Association, 2014, http://www.ncea.org/data-information/catholic-school-data. 
41 Patrick Doyle, “Resurrection,” Boston Magazine, November 2012, 
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/articles/2012/10/archdiocese-catholic-church-rebuild-after-scandal/4/. 
CARA reports 5,120,264 students in 12,194 schools in 1965. 
42 In this section I have made a conscious effort to include data on a range of moral issues, not merely 
issues dealing with sex and reproduction. Nevertheless, as noted above, my examination is limited by the 
availability of data that was collected in a consistent manner over the course of multiple decades. 
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58% in 2012.43 Catholics’ approval of euthanasia, which the Church likewise deems 
morally unacceptable, has fluctuated over the years, rising from 56.5% in 1978 to 68.5% 
in 1988 before dropping somewhat to 67.5% in 1998 and more dramatically to 63.3% in 
2006.44 In more personal matters, the Church has been very clear in its condemnation of 
premarital sex, homosexual relations, divorce, artificial birth control, and abortion. In 
some cases, surveys reveal continued or even increased support among American 
Catholics for these teachings. For instance, the percentage of Catholics who say that 
divorce laws should be easier has declined from 27% in the years 1972-5 to 23% in 1982-
5 to 21% in 2012.45 Similarly, Catholics’ support for abortion in cases of danger to the 
mother, after remaining steady at 86% from 1972 to 1985, had dropped to 54% by 
2012.46  
Support for official Church teaching has been less strong in other areas. For 
example, the percentage of Catholics who in 2012 said that premarital sex is never wrong 
was lower than that recorded in the early ‘80s but higher than in the early ‘70s.47 Official 
Church teaching on contraception has always faced massive resistance. In the years 1972 
to 1975, 71% of Catholics favored providing information about birth control to teenagers, 
a figure that rose in the ‘80s.48 In 2012, 82% deemed birth control morally acceptable.49 
                                                
43 The Association of Religion Data Archives, “General Social Surveys,” The Association of Religion Data 
Archives, 2014, http://www.thearda.com/Archive/GSS.asp. (Henceforth GSS.) Where not otherwise 
specified, GSS data is cited from the ARDA website. 
44 GSS. Respondents were asked if they thought it was acceptable for a doctor to end the life of a patient 
with an incurable disease with the family’s consent. 
45 GSS cited in Greeley, Religious Change in America, 91. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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On the issue of homosexuality, Catholics’ attitudes have shifted dramatically away from 
official teaching. In the years 1972 to 1975, 71% of Catholics said homosexuality is 
always wrong.50 In 2012, by contrast, only 20.5% of Catholics disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that homosexuals have the right to marry (versus 25% who agreed or strongly 
agreed).51 While the wording of the survey questions concerning these last two issues was 
not consistent, comparison of the results strongly suggests that Catholics have shifted 
their views on this issue. 
Taken together, these findings concerning a variety of social and personal moral 
issues reveal that today’s Catholics are inconsistent in their agreement with the Church’s 
official teaching on moral matters. Perhaps the most salient conclusion one arrives at 
from surveying this data is that American Catholics are less influenced by the authority of 
the institutional Church than they used to be. In 2005, a majority of the Catholics 
surveyed said that one could be a good Catholic without following Church teaching on 
birth control (75.3%), remarriage for divorced persons (65.7%), and abortion (58.1%).52 
All of these figures are up significantly from the late ‘80s. The importance Catholics 
attributed to Church authority continued to decline dramatically from 2005 to 2011 
among all age groups, with only three in ten Catholics saying the Vatican’s claim to 
teaching authority was very important to them.53 
                                                                                                                                            
49 Gallup data cited in The Association of Religion Data Archives, “News Polls,” The Association of 
Religion Data Archives, 2014, http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Polls.asp. Where not otherwise specified, 
Gallup data is cited from the ARDA website. 
50 GSS cited in Greeley, Religious Change in America, 91. 
51 GSS. 
52 Gallup. 
53 William D’Antonio, “Survey Reveals Generation Shift in the Catholic Church,” National Catholic 
Reporter, October 24, 2011, http://ncronline.org/node/27162#figure1. 
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The picture emerging from this data about how American Catholics live out their 
faith is thus a complex one. Religious vocations and financial donations have declined 
considerably while lay ecclesial ministry has grown. Catholics affirm Church teaching on 
some moral issues and adamantly reject it on others. To infer from these findings that 
today’s Catholics have grown weak in their faith is too facile a conclusion. It is clearly 
the case that many of today’s Catholics no longer adhere to Church moral teachings as 
consistently as they used to or express their faith in their lives in the same ways that 
Catholics did in the past. However, it is also an open question whether Catholics’ 
attitudes about controversial issues like birth control and homosexuality represent a 
severing of a “seamless garment” of Church teaching or a stitching together of a Christian 
ethic that is consistent, albeit according to a different standard.  
 
Catholics’ Habits of Prayer 
Beyond knowing the content of the faith, celebrating the faith in the sacraments, 
and enacting that faith in one’s life, discipleship inescapably demands a personal 
relationship with God as expressed in prayer. For a look at Catholics’ habits of prayer 
over the decades, we have to compare surveys administered by several different 
organizations, which limits the conclusions we can draw from the data. That being said, 
there is no data to suggest Catholics are praying any less today than they were in the early 
‘70s, and it is probable that they are even praying more. According to Andrew Greeley, 
the percentage of Catholics praying at least once a day increased from 52% in 1972 to 
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62% in 1984.54 Gallup reported figures as high as 66.8% in 1983 and then a somewhat 
diminished percentage of 62.5% in 2005. The Pew Forum published a more modest 
estimate in 2008 of 58%, which, though somewhat lower than recent figures, may 
nevertheless indicate persistence of higher levels of prayer as compared to the early 
‘70s.55 Other surveys seem to indicate that American Catholics are not only praying more 
but also experiencing God more frequently. In 1998 and 2008, the General Social Survey 
asked participants, “Did you ever have a religious or spiritual experience that changed 
your life?” In those years, the affirmative response rate among Catholics increased from 
23.0% to 32.2%. While there is not enough data for this question to make any positive 
claims regarding more frequent encounters with God among Catholics, at very least we 
can make the more reserved observation that none of the available data suggests that 
Catholics are encountering God less than they used to. 
 
Initial Interpretation and Analysis: Dis-integration of Catholic Lives? 
Does the above survey data corroborate common assertions about the decline of 
Catholicism in the United States? Are there ways in which American Catholics are failing 
to live out their call to discipleship that go beyond the usual lapses and shortcomings of 
human beings? If so, what patterns emerge in these areas of deficiency? In the hopes of 
addressing these questions, we have just examined historical trends in American 
Catholics’ lives of faith as represented in four categories—knowledge of the faith, 
                                                
54 Andrew M. Greeley, American Catholics Since the Council: An Unauthorized Report (Chicago, IL: 
Thomas More Press, 1985), 51. 
55 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Beliefs and 
Practices: Diverse and Politically Relevant. 
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celebration of the sacraments, participation in the Christian life, and habits of prayer. 
Concerning knowledge of the faith, we found scant evidence that Catholic knowledge is 
worse today than it was in the ‘60s (even if it is not particularly impressive at present). 
We saw that Catholics’ celebration of the sacraments is undeniably in decline. Continued 
fidelity to certain Church moral teachings and increased numbers of lay ministers suggest 
signs of hope in Catholics’ living. However, in many regards (e.g., financial giving, 
certain moral attitudes, self-evaluated measures of importance), Catholics’ faith appears 
to be influencing their living less than in the past. As for prayer, today’s Catholics seem 
to be entering into direct communication with God at least as much as in the past.  
What are we to make of these trends? Given the changes in Catholics’ 
sacramental celebration and moral attitudes, one can understand why some perceive 
Catholicism to be in decline. Yet, if there is indeed a problem, it is evidently not a lack of 
knowledge or a decrease in Catholics’ affinity for the spiritual. Neither does the data 
support secularization theorists’ narrative of a general decline in religiosity. Rather, it 
seems that for some reason Catholics’ desire for God and knowledge of the faith is not 
translating into a life that would be considered distinctively and consistently Catholic by 
the standards of the mid-century Church. Some might argue that those standards reflected 
a style of religious expression from a bygone era and that a new era has dawned with its 
own norms for religious devotion. There may very well be truth in this assertion, but two 
points need to be made here. 
First, regardless of any shift in norms that may be occurring, the fact of the matter 
is that the Christian life lacks a unity for many contemporary Catholics that their 
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ancestors in faith once enjoyed. The change experienced by American Catholics over the 
course of the past half-century might thus be most aptly described, not as a simple 
decline, but rather as a dis-integration. Second, even allowing for some diversity of 
legitimate religious expression, participation in the four dimensions of the Christian life 
examined above would seem a baseline standard for fidelity to the demands of 
discipleship. Even if one rejects the interpretation that shifting habits in other areas 
indicate a decline in American Catholicism, the drastic declines in sacramental 
celebration present an undeniable indicator that many contemporary Catholics are failing 
to participate in aspects of the Christian life deemed essential to discipleship since the 
earliest days of the Church. An integrated view of the Christian life that goes back 
hundreds if not thousands of years has fallen apart. Granting this conclusion, the question 
then arises, what factors have contributed to this fragmentation of Catholics’ faith as their 
predecessors professed, celebrated, lived, and prayed it? In order to begin answering this 
question, I now turn to an examination of the dynamics at play within the Catholic 
Church during the past half-century. 
 
Internal Change 
When situating the above statistics in historical context, the trends in American 
Catholics’ changing lives of faith begin to make more sense. Patterns of immigration and 
assimilation and events like the Second Vatican Council, the promulgation of the papal 
encyclical Humane Vitae, and the clergy sex abuse scandal have undoubtedly affected 
how American Catholics learn about, celebrate, pray, and live out their faith. A number 
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of scholars of American Catholicism have explored these historical moments in great 
depth, elucidating how they have shaped Catholics’ faith as we see it today.56 However, 
we gain deeper insight into how these events have impacted the lives of Catholics when 
we consider them, not as isolated events, but rather in terms of their cumulative influence 
on Catholics’ religious imaginations. As I will argue at length in the next chapter, human 
beings rarely change their behavior without a corresponding change in the way they 
imagine themselves and their environment. Events like Catholic immigrants’ assimilation 
into American culture, Vatican II, the promulgation of Humane Vitae, and the clergy sex 
abuse scandal altered Catholics’ religious behaviors because they changed the way 
Catholics imagined their relationship to the transcendent and the mediators thereof. In 
Chapter Two, I will argue this point by drawing support from cognitive science, 
psychology, and phenomenology, but for the time being we can begin to appreciate the 
importance of the imagination from a sociological perspective.  
When it comes to religious imagination, there has been no more influential voice 
in sociology than that of Andrew Greeley. Over the course of his 50 years of sociological 
research, Greeley concluded that the imagination was the key to understanding people’s 
attitudes, commitments, and behaviors.57 Through various studies, he found that people’s 
                                                
56 See, e.g., O’Toole, The Faithful; Steinfels, A People Adrift; Greeley, American Catholics since the 
Council; Mark S. Massa, The American Catholic Revolution: How the ’60s Changed the Church Forever 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734122.001.000
1/acprof-9780199734122.  
57 Greeley’s hunch about the importance of the imagination began to develop in the ‘70s, during which time 
he developed a set of survey tools designed to evaluate how people imagined God and how those ways of 
imaging correlated with other aspects of people’s lives. One of these tools was a “forced choice” question 
included in the General Social Survey (GSS) that asked participants to place their image of God along a 
continuum between more traditional images of God (e.g., Father, Judge, Creator) and more modern images 
(e.g., Mother, Lover, Healer). 
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preference of religious images was more predictive of behaviors and attitudes than prayer 
habits, religious intensity, church attendance, confidence in religious leaders, and 
doctrinal orthodoxy—in short, more than any other measure of religion and, indeed, more 
than all the other measures of religion put together.58 This finding becomes even more 
interesting for the current project in light of Greeley’s discovery that the correlation 
between images and attitudes was stronger among Catholics under 45 (that is, so called 
“Vatican II Catholics” who grew up in the years surrounding the Council) than among 
older Catholics and all Protestants.59 This fact is significant because, as Greeley notes, 
this difference suggests “something…happened in the last twenty-five years [between 
1960 and 1985] which notably affected the religious imagination of Catholics in a more 
benign and gracious direction but which had no effect on the religious imagination of 
Protestants.”60 What was it that happened? 
Greeley points to Vatican II. He argues that the images that predominated in 
Catholics’ minds prior to the Council were fearful ones (e.g., God as exacting Judge) 
whereas, after the Council, Catholics tended to have warmer images of God (e.g., God as 
Lover or Friend). Historian Peter Steinfels expresses similar suspicions that the 
postconciliar drop in Mass attendance was related to a de-emphasizing of teachings on 
                                                
58 Greeley, Religious Change in America, 100; cf. Greeley, American Catholics Since the Council, 105, 
201. Greeley’s conclusions might be challenged based on the small sample size of some of his studies. 
However, they have been corroborated by the research of Andrew Thompson (see Andrew D. Thompson, 
That They May Know You (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Educational Association, 1982), 62–3). 
Christian Smith’s study of American adolescents might be seen as providing further corroboration (see Soul 
Searching, 41). In Chapter Two I will show that research in other fields likewise support Greeley’s claims 
about the importance of the imagination. 
59 Greeley, Religious Change in America, 100. 
60 Ibid., American Catholics Since the Council, 202. 
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hell and damnation.61 However, we must be careful about describing the contrast between 
pre-Vatican II and post-Vatican II Catholicism in too stark of terms, as Greeley tends to 
do at times. It is not the case that prior to the Council Catholics thought of God 
exclusively as a wrathful judge and afterwards as a loving parent or friend. 62 
Notwithstanding, Greeley is certainly right that the Council prompted a shift in Catholics’ 
religious imaginations… and not only in the way they imagined God. As a result of the 
changes issuing from Rome in the early ‘60s, American Catholics came to see the world, 
the Church, and themselves in radically new ways. 
Concerning the first of these, Vatican II marked a radical departure from the way 
the Catholic Church had viewed the “world”—that is, everything outside of the Church—
for much of its history. As theologian Sandra Schneiders explains, “The history of 
negativity toward the world (defensiveness, cooptation, competition and secularization, 
isolation and animosity) was now supplanted by a positive evaluation of and an embrace 
of a kind of equality and solidarity that really had no large-scale precedent in the 
Church’s experience, even in the Middle Ages.”63 Indeed, the documents of the Council 
broke down the mental barriers between the Church and the world long imagined by 
Catholics. For example, Gaudium et Spes, the Council’s pastoral constitution on the 
                                                
61 Steinfels cites as an example John Paul II’s Dies Domini (1998), a letter on the Lord’s Day in which the 
pope devotes only one sentence out of the entire document to the grave obligation to attend Mass and even 
then in only an oblique manner. Steinfel’s further illustrates his point by quoting Bishop Kenneth Untener, 
who once said, “When I grew up you had two choices: go to Mass…or go to hell. Most of us chose Mass” 
(Steinfels, A People Adrift, 172). 
62 For proof of this one need only consider the devotion to God’s more tender side as imagined in the 
Sacred Heart of Jesus, which was immensely popular from shortly before the turn of the century until just 
before the Council. 
63 Sandra M. Schneiders, Buying the Field: Catholic Religious Life in Mission to the World (Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Paulist Press, 2013), 21. See pp. 4-23 for an extended discussion of how the Church’s 
understanding of its relationship with the “world” has changed over time. 
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Church in the modern world, speaks of God’s Spirit filling the whole world and asserts 
that “the earthly and the heavenly city penetrate each other.”64 The result of these 
teachings, claims historian James McCartin, was that “Vatican II energized the already 
substantial intercourse between the distinct realms of ‘sacred’ and ‘secular,’ significantly 
blurring an imagined partition established in the age of the immigrant church.”65 
Significant in McCartin’s words is the observation that the sacred and the secular, the 
Church and the world, were never perfectly separated. What shifted at Vatican II was the 
Church’s willingness to speak of the world in language that permitted Catholics to 
reimagine the world in less antagonistic terms. Recent survey data illustrates how lasting 
this shift in perspective has been. A 2008 Pew Forum survey found that American 
Catholics are less likely than the general population to perceive a conflict between 
religion and society (34% versus 40%).66 It also found that the majority (54%) of 
Catholics do not perceive Hollywood as a threat to their values.67  
The more irenic attitude adapted at Vatican II applied not only to “secular” people 
and aspects of life but also to members of other faith traditions, whom Catholics had 
previously viewed as enemies at worst and in dubious spiritual standing at best. For 
example, Unitatis Redintegratio, the Council’s decree on ecumenism, states, “Catholics 
must gladly acknowledge and esteem the truly Christian endowments from our common 
                                                
64 Paul VI, “Gaudium et Spes," nos. 11, 40.  
65 James P. McCartin, Prayers of the Faithful: The Shifting Spiritual Life of American Catholics 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 103. 
66 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, 69. 
67 Ibid., 70. 
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heritage which are to be found among our separated brethren.” 68  Vatican II also 
introduced Catholics to a new vision of the Church itself. For one thing, the teachings of 
the Council marked a shift in focus from ad intra to ad extra affairs, emphasizing the 
Church’s mission to the world. Gaudium et Spes, for example, proclaims, “Therefore, this 
sacred synod, proclaiming the noble destiny of man[kind] and championing the Godlike 
seed which has been sown in [them], offers to mankind the honest assistance of the 
Church in fostering that brotherhood of all [people] which corresponds to this destiny of 
theirs.”69 Secondly, these documents spoke less of the “Mystical Body of Christ,” 
previously the preferred image for the Church, and more about the “People of God.” This 
change in emphasis had the effect of shifting attention away from the Mystery of the 
Church and its union with God and toward the people who comprise the Church.  
In addition to privileging a more democratic metaphor for the collective Church 
community, the Council dramatically reshaped its vision for the lives of individual 
Catholics. First of all, Vatican II redefined Catholics’ self-understanding, especially as it 
concerned their relationship to the world, by emphasizing the goodness of the world and 
Christians’ call to serve therein. Schneiders notes that this was particularly difficult for 
religious, who had previously defined themselves by virtue of “leaving the world” and 
who were now told that they were expected to minister in the world. Recognizing this 
shift helps to explain why so many religious abandoned their habits, engaged in more 
political activities, and even left the religious life completely in the years immediately 
                                                
68 Paul VI, “Unitatis Redintegratio,” 1964, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19641121_unitatis-redintegratio_en.html, no. 4. 
69 Paul VI, “Gaudium et Spes,” no. 3. 
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following the Council. It also provides some insight into the vocations crisis of the latter 
part of the 20th century. No longer were priests, nuns, and religious brothers afforded the 
special status they once held, at least not to the same degree. For many, this change raised 
the question, Why enter the priestly or religious life if one can achieve an equally holy 
life without sacrificing the pleasures of family life and a professional career? Seen in this 
context, the statistics cited above on declining priestly and religious vocations might be 
interpreted as reflecting not a simple fading of commitment within the Church but rather 
a new openness to alternative forms of religious commitment. 
A similarly dramatic transformation occurred among the laity. Previously lay 
people had been given to view themselves as occupying the lowest rung of the hierarchy 
of holiness below religious brothers and sisters, priests, and bishops and their state in life 
as a concession to temporal concerns. However, the Council informed Catholics that it 
was not only priests and religious who have a call to holiness but rather that this call is 
universal. 70  “Every person,” declares Lumen Gentium, “must walk unhesitatingly 
according to his own personal gifts and duties in the path of living faith.”71 The 
distinction between the laity and the clergy was further softened in the Council’s 
“Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy,” which states that members of the laity have the 
“right and duty” to enter into “full and active participation” in the liturgy.72 Again, recent 
survey data demonstrates that these teachings of the Council effected a lasting change in 
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lay Catholics’ attitudes about themselves and their role in the Church. For example, a 
2005 Gallup poll showed that the overwhelming majority of Catholics believe lay people 
should have a greater say in the Church.73 
Lastly, just as Vatican II knocked down many of the walls that divided religious 
from the laity (sometimes literally) so too did it knock down the walls that partitioned 
different areas of lay Catholics’ lives. Documents like Apostolicam Actuositatem and 
Gaudium et Spes not only removed the stigma of lay life as a concession to worldly 
concerns; they went so far as to declare that lay people are “bound to penetrate the world 
with a Christian spirit.” 74  The result, explains Schneiders, was that “the ‘Sunday 
Catholic’ who had lived in two self-enclosed worlds could now be, in good conscience, a 
seven-day-a-week secular Catholic, and a seven-day-a-week Catholic secular.”75 
Some historians like Mark Massa and James McCartin assert that it was 
postconciliar changes in the liturgy and devotional practices that, even more than official 
Council documents, had the greatest influence on Catholics’ religious imaginations. Prior 
to Vatican II, the members of the congregation were for the most part passive observers 
as the priest performed the rites of the Eucharist, employing Latin words that few 
understood. Since the priest was offering the sacrifice of the Mass on behalf of the 
people, the people were encouraged to occupy themselves with other pious devotions 
such as praying the rosary or reading devotional books. Catholic publishers of the time 
produced a great variety of such prayer books, which encouraged laity in growing 
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numbers to unite themselves imaginatively with the priest as he offered the holy 
sacrifice.76 After the Council, Catholics arrived at Mass to discover a ritual that was 
hardly recognizable: the priest now faced the congregation, the altar had been pulled 
away from the wall, the laity were encouraged to participate actively through vernacular 
responses and song, and traditional organs were joined or replaced by guitars in many 
parishes.  
Though initial reactions to the changes to the liturgy were largely positive, many 
began to feel that something had been lost. One Catholic gave expression to these 
sentiments in 1976, saying, “The Eucharist has some kind of pervasive meaning in our 
lives, and we seem to have forgotten what it is.”77 By 1999, 131 out of 181 U.S. dioceses 
had resumed offering Masses of the preconciliar variety in response to requests from the 
laity, who were seeking to reclaim something of the old experience.78 It would seem that, 
in abandoning the ancient sounding Latin, the personal devotions, and the aura of 
mystery, the Church’s celebration of the Eucharist lost its hold over many Catholics’ 
imaginations.79 
The changes of Vatican II also affected Catholics’ practice of popular devotions, 
not only during Mass, but outside of Mass time as well. Historians generally recognize 
the period from the 1920s to the mid-1950s as the heyday of American Catholic 
devotionalism.80 One of the most popular was the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, 
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which emphasized God’s love and tenderness and fostered in many Catholics a sense of 
intimate friendship with God in Jesus. This time period also saw the flourishing of 
devotions to Mary and the saints, whom Catholics looked upon as spiritual friends and 
protectors. The popularity of these devotions was due in part to the strong imaginative 
dimension involved. 81  On the one hand, these devotions sometimes bordered on 
superstition.82 On the other, they vitalized the prayer lives and shaped the imaginations of 
Catholics in a way that framed how they saw the world and guided their everyday 
actions.83  
By the ‘50s, however, popular devotions were on the decline, a process that was 
expedited by the Second Vatican Council but related to numerous other factors as well. 
Scholars like Margaret McGuiness, Paula Kane and Joseph Chinnici have pointed to 
various influences including higher levels of education among American Catholics, better 
understanding of the Mass among laity, increased time in front of televisions, more 
successful assimilation into American society (which made distinctive identity markers 
less important), and the subsiding of social crises like the threat of communism.  
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In this sense, Vatican II may be seen as simply expediting or consummating 
changes to the Catholic imaginal context that were already underway.84 The imaginative 
and devotional practices of Catholics in the first part of the century reflected their 
situation as immigrants trying to maintain their identity in a sometimes hostile culture 
and as Americans facing threats from abroad. When the danger of those perceived threats 
subsided, the imaginal synthesis that had sustained American Catholics since the 19th 
century began to fall apart and the importance of the Catholic way of life grew more 
obscure.85 Holding together the old synthesis was further complicated by the enrollment 
crisis in America’s Catholic schools. At their peak in the ‘60s, Catholic schools had 
immersed over five million students in a Catholic world of religious art, habited nuns, 
and sacred ritual. As enrollment declined throughout the rest of the century, so too did 
Catholic schools’ influence over the imaginations of the nation’s youth.86 Perhaps even 
more pervasive was the influence of Catholic media, which took advantage of the 
growing popularity of radio and then television during the ‘30s, ‘40s, ‘50s, and ‘60s. 
                                                
84 Joseph Chinnici explains, “while the devotional practices of the 1930s often appeared superficially 
similar to their predecessors, they were constantly reflecting a changing pattern of prayer, which located the 
community within a specific historical, political, economic, theological, and cultural era” (Joseph P. 
Chinnici, “The Catholic Community at Prayer 1926-1976,” in Habits of Devotion: Catholic Religious 
Practice in Twentieth-Century America, ed. James M. O’Toole (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2004), 75). 
85 Chinnici describes the situation this way: “Such public rhetoric coupled with the popular symbols [e.g., 
Enthronement of Sacred Heart, Family Rosary Crusade, May Day practices, Eucharistic and Marian rallies] 
remained internally coherent as long as there existed a common socioreligious consensus against 
secularism and atheistic communism. But as a ‘system of the sacred’ dependent on a combination of social, 
political, and moral values, its underlying fault lines and uneasy synthesis would have a short life once the 
common enemy no longer dominated the horizon of thought and action” (Chinnici, “The Catholic 
Community at Prayer 1926-1976,” 53). John Allen has suggested that Islamic radicalism may be emerging 
as the new enemy in the mind of American Catholics. See John L. Allen, The Future Church: How Ten 
Trends Are Revolutionizing the Catholic Church (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 440. 
86 This decline in enrollment was sudden and dramatic. The seventies opened with one Catholic school 
closing every day (Frances Forde Plude, The Flickering Light: What’s Happening to Catholic Schools? 
(New York: William H. Sadlier, Inc., 1974), 12). 
 36 
However, while Catholic TV personalities like Archbishop Fulton Sheen and Fr. Patrick 
Peyton enjoyed massive appeal during the middle part of the century, even their influence 
had begun to fade by the end of the ‘60s.87 Likewise notable is the impact of the feminist 
movement, whose proponents challenged the patriarchal bias of traditional Christian 
symbols that for 2,000 years had served as the pillars of most Christians’ religious 
imaginations.88  
On account of these myriad changes, many American Catholics experienced a sort 
of “piety void” in the years following Vatican II in which they no longer found meaning 
in the old devotions and religious habits.89  This is not to deny the many positive 
developments to come out of the Vatican II era—vibrant new spiritualities, new attention 
to Scripture, greater emphasis on social justice issues, liturgical renewal, and new lay 
ecclesial movements, to name a few. However, as I will argue more at length in the next 
chapter, human nature abhors an imaginal vacuum. When one imaginative synthesis falls 
apart, as happened around the middle of the 20th century, people immediately begin the 
search for new sources of meaning. The emergence of these new practices and 
movements reflects such a search for meaning. Still, survey data and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that, despite these disparate spiritual developments, a new synthetic vision of the 
Christian life is yet to emerge to match the strength of the old one. If anything resembling 
a new synthesis exists today, it is influenced most strongly, not by Church teaching and 
practice, but by the opinions and customs of the wider American culture.  
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Wider Trends of Change 
Having situated the relevant data within the historical context of 20th-century 
American Catholicism, we can now better appreciate some of the causes of the dis-
integration experienced by Catholics in recent decades. As we widen the scope of this 
inquiry, we will see that this lack of integration is not a problem unique to American 
Catholics but rather a challenge confronting much of the Western world.  
 
Americans’ Changing Religious Habits and Attitudes 
I begin by returning to the four dimensions of the Christian life that structured my 
examination of the changing lives of Catholics above. There I highlighted, in the first 
place, the lack of evidence that today’s Catholics are less knowledgeable about their faith 
than their predecessors. This finding is consistent with a wider trend reflected in 
Americans’ improving religious knowledge. By way of evidence, consider the fact that 
the percentage of Americans who could name all four Gospels increased from 35% in 
1954 to 46% in 1982.90 According to Pew, that percentage remains high today.91 
Similarly, the percentage of Americans who could correctly identify Jesus’ place of birth 
increased from 64% in 1954 to 70% in 1982 and has remained steady since then.92 While 
some analysts, such as those at the Pew Forum, are not impressed with Americans’ 
religious knowledge, the best available data suggests that levels of religious knowledge 
today mark an improvement since mid-century. According to the Pew survey, Catholics 
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are actually less knowledgeable when it comes to basic facts about Christianity (e.g., 
names of Gospels, Jesus’ birthplace, biblical figures) than the general American public, 
but there is no survey evidence to suggest that Catholics are less knowledgeable than they 
used to be.93 To the contrary, Catholics, like the rest of the general U.S. population, may 
actually be more knowledgeable about religion than in the past (at least by some 
measures). 
Second, we saw above that Catholics’ celebration the sacraments has declined 
significantly over the course of the past 50 years. Comparing the data on Catholics to the 
general population, the modest decline in worship attendance among the general 
population pales in comparison with what the Catholic Church has seen. For most of the 
century, Americans’ weekly worship attendance has hovered around 40-41%, with a 
modest spike in the late ‘50s and early ‘60s.94 Those percentages have declined slightly 
as of late, dropping to 39% in 2008 and 37% in 2013.95 Regarding the difference in rates 
of attendance in the ‘70s, the 30% decrease among Catholics represents a clear 
divergence from the wider trend among Americans. While this drop in attendance seems 
dramatic—and indeed it is—we gain better perspective on the matter when we recognize 
that Catholic attendance rates in the ‘40s, ‘50s, and ‘60s were well above averages for the 
general population—20 and even 30 percent higher than historic averages. Viewed in 
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context, the subsequent decline appears a return to more normal attendance levels.  
Still, the question remains, What contributed to the dramatic decrease in 
attendance? Greeley points to Humanae Vitae as the primary cause for the decline, noting 
that rates of attendance began to plummet the year after the encyclical was promulgated 
and then leveled out within the following decade.96 Steinfels suggests a postconciliar shift 
in magisterial rhetoric might be partly to blame.97 Nevertheless, when we look at data for 
the past decade, we see that Catholic rates of Mass attendance match the wider trend. 
Americans in general are attending weekly worship slightly less than they have in 
previous decades.  
Third, when discussing today’s Catholics’ participation in Christian living above, 
we found that many Catholics’ relationship with official Church expectations was 
complicated, we might even say lacking in coherence. Comparing Catholics’ behaviors 
and moral attitudes with those of other Americans sheds some light on this otherwise 
confusing picture. To begin with, despite the claims of some scholars about the 
secularization of Western culture, recent survey data reveals that weakening sense of 
Catholic identity is a distinctly Catholic problem. Where Catholics are identifying less 
strongly, Protestants have increased in their readiness to identify themselves as a “strong 
Protestant.”98 The secularization theory is further discredited by the fact that Catholics, 
like Americans in general, remain as active in their parishes as they ever were.99 At the 
same time, the Catholic retention rate, though significantly lower than it was for most of 
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the 20th century, is still significantly higher than that of Protestantism as a whole (albeit 
lower than Mormon, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish traditions).100 In terms of financial 
giving, the general trend among Americans since the early ‘60s has been toward 
declining contributions, though Catholic contributions are far lower than those of 
mainline Protestants.101 Taking all of these measures into consideration, unnuanced 
claims about the declining religiosity of Americans appear unfounded. If Americans have 
soured on religion in some ways, there remain many respects in which Americans value 
religion highly. 
Looking to the moral attitudes of the general American population helps us to 
make further sense of the moral attitudes of Catholics, who, as we saw above, hold to 
official Church teaching in some issues but not in others. As it turns out, Catholics’ moral 
views have grown increasingly hard to distinguish from the wider population. Though 
slightly lower on average, the percentage of Catholics approving of the death penalty,102 
birth control, 103  euthanasia, 104  and divorce 105  has historically approximated that of 
Americans in general. In the past two decades, Catholics have grown more similar to the 
general population in their views on abortion.106 Prior to that time, Catholics were 
actually far more permissive, as they have been consistently on the issue of premarital 
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sex.107 Catholics have likewise followed the general trend of increasing acceptance for 
gay marriage and lifestyles.108 In light of these statistics, we can see that Catholics are 
less and less likely to adhere to official Church teaching where it diverges from popular 
opinion. In some cases (e.g., homosexuality, divorce), the divergence between popular 
opinion and Church teaching has widened over time, carrying many Catholics along with 
the pull of popular opinion. In some cases Catholics’ moral attitudes do not diverge from 
Church teaching to the same degree as does the general population, but the influence of 
the surrounding culture seems clear. Though the Church perhaps never had a complete 
hold on Catholics’ moral imaginations, it is evident that their imaginations are less 
influenced by Church teaching than they used to be. Other more persuasive voices are 
increasingly exerting their influence. 
Finally, we saw above that American Catholics are not praying or experiencing 
God any less than in the past and might even be doing so more. Again, this fits the 
general trend among Americans. Greeley reported an increase of those who pray every 
day from 54% in 1972 to 59% in 1985.109 In 2008, the Pew Forum reported that that 
figure was holding steady at 58%.110 The percentage of Americans reporting ever having 
a spiritual experience has increased from about a third of respondents in 1972 to 38.5% in 
1998 to 43.1% in 2008.111 Hence, whatever changes may be occurring in the U.S. 
context, it does not appear that Americans are growing more distant from God. 
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From this comparison of Catholic religious knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors 
with that of the general American public, we see that changes in these areas of Catholics’ 
lives have generally followed wider trends. Undoubtedly, events of a more internal nature 
like Vatican II and the sex abuse crisis have greatly influenced Catholics’ attitudes and 
behaviors. Notwithstanding, changes within the Church cannot fully explain phenomena 
like recent declines in Mass attendance and increasing rejection of the Church’s teaching 
on homosexuality. Only in looking at the experience of Americans in general do the 
seemingly incoherent behaviors of Catholics make sense. 
 
Changes in 20th-Century U.S. Culture and Religion 
One thing is for sure—the changes experienced by Americans in this time period 
have been many and dramatic. Beginning with the ‘60s, Americans entered into a period 
of social upheaval during which time many long-held assumptions about society, family, 
and certain groups of people were challenged. As James McCartin says, “the rapid 
alteration of a range of established social and cultural norms diminished the value of the 
past and the significance of tradition and furnished the context in which American 
Catholics’ spirituality underwent dramatic revision.”112 One example of changing norms 
identified by McCartin, O’Toole, and others is the rise of an individualistic, “me-
centered” culture in the United States, a phenomenon that manifests itself in Americans’ 
spirituality as well as in consumer habits.113 McCartin observes that recent demographic, 
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technological, and cultural changes have created an atmosphere of isolation in which 
spiritual life is increasingly dependent on each individual’s commitment and creativity.114  
Keying in on one of these contributing factors, the rapid development of 
technology has wrought dramatic changes in the contemporary world. An ambivalent 
force in modern life, technological advance has brought increased potential for 
communication and the elimination of suffering but at the same time has contributed to 
increased isolation and the breakdown of communities. New technology and media, 
according to McCartin, “hastened the collapse of the vital core of the immigrant church, 
the ethnic conclave that came to dominate American cities during the late nineteenth 
century.”115 In the age of 4G networks and the 24-hour news cycle, Americans are 
constantly made aware of events transpiring around the world and fewer and fewer 
people find themselves in a cultural ghetto where life is uncomplicated and neighbors are 
all of one mind. 
The rapid change and complexity of contemporary life has thus made it 
increasingly difficult for Americans to live well-integrated lives and especially well-
integrated spiritual lives. Political scientist Alan Wolfe describes the current condition of 
American religion in these terms: 
Religion moves people because its ideas are powerful, yet Americans, who shun overly 
intellectual ideas on radio and television, are also likely to avoid faiths that ask them to 
take doctrine seriously. They define themselves and each other by their religion, yet they 
are willing to shape and reshape their traditions that offer religions their distinctive 
identities. They pay homage to a force larger than themselves, even while asking for 
things for themselves. Americans know that faith offers fellowship, but then they treat the 
institutions capable of offering fellowship with a decided suspicion. They believe that 
religion is a precondition for morality but are not at all surprised when religious figures 
prove themselves immoral. They understand that God judges some of what they do as 
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sinful, but they do not believe him to be too demanding and they avoid trying to judge 
each other. And those who feel a special obligation to spread their faith acknowledge 
that, for the sake of neighborliness, they are reluctant to shove anything down anyone 
else’s throat.116 
 
It would seem that the United States’ Christian identity is, if not disappearing, then 
certainly growing more disjointed. Books could and have been written about how each of 
the above factors has contributed to the changing face of American religion in the 20th 
century.117 For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I will focus on one factor that 
brings the rest into greater clarity, namely, Americans’ changing religious imaginations.  
  
 Americans’ Changing Religious Imaginations 
Earlier we examined how American Catholics have come to imagine the world, 
the Church, and themselves differently on account of the changes of Vatican II and a 
number of other events and influences. Looking to data about the general American 
public, it is clear that it was not only factors internal to the Church that were responsible 
for this change in imagination. Americans in general (and much of the Western world, for 
that matter) have undergone a dramatic change in the way they imagine their reality. 
On the one hand, traditional religious symbols still exercise significant power 
over the imaginations of many Americans. Belief in heaven and hell seems to be as high 
today as it was in the ‘50s,118 and, while belief in God seems to have declined somewhat 
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since the ‘60s, belief in the Devil and angels has actually increased since 1990.119 On the 
other hand, these symbols do not dominate modern Americans’ view of reality as they 
did that of their predecessors. 120  Today many other images vie for Americans’ 
imaginations—images of patriotism and financial success; images of other religions’ 
gods; images of a mechanistic, creatorless universe. The cumulative effect over time has 
been that, even as most Catholics have remained Catholic in name, their imaginations 
have become as generically American as those of the general population.  
This imaginal shift did not come as a bolt out of the blue. Rather, it was the result 
of a longer history of sweeping but subtle change. No one has written on the changing 
religious context with greater breadth of scope or scholarly acumen than Charles Taylor. 
Though Taylor’s A Secular Age tends to be European in its focus, his narrative remains 
highly illuminating for the American context. In this work, Taylor debunks a popular 
model for explaining the plight of Christianity in modern times—what Taylor terms the 
“subtraction theory” of secularization—which purports that belief inevitably fades with 
the rise of science and modern knowledge. Against this theory, Taylor argues that an 
increase in scientific learning (and, I would add, events like the sex abuse scandal and 
Vatican II) could not have had anywhere near the deleterious effect on belief and practice 
they have had without a concurrent shift in the way people spontaneously imagine and 
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experience reality.121  
Taylor refers to this ensemble of ways people imagine the world they live in as 
their “cosmic imaginary.”122 This cosmic imaginary “makes sense of the ways in which 
the surrounding world figures in our lives,” that is, in our religious images and practices, 
cosmological doctrines, and in the stories we tell.123 Some such imaginary is operative in 
the consciousness of every human being, and, even though this imaginal synthesis may 
undergo radical revision over the course of a lifetime, a person never relinquishes an 
element of that imaginary until they have replaced it with another that allows them to 
maintain coherence in the way they imagine the world. Hence, argues Taylor, when 
Western people began to abandon their Christian beliefs and worldview it was only 
because an alternative view—what Taylor calls “exclusive humanism”—had infiltrated 
their imaginations. 124  The old imaginary was never directly refuted. Rather, new 
possibilities for imagining reality crept into people’s minds, subtly eroding the old 
imaginary until nothing but a hollow shell remained.125 
Taylor, following Weber, describes this subtle, pernicious shift as a movement out 
of an “enchanted” imaginary to a “disenchanted,” mechanistic one. In the old enchanted 
imaginary, which held sway up until 500 years ago, people perceived themselves as 
living in a world where natural events were controlled by God and evil spirits and in 
which the boundaries between human agency and external influences were porous. 
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Taylor associates this enchanted imaginary with “Latin Christendom,” which he 
describes as “a civilization where society and culture are profoundly informed by 
Christian faith,” that is, in which people’s social and cosmic imaginaries were deeply 
Christian.126  
Looking more specifically at the American context, Andrew Delbanco describes 
how the process Taylor narrates manifested itself here. “In the first phase of our 
[American] civilization,” writes Delbanco, Americans expressed their sense of the 
purposefulness of life “through a Christian story that gave meaning to suffering and 
pleasure alike and promised deliverance from death.”127 In this God-centered phase, 
which lasted for the better part of 200 years, colonials (mostly Protestants) ascribed 
nothing to chance; all was within God’s providence, from the weather to crop yield. Their 
imagined conditioned, which was formed primarily by the 15,000 hours of sermons each 
person was likely to hear in their lifetime, was that of helplessness in a world largely 
beyond their control and of utter dependence on God. Delbanco writes, “It says to the 
sufferer, your only deliverance is to discover and submit to something larger and more 
enduring than yourself. This was the core idea of the first phase of American history.”128  
Taylor charts how, beginning around the time of the Renaissance, new interest in 
understanding nature and applying rigorous methods of reasoning to inquiry precipitated 
challenges to long-held, naive beliefs about God, the world, and society. Initially this new 
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interest in science and learning and the newfound confidence it inspired in the human 
ability to know about and control nature posed no direct threat to belief in God. However, 
in order to accommodate new understandings of the natural world, Christians adjusted 
their image of God, resulting in what Taylor terms “Providential Deism.”129 On this view, 
God is imagined as a distant Creator who created the universe and then stepped back 
from his creation in order to allow it to operate upon fixed laws, which are knowable by 
the human mind.  
At the same time, people began to re-imagine everyday life. In the spirit of the 
Reformation, some Christians rejected the presumption that holiness was the special 
possession of a few priests and religious and so made an intentional effort (which Taylor 
calls the “Reform” as distinct from the Reformation) to affirm the “ordinary” life lived by 
the vast majority of people. Ironically, in holding everyone to a supposedly higher 
standard of holiness, the elites discouraged ordinary Christians from participating in 
many of the practices that had sustained their faith. Taylor explains: 
on the Protestant side, there was an in principle denial of any hierarchy of vocations. 
Everyone was called on to live their faith to the full. And this meant that the lives and 
practices of ordinary people couldn’t just be left as they were. They had to be exhorted, 
commanded, and sometimes forced and bullied into giving up, e.g., the veneration of 
saints, the adoration of the Sacrament, dancing around the maypole, and so on.130 
 
This Reform thus amounted to an “excarnation” of the Christian faith.131 Taylor writes: 
We have moved from an era in which religious life was more “embodied”, where the 
presence of the sacred could be enacted in ritual, or seen, felt, touched, walked towards 
(in pilgrimage); into one which is more “in the mind”, where the link with God passes 
more through our endorsing contested interpretations—for instance, of our political 
identity as religiously defined, or of God as the authority and moral source underpinning 
                                                
129 Taylor, A Secular Age, 221. 
130 Ibid., 104. 
131 Ibid., 554. 
 49 
our ethical life.132 
 
It is significant for our narrative that the United States declared its independence 
and established its founding principles during the Age of Enlightenment, when 
Providential Deism held widespread currency. During this period, Enlightenment 
rationality came to exert its influence on Christianity with the result that, as Delbanco 
explains, the sense of transcendence Americans had previously experienced in relation to 
God was replaced by an experience of transcendence in relation to nation. The same 
thinking that Taylor describes as being applied to the natural world was applied to the 
world of politics. America’s Founding Fathers established the new nation upon certain 
truths that they deemed “self-evident”—that is, knowable through the use of the natural 
powers of reason—and that therefore ought to form the foundation of social relations 
among human beings.  
Hence, as thrones were toppling around the world, God was displaced (in practice 
if not in name) to make room for a newly deified people and nation. This new religion 
was nourished by an emerging body of American literature produced by authors like 
Longfellow, Emerson, Hale, Whitman, and Melville, who facilitated the transformation 
by converting old religious symbols into symbols of national transcendence.133 Where 
Americans had previously looked to God as their savior from the dangers and evils of the 
world, increasing numbers now looked to the “redeemer nation”.134 Interestingly, at the 
same time that Americans were implicitly deifying the nation and thereby blurring the 
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imagined lines between the transcendent and the worldly, they were explicitly separating 
the affairs of the State from those of the Church. However, as the rhetoric of founding a 
new nation “under God” would suggest, God was still very much active in the American 
imagination. 
At this stage, Christians still by and large believed themselves to be acting in a 
manner faithful to their religion. On their understanding, God had given them these 
powers of reason and expected them to make use of them. Notwithstanding, however 
well intentioned, this reimagining of God’s role vis-à-vis the created world subtly yet 
significantly changed people’s attitudes about transcendent reality. They increasingly 
came to perceive their universe through an “immanent frame” in which all sense of the 
sacredness of certain times and places had given way to an impersonal order of laws and 
matter. According to Taylor, this mechanistic view of the universe: 
undermines enchantment, the expression-embodiment of higher reality in the things which 
surround us, and thus made the presence of God in the cosmos something which was no 
longer experience-near, or at least not at all in the same way. God’s power was no longer 
something you could feel or see in the old way; it now had to be discerned in the design of 
things.135 
 
Because people had ceased to imagine God as immediately present in the natural world, it 
became difficult to imagine what role God played at all. Hence, it was only another short 
step to excluding God altogether. Having been thoroughly hollowed out, the shell of 
Christendom that remained was now easy to reject. 
With God thus excluded from people’s ways of imagining reality and the universe 
imagined as an impersonal order, a gaping hole appeared in modern people’s lives. God 
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had been gradually edged out of the picture in favor of “exclusive humanism.”136 Yet, 
having pursued this ideal of human flourishing for its own sake and by merely human 
efforts, people now found this alternative equally unsatisfying. For the first time in 
human history, the question of the meaning of existence became a real issue. As Taylor 
notes, this problem would have been totally incomprehensible to people of previous eras, 
whose world was replete with meaning and with spiritual beings and cosmic forces 
impinging upon them at every turn. Yet modern Westerners, now confronted with two 
seemingly untenable options, began to despair of the meaningfulness of reality. A 
plethora of alternative accounts of human fulfillment emerged, seeking to fill the void 
and resulting in what Taylor describes as “a spiritual super-nova, a kind of galloping 
pluralism on the spiritual plane.”137 However, none of the many new positions possessed 
the power of the old Christian synthesis.  
We see these dynamics at play in the United States during the 1960s when 
Americans began to grow disillusioned with the national ideal on account of the war in 
Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. Having displaced God, the deified nation now found 
itself out of favor. This led into what Delbanco terms the stage of the “self,” which in 
many ways reflects Taylor’s description of exclusive humanism and the “expressive 
individualism” that emerged through the “nova effect”.138  In this current stage of 
American history, many people have ceased seeking something greater than themselves, 
instead making diversion and self-gratification their chief aim. People still experience a 
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longing for transcendence and fulfillment, but, as Delbanco explains, “the idea of 
transcendence has detached itself from any coherent symbology.”139  
In the same way that Protestant Americans eventually experienced the processes 
Taylor describes taking place earlier in Europe, so too did Catholic Americans belatedly 
follow down the same road as their Protestant counterparts.140 Regarded as outsiders in 
the U.S. until the middle of the 20th century, Catholics remained in an enclave mentality 
and so resisted the secularizing trends of the surrounding culture until a relatively late 
date. However, by mid-century Catholics were becoming thoroughly assimilated into 
American culture, and a shift occurred. As suggested above, the Second Vatican Council 
seemed to accelerate a number of changes that were already underway. As the elites’ 
efforts of Reform had done for European Christians centuries before, Vatican II 
encouraged Catholics to think of vocations in less hierarchical terms and affirmed 
marriage and other lay vocations. This shift in emphasis was soon followed by a decline 
in religious vocations as well as in popular devotional practices, a consequence that 
follows the pattern of excarnation described by Taylor. 141  Encouraged by greater 
acceptance and success in American society and by Vatican II’s assurance of the 
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goodness of their everyday lives, Catholics’ practice of their faith in the late 20th century 
became less about gaining proximity to God through weekly Mass, priest-mediated 
sacraments, and private devotions and more about living “a good (Christian) life.”142  
Catholics’ successful assimilation, combined with Vatican II’s relaxation of rules 
that had hitherto distinguished Catholics from their fellow citizens (e.g., abstaining from 
meat on Fridays), thus contributed to the diluting of distinctively Catholic values to the 
point that the values of many self-described Catholics became indistinguishable from 
those of the wider American culture.143 However, as Andrew Greeley has argued, most 
Catholics are not rejecting Catholicism altogether. Even with rates of disaffiliation 
increasing since Greeley conducted his surveys, his central point remains valid: Most 
Catholics seem to like being Catholic and are reluctant to give it up, even when 
confronted with internal scandal and teachings with which they disagree.  
Yet Taylor’s account gives cause to sound the alarm at the sight of such trends, 
even if most Catholics are not rejecting the faith outright. According to the story of 
secularization that Taylor weaves, European Christians believed themselves to be acting 
as good Christians even as they gradually diluted their faith to the point that it simply 
dissipated. The source of the problem, claims Taylor, was not a frontal assault on 
Christianity but rather a subtle shift in the way Christians imagined their world. 
Something similar seems to have transpired within American Catholicism. Today 
significant numbers of Catholics are openly defying ecclesiastical authority and formally 
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leaving the Church or simply choosing not to adopt the faith of their parents. Such actions 
were more or less unimaginable a couple of generations ago. So what has changed? As 
we have seen, many significant events have transpired in the past 50 years. However, 
more significant for the faith lives of Catholics than any single event or combination of 
events is the transformation that has occurred in American Catholics’ imaginations. 
 
The Imaginal Situation in the U.S. Today 
Taylor and Delbanco argue that God no longer occupies a central place in many 
people’s imaginations. Delbanco contends that even the ideal of the nation has lost its 
hold, and so many Americans, now bereft of coherent symbolic intercourse with the 
transcendent, continue to pursue it through New Age spirituality, environmentalism, the 
quest for ancestral roots, and any number of other meaning-seeking endeavors. However, 
none of these is able to satisfy completely. None provides the all-encompassing, 
imaginative synthesis that the old theocentric worldview did. Each of these pursuits 
individually—and even when combined, as often happens—lacks the unified symbol 
system of the old Christian synthesis, which allowed people to make coherent sense of 
their relationship to the world and the transcendent.144 Anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
once commented that, without a coherent symbol system, the human person becomes “a 
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kind of formless monster with neither sense of direction nor power of self-control, a 
chaos of spasmodic impulses and vague emotions.”145 Looking at the lives of many 
contemporary Americans, he appears to have been right. 
Above I noted Delbanco’s observations that sermons and literature were the 
primary modes of forming Americans’ imaginations in earlier stages of the country’s 
history. In each case, the media of choice formed people in a unified vision—either of a 
universe under God’s control or of a nation in which people could together achieve some 
sort of transcendence. But what media are forming contemporary Americans’ vision of 
reality, and how are they doing so? As opposed to the text-based culture of the past, 
today’s culture has been called the “civilization of the image.”146 Where artificial images 
were rare in previous ages, today images crowd into our visual field from every 
direction—from billboards, the sides of vehicles, clothing, TV, computers, and handheld 
electronic devices. The average North American now sees approximately 6,000 
marketing messages each day,147 and, thanks to the proliferation of handheld electronic 
devices, young people now pack 10 hours and 45 minutes worth of media content into 7.5 
hours of consumption every day.148 As people’s lives become more and more filled with 
images, text occupies less and less attention. Popular social media like Facebook, 
Instagram, Tumblr, and Pinterest make their living by dealing in images while 
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increasingly marginalizing text. Twitter limits users to messages of 140 characters or less. 
Educational theorist Jack Mezirow has described our contemporary environment well, 
stating that it is “less a river of messages, symbols, and images into which we 
occasionally dip than an ocean in which we perpetually swim.”149 Though today’s 
“digital natives” think nothing of it, this state of affairs marks a radical departure from 
human experience in all preceding history. 
In times past, Americans received information and heard stories from a limited 
number of sources. This ensured a relatively unified set of meanings and messages that 
served as the foundation for Americans’ social world. In colonial times, it was the 
Christian message as proclaimed from the pulpit by preachers. Beginning in the 
Revolutionary era, the nationalist cause became the dominant message, thanks largely to 
a growing body of American literature. In the current era, however, the media sources 
have proliferated and so too have the messages. Philosopher Richard Kearney describes 
the situation thus: “All we have is a series of random and conflicting meanings which 
cancel each other out, leaving us with nothing but a flux of surface images.”150 Rapid 
advances in communication technologies have provided Americans unprecedented 
exposure to diverse cultures, religions, and worldviews and multiplied exponentially the 
sources informing their minds and imaginations. This onslaught of conflicting messages 
and images undoubtedly presents a significant challenge to one’s efforts to form a 
coherent vision of life. In the words of theologian Ray Hart, “For an American Christian 
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to see via satellite television the life-style of a self-immolating Buddhist priest in Saigon 
is for him to see another human being whose existence is ordered by radically different 
self-images.”151 If such incidental contact with alien images causes this sort of internal 
conflict, how much more so must the targeted visual attacks launched by the marketing 
industry? McDonald’s, Pepsi, Amazon, Gillette, Marlboro, Macy’s, Toyota, Ikea, NBC, 
Yoplait, Apple, Turbotax, and Abercrombie and Fitch all assault consumers with images 
fabricated to capture their imaginations and envelop them in their version of reality.  
Predictably, the consequence of living in the midst of this imaginal maelstrom has 
been the fragmentation and disorientation of Americans’ lives. In the words of Sharon 
Daloz Parks:  
They find themselves living fragmented lives, piecing together various scraps of discrete 
meaning, each with its own center of value, power, and affection, each with its own 
god…many people yearn for a sense of deep integration in their lives but experience even 
the worlds of home and work as separate, each sphere oriented to differing values, 
expectations and loyalties.152 
 
Taylor testifies, “everyone understands the complaint that our disenchanted world lacks 
meaning, that in this world, particularly youth suffer from a lack of strong purposes in 
their lives.”153 Battered about by so many conflicting messages and images, people are 
overwhelmed by the prospect of having to choose a single path or of selecting from 
among the many options one good that is especially worth devoting their lives to. 
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Thus overwhelmed, many have grown numb to any prospect of a meaningful 
future, even the future that is but a few minutes away. “This desensitizing of human 
experience,” writes Kearney, “is compounded by the erosion of narrative coherence and 
continuity caused by the fragmentary nature of TV production and consumption.”154 The 
average half-hour TV program typically runs for four to seven minutes at a time before 
cutting to a commercial break, prompting many viewers to develop a compulsive habit of 
“channel surfing”. The immensely popular YouTube has lowered the bar even further, 
with the average video lasting only four minutes and twelve seconds.155 Numerous 
studies have reported on Americans’ diminishing attention spans and capacity for 
concentration.156 In a survey by the Pew Forum, 76% of teachers shared the opinion that 
students have been conditioned by the Internet to find quick answers, resulting in the so-
called “Wikipedia problem,” the habit of giving up when they are unable to quickly 
locate an easy answer.157 Such diminished expectations of and success in arriving at 
meaningful answers in response to serious questions has affected every area of 
Americans’ life—education, work, sexuality,158 family life, social interactions,159 even 
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architecture.160  
Religion, too, has suffered the effects of our imaginally overloaded, overly 
produced culture. As theologian Roberto Goizueta describes the matter: 
the only religious faith acceptable for a consumerist society is precisely that which 
presupposes symbolic malleability and interchangeability (separation of form and content) 
since, lacking a social body that distinguishes such faith from its environment, it is the kind 
of faith most easily subsumed within the social body that we call the Market. A 
disembedded, disembodied, deinstitutionalized spirituality will become de facto the 
spirituality of the thoroughly embedded, embodied, institutionalized global Market of late 
capitalism.161  
 
Indeed, this is precisely the sort of Catholicism that survey data shows to be emerging. In 
past ages when people’s cosmic and social imaginaries were centered around an all-
powerful God, that vision determined their conduct in society and in the wider universe. 
In the present day, by contrast, many have adopted an image of God modified to 
accommodate “scientific” presuppositions or the predilections of consumerist culture, as 
a result of which religious symbols have become just another option on the store shelf. In 
such a state of affairs, the symbols that are most prominent in people’s lives are not those 
that mediate the transcendent most adequately but rather the flashiest or most highly 
visible. “Our most conspicuous symbols,” laments Delbanco, “are the logos of corporate 
advertising—the golden arches and the Nike swoosh.”162 Nevertheless, Delbanco notes, 
“though vivid and ubiquitous, such symbols will never deliver the indispensable feeling 
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that the world does not end at the borders of the self.”163  
Where does all this leave us today? Contemporary Americans have the ability to 
satisfy virtually every desire, and yet we are less satisfied than ever. “We live in an age of 
unprecedented wealth,” writes Delbanco, “but in the realm of narrative and symbol, we 
are deprived. And so the ache for meaning goes unrelieved.”164 Everyone acknowledges 
that something is missing. Everyone longs for something more. We retain the sense that 
there is “‘something further to be sought after, besides what we have found in 
ourselves’—but our symbols for this ‘something further’ are terribly weakened.”165 
Without a coherent symbol system through which to interpret our experiences, our reality 
has become utterly distorted.166 Hence, many today not only lack a sense of meaning in 
their lives; they don’t even have a clue how they would go about discovering that 
meaning. It is no wonder a sense of hopelessness has overcome so many of today’s young 
people. 
 
Future Prospects 
It is clear from the above analysis that the faith lives of American Catholics have 
undergone dramatic changes in the course of the past half-century. I have characterized 
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this change as the disintegration of an old synthesis. As I will argue at greater length in 
Chapter Three, the old synthesis was compact and somewhat naive in its composition. It 
often presumed rigid dichotomies between Church and world, sacred and secular, and 
regarded all of the Church’s teachings as equally essential.167 To be a Catholic meant to 
affirm the necessity of it all. In reality, it was never the case that every individual 
believed and observed every aspect of Catholic faith, but that was the commonly 
understood expectation.  
That expectation is not present in the same way today, despite commonplace 
criticisms of “cafeteria Catholics” and the like. Less than half of Catholics view their 
faith as very important to their lives,168 and many younger Catholics especially seem 
unable to see how the faith they profess should translate into their living.169 These are 
symptoms, not merely of personal shortcomings, but of a large-scale shift in the way 
American Catholics experience their lives of faith. Many of today’s Catholics, while 
remaining true to their faith in some sense, possess a sense of Catholic identity that, in the 
words of Peter Steinfels, is “not very coherent.”170 This is certainly not the reality of all 
American Catholics, but it is true for a disturbingly large segment—perhaps the majority. 
Without discounting the numerous positive developments in contemporary Catholic 
spirituality and practice, it seems safe to say that the present state of affairs falls short of 
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the “life in abundance” to which Jesus called his disciples. 
Given this state of affairs, it is clear that Christian educators have much work to 
do, but in what exactly does that work consist? The problem is complex and so too will 
be the solution. No single effort or corrective will ensure personal integration for 
American Catholics. In the space of this dissertation, I will only be able to focus on one 
proposal, but before narrowing my focus it will do to recognize current educational 
efforts that we might build upon in fashioning the needed response to the present 
situation.  
 
Current Efforts in Catholic Religious Education 
To begin with, we do well to recognize the numerous positive elements of current 
Catholic religious education that should be retained. The Church’s emphasis on prayer 
and social justice must be counted among the greatest of these strengths. From the 
writings of Pope Francis to the emphasis on relationship with Jesus in authoritative 
catechetical texts to the wealth of prayer resources made available by Catholic 
publishers,171 Catholic educators have made clear the importance of prayer and provided 
American Catholics with ample resources for nurturing a life of prayer. Catholic Social 
Teaching has likewise become a staple of Catholic religious education, earning a place in 
the U.S. bishops’ Curriculum Framework (see below) and in the course sequence of most 
Catholic schools. In light of these efforts, the Church and its educational representatives 
surely deserve some credit for Catholics’ continued commitment to prayer and for their 
                                                
171 For an example, see Loyola Press’s website: http://www.loyolapress.com/prayer.htm. 
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blooming commitment to social justice. 
Without a doubt, the magisterium’s greatest educational emphasis in recent 
decades has been on doctrinal knowledge. This emphasis was evident, for example, in the 
U.S. bishops prioritizing the publication of a national catechism to adapt the 1992 
Catechism of the Catholic Church for an American audience.172 Since 1976 the National 
Catholic Educational Association (NCEA) has published guidelines and assessment tools 
for measuring students’ knowledge of doctrine (and later affective responses to faith).173 
The bishops’ concern for imparting knowledge of doctrine was demonstrated most 
recently in the 2008 Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the 
Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age and the 
2010 Adaptation, which adapts the Framework for use in parish and youth ministry 
programs. Though professing the goal of putting young people “in communion, in 
intimacy, with Jesus Christ,” the document is comprised almost entirely of Catechism 
citations arranged into course outlines.174 In the time since the Conformity Review 
Committee began reviewing textbooks for compliance with the Framework, it has 
become manifestly clear that the committee’s chief concern is that these texts clearly 
present Church teaching.  
As was the case with prayer, survey data indicates that the American Church’s 
                                                
172 See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, United States Catholic Catechism for Adults 
(Washington, D.C: USCCB Publishing, 2006). 
173 The Religious Education Outcomes Inventory (REOI) and the Religious Education Inventory of 
Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (REKAP) were first implemented in 1976. In 1978 they were 
combined into the Assessment of Catholic Religious Education (ACRE). 
174 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the 
Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age (USCCB Publishing, 2008), 
1, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/catechesis/upload/high-school-curriculum-
framework.pdf. 
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efforts in this area have been effective. The ACRE results examined above show that 
Catholic schools and parishes (the former more so than the latter) have been reasonably 
successful in promoting doctrinal knowledge in students. Knowledge of the faith is 
clearly necessary for living a life of discipleship, so Catholic educators should make 
every effort to maintain the currently high standards of doctrinal education. They should 
also strive to extend religious education to the many young people who are not enrolled 
in Catholic schools and do not receive systematic catechesis through their parishes. 
Another strength of Catholic religious education since Vatican II has been 
recognition of the importance of engaging people’s lived experiences and giving them 
access to the faith through the generative themes of their lives. The National Directory 
for Catechesis, following the General Directory, impresses upon educators that “human 
experience is a constituent element in catechesis. It…provide[s] the sensible signs that 
lead the person, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, to a better understanding of the truths of 
the faith.”175 This articulation of the role of experience builds upon the work of Catholic 
religious educators like Thomas Groome, who in recent decades have advocated 
persistently for greater attention to the actual lives of believers.176 The NCEA, for its part, 
includes guidelines in the ACRE for experiential dimensions of learning, including 
students’ relationship with Jesus, their relationships with others, and students’ own 
                                                
175 United States Council of Catholic Bishops, National Directory for Catechesis (Washington D.C.: 
USCCB Publishing, 2005), 97. 
176 See, e.g., Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and 
Pastoral Ministry: The Way of Shared Praxis (Harper San Francisco, 1991), 155–214. Groome in turn 
acknowledges his debt to other famed educators like John Dewey, whose Experience and Education (1938) 
has been tremendously influential on the field. 
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concerns. 177  The National Conference for Catechetical Leadership likewise makes 
frequent appeal to learners’ experiences in its publications.178 Of course, the extent to 
which educators appeal to experience varies from classroom to classroom, but by and 
large the Church’s official documents on religious education and the works of the 
country’s leading catechetical associations and publishers reflect such a commitment. As 
with rigorous teaching of doctrine, consistent engagement with lived experience is an 
element of Catholic education that has strengthened American Catholics in their faith and 
that should be maintained 
While such elements of Catholic religious education in the U.S. ought to be 
affirmed, others must be denounced as corruptions of authentic Christianity and 
eliminated from the educational process. One of these is presenting the faith in a 
“judicialized” manner.179 I borrow this term from Charles Taylor, who claims that the 
immanent frame that has replaced theocentric Western people’s social and cosmic 
imaginaries is a product of a “corruption” of Christianity.180 That corruption consists in 
elite Christians responding to people’s failure to care for one another and to form caring 
relationships by attempting to create a system that compels Christian conduct through 
“(a) a code or set of rules, (b) a set of disciplines which make us internalize these rules, 
and (c) a system of rationally constructed organizations (private and public bureaucracies, 
                                                
177 National Catholic Educational Association, “NCEA ACRE Interpretation Manual” (National Catholic 
Educational Association, 2002), 
http://ncea.caltesting.org/docs/NCEA%20ACRE%20Interpretation%20Manual.pdf.  
178 See, e.g., the Echoes of Faith Plus series of catechetical booklets (RCL Benzinger, 2007). 
179 Taylor, A Secular Age, 740. 
180 Ibid., 737. 
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universities, schools) to make sure that we carry out what the rules demand.”181 As 
Taylor demonstrates over the course of hundreds of pages, this approach to Christian 
education is deeply engrained in the Church. We see it reflected today in the attitudes of 
Christian educators and in catechetical texts that reduce Christianity to a set of moral 
rules to be obeyed and doctrines to be memorized. This is the danger in overemphasizing 
doctrinal knowledge in the educational process. By focusing too narrowly on rules and 
doctrines that can be precisely articulated, we run the risk of excluding much else that is 
necessary for authentic faith. 
Besides such outright corruptions in the educational process, there are some 
elements of Catholic religious education that have been neglected in recent decades and 
that need to be reclaimed or compensated for by alternate means. Chief among these is 
the formation of students’ imaginations. Ray Hart has observed, “Since imaginative 
discourse is noticeable largely by its absence, at least by its infrequency of use, in the 
rhetoric of the church today, we must conclude that the effectiveness of the Christian 
tradition in its imaginative dimensions is weak.”182 The recent data and trends that we 
examined above corroborate Hart’s claim.183  
One reason the American Church has received such criticism is its inadequate 
attention to an essential aspect of the work of handing on the faith, namely, persuasive 
                                                
181 Ibid., 742. 
182 Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination, 275. 
183 Although the situation has undoubtedly improved since then, it is telling that in an edited volume 
published by the NCEA in 1999, leading catechetical authorities acknowledged that visual methods of 
religious education are probably less in use today than they were half a century ago. (See Carl J. Pfeifer and 
Janaan Manternach, “The Process of Catechesis,” in Empowering Catechetical Leaders, ed. Thomas H. 
Groome and Michael J. Corso (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Educational Association, 1999), 74–
6.) 
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use of symbols in proclaiming the Gospel.184 To be sure, various authors and educators 
have drawn attention to the importance of symbol over the years,185 but Christian 
symbols have never been raised to the level of importance that doctrine has in texts like 
the Catechism or the USCCB Framework.186 For example, in the U.S. bishops’ 1972 
pastoral message on Catholic education, To Teach as Jesus Did, the authors write: “In 
proclaiming all things which His Father commanded Him to reveal, Jesus used images 
from the lives of His hearers and spoke in the idiom of his day. The Church, too, must 
use contemporary methods and language to proclaim the message of Christ to men and 
women today.”187 Here the bishops clearly acknowledge the power of teaching through 
images, yet this insight is not developed at all in the rest of the document. Such 
undeveloped thinking about the pedagogical value of symbols is typical of much of the 
catechetical literature generated since Vatican II. The symbolic richness of preconciliar 
Catholic culture and education was one of the Church’s greatest assets and something 
that today’s educators should work to recover. 
In identifying this failure of the American Church to nurture Christian 
imaginations, it should be acknowledged that the Church would have been hard pressed 
                                                
184 Bernard Lonergan is one scholar who has highlighted this essential role of symbol in the communication 
of religious meaning: “religion has to retain its identity and yet penetrate into the cultures of mankind, into 
the manifold fabric of everyday meaning and feeling that directs and propels the lives of men. It has to 
know the uses of symbol and story” (“Theology and Man’s Future,” in A Second Collection: Philosophy of 
God, and Theology, ed. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 
141). 
185 I will examine the work of these authors in depth in Chapter Five. 
186 It might be objected that doctrine often contains symbolic elements, and that is true enough. However, 
seldom has doctrine been taught in a manner that draws out the symbolic, imaginative dimension. As I will 
argue in Chapter Two, symbols can be flattened and lose their symbolic force, and that is precisely what 
happens when they are incorporated into doctrines, which are then taught as material for memorization 
rather than exploration. 
187 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, “To Teach as Jesus Did: A Pastoral Message on Catholic 
Education” (USCCB Publishing, 1972), 5–6. 
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to do better.188 American culture underwent momentous changes in the latter half of the 
20th century, and there is only so much an institution can do to respond. In the past, 
Christians could not help but be formed in a Christian way of seeing the world on account 
of the fact that the surrounding culture was largely Christian in character. For hundreds of 
years, most people lived within eyesight of the local church. For Catholic Americans in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the parish was the center of social life and the home 
was full of religious images and sacramentals. The Catholic schools that were bursting 
with students prior to Vatican II were operated by priests and religious with extensive 
spiritual formation.189 Catholic-themed movies like The Song of Bernadette (1943), 
Going My Way (1944) and, The Bells of St. Mary’s (1945, 1959) enjoyed great popularity 
among American theater-goers, not only Catholics.  
Today’s American Catholics, by contrast, live in a culture that decidedly lacks 
this Christian character. They live further away from their parishes and rely on them less 
as social centers.190 The Catholic character of the average home is in many respects 
weaker than it used to be. 191 Despite continued growth of the Catholic population in the 
U.S., Catholic schools today enroll more than three million fewer students than they did 
in the early ’60s. Moreover, the students who do attend those schools are educated by 
mostly lay teachers who typically do not received anything like the spiritual formation 
                                                
188 Steinfels, for one, defends that major shifts in the wider culture rather than shortcomings in religious 
education are chiefly to blame for the troubled state of the American Church. (See A People Adrift, 210.) 
189 See Neuwien, Catholic Schools in Action, 126-144 for a detailed description of the spiritual and 
professional formation received by various educating orders. 
190 CARA reports that 39% of Millennials live closer to another parish than the one they attend versus 27% 
of pre-Vatican II Catholics, 30% of Vatican II Catholics, and 33%, of post-Vatican II Catholics. (CARA, 
The Changing Face of U.S. Catholic Parishes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, July 2011). 
191 For example, less than half of Catholic teens report having sacred images or an altar in their home 
(Smith, Soul Searching, 48). Smith also reports that 66% of Catholic teens say their family talks about 
religious matters a few times a month or less (ibid., 55). 
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received by the priests and religious who formerly educated America’s Catholic youth.192 
Finally, while Catholics still maintain a media presence through TV stations like EWTN 
and other outlets, that presence has diminished considerably in influence as the number of 
channels has proliferated from three to over 200 (not to mention Netflix, YouTube, and 
other digital entertainment providers), most of which air content that more often than not 
conflicts with Catholic values. 
The net effect of these changes in American culture is that Catholics today are 
seldom spontaneously enculturated into a Christian worldview in the way past 
generations were. Given pervasive trends toward greater plurality and quasi-
secularization, it is highly unlikely that American culture will ever regain the Christian 
character it once had. Consequently, the Catholic Church will need to compensate for this 
loss through more intentional efforts at socialization and forming the imagination of its 
members. Efforts to strengthen community, revitalize parishes, and support parents in 
creating Christian homes will all be important. That Catholic educators recognize this 
need is evident in discussions of intentional socialization in Vatican documents like 
Evangeli Nuntiandi, Familiaris Consortio, Catechesi Tradendae, the Rite of Christian 
Initiation of Adults, and the General Directory for Catechesis as well as in national 
documents like To Teach as Jesus Did and the National Directory for Catechesis. 
However, recognizing the need and addressing it effectively are two different matters.  
 
 
                                                
192 See Steinfels’s discussion of the challenges presented by the shift to a primarily lay teaching force in 
Steinfels, A People Adrift, 218-9. 
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A Proposal 
A historic change has occurred in Western Christianity. Christianity has lost its 
privileged position of virtual coextension with Western culture, a position it had occupied 
since at least the early Middle Ages. In the midst of this cultural shift, many people have 
lost or are losing their sense of the meaningfulness of life because the images and 
symbols that formerly mediated that meaning have been “demythologized”, critiqued, 
and discarded.193 Yet, in spite of it all, the old Christian symbols still live. We need only 
learn how to see them with new eyes—eyes that are wide open and yet able to see with a 
renewed sense of wonder.194  
Beyond the resilience of the symbols themselves, Christian religious educators 
have many assets at their disposal in their work of forming disciples for the 21st century. 
The past half-century has seen a blooming of new, vibrant spiritualities and a culture of 
genuine spiritual seeking. It has brought greater respect for diversity, including different 
ways of knowing and cultural and religious differences. It has afforded religious 
educators the benefit of cognitive science, phenomenology, modern methods of 
theological and biblical studies, and many other advances in modern learning. Today’s 
religious educators also enjoy the advantages of increased powers of technology and 
communication, which make it possible to share a vision of faith more easily and with 
                                                
193 Paul Ricoeur has observed to this effect that the present moment “is that of forgetfulness and restoration. 
Forgetfulness of hierophanies, forgetfulness of the signs of the sacred, loss of man himself insofar as he 
belongs to the sacred [sic]” (Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967), 349). Edward Farley likewise highlights the fading of important symbols in 
postmodern culture in Deep Symbols: Their Postmodern Effacement and Reclamation (Valley Forge, PA: 
Trinity Press International, 1996). 
194 David Tracy speaks to the same, asserting that modern people need to recover a sense of the “uncanny”. 
(David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1981), 362. 
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more people than ever before.195 All of the above present opportunities to help Christians 
recover coherent meaning in their lives.  
Still, as we have seen, the current context presents many unprecedented 
challenges. Given the novelty of the situation, an adequate response will demand more 
than augmenting the positive aspects in Catholic religious education and correcting 
lapses. It will be my contention in this dissertation that, as a result of these cultural shifts, 
in order to remain committed disciples most Catholics will need to undergo an evolution 
in the way they understand their faith and reality as a whole. I believe that the 
imagination is key to this transformation. Indeed, the reports of all the various 
sociologists, historians, and philosophers examined above converge upon this conclusion: 
Empowering today’s Christian disciples to live integrated lives of faith in today’s 
disorienting, fragmentizing postmodern culture will require greater attention to the 
function of images and symbols in human cognition and in the process of handing on the 
faith.196 Emboldened by the corroborating research of so many distinguished scholars, I 
intend to make my own contribution by developing common sentiments about the 
                                                
195 For a more extended discussion of the potential for growth in faith within postmodern culture of see 
Harold Daly Horell, “Cultural Postmodernity and Christian Faith Formation,” in Horizons and Hopes: The 
Future of Religious Education, ed. Thomas H. Groome and Daly Horell Harold (New York: Paulist Press, 
2003). 
196 Andrew Thompson, for example, reiterates, “The significance of the NCEA and Greeley research is 
found in the direction it gives religion teachers, pastors and parents to attend to the affective and 
imaginative elements in their efforts at catechesis and religious socialization” (Thompson, That They May 
Know You, 64). Andrew Greeley, states the matter well himself: “The artist (musician, story teller, poet) is 
a ‘sacrament maker,’ a person who calls out of his materials insights and images into the meaning that lurks 
beneath them. For most of its history the Catholic Church has realized that the sacrament makers are not 
luxuries but necessities for its life and work. One would like to think that as a new religious sensibility 
develops the church leadership will understand that the only way it can guide and direct the development of 
that religious sensibility is not denouncing it, not trying to limit it or contain it, but rather influencing its 
direction and flow through works of the fine and lively arts” (Greeley, American Catholics Since the 
Council, 222). 
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importance of imagination into a distinctive approach for shaping a Christian 
“imaginary”.197  
In this first chapter, I have defined the problem I am seeking to address and 
described the context in which this problem arises: The greatest problem facing American 
Catholics today, as I see it, is an inability to view their lives through the eyes of faith in a 
way that meaningfully integrates their experiences and illumines their reality. In order to 
substantiate this claim more fully, it will be necessary to explore the role of the 
imagination in human cognition, especially as it concerns humans’ efforts in constructing 
their reality. This, along with the role of revelation in human meaning-construction, will 
constitute the content of Chapter Two. In Chapter Three, I will draw upon developmental 
psychology in order to demonstrate that the struggles of contemporary American 
Catholics can be accounted for in great part by a gap between the mental demands of 
postmodern culture and their mental resources for imagining reality. I will further suggest 
what more adequate ways or levels of imagining might look like. In Chapter Four, I will 
explore the possibilities suggested in multiple fields of research for how educators can 
promote a more adequate manner of imagining in their students. Having identified these 
possibilities, in Chapter Five I will begin to articulate general pedagogical principles for 
an approach or process of forming Christian imaginaries, drawing upon the example of 
Jesus as well as that of other notable Christian educators. Finally, in Chapter Six I will 
synthesize and expand upon these pedagogical precedents in order to articulate a 
pedagogical process whereby educators might be better able to form their students in a 
                                                
197 I borrow this term from Taylor. In Chapter Two I will explain the reasons for my preference of this term 
over “imagination” when speaking of a community’s imaginative framework for viewing the world. 
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Christian imaginary, that is, a manner of envisioning the reign of God that will enable 
them to make coherent sense of their experience and integrate their living in the 
postmodern world. 
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Chapter 2 
Meaning-Construction, Imagination, and Revelation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“What you are in love with, what seizes your imagination, will affect everything.” 
(Fr. Pedro Arrupe, S.J.) 
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Introduction 
 While there are many signs of hope in contemporary U.S. Catholicism, today’s 
Christian disciples and the people who form them face significant challenges. The 
disorienting maelstrom of images, messages, and experiences that characterizes 
postmodern culture poses what at times seems an insurmountable obstacle to a coherent 
life of faith. Even though the Catholic tradition offers a wealth of resources to religious 
educators seeking to address this obstacle, the specific nature of these challenges makes it 
imperative that educators understand what has happened to U.S Catholics’ imaginations 
and how this imaginal change has affected society at large. In Chapter One, I argued the 
importance of images and imagination for people’s lives of faith through sociological 
analysis. The present chapter will deepen the argument by demonstrating the importance 
of imagination through a careful examination of the dynamics of human meaning-
construction and of the role of divine revelation therein. Chapter Three will build upon 
this analysis by describing what is happening psychologically when meaning breaks 
down, as has happened in contemporary U.S. culture. Having illuminated the current 
situation of U.S. Catholics with these sociological, historical, scientific, 
phenomenological, philosophical, and theological perspectives, later chapters will 
explore possibilities for developing meaningful, unifying ways of imagining through 
Catholic religious education.  
 
What is Meaning? 
 As we saw in Chapter One, the present U.S. context has been characterized as a 
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culture suffering from a widespread sense of meaninglessness (Taylor) and American 
Catholics as suffering from a lack of coherence in their lives of faith (Steinfels). At the 
heart of these assessments is the concept “meaning”. At first blush, this concept seems 
simple enough. We speak of “meaning” countless times a day and presume it in the vast 
majority of our actions. However, if pressed to explain, most people will quickly find 
themselves at a loss for words when it comes to articulating precisely what “meaning” is. 
What is this thing that many American Catholics seem to have lost? 
Contrary to conventional ways of talking about meaning (e.g., “finding” meaning 
in a song or “discovering” new meaning in one’s life), meaning is not something “out 
there” to be found, like a coin in a field.1 It is, rather, primarily something human beings 
do, namely, an act of interpretation.2 Yet one would be equally mistaken to describe 
meaning as the pure creation of the human mind.3 Interpretation requires something to be 
interpreted—a text, a situation, or, in the most basic cases, sensory input received through 
interaction with one’s external environment. Human beings construct or organize this 
input that is given to the senses and imagination into intelligible patterns or forms, 
                                                
1 Bernard Lonergan has argued persuasively in Insight, Verbum, and elsewhere against this naive notion of 
how human beings understand. He receives ample support from Mark Johnson, who cites dozens of 
empirical studies that undermine what he terms the “objectivist” account of meaning and rationality. (See 
Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), xi-xiii, n.2-9.  
2 Cf. Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991), 11. 
Speaking from a cognitive science perspective, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner describe how this 
apparently simple thought process is actually deceptively complicated: “elements of mental life that look 
like primitives for formal analysis turn out to be higher-order products of imaginative work” (Gilles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending And The Mind’s Hidden 
Complexities (Basic Books, 2003)). 
3 The two conflicting epistemological theories alluded to here are those of the “discovery” and 
“constructivist” schools of thought, neither of which is completely adequate. I will present what I believe to 
be an adequate resolution of this debate in my discussion of the role of judgment at the end of the section 
below on metaphor and abstract thought. 
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thereby giving coherence to their actions in and perceptions of the world.4 As philosopher 
Mark Johnson explains, “An event becomes meaningful by pointing beyond itself to prior 
event structures in experience or toward possible future structures.”5 In short, to speak of 
“meaning” is to speak most basically of human beings’ activity of interpreting patterns in 
sensory and imaginal input.6 
Again, contrary to the common, naive understanding, we never see the world 
simply “as it is.”7 Nor is the work of constructing meaning ever dispassionate. “Before 
we look for answers,” observes Bernard Lonergan, “we want them.”8 Martin Heidegger 
suggests the same when he describes the human being as “always also absorbed in the 
world of its concerns.”9 On the most basic level, one’s interpretation of sensory and 
imaginal input is more often than not motivated and constrained by one’s needs, desires, 
and wishes.10 This is an ineluctable fact of human existence resulting from the way our 
                                                
4 Because this activity is more accurately described as organizing meaning than creating meaning, I will 
follow developmental psychologist Robert Kegan in employing the term “meaning-construction” rather 
than the more common “meaning-making”. (See Robert Kegan, In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demands 
of Modern Life (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 29.) 
5 Johnson, The Mind in the Body, 177. An “event” in Johnson’s sense would include a sensory or 
imaginative impression as well as historical occurrences in the life of a person. 
6 This initial discussion offers only a basic understanding of the process of meaning-construction. I will 
continue to fill out my description of this activity in the following sections. 
7 Cf. Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Our Minds, Our Memories: Enhancing Thinking and Learning at All Ages 
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011), 26. As author Anaïs Nin says, "We don't see things as they are, we 
see them as we are."  
8 Lonergan, Insight, 34; cf. Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on 
the Philosophy of Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 1988), 
83. 
9 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and John Robinson (New York: Harper 
Perennial Modern Classics, 2008), 237.  
10 From a neuroscience perspective one might say that a person’s brain only changes when one perceives 
that something matters. (Cf. Brain Plasticity with Michael Merzenich, Brain Science Podcast, accessed 
September 5, 2014, http://brainsciencepodcast.com/bsp/2014/bsp-105-merzenich.) Neuroscientists have 
even identified the brain systems that seem most essential to attention and desire. David Hogue explains, 
“the human brain has a basic system deep within its core [viz., the mesolimbic pathways] that…selects 
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organism is constituted and develops. In human beings as in other organisms, the systems 
most critical to survival—cardiovascular, respiratory, central nervous, etc.—are the first 
to develop. Similarly, instinctual, emotional responses develop prior to more 
sophisticated capabilities like abstract reasoning. Hence, explains neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio, “since what comes first constitutes the frame of reference for what comes after, 
feelings have a say on how the rest of the brain and cognition go about their business.”11 
Neither Damasio nor I would want to overemphasize the dominance of the affect over the 
intellect or vice versa. Likewise, I would not restrict human concern to biological needs 
and egocentric interests.12 The crucial point to grasp here is the inseparability of the 
two—every intelligent thought is attended by affectivity, and feelings and desires13 are 
often the impetus for further thought.14 
Inseparable though the intellectual and affective dimensions are in the work of 
                                                                                                                                            
objects in the environment that it needs or wants and prompts seeking them” (David A. Hogue, “The 
Desiring Brain: Contemporary Neuroscientific Insights into Pleasure and Longing,” in City of Desires - a 
Place for God?: Practical Theological Perspectives, ed. Reinder Ruard Ganzevoort, Rein Brouwer, and 
Bonnie Miller-McLemore (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2013), 53. 
11 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 
1994), 160;  cf. 197. Psychologist Jeanne Ellis Ormrod cites multiple studies demonstrating the greater 
power of events and objects with greater perceived personal relevance to attract and hold our attention. (See 
Ormrod, Our Minds, Our Memories, 53, n.6.) 
12 I will return to the question of the limits and expansiveness of human concern below. 
13 Though the terms “affect,” “feeling,” and “emotion” are often used interchangeably in common 
parlance, I will be employing them in a more technical sense. I take “emotion” to refer to innate, 
unconscious, non-intentional affective responses resulting more or less directly from changes in body 
states. “Feeling,” by contrast, indicates an affective response mediated by noematic contents (e.g., images, 
thoughts, values). I employ “affectivity” as a more general term encompassing emotion, feeling, and any 
other elements that contribute to one’s felt condition, as opposed to one’s condition as known intellectually. 
To speak of an “affect” is to indicate a general disposition, felt state, or mood. 
14 Ormrod, Our Minds, Our Memories, 81; Luiz Pessoa. “On the Relationship Between Emotion and 
Cognition,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9 (2008): 148–158; ibid., “How Do Emotion and Motivation 
Direct Executive Control?,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (2009): 160–166; Alexander J. Shackman, J. 
S. Maxwell, B. W. McMenamin,  L. L. Greischar, and R. J. Davidson, “Stress Potentiates Early and 
Attenuates Late Stages of Visual Processing,” Journal of Neuroscience, 31 (2011): 1156–1161; Alexander 
J. Shackman, T. V. Salomons, H. A. Slagter, A. S. Fox, J. J. Winter, and R. J. Davidson, “The Integration 
of Negative Affect, Pain, and Cognitive Control in the Cingulate Cortex,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
12 (2011): 154–167. 
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construction meaning, it is illuminating to distinguish the different contributions each 
makes to this work. For this reason, some thinkers have distinguished between two 
equiprimordial modes of self-presence or being in the world—Verstehen (understanding) 
and Befindlichkeit (mood or disposition) in Heidegger’s terms,15 or “intentional 
operations” and the “sensitive psyche” in Lonergan’s. Lonergan explains: 
we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather 
passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our 
joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we 
consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh 
evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to 
act.16 
 
Again, I would emphasize that, even though we can distinguish these two modes 
of consciousness17 in theory, they are inseparable in one’s actual living. Still, this 
distinction is a crucial one for understanding how human beings construct meaning. 
Meaning is not a purely intellectual construct. When we speak of something as 
“meaningful,” we typically mean that it is desirable, valuable, or worthwhile (or 
undesirable or not valued or worthwhile) in addition to being intelligible.18 Without 
sensitivity, life for us would be flat and insignificant. Without intellectuality, life would 
                                                
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, 171-2; cf. Robert Doran, “Two Ways of Being Conscious: The Notion of 
Psychic Conversion,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 3, no. 1 (2012), 6. 
16 Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, trans. Michael G. Shields, eds. Robert M. Doran and 
H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 139. More precisely, when Lonergan 
speaks of the sensitive psyche, he refers to the corporeal/affective/imaginative component of human 
consciousness, the stream of sensations, images, emotions, bodily movements, and spontaneous 
intersubjective responses that attends human experience. I will follow his meaning when I employ the term 
“psyche” in this dissertation. 
17 I follow Lonergan in my understanding of “consciousness” not as some sort of introspection but rather 
as an “awareness immanent in cognitional acts” (Insight, 346). 
18 As Lonergan puts it, the world we live in is mediated by meaning, but it is also motivated by values. 
(See Bernard Lonergan, “Reality, Myth, Symbol,” in Myth, Symbol, and Reality, ed. Alan M. Olson (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 31.) While some thinkers distinguish between meaning 
as a product of intelligence and value as a product of feeling, my usage of “meaning” connotes the 
involvement of both the intellectual and affective dimensions of the human person unless otherwise 
specified. I will say more about values presently. 
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be, to quote Shakespeare, “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”19 Drawing 
together these different elements into a pithy phrase, theologian Rosemary Haughton 
describes meaning as “a summing up of experience in a total emotional-intellectual 
grasp.”20 
Both of these modes of consciousness or dimensions of meaning-construction 
undergo development across the human lifespan. I will describe the stages of this 
development in more detail in the next chapter, but some initial comments will illuminate 
the present discussion of meaning. At the beginning of life, the fetus’s and the infant’s 
world is a world of immediacy. Their sense of their world, self (if we can speak of a 
“self” at this early stage), and needs are compact and undifferentiated.21 They respond 
instinctively to these needs as they arise from changes in their environment or internal 
states without, as Lonergan says, “any perceptible intrusion from insight or concept, 
reflection or judgment, deliberation or choice.”22 As the human person develops, 
however, one’s manner of responding to stimuli becomes more differentiated23. One 
grows progressively better able to detect patterns in sensory and imaginal input, employ 
                                                
19 William Shakespeare, “Macbeth,” Act 5, Scene 5, http://www.gutenberg.orgdirs/etext00/0ws3410.txt, 
accessed October 12, 2014, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2264/pg2264.html. 
20 Rosemary Haughton, The Transformation of Man: A Study of Conversion and Community (Springfield, 
Ill: Templegate, 1980), 76. Along similar lines, developmental psychologist Robert Kegan describes 
meaning as being “about knowing and being, about theory-making and investments and commitments of 
the self” (The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 45. 
21 In Lonerganian terms, we might say that at this stage the self is identical with the psyche or the empirical 
level of consciousness, which is constituted by the subject’s sensations, perceptions, and flow of mental 
images. (See Doran, “Two Ways of Being Conscious,” 12-13.) 
22 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 76. William James made similar observations in 1891: “The baby, 
assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion” 
(The Principles of Psychology (Cambdrige, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983)). 
23 According to Kegan, this activity of differentiation and reintegration is the very source of thought and 
feeling.  (See Kegan, The Evolving Self, 44.) 
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prior understandings as a basis for new understanding, and make reasonable judgments 
about the accuracy of one’s understanding.24  
One’s concerns and feelings likewise become more differentiated.25 At first, 
infants’ concern extends only as far as their physiological needs (e.g., warmth, nutrition, 
excretion). As those needs are consistently met and children grow, their concern expands 
to include concern for their safety, and subsequently for a sense of belonging and being 
loved, being esteemed, and, most abstractly, a sense of self-actualization. This course of 
development represents an expansion of concern from the mere satisfaction of needs and 
desires to an aspiration toward “values,” that is, objects of human striving that are 
recognized as worthwhile independently of their benefit to oneself.26 Value in turn admits 
differentiation, resulting in a scale of values that ascends from vital values (e.g., health, 
strength) to social, cultural, personal, and religious values.27 Still, while the human 
person’s range of concerns expands in this manner beyond more primitive needs, it never 
leaves them behind. Anyone who has ever been jolted out of deep thought by a growling 
stomach or by tripping on a crack in the pavement can testify as much. Regardless of 
                                                
24 In Insight Lonergan helpfully distinguishes between these levels of consciousness—viz., empirical, 
intelligent, rational (as well as reasonable)—and argues that fully mature cognition requires differentiation 
among these levels of consciousness and affirmation of these intentional operations in one’s own knowing. 
25 Such is the foundational insight at the heart of Abraham Maslow’s theory of the “hierarchy of needs,” 
which I allude to in the following sentences. (See Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 
Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370–96.) 
26 Jack Mezirow, Damasio, and others argue that it is feelings that generate and perceive values. (See Jack 
Mezirow and Associates, Learning as Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress 
(Jossey-Bass, 2000), 11; Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 173.) Some neuroscientists even believe they have 
identified specific brain regions responsible for the perception of value. (See Luiz Pessoa, The Cognitive-
Emotional Brain: From Interactions to Integration (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).) 
27 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 31. 
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whether they are more basic or noble, our concerns determine what we attend to28 and 
even what we perceive.29 The endless possibilities for differentiation of a human being’s 
concern accounts for how people from different places and cultures and even from the 
same culture can perceive the world and specific events so differently.30  
However diverse the concerns of different people, one concern takes center stage 
for every single human being—the concern for meaning itself. “No need is more 
fundamentally human,” observes educational theorist Jack Mezirow, “than our need to 
understand the meaning of our experience.”31 It is, according to Kegan, “the primary 
human motion.”32 As compared to animals, which generally develop very early on all of 
                                                
28 As Lonergan puts it, “According to our measure of interest and concern, that is, in the measure in which 
things are relevant to us, we pay more or less attention to them” (Bernard Lonergan, Phenomenology and 
Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism, ed. Frederick E Crowe, 
Robert M. Doran, and Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 288). 
29 We only ever attend to a small portion of the sensory impressions that make their way to our brains. 
Lonergan explains, “the flow of sensations, as completed by memories and prolonged by imaginative acts 
of anticipation, becomes the flow of perceptions. It is of the latter, perceptual flow that we are conscious” 
(Insight, 96). As an illustration of the selectivity of attention, you might consider your ability to focus on 
one particular conversation (either the one in which you are involved or another elsewhere that seems more 
interesting) in the midst of a crowded room. Experimental research in neuroscience corroborates such 
anecdotal evidence of how affectivity influences perception. (See Adam K. Anderson and Elizabeth A. 
Phelps, “Lesions of the Human Amygdala Impair Enhanced Perception of Emotionally Salient Event,” 
Nature 411, no. 6835 (2001): 305–9, and Ralph Adolphs and Michael Spezio, “Role of the Amygdala in 
Processing Visual Social Stimuli,” Progress in Brain Research 156 (2006): 363–78.) 
30 It is this phenomenon to which Lonergan refers when he speaks of the various “patterns of experience,” 
e.g., biological, dramatic, artistic, intellectual. (See Insight, 213-4.) Different people and even the same 
person at different times will experience the same sensations and impressions differently depending on how 
they are “patterning” their experiences. (Cf. Ference Marton and Shirley Booth, Learning and Awareness 
(Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997)). 
31 Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, 11; cf. Mezirow and Associates, Learning as 
Transformation, 3. A multitude of studies in neuroscience support this claim. See B. N. Frazier, S. A. 
Gelman, and H. M. Wellman, “Preschoolers’ Search for Explanatory Information Within Adult-Child 
Conversations,” Child Development, 80 (2009): 1592-1611; S. A. Gelman, The Essential Child: Origins of 
Essentialism in Everyday Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); D. G. Kemler Nelson, L. 
Egan, and M. B. Holt, “When Children Ask, ‘What Is It?’ What Do They Want to Know About Artifacts?,” 
Psychological Science, 15 (2004): 384-389; N. N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly 
Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007); E. Tulving, “Subjective Organization in Free Recall of 
‘Unrelated’ Words,” Psychological Review, 69 (1962): 344-354. 
32 Kegan, The Evolving Self, 19. 
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the drives and capacities that will guide their behavior for the entirety of their lives, 
human beings continue to construct new meaning throughout our lifetimes. Our craving 
for meaning seems insatiable. Lonergan describes this insatiable desire for meaning as a 
“pure desire to know” or, alternatively, a “notion of being,” which aims at knowing all 
there is to be known.33 This notion of being is complemented by a “transcendental notion 
of value,” which incites us toward and leaves us unsatisfied with anything less than 
goodness in its fullness.34 On account of this drive to construct meaning, we feel 
increasingly content to the degree that we understand our experiences and perceive 
ourselves to be involved in something worthwhile. The flip-side of this phenomenon is 
that we feel ill at ease and depressed when we fail to make sense of our experiences. As 
we will see below, our ability to construct meaning is wound up with our very sense of 
self. In consequence, the negation of the meaning one has constructed is tantamount to a 
negation of the self. And, in the words of Lonergan, “The subject’s fundamental anxiety, 
his deepest dread, is the collapse of himself and his world.”35 For this reason, the human 
mind is strongly resistant to major revisions of its reality constructions and, to a lesser 
degree, to ambiguity or uncertainty of any kind.36 
 At this point one might ask, What powers this relentless drive for meaning and 
governs the magnificent orchestration of bodily, affective, and intellectual activity 
                                                
33 Lonergan, Insight, 377. 
34 Ibid., Method in Theology, 36. 
35 Ibid., Topics in Education, 90; cf. Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism 
of Reason, Rite, and Art, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 287. 
36 See, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown, “Illusion and Well-being: A Social Psychological 
Perspective on Mental Health,” Psychological Bulletin, 103, no. 2 (1988): 193–210. Stated positively, the 
human mind exhibits what cognitive scientists call “confirmation bias,” the tendency to give more credence 
to information that supports one’s current beliefs. (See, e.g., Ormrod, Our Minds, Our Memories, 172.) 
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involved in meaning-construction? Cognitive scientists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark 
Turner offer a compelling proposal. They argue that careful examination of the cognitive 
strategies and mechanisms governing humans’ construction of meaning discloses a single 
overarching goal—achieve human scale.  
 In order to understand what Fauconnier and Turner mean by this phrase, one 
needs to recognize that, from an evolutionary standpoint, constructing meaning is for 
human beings a matter of survival.37 The way any organism survives is by successfully 
negotiating its environment and attending effectively to its own needs. In other words, the 
organism must assess its situation through the lens of its concern for its own survival. 
Human beings have become remarkably successful in this activity—much more so than 
any other species—by employing several cognitive strategies or subgoals: sharpen or 
simplify what is vague or diffuse, obtain global insights that unify complex networks of 
mental spaces, strengthen frequently recurring conceptual relations (e.g., change, identity, 
time, space, cause-effect), come up with a story, go from many to one.38 Operating 
according to these (largely non-conscious) strategies, humans are able to efficiently focus 
their experience of an incomprehensibly complex, dynamic world to the “human scale,”39 
which translates into streamlined guidelines for how to conduct ourselves in the world in 
                                                
37 Cf. Kegan, The Evolving Self, 19. 
38 Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 312. 
39 Most essentially, “human-scale situations” are those that “have direct perception and action in familiar 
frames that are easily apprehended by human beings: An object falls, someone lifts an object, two people 
converse, one person goes somewhere. They typically have very few participants, direct intentionality, and 
immediate bodily effect and are immediately comprehended as coherent” (Fauconnier and Turner, The Way 
We Think, 312). A statement attributed to Joseph Stalin illustrates how the cognitional drive for human 
scale impacts our perception of the world: “The death of one person is a tragedy, but the death of a million 
persons is a statistic.” 
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ways that prove most advantageous to us.40 
 Fauconnier’s and Turner’s explanation of what drives human meaning-
construction is helpful but incomplete. Discussion of Lonergan’s notion of the 
unrestricted desire to know and value, which I will provide in the section on “Human 
Transcendence” below, will fill in this explanation. Notwithstanding, this preliminary 
description of humans’ drive for meaning on the human scale is essential for 
understanding why we construct meaning the way we do.  
 
The Dynamics of Meaning-Construction 
Having established a general notion of meaning as an interpretive activity that 
human beings engage in through interaction with their environment, I will now describe 
the specific processes whereby we construct meaning.41 This in-depth exploration of 
meaning-construction will provide the necessary background against which we can better 
understand what has happened in American Catholicism in recent decades (Chapter 
Three) and what kind of pedagogical response would be adequate to improving 
Catholics’ present imaginal situation (Chapters Four, Five, and Six). 
 
The Body, Neural Patterns, and Mental Images 
Up through the Middle Ages, the predominant epistemological position was that 
                                                
40 For a discussion of how the human-scale principle is applied in scientific, corporate, and marketing 
contexts, see Chip Heath and Dan Heath, Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die (New 
York: Random House, 2008), 143–7. 
41 In presenting the following description I will have to be selective in my focus. My purpose here is not to 
sketch out a complete cognitional theory but rather to highlight the central role of imagination in the way 
humans construct meaning. 
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espoused by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, namely, that “nothing is in the intellect that 
was not previously in sense.”42 Centuries later Enlightenment thinkers enamored with the 
ideal of “pure,” “objective” reason rejected Aristotle’s and Thomas’s position, instead 
espousing an epistemology that conceives of reason and concepts as disembodied and 
free from the adulterating influence of bodily sensations. Even though this Enlightenment 
epistemology continues to dominate the popular consciousness in our own time, modern 
neuroscience has reaffirmed the validity of the classical position. For example, Antonio 
Damasio, one of the world’s leading neuroscientists, writes, “our very organism rather 
than some absolute external reality is used as the ground reference for the construction of 
the ever-present sense of subjectivity that is part and parcel of our experiences… [O]ur 
most refined thoughts and best actions… use the body as a yardstick.”43 Today the view 
articulated by Damasio is generally accepted in the world of science and is gradually 
taking hold in theology and philosophy.44 
According to the best available account, then, human meaning-construction 
begins from the senses, which are stimulated by interaction with the external 
environment. Sensory receptors on the surface of the skin and in the eyes, ears, and 
mouth receive impressions from outside the organism. Sensory and motor nerves then 
                                                
42 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), 
q.2, a.3, arg.19, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/QDdeVer2.htm.; cf. Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” in The 
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 980. 
43 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, xvi. 
44 See, e.g., Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 266; Katrina Schwartz, “How Emotional 
Connections Can Trigger Creativity and Learning,” KQED, March 15, 2013; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2005); Doran, Theology and the 
Dialectics of History, 507; Robert Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God: Theology After Cognitive 
Linguistics (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2014); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The 
Embodied Mind and It Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
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carry signals from the receptors to the brain. Damasio suggests that these signals fire the 
brain’s neurons in different patterns corresponding to the different stimuli.45 Whenever 
neurons fire, the synapses connecting them grow stronger, altering the topography or 
structure of the brain. Damasio refers to each resulting structure as a “neural” or 
“dispositional representation,” “a dormant firing potentiality which comes to life when 
neurons fire, with a particular pattern, at certain rates, for a certain amount of time, and 
toward a particular target which happens to be another ensemble of neurons.”46 Through 
this process what the person encounters in their external environment becomes “mapped” 
onto the brain.  
These neural representations serve as the physiological basis for mental “images”. 
According to Damasio’s hypothesis, mental images present themselves to consciousness 
when neurons fire in patterns similar to the patterns that occurred when the perceptual 
representation was first formed.47 It should be noted that Damasio’s use of “image,” 
which will be consistent with my own and that of other authors cited here unless 
otherwise specified, diverges from popular usage.48 For Damasio, the word “images” 
indicates “mental patterns with a structure built with the tokens of each of the sensory 
modalities—visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory.”49 Significant in 
                                                
45 Though his descriptions of these processes are fully consistent with available evidence, Damasio is 
careful to qualify that the evidence is not definitive enough for him to claim more than a high degree of 
plausibility for his descriptions. 
46 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 103-4. 
47 I say “hypothesis” because, again, Damasio acknowledges that the precise mechanisms by which neural 
representations translate into mental images have thus far eluded neuroscientists. 
48 Damasio also employs the term “mental pattern” as a synonym for “mental image.” 
49 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness 
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 2000), 318. 
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Damasio’s definition is the fact that the term “image” is not limited to the visual.50 One’s 
recollection of a friend’s face, a catchy melody, the smell of a favorite flower, the taste of 
a favorite fruit, and the feel of a loved one’s touch would all qualify as “images” in this 
sense. These various images are all laden with affect conditioned by the circumstances 
that initially gave rise to the neural representations and by the circumstances in which one 
subsequently reactivates (e.g., by remembering) those neural representations.  
This process of transmission (whereby sensory input passes from sensory 
receptors through the nerves to neural representations on the brain and finally into mental 
images) is a permanent feature in the operations of the human organism. So long as one is 
awake or dreaming, one experiences a constant stream of images through one’s 
consciousness. This stream of images is, according to Damasio, “probably the main 
content of our thoughts.”51 The capacity for image formation varies with each person. In 
some, including geniuses like Albert Einstein, the generation of images is more rapid.52 
                                                
50 Inclusion of other sense sources in this notion of “image” is consistent with the usage of many other 
authors. (See, e.g., Arthur W. Staats and Jeffrey M. Lohr, “Images, Language, Emotions, and Personality: 
Social Behaviorism’s Theory,” Journal of Mental Imagery 3, no. 1–2 (1979), 87;  Lonergan, Insight, 34-5; 
Terrence W. Tilley, Faith: What It Is and What It Isn’t (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 91.) If at 
times my usage of “image” seems excessively focused on visual experiences, this is only because visual 
images tend to be the most prominent in the average person’s meaning-construction. I do not intend for my 
use of the term to be taken in a way that excludes auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory images. 
51 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 107. Damasio is in good company in noting the indispensable role images 
play in human thought. Cf. Aristotle, "De Anima," in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York: Modern Library, 2001), 431a, 16; Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica,” trans. Fathers of 
the English Dominican Province, New Advent, 2008, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/, I, q.79, a.4, r.3; 
Paul Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 348; Lonergan, Insight, 33. 
52 According to Einstein himself, “The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to 
play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in 
thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be ‘voluntarily’ reproduced and 
combined” (cited in Jacques Hadamard, An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical 
Field (New York: Dover Publications, 1954), 142).  
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Nevertheless, every single person possesses this capacity to some degree.53 The ability to 
generate, attend to, and mentally manipulate these images—“imagination” in the most 
basic sense of the word—is the “transcendental condition”54 of consciousness (to borrow 
a phrase from Sartre) and the foundational mechanism of human meaning-construction.55 
 
Image Schemata, Metaphor, and Abstract Thought 
 At this point in the development of a human being’s meaning-constructing 
capacities, the subject’s thinking is still bound to the concrete and that which can be 
experienced more or less directly. This level of mental functioning (what Lonergan 
would identify as “empirical consciousness”) is sufficient for enabling most animals on 
the planet to behave in an adaptive manner, but it does not yet come anywhere near to 
explaining the complex ways in which human beings construct meaning and organize 
their living.56 So how does one get from this basic level of empirical consciousness to the 
fully developed human being who can execute computations with irrational numbers, 
ponder the meaning of life, and affirm truths about reality?  
Today few will be satisfied by a solution that involves positing that human beings, 
unlike animals, have been endowed with a rational soul, if by “soul” one means a 
Cartesian “ghost in the machine” with no relation to the physiological development of the 
person. In light of modern cognitive science, numerous authors—including several cited 
                                                
53 Ormrod, Our Minds, Our Memories, 81, n. 15. 
54 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination (New York: Citadel Press, 1948), 273. 
55 In the words of Fauconnier and Turner, imagination “is the central engine of meaning behind the most 
ordinary mental events” (The Way We Think, 15). 
56 Lonergan, Insight, 346. 
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above, but most notably Mark Johnson—have argued convincingly that rational and 
conceptual thinking are not disembodied, as “objectivist” theorists maintain, but rather 
are ultimately and invariably rooted in concrete, bodily experience.57 For this reason there 
can be no absolute distinction between abstract and imaginative thought. All thought 
originates in the body and emerges in mental images deriving from that bodily 
experience.58 
A decisive step from immediate sense experience towards abstract thought (i.e., 
from empirical consciousness to “intelligent consciousness”) occurs when we begin to 
anticipate sensory and imaginal input rather than receiving it more passively, as we all do 
at the beginning of life.59 This increased power of anticipation is made possible by the 
patterning of neural structures in response to repeated exposure to stimuli. The more 
intense and emotionally charged the stimuli, the more likely they are to create enduring 
neural structures, which translate into stronger habits of expectation and, eventually, 
conscious memories.60 Only with reference to this stage of neural and cognitive 
                                                
57 See Johnson, The Body in the Mind. Along similar lines, Langer writes, “But it is only where experience 
is already presented - through some other formative medium, some vehicle of apprehension and memory - 
that the canons of literal thought have any application. We must have ideas before we can make literal 
analysis of them; and really new ideas have their own modes of appearance in the unpredictable creative 
mind” (Philosophy in a New Key, 201). ⁠ 
58 Johnson puts it this way: “beliefs are merely the surface of our embodied understanding which we peel 
off as abstract structures” (ibid., 138). Elsewhere he writes, “Imaginative projection is a principle means by 
which the body (i.e., physical experience and its structures) works its way up into the mind” (ibid., xxxvi-
xxxvii). For a particular example of this process, see The Body in the Mind, 39-40.  
59 I qualify “more passively” because in reality human beings are never completely passive in our 
interaction with our environment. As discussed above, our interactions are driven from the very outset by a 
desire for meaning. Nevertheless, our ability to make sense of our experiences is very limited in the 
beginning. As we accumulate more experiences and insights, we are better equipped to actively organize 
sensory and imaginal input. 
60 Cf. Jack Mezirow, Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and 
Emancipatory Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1990), 4; Ormrod, Our Minds, Our 
Memories, 82. 
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development can we begin to talk about interpretations and experiences in a richer sense.  
“Experience,” as I employ the term here, may include perceptions, movements, 
emotions, imaginings, thoughts, and sensations that involve some degree of awareness on 
the part of the subject experiencing them.61 This definition presumes the subject’s 
capacity for interpreting the sensory and imaginal input reaching their brain. 
“Interpretation” in turn presumes some mental apparatus for organizing the flood of 
sensory and imaginal input. While most cognitive scientists reject the hypothesis that 
human beings are born with a store of a priori ideas or concepts, they do affirm that 
humans are genetically disposed to develop in a way that they will construct mental 
categories based on their interactions with their environment. 
The most fundamental of these rudimentary mental categories are what Mark 
Johnson calls “image schemata”. “An image schema,” Johnson explains, “is a recurring, 
dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence 
and structure to our experience.”62 Image schemata, which are abstract, unconscious, and 
pre-propositional, should not be equated with what Johnson calls “rich images,” which 
can be pictured in the mind’s eye in relatively vivid detail. Schemata emerge when the 
subject, over the course of thousands of repetitions of perceptions and bodily movements 
and activities, establishes mental connections and patterns in different experiential 
domains. For example, the VERTICALITY schema derives from one’s bodily experience 
                                                
61 Needless to say, this understanding of “experience” differs from common usage (e.g., “She had a great 
experience studying abroad,” or “I’ve never experienced anything like that ride”). Like Mark Johnson, I 
find the popular and classical empiricist understanding of experience as passively received sense 
impressions inadequate (cf. Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xvi). 
62 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xiv; cf. 29, 79. 
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of UP-DOWN orientation.63  
Once established, an image schema provides one with the means of anticipating, 
associating, asking questions about, and eventually naming a category of similar 
experiences. This development marks the first major step in the infant’s passage from the 
world of immediacy to a world mediated by meaning. Now equipped with a rudimentary 
mental framework for interpretation, the child’s responses to the environment depend less 
and less on somatic states (e.g., feeling hunger) and more on mental representations of 
these somatic states and orientations (e.g., recognition that one is hungry).64 As one 
accrues additional experience and becomes aware of more and more patterns, one begins 
to form more complex mental categories like ANIMAL, TABLE, and THING. 
Still, the mental processes described so far in our account of meaning-
construction have been limited to those that simply increase the quantity of neural 
patterns derived from bodily experiences and connect similar patterns of experience. 
However, higher order meaning-construction depends upon humans’ capacity to relate 
unlike patterns to one another. Mental images are the ground of this possibility. While 
derived from bodily experience, mental images generate objects of attention distinct from 
immediate sensory impressions. This ability to generate, retain, modify, and manipulate 
mental images makes it possible to project patterns from one domain of experience onto 
another, a cognitive phenomenon that linguistics and cognitive theorists refer to as 
                                                
63 My use of capitalization here follows Johnson’s conventions. 
64 Cf. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 184. 
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“metaphor”.65  
As opposed to image schemata, which emerge through establishing similarity in 
repeated bodily experiences (e.g., VERTICALITY from experiences of UP-DOWN 
orientation), metaphor connects inherently different kinds of experiences as, for example, 
in the metaphor MORE IS UP (e.g., “prices are up,” “the temperature is rising”). These 
linkages are made possible by a series of “compressions” in which many experiences are 
consolidated into a single image or concept and the different images or concepts then 
related to one another.66 Unlike image schemata, compressions are the result of conscious 
acts of understanding. This ongoing process of compression gives rise to an emergent 
structure of metaphors and concepts that, by consolidating lots of sensory and imaginal 
input into a single mental entity, frees up the mind for more complicated and reflexive 
cognitive operations.67 For example, this capacity to construct and connect different 
“mental spaces” enables us to relate representations that in the real world are 
incompatible with one another.68  
Relating these normally incompatible entities creates the possibility of 
                                                
65 Mark Johnson, e.g., defines “metaphor” as “a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project 
patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different kind” (The Body 
in the Mind, xiv-xv). Alternatively, psychologist Annette Karmiloff-Smith describes the same activity in 
terms of “representational redescription” (Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive 
Science (MIT Press, 1996), 15). Some cognitive researchers have identified the angular gyrus as the part of 
the brain primarily responsible for metaphorical thinking. (See Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and Edward 
Hubbard, “Hearing Colors, Tasting Shapes,” Scientific America-American Edition 288, no. 5 (2003): 52–59 
and A Journey to the Center of Your Mind, Podcast, A Taste of TEDTalks, October 21, 2007.) 
66 Fauconnier and Turner offer the example of a commencement ceremony or, even more compact, the 
action of a graduate flipping the tassel from one side of the mortarboard to the other. In these symbolic 
actions, the whole college experience is “compressed” into a single moment and a single image or concept 
(The Way We Think, 31). 
67 Ibid., 393. 
68 By “mental spaces,” Fauconnier and Turner mean “small conceptual packets constructed as we think and 
talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. They are very partial assemblies containing elements, 
structured by frames and cognitive models” (ibid., 102). 
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“counterfactual reasoning” and “presupposition projection,” which are essential to 
planning and pursuing goals.69 Most essentially, however, through metaphor we are able 
to make sense of less familiar phenomena and abstract concepts by linking them to 
objects and experiences that are more concrete and familiar. Metaphor also makes it 
possible for us to relate two known entities in such a way that results in a “tectonic 
reconfiguration” of our field of meaning.70 On account of these processes, human beings 
can construct meaning not only through incremental accumulation of experience but also 
in gestalt shifts. Thanks to metaphor, it is possible for us to think genuinely new, creative 
thoughts.71 
 While going into great detail would distract from the focus of this chapter on the 
role of imagination in meaning-construction, it is imperative at this point to note the role 
of judgment in the process. Mental images and metaphors make possible the generation 
of new, intelligent understandings about one’s sensory and imaginal experiences, but 
those understandings can be mistaken. For example, you can have the insight that it is 
raining based on the sensation of something wet continuously striking the top of one’s 
head and then realize that, in fact, someone is spraying you with a garden hose. Hence, 
understanding is not yet knowing.  
 In order for one’s efforts to construct meaning to progress from understanding to 
knowing (i.e., from intelligent consciousness to “rational consciousness”), one must 
arrive at a “virtually unconditioned” through the exercise of reflective judgment. That is 
                                                
69 Ibid., 30.  
70 Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 63-4. 
71 Cf. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 200-1. 
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to say that one must grasp both the conditions that would have to be fulfilled for 
something to be true and the fact that those conditions are fulfilled.72 Recognizing this 
role of reflective judgment in human knowing and meaning-construction allows us to 
affirm “discovery” theorists’ belief in objective meanings as well as “constructivists’” 
insistence on the necessity of human activity in constructing meaning without 
succumbing to the fallacies of either theory. 
 
Sign and Symbol 
 In addition to metaphor, two other concepts prove indispensable for 
understanding the complexities of human meaning-construction, namely, “sign” and 
“symbol”. As a young child’s cognitive capacities develop, it acquires the ability to think 
of images as representing something other than themselves, that is, as “signs”. Language 
is the primary manifestation of signifying, though other instances abound—for example, 
facial expressions, gestures, and fabricated signs (e.g., traffic signals). The relationship 
between many signs and their referents is arbitrary, the result of human decision and 
convention. However, between some signs and their referents there exists an intrinsic 
connection.73 To such signs we give the name “symbols”.74 Natural objects, artifacts, 
                                                
72 For Lonergan’s detailed explanation of reflective judgment and the “virtually unconditioned,” see 
chapters 9 and 10 of Insight. 
73 To quote Paul Ricoeur, “I shall always understand by symbol, in a much more primitive sense, 
analogical meanings which are spontaneously formed and immediately significant” (Paul Ricoeur, The 
Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 18). Many other authors 
have defined symbols by virtue of their participation in the reality they symbolize. (See, e.g., Karl Rahner, 
“The Theology of the Symbol,” Theological Investigations 4 (1966): 221–52; Paul Tillich, “The Meaning 
and Justification of Religious Symbols,” in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: 
New York University Press, 1961), 3–11.)  
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historical events, deeds, gestures, persons, and dreams can all be symbols. Though 
symbols always carry this potential connection with the reality they symbolize (e.g., 
water symbolizing cleansing), human intelligence and intentionality are required to 
establish this connection.75 In other words, the concept of a symbol presumes prior 
experience and background knowledge on the part of the symbolizer.76 We cannot simply 
read the meaning of a symbol on its surface any more than we can simply see the world 
“as it is.” Both are always acts of interpretation.77  
 Symbols are further distinguished from signs by their affective valence. Where a 
mere sign—for example, a stop signal—is unlikely to elicit much of an affective response 
from anyone, symbols like a national flag or a picture of a loved one touch something 
deep within the human person, calling forth a response not just of the intellect but of 
                                                                                                                                            
74 The term “symbol” is employed in very different ways in different fields and often even by different 
authors in the same field. For example, Judy Deloache, who has conducted extensive research on 
“symbolic” thinking, intends something closer to what I have described as “mental images” when she 
speaks of “symbols”. Others (e.g., Paul Tillich and Avery Dulles) use Philip Wheelwright’s term “steno 
symbols” to distinguish what I describe as signs proper from “tensive symbols,” what I would regard as 
symbols proper. 
75 What Fauconnier and Turner say of language generally might be appropriately said of symbol 
specifically, namely, that it “does not represent meaning directly; instead it systematically prompts for the 
construction of meaning” (The Way We Think, 142; cf. Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 177). Numerous 
studies in cognitive science support this understanding of the cognitive functioning of symbols. (See, e.g., 
Judy S. DeLoache, “Dual Representation and Young Children’s Use of Scale Models,” Child Development 
71, no. 2 (2000): 335; Judy S. DeLoache, Olga A. Peralta de Mendoza, and Kathy N. Anderson, “Multiple 
Factors in Early Symbol Use: Instructions, Similarity, and Age in Understanding a Symbol-Referent 
Relation,” Cognitive Development 14 (1999): 299–312; Paul Bloom and Lori Markson, “Intention and 
Analogy in Children’s Naming of Pictorial Representations,” Psychological Science 9, no. 3 (May 1998): 
200–204; Paul Bloom and Lori Markson, “The Role of Intentionality in Children’s Naming of Pictures” 
(presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Washington D.C., 
1997); cf. S. A. Gelman and K. S. Ebeling, “The Influence of Shape and Representational Status on 
Children’s Naming” (biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Washington 
D.C., 1997).) 
76 As Susanne Langer says, “The mind, like all other organs, can draw its sustenance only from the 
surrounding world; our metaphysical symbols must spring from reality” (Philosophy in a New Key, 291). 
77 In the words of theologian Louis-Marie Chauvet, “Reality is never present to us except in a mediated 
way, which is to say, constructed out of the symbolic network of the culture which fashions us” (Symbol 
and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical 
Press, 1995), 84. 
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feeling as well.78 By virtue of their affective valence, symbols, unlike intellectual 
concepts, can serve as carriers of value as well as of intelligible meaning.79 It is with 
reference to this capacity that Lonergan notes, “symbols….reveal the attitude and the 
orientation of a person in the world and towards other persons.”80 
Another trait that distinguishes symbols from signs in the more limited sense is 
the excess of meaning found in the former.81 Where a sign answers a single question or 
conveys a single, narrow meaning (e.g., a stop sign signals that one should stop), a 
symbol incites the mind to new thoughts and raises a multitude of questions. The 
meaning of a symbol can never be exhausted or strictly determined.82 In consequence, 
every symbol is open to many interpretations.83 For example, water is commonly 
interpreted as a symbol of purity and cleansing as well as of life and of destruction. 
Symbols’ multivalence gives rise to unique possibilities and challenges. On the one hand, 
it can lead to confusion and conflicting interpretations. On the other, it makes possible a 
kind of knowing that is inaccessible through empirical observation and conceptual 
understanding and yet indispensable for human meaning-construction and living. 
                                                
78 Cf. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1961), 129. 
79 Cf. Walter Conn, Christian Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 234. 
80 Bernard Lonergan, “Time and Meaning,” in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Philosophical and 
Theological Papers, 1958-1964, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E Crowe, and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996), 99. 
81 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970), 38; Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1983), 132; 
Roger Haight, Jesus Symbol of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 201. 
82 As Chauvet puts it, “Symbolism is precisely the very impossibility of completing our thinking process, 
grasped by it as we always-already are as subjects together with our ‘world’” (Symbol and Sacrament, 533. 
Italics original.). 
83 Hence Ricoeur’s famous dictum: “The symbol gives rise to thought” (The Symbolism of Evil, 348). 
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By virtue of their multivalence and affective charge, symbols are able (in the 
words of Avery Dulles) to “arouse tacit awareness of things too vast, subtle, or complex 
to be grasped in an explicit way.”84 This manner of knowing is not a form of intellectual 
mastery; it is not achieved by detailed analysis or comprehensive explanation of the 
phenomenon in question. Rather, it involves the integration of diverse ideas, impressions, 
memories, feelings, and experiences that defy conceptual synthesis and unites the subject 
with the reality mediated through the symbol.85 Ricoeur explains, “the symbol in fact is 
the very movement of the primary meaning which makes us share the hidden meaning 
and thus assimilates us to the thing symbolized, without our being able to get hold of the 
similarity intellectually.”86 More concretely speaking, the knowledge mediated by 
symbols is akin to the knowledge one acquires of another person. Human beings are 
incredibly complex entities, so much so that we remain mysteries even to ourselves until 
our dying day. Yet we nevertheless can claim to know another person well, even 
intimately, because we have shared experiences, feelings, and concerns with them. This is 
the kind of intimate knowledge connoted in the Hebrew word “yada” ([dy) that appears 
frequently in the Hebrew Scriptures87. It is a knowledge that comes from participating in 
the reality that one would know. 
Therefore, while symbols do not bestow declarative knowledge or conceptual 
                                                
84 Dulles, Models of Revelation, 257. 
85 Cf. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 147. Hence the etymology of the Greek term “symbolein” (to 
gather together). Emphasizing the integrative, holistic manner of knowing facilitated by symbols, Chauvet 
writes, “symbolic action ‘embraces’ the whole of the subject, rather than directing itself solely to the brain”  
(Symbol and Sacrament, 265). 
86 Paul Ricoeur, “The Symbol: Food for Thought,” Philosophy Today 4 (1960): 200. 
87 E.g., Gen 4:1; Deut 34:10; Job 18:21; Ps 25:4. 
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clarity, the knowledge they do bestow is in many ways deeper and more crucial for our 
living as human beings, who most essentially are not analytical, computing machines but 
rather meaning- and value-seeking beings-in-relationship.88 Symbols’ importance 
becomes more evident when we consider the paradoxical situation of human beings in the 
world: We desire to know all that can be known. Yet, no matter how much we learn, 
there is always much more that we do not know. In the meantime, we must negotiate the 
concrete demands of living in the world. With comprehensive understanding of reality 
beyond our reach, we have to utilize alternative means of orienting ourselves in the world 
and of relating to that which is unknown or imperfectly understood.89 Part and parcel of 
this exigency is the matter of integrating the sensitive psyche, which, as noted above, is 
beset by anxiety in the absence of meaning.90 Symbols satisfy this need.91 As images that 
are partly concrete and yet intellectually inexhaustible, they enable us to imagine, name, 
ask about, and grow in understanding of what is initially unknown and to achieve some 
level of internal integration in the absence of complete knowledge. Put otherwise, they 
mediate on the “human scale” a reality that exceeds human comprehending. Since we 
never acquire complete knowledge in this life, the human need for symbols is 
                                                
88 As Chauvet puts it, “Far, then, from being opposed to the ‘real,’ as the reigning logic of signs would 
have it, the symbol touches the most real aspect of ourselves and our world” (Symbol and Sacrament, 123). 
Haight applies the term “symbolic realism” to this capacity of symbols to manifest reality (Jesus Symbol of 
God, 11). 
89 Lonergan describes this realm of which one lacks knowledge as the “known unknown” and the “field of 
mystery and myth” (Insight, 557; cf. Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 
77).  
90 Cf. Lonergan, Insight, 570, and Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, 212. 
91 Cf. Lonergan, Insight, 557; Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 289. 
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permanent.92  
 In sum, symbols and symbolic thinking are essential to any meaning-construction 
that we would consider genuinely human. We depend on symbols for making sense of 
our world, achieving personal integration, and, as we will see later in the chapter, relating 
to the divine. For this reason human beings have received the appellations the “symbolic 
species” and the “symbolic animal”.93 As I continue to develop my argument through this 
chapter and those that follow, it will become even more evident how important symbols 
are to human existence and to a solution to the current struggles of American Catholics. 
 
Meaning Frameworks and Worlds 
 In the preceding sections, we have seen how imaginative processes, including the 
generation and manipulation of mental images and the organization of image schemata, 
create a basic mental framework through which human beings can interpret and make 
sense of sensory and imaginal input. With the above discussion of metaphor and symbol, 
we began to see how humans, while always rooted in the bodily and concrete, are able to 
construct an understanding of what they cannot experience directly. Fauconnier and 
Turner, Robert Masson, and others argue that this capacity for metaphoric and symbolic 
                                                
92 Cf. Lonergan: “Though the field of mystery is contracted by the advance of knowledge, it cannot be 
eliminated from human living. There always is the further question” (ibid., 570). 
93 As Lonergan explains, the human being “is regarded as the symbolic animal, whose knowledge is 
mediated by symbols, whose actions are informed by symbols, whose existence in its most characteristic 
features is constituted by a self-understanding and by commitments specified by symbols” (Bernard 
Lonergan, “Religious Experience,” in A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. 
Frederick E. Crowe (Paulist Press, 1985), 115; cf. Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 26; Terrence William Deacon, The 
Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Human Brain (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1997); Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 27-8).  
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thinking was the very condition for the emergence of human culture as we know it, with 
its languages, number systems, rituals and sacraments, art, technology, games, and 
money. Still, at this point we have only glimpsed the beginnings. We have not yet come 
into full view of the rich world of meaning we all experience on a daily basis—a world of 
complicated relationships, life goals, personal and communal causes, culture, and 
religion. Only when we arrive at an account of this fuller world of meaning will our 
inquiry into the source of American Catholics’ sense of meaninglessness come to a head. 
How, then, does human meaning-construction advance from the emergence of 
image schemata that make possible basic survival-oriented functioning in the organism’s 
environment to a more sophisticated framework of meaning that enables human beings to 
live in a “world”? Crucial to answering this question is recognizing that meaning-
construction is a communal activity.94 None of the developmental processes described 
above ever occurs in a social vacuum. At the same time that young human beings are 
developing image schemata based on emerging patterns in their interactions with their 
environment, they are also imitating other human beings’ behaviors and developing 
language schemata based on their verbal interactions with them.95 Though image 
schemata initially play the dominant role in incipient efforts at constructing meaning (and 
always remain primary to an extent), language plays an increasingly significant role as 
                                                
94 Cognitive research substantiates this commonsense observation. See, e.g., Staats and Lohr, “Images, 
Language, Emotions, and Personality”; L. L. Namy, “What’s in a Name When It Isn’t a Word? 17-Month-
Olds Mapping of Nonverbal Symbols to Object Categories,” Infancy 2 (2001): 83; J. S. DeLoache et al., 
“Grasping the Nature of Pictures,” Psychological Science 9 (1998): 208; cf. T. C. Callaghan, “Early 
Understanding and Production of Graphic Symbols,” Child Development 70 (1999): 1314–24. 
95 See Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, 49, on the distinction between schemata 
that depend upon the mastery of language and those that do not. 
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linguistic competence develops.96  
Language is but one communal asset that contributes to each individual’s efforts 
to construct meaning.97 Others include nonverbal cues, metaphors, symbols, traditions, 
rituals, and stories. These various mediations of interpersonal meaning—which constitute 
the core of a “culture”98—facilitate the construction of a complex mental framework for 
interpreting one’s experience that is far more extensive than anything that could be 
constructed on the basis of personal experience alone and they do so far more rapidly 
than would be possible for an unaided individual.99 Noting the pervasiveness of this 
process, Lonergan explains: 
It remains, however, that these operations occur within a context and that this context is 
all the more complex and extensive the richer the culture and the more nuanced the social 
arrangements one has inherited. Nor is this context just some inert datum that attains 
influence only in the measure that is it noted, understood, verified, evaluated. Rather it 
exerts a major influence on the interest that motivates our attention, on the language that 
selects what we can name and study, on the preunderstanding that underpins our further 
advance, on the opinions that have to be revised before anything novel or new can be 
entertained or accepted.100 
 
In short, from the very beginning of life, the way we construct meaning is subtly yet 
powerfully influenced by the people and culture around us. 
Above I quoted Fauconnier’s and Turner’s conclusion that humans’ meaning-
                                                
96 As Mezirow explains, one typically attempts to construe—that is, understand or interpret—one’s 
experience first through “presentational construal” and then through “propositional construal” if necessary 
(ibid., 33). 
97 Every language carries with it a distinct way of understanding various people, places, situations, and 
phenomena, which each of us internalizes unwittingly as we learn the language. Mezirow identifies a 
number of other cultural influences on meaning-construction in Transformative Dimensions of Adult 
Learning, 43. 
98 Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, xi. Clifford Geertz offers a more expansive definition of culture as 
“an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbolic forms by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (The Interpretation 
of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89). 
99 To this point, Lonergan says, “it is only with respect to the available common meanings that the 
individual grows in experience, understanding, judgment” (Method in Theology, 79). 
100 Lonergan, “Religious Experience,” 126. 
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constructing activity is guided by the overarching goal “achieve human scale.” One of the 
concerns that distinguishes “human scale” from “animal scale” (to riff on Fauconnier’s 
and Turner’s term) is the mental demand to “come up with a story.” Animals do not 
worry about where their life is going or who they really are; their primary—and often 
sole—concern is survival. But for human beings, who through symbolic thought 
transcend the immediacy of biological needs and satisfactions, these existential matters 
are of paramount concern. For us living is a work of art, a story we weave with ourselves 
as the protagonist.101 A life lacking in such artistry and movement is viewed as an 
unfulfilled life. Beset with these post-biological compulsions, human beings have a need 
for existential integration that other animals do not. 
 Communal stories and symbols are the indispensable mortar by means of which 
we construct an integrated life.102 A symbol, to borrow some language from Sandra 
Schneiders, includes “an intuition of relationship of parts to a whole….that not only 
unifies seemingly unrelated facts and experiences but also facilitates their 
interpretation.”103 It “illuminates the parts while the newly meaningful parts build up the 
whole.”104 Lonergan adds, that, beyond integrating our perceptions and experiences, 
symbols “intimate to us at once the kind of being we are to be and the kind of world in 
                                                
101 Cf. ibid., Insight, 210. 
102 See Tilley, Faith, 74-87 for an enriching discussion of the different types of stories communities share 
in their traditions. 
103 Sandra M. Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred Scripture (San 
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), 104. In this particular passage, Schneiders is describing her 
meaning of “image”, which is richer than the use of the term as developed here. The richness of her notion 
of image makes it appropriate to apply her words to the present discussion of symbol. 
104 Ibid., The Revelatory Text, 104. 
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which we become our true selves.”105 Seizing upon the same insight, Schneiders 
identifies three “master images” (we might say “master symbols”) that decisively guide 
one’s participation in reality—one’s God-image, self-image, and world-image.106 These 
master images or symbols give expression to our “hunches” about certain truths of human 
existence that elude precise formulation or explanation.107  
Because we desire greater clarity than symbols can give, we tell stories. Most 
basically, a story is a symbol or group of symbols expounded in narrative fashion.108 
When a story pertains to some central concern of human existence or to realities that 
transcend human comprehension, we refer to it as a “myth”. “Myth” should not be 
understood here in the pejorative sense of fantastical stories or fairytales. While myths 
may devolve into stories that have no bearing upon actual reality, “myth” in the more 
general sense is, in the words of Terrence Tilley, “a story that sets up a world.”109 
Without yet getting into what Tilley means by a “world,” we can say that myth 
                                                
105 Lonergan, “Reality, Myth, and Symbol,” 34. Speaking to the same point, Ricoeur writes, “the 
consciousness of self seems to constitute itself at its lowest level by means of symbolism and to work out 
an abstract language only subsequently, by means of a spontaneous hermeneutics of its primary symbols” 
(The Symbolism of Evil, 9). Damasio likewise writes, “You cannot have a self without wakefulness, 
arousal, and the formation of images” (Descartes’ Error, 238). 
106 Again, Schneiders’s meaning of “image” here more closely approximates my meaning of “symbol” 
than it does my meaning of “image”. Ray Hart likewise employs the phrase “master image” to indicate that 
by which is known rather than that which is known (Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an 
Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 304. Hart’s application of 
the term is less selective than Schneiders’s. As compared to Schneiders’s three master images, Hart cites 
numerous examples including Covenant, Israel, New Jerusalem, Second Adam, Son of Man, Kingdom of 
God, black power, and the Southern way of life (see Hart, Unfinished Man, 301). 
107 Lonergan, “Reality, Myth, and Symbol,” 33. 
108 Cf. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 237. Stating the relationship inversely, Lonergan describes 
symbols as “a more elementary type of story” (“Reality, Myth, and Symbol,” 34). 
109 Tilley, Faith, 76. Italics original. Roger Haight defines “myth” as “a traditional story that represents 
deep truths about the world, nature, and human existence” (Roger Haight, “Sin and Grace,” in Systematic 
Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, ed. Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, 2nd ed. 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 389). 
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synthesizes into narrative form an account of reality that enables us to make some sense 
of obscure aspects of our experience. In this sense, myths are not the crutch of the feeble-
minded and eccentric but rather a cognitive and existential necessity of every living 
person. The way the average layperson (and perhaps many scientists) imagines the 
universe originating in a “Big Bang” functions as a myth just as the creation stories of 
Genesis 1-2 do for others. 
Most of the symbols and myths operative in our consciousness are inherited rather 
than our own creations. As David Tracy says, “we find ourselves most surely not through 
out own achievements but through and in the classic signs and symbols scattered in our 
world.”110 As Tracy suggests by designating certain symbols as “classics,” some symbols 
and stories are more potent than others in their capacity for helping us to make sense of 
reality. These expressions of the human spirit arise within a particular time and culture 
but, because of their power for eliciting thought about our most deep-rooted concerns, 
exercise a claim to attention for all peoples and times.111 Homer’s Iliad, Dostoyevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment, the Buddha, Gandhi, the French Revolution, and the American 
Civil Rights Movement might all rightly be considered classics. Such texts, symbols, 
persons, and events invariably and irrevocably alter the imagination of anyone who 
engages them seriously. It is largely thanks to these inherited mediations of meaning that 
each of us is able to advance from living in an environment of sensory stimuli to living in 
                                                
110 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New 
York: Crossroad, 1981), 307. 
111 Of these classics Tracy says, “If, even once, a person has experienced a text, a gesture, an image, an 
event, a person with the force of recognition: ‘This is important! This does make and will demand a 
difference!’ then one has experienced a candidate for classic status” (ibid., 115-6). 
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a world rich with meaning. 
Through the accumulation of these socially-mediated carriers of meaning, 
language schemata, and image schemata, human beings gradually develop what Jack 
Mezirow terms “meaning perspectives”.112 Mezirow describes a meaning perspective as 
“a habitual set of expectations that constitutes an orienting frame of reference that we use 
in projecting our symbolic models [i.e., schemata] and that serves as a (usually tacit) 
belief system for interpreting and evaluating the meaning of experience.”113 Many image 
schemata, language schemata, symbols, stories, beliefs, and values contribute to the shape 
of a particular meaning perspective. Meaning perspectives are further distinguished from 
schemata in that, “Rather than simply serving as frameworks for classifying current 
experience, meaning perspectives are informed by an horizon of possibility that is 
anticipated and represents value assumptions regarding ends, norms, and criteria of 
judgment.”114 Though schemata contribute to the development of meaning perspectives, 
meaning perspectives ultimately operate as the criteria by which schemata are selectively 
employed in interpreting one’s experiences.  
As Mezirow notes, various thinkers have employed different terms to describe 
such interpretive frames of reference. These include “lifeworlds,” “paradigms,” 
“schemas,” “language games,” and “horizons”. Lonergan is one such thinker to employ 
                                                
112 Mezirow identifies three types of meaning perspectives—epistemic, sociolinguistic, and psychological. 
(See Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, 43.) In later works, Mezirow refers to these meaning 
perspectives as “frames of reference”. (See Learning as Transformation.) 
113 Ibid., Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, 42. 
114 Ibid., 49. Mezirow adds that meaning perspectives are also distinguished from schemata in that the 
former “reflect developmental stage perspectives, cognitive and learning styles, and perceptual filters as 
well as social ideologies, professional or academic disciplines, cultural and linguistic codes, self-concepts, 
introjected value systems, and predispositions shaped by personality and neurosis” (ibid.). 
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the language of “horizon,” though there are some key differences between what he has in 
mind and Mezirow’s meaning perspective.115 Notwithstanding the differences, both 
thinkers indicate that these interpretive frameworks (meaning perspectives and horizons, 
respectively) are influenced by the subject’s experiences, education, language, 
socialization, and concerns. Adopting the language of “horizon” from the analogy of a 
person’s field of vision, Lonergan describes a horizon as the limit of what one can see 
from a given vantage point. Applied to a person’s cognitive operations, one’s horizon is 
the limit of what one can or cares to ask about. One’s horizon is thus determined by one’s 
particular concerns.116 Since different concerns occupy one’s mind at different times, a 
person’s horizon shifts as their consciousness flows out of one pattern and into another. 
As Lonergan puts it, “the flow of consciousness is the subject with his concern 
constructing a horizon that selects his world.”117 This highly significant sentence merits 
some unpacking. 
First, depending on what concern prevails at a given moment, one will pattern 
experience differently at different times. Lonergan explains that intellectual wonder 
generates an intellectual patterning of experience in which one is open, not merely to 
things as they appear or things as related to one’s own narrow interests, but rather to 
things as they are. By contrast, concern for how one is perceived by others generates a 
dramatic patterning of experience in which one is more acutely aware of the roles one is 
                                                
115 For example, Mezirow limits meaning perspectives to three different types while Lonergan’s usage of 
“horizon” suggests a concept that is at once more general and more variable in its manifestations. For an in-
depth explication of this term in Lonergan’s work, see David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 9-21.  
116 Cf. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 89–90. 
117 Ibid., 85. 
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playing in the drama of life and how well one is playing it. Each pattern of experience 
facilitates the construction of one’s horizon in a different way, inclining one to pay more 
attention to some input and less to others. The cumulative result of all that one has 
experienced, learned, and imagined—which is invariably experienced in different 
patterns throughout one’s life and on any given day—is one’s “world”. This concept—
often referred to by the German “Weltanschauung”—is a crucial one in philosophy and 
theology, as it is in this dissertation.118 A “world” in this sense is not the Earth on which 
we live but rather the imaginative construct of a particular person. Due to the limits of 
human perception, knowing, and affectivity, none of us ever experiences or knows reality 
in its fullness. The portion of reality that one knows and is concerned about is one’s 
“world”. Our world, in other words, is “a horizon of horizons,” the sum total of all one’s 
horizons, that is, of all one has experienced, imagined, and asked about.119 Lonergan 
summarizes, “The subject’s concern determines his horizon, and his horizon selects his 
world.”120  
One’s world in turn determines how one interprets all subsequent learning and 
experience. This interpretation goes far beyond real-time processing of sensory input or 
even reproducing images in the mind (what Schneiders and others call “synthetic” and 
                                                
118 In philosophy, see, e.g., Heidegger’s Being and Time, which has greatly influenced subsequent 
philosophical reflection. For a recent example in theology, see Sandra M. Schneiders, Buying the Field: 
Catholic Religious Life in Mission to the World (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2013) in which the 
author builds her argument upon a foundational analysis of the meaning of “world”. This concept has 
likewise made its way into the popular lexicon and even into sociological studies. (See, e.g., Amy Mitchell 
et al., “Political Polarization & Media Habits,” Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project, October 21, 
2014, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/.) 
119 Lonergan, Topics in Education, 85; cf. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 287. Elsewhere Lonergan 
speaks of one’s world “lying within” one’s horizon (Phenomenology and Logic, 288). 
120 Ibid., 85. 
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“reproductive” imagination, respectively).121 As Schnieders explains, constructing a 
world requires a highly sophisticated “capacity to construct reality, to create dynamic 
images through which we interpret and respond to reality not as a collection of fragments 
but as a complex whole composed of wholes.”122 One’s world is thus the result of the 
human powers of imagination operating at their fullest capacity. It is the highest synthesis 
of all one’s experiences, imaginings, questions, and concerns—the magnum opus of the 
human imagination. This synthesis is different for every person (in some cases very 
different, in others less so). The world of some is a realm of beauty and wonder; for 
others it is the product of impersonal, mechanistic processes. One’s world may be limited 
to one’s own narrow concerns, seldom overlapping with the worlds of others, or, to the 
extent that one overcomes bias and yields to the human potential for unrestricted 
questioning and valuing, one’s world encompasses a wide sweep of reality. In short, 
one’s world is what gives coherence and meaning in the richest sense to a person’s life. 
 
The Centrality of Imagination in Human Living 
 Along the way I have offered occasional comments about the benefits of 
possessing these imaginative capacities, but, here at the end of this examination of the 
meaning-construction process, it behooves us to acknowledge more directly just how 
                                                
121 Schneiders, The Revelatory Text, 102-3. In The Wake of the Imagination, Kearney discusses how 
similar categories for imaginative functions have been used and debated over the years. Immanuel Kant 
was the first to make the influential distinction between the “productive” and “reproductive” functions of 
the “transcendental” and “mimetic” imagination, respectively. The English romantic, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, made a similar distinction between “imagination” proper (i.e., productive/synthetic imagination) 
and “fantasy” (i.e., mimetic imagination). (See The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 167-71, 182.) 
122 Schneiders, Buying the Field, 37. 
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central imagination is in constituting a life that we would recognize as fully human. In so 
doing, I would not oppose imaginative and rational thought to one another. The latter 
arises from the former, and the interplay of the two is essential to the sort of sophisticated 
meaning-construction described in this chapter. Abstract conceptualization and reasoning, 
scientific inquiry, mathematical proofs, even what we commonly regard as “literal” 
statements all depend upon symbolic and metaphorical processes.123 Moreover, contrary 
to common misconceptions about the nature of mathematical and scientific method, 
current research in multiple fields indicates that new discoveries and solutions to 
problems most often arise through image-centered thinking.124 For his part, Antonio 
Damasio defines thought itself as the process of ordering mental images.125 On this 
understanding, to characterize certain patterns of thought as imaginative and others as 
abstract is a matter of distinguishing degrees of proximity to the originating image rather 
than differences in kind. For this reason, Mark Johnson argues, “any adequate account of 
meaning and rationality must give a central place to embodied and imaginative structures 
of understanding by which we grasp our world.”126 
Beyond providing the material of thought and a basic interpretive lens, 
imagination gives direction to our living. As Ricoeur says, “One lives only that which 
                                                
123 Cf. Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 52; Schneiders, The Revelatory Text, 123 
124 See, e.g., Michael Polanyi, Tacit Dimension (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Publisher Inc., 1983) and the 
body of research on “analogical reasoning,” e.g., D. H. Helman, ed., Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of 
Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, and Philosophy (Boston: Springer, 2010). 
125 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 89. 
126 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xiii. Masson likewise asserts, “The imaginative aspects of cognition—
metonymy, metaphor, and mental images—are crucial and primary, not derivative and secondary” (Without 
Metaphor, No Saving God, 33). 
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one imagines.”127 Famed educator Parker Palmer similarly asserts, “Our seeing shapes 
our being.”128 Even executing relatively simple actions—for example, locating an object 
or walking to a particular destination—requires visualization of the action to be 
completed. In fact, it is especially in the case of day-to-day living and real-time thinking 
and deciding that we rely most heavily upon rapid acts of imagination rather than 
discursive reasoning.129  
As much could be said about the “imagination” of animals, but humans’ more 
sophisticated imaginative capabilities also generate ontological possibilities beyond those 
accessible to animals. Animals are more or less bound to the concrete and present and 
therefore unable to consider counterfactuals or project future possibilities. Human beings, 
by contrast, are not constrained to the same extent by a limited set of instincts and 
perceptual capacities.130 Our ontological potential is expanded exponentially by our 
                                                
127 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 278. Ricoeur adds, “even Life is a symbol, an image, before being 
experienced and lived.” In the same vein, David Tracy writes, “human beings need story, symbol, image, 
myth, and fiction to disclose to their imaginations some genuinely new possibilities for existence” (David 
Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1996), 207. Maria Harris similarly notes that people are not moved by direct appeal to the will so much as 
by inciting their imaginations to hoping and acting (Teaching and Religious Imagination (San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1987), 20). 
128 Parker J. Palmer, To Know as We Are Known (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), xi. 
129 Cf. Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 179-80. Psychologist Justin Barrett adds, “what we say 
we think and know and what we think and know in real-time problem solving sometimes are two entirely 
different things” (“Theological Correctness: Cognitive Constraint and the Study of Religion,” Method & 
Theory in the Study of Religion 11 (1999), 325). 
130 While human beings have often been distinguished from other animals and their primitive ancestors by 
our use of reason (hence appellations like “homo sapiens” and “rational animal”), these considerations 
suggest that it is really our imaginations from which we primarily think and live. In fact, researchers have 
recently pointed out that one thing that distinguishes human beings from other animals is the size of the 
angular gyrus, the part of the brain primarily responsible for metaphorical thinking, which is 
disproportionately (eight times) larger in humans than in apes and monkeys. (See Ramachandran and 
Hubbard, “Hearing Colors, Tasting Shapes,” 58, and A Journey to the Center of Your Mind.) 
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ability to imagine and become what we presently are not.131 This is what Ricoeur means 
when he refers to imagination as “par excellence, the instituting and constituting of what 
is humanly possible.” Indeed, “in imagining possibilities, human beings act as prophets 
of their own existence.”132 To exercise the sort of control over one’s existence implied in 
Ricoeur’s words—in other words, to fashion a “life”—involves a number of highly 
imaginative tasks, including establishing and maintaining a sense of identity, customs, 
and relationships with others.133 Theologian William Shea explains, “Human action rests 
on the ability of human beings to project in imagination an ideal for the sake of which the 
present can be understood and transformed. The ideal promotes a unification of feeling 
and understanding which in turn becomes a unification of action.”134 Stating the matter 
negatively, Robert Doran says, “Forgetfulness of the images reduces and in the limit 
eliminates the probability that we will have the insights we need, not only to get on with 
our individual lives, but also to fulfill our historical responsibilities.”135  
In addition to providing direction for our living, imagination also channels the 
emotion and feeling necessary for motivating action. Without feeling and emotion, we 
                                                
131 As a matter of fact, cognitive research has shown that the mere act of imagining can stimulate 
development in the brain. (See I. G. Meister et al., “Playing Piano in the Mind: An fMRI Study on Music 
Imagery and Performance in Pianists,” Cognitive Brain Research 19, no. 3 (2004): 219–28.) 
132 Paul Ricoeur, “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” in History and Truth (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1965), 127. 
133 Antonio Damasio puts it this way: “My view then is that having a mind means that an organism forms 
neural representations which can become images, be manipulated in a process called thought, and 
eventually influence behavior by helping predict the future, plan accordingly, and choose the next action” 
(Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 90). 
134 William Shea, “Feeling, Religious Symbol and Action,” in The Pedagogy of God’s Image: Essays on 
Symbol and the Religious Imagination, ed. Robert Masson (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982), 86. 
135 Robert M. Doran, “Reception and Elemental Meaning,” Toronto Journal of Theology 20, no. 2 (2004), 
155. Doran is supported in this claim by research in behavior science. (See Staats and Lohr, “Images, 
Language, Emotions, and Personality,” 99. 
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would lack the motivation to do any of the intentional actions (e.g., walking, eating, 
lifting objects) involved in our day-to-day living. Even mundane actions such as these 
require some degree of attention, and, as Damasio observes, “Somehow, what does not 
come naturally and automatically through the primacy of feeling cannot be maintained in 
the mind.”136 As we saw earlier, there exists a close relationship between imagination and 
affectivity. Ray Hart points out that among the whole range of mental acts, imagination is 
“closest in proximity to the event itself, and so aims to embody the extensional wholeness 
of the event without loss of significant feeling-tone.”137 Explanatory, abstract thinking, by 
contrast, is less proximate and therefore less affectively charged. For this reason, 
explanation, in the words of Lonergan, “does not give man a home.”138  
Human beings are ineluctably concrete creatures. A consequence of being 
concrete creatures is that, cognitively and affectively, we are most at home on the level of 
the concrete, easily visualized, and tangibly felt. This was the import of Fauconnier’s and 
Turner’s, concept of the “human scale”. Cognitive linguists like Eleanor Rosch testify 
that the mental categories that are most “human-sized”—what researchers in this field 
term “BASIC categories”—are those that are a function of our interaction with our 
                                                
136 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 154. More colloquially, Shea says, “every action requires some minimal 
unification of heart and mind” (Shea, Feeling, Religious Symbol and Action, 86). 
137 Hart, Unfinished Man, 231. Along similar lines, Aristotle writes, “When the imagination moves it does 
not move without desire” (“De anima,” 433a). 
138 Lonergan, Insight, 570. This is not to say that explanatory, abstract thought is unimportant. Imagination 
is not sufficient in itself for authentic cognition. Lonergan has argued compellingly for the need for an 
explicit metaphysics, which through an emphasis on the role of judgment guards against distortions of 
mythical, symbolic thinking (see Chapter 17 of Insight). This need will become more apparent in my next 
chapter. 
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environment and imagined with ease (e.g., chairs, tables cats).139 Because of our need for 
such concreteness, Lonergan explains, explanatory knowledge “can become effective in 
[one’s] concrete living only if the content….can be embodied in images that release 
feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words.”140  
Another reason imagination is crucial for human living is its role in facilitating 
unification within the person.141 As we have seen even from this relatively narrow 
account of human meaning-construction, human beings are unfathomably complex 
organisms. Like other animals, we are constituted by physical, chemical, biological, 
organic, and psychic levels of integration.142 Unlike other animals, we have the additional 
need for integration of these lower manifolds with intellectual activity. Each manifold 
exerts its own demands that must be met for the sake of the overall health of the 
organism. So, Lonergan explains, “if developments on different levels are not to conflict, 
                                                
139 Cf. Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 43-4. These easily imagined categories are the earliest 
to develop in childhood and the ones that form most naturally across the human lifetime. Masson notes, 
“CSR [Cognitive Science of Religion] contends that believers frequently operate at the basic level 
theologically for the same reason that professional scientists in everyday life rely on naive physics and 
biology: representation and computation at the basic intuitive level in such situations is often more 
appropriate and efficient than complex theoretical analysis and calculation” (Without Metaphor, No Saving 
God, 180). 
140 Lonergan, Insight, 570. Walter Conn likewise asserts, “Concrete, historical human persons do not live 
and act on the strength of universal, abstract ideals of the human good, however. The concrete personal 
conscience responds to value as embodied in concrete, affective images, symbols, and stories” (Christian 
Conversion, 158). Sandra Schneiders would add that, in order for something to be “real” to us and affect 
our living, it must be integrated into our imaginative constructs of world and self (Buying the Field, 39-40). 
Such claims are well supported by a growing body of experimental research. (See Masson, Without 
Metaphor, No Saving God, 179 for a discussion of this research in cognitive science of religion.) 
141 This unifying power is reflected in the German word for imagination, “Einbildungskraft,” which 
literally means “the power to form into one.” This term fittingly describes imagination’s power to not only 
unify one’s experiences and impressions but also to unify the many levels and dimensions of the human 
organism. 
142 Cf. Lonergan, Insight, 484. 
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there has to be a correspondence between their respective operators.”143 As noted above, 
mental images provide the point of communication between bodily and mental 
operations.144 Imagination is therefore indispensable to promoting correspondence among 
the various manifolds of the human person insofar as it unifies not only one’s intellect but 
also one’s bodily movements, sensations, impressions, emotions, and feelings in an 
orientation toward being and value.145 Commenting on this need, Lonergan writes, “we 
become normal human beings only by mastering vast systems of symbols and adapting 
our muscles, our nerves, our cerebral cortex, to respond to them accurately and 
precisely.”146 The quality of living we all recognize as distinctively “human” simply 
could not be achieved otherwise.147  
In light of this understanding of imagination’s role in human meaning-
construction and living, imagination cannot be regarded as merely one cognitive function 
among many. In the words of Ray Hart, imagination “is not alone a mode of cognition 
                                                
143 Ibid., 555. 
144 This is a point I emphasized in the earlier discussion of metaphor and one captured well in Marion 
Woodman’s assertion, “Metaphor comes out of your bones; it’s organic in the body” (“In Her Own Voice: 
An Interview with Marion Woodman by Ann A. Simpkinson,” Common Boundary 10, no.4 (July/August 
1992): 27); cf. Johnson, The Body in the Mind, and Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God. 
145 Cf. Lonergan, Insight, 555-6. There is also a growing body of research drawing attention to how the 
way people imagine or “package reality differently” impacts their health. (See Sandra Blakeslee, 
“Birthdays: A Matter of Life and Death,” New York Times, September 22, 1992, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/22/news/birthdays-a-matter-of-life-and-death.html, accessed December 
7, 2014; cf. Ellen Langer, Counterclockwise: Mindful Health and the Power of Possibility (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 2009). 
146 Bernard Lonergan, “Religious Experience,” in A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, 
S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Paulist Press, 1985), 127. Ricoeur similarly notes, “the same symbol unifies 
several levels of experience or representation: the exterior and the interior, the vital and speculative” 
(“Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection,” International Philosophical Quarterly 2, no. 
May (1962): 201). 
147 We might again recall Clifford Geertz’s assertion that a human being deprived of symbolic mediation is 
“a kind of formless monster with neither sense of direction nor power of self-control, a chaos of spasmodic 
impulses and vague emotions” (“Religion as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures 
(London: Fontana Press, 1993), 99). 
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but also fundamentally a way of being human.”148 It is, perhaps more than any other 
feature of our being, what defines our humanity. Hence, only in recognizing the complex 
work of the imagination we can talk about a “meaningful” life in the fullest sense—one 
enriched by perceptions of truth and value and by participation in the human family’s 
store of communal meaning.  
The imaginatively-constructed “world” each of us lives in determines how we 
experience the events of our lives, what our lives will be about or, alternatively, if we will 
fail to see any point to life at all. Such was the thrust of Charles Taylor’s argument 
concerning “social” and “cosmic imaginaries,” which we engaged in the previous 
chapter. An “imaginary” in Taylor’s usage is not the same as a “world” as I have defined 
it here. “Imaginary” describes a community’s collective vision or understanding of the 
cosmos or society where one’s “world” is particular to each person. However, the terms 
are closely related, for an imaginary is constituted by elements of meaning shared among 
many people’s worlds and people’s worlds are shaped by the imaginary that 
predominates in their culture. Taylor argues that, in order to understand how the Christian 
West has given way to a secularized culture, one must attend to the story of how Western 
people’s imaginaries changed over the centuries. Having made a similar argument in the 
first chapter with regards to Catholic U.S. culture specifically, my aim up to this point in 
the present chapter has been to highlight the cognitive processes that lie behind human 
beings’ construction of meaning and, indirectly, these historical shifts. Construction of a 
world—and even more so of a social or cosmic imaginary—is a wonderfully complex 
                                                
148 Hart, Unfinished Man, 184. 
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process that draws upon innate human capacities, personal experience, social influence, 
and (as we will soon see) divine mediation of meaning. Disruption in any of these factors 
will radically alter the way a given person sees the world and how they live their life. 
 
Revelation, Imagination, and Religious Meaning 
Human Transcendence  
As we have seen, humans’ meaning-construction capabilities make possible 
complicated constructions like values, relationships, self-images, and worlds. When 
human beings develop a value system or aspirations about the sort of people we would 
like to be, we expand our experience of reality well beyond mere sensing of and reacting 
to a physical environment. In this sense, human beings represent the point where the 
material world transcends itself.  
 If we are to take into account this human capacity for transcendence, we must 
now qualify Fauconnier’s and Turner’s claim that human meaning-construction is driven 
by the need to achieve “human scale”. Insofar as meaning-construction operates as a 
mechanism for survival, their description is accurate. However, our drive for meaning 
does not terminate in the achievement of conditions necessary for survival. When all of 
our basic needs are met, desires of a different order persist. Our concern drives us ever 
onward, constituting an ineradicable “openness” in our being that Christian theologians 
have traditionally understood as the means by which God orients humans to Godself.149 
                                                
149 The classic formulation of this belief is Augustine’s famous profession, “you have made us for yourself, 
[Lord,] and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), I., i; p.3). 
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This openness is manifested in two forms corresponding to the two modes of 
consciousness identified above—intellectuality (or Verstehen) and sensitivity (or 
Befindlichkeit).  
 Regarding the first, human beings exhibit an insatiable desire to know and 
understand. This intuition of all there is to know is expressed in our ability to ask a 
seemingly unlimited number of questions. As previously mentioned, Lonergan refers to 
this intuition as our “notion of being”.150 Our affectivity likewise orients us into the 
transcendent. There is no end to our desiring in this life. Even if it were possible to satisfy 
permanently all hunger, thirst, and sexual desire, we would still yearn for something 
more. Doran describes this transcendent desire as Befindlichkeit’s “vertical finality” (as 
distinct from the “horizontal finality” manifest in our desires for physical gratification).151 
More famously, Paul Tillich has drawn attention to human concern for issues of ultimacy, 
that is, for spiritual concerns that, even more than vital concerns like those for food and 
shelter, determine the shape of one’s life. If such a spiritual concern claims ultimacy, 
writes Tillich, “it demands the total surrender of him who accepts this claim, and it 
promises total fulfillment even if all other claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in 
its name.”152  
 Hence, while it is true that human meaning-construction aspires to achieving 
human scale, it neither originates nor ends there. Human beings are constituted such that 
                                                
150 Lonergan, Insight, 377. 
151 Doran, “Two Ways of Being Conscious,” 17. Lonergan claims that, just as our questions for 
intelligence head for the fullness of Being, so too do our questions for deliberation intend a goodness 
beyond criticism. We not only ask questions that lead to self-transcendence but also experience a stirring of 
our very being when we glimpse the possibility of moral self-transcendence. (See Lonergan, Method in 
Theology, 36, 38.) 
152 Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: HarperPerennial, 2001), 1. 
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fully realizing our humanity demands openness to what lies beyond ourselves, our limited 
knowledge, and our creaturely desires. In this sense, human striving toward the 
transcendent is an ineradicable part of how we construct meaning. Understood within this 
framework, religion is the human response to God’s initiative, the means by which we try 
to make sense of the transcendent dimension of our experience. Initially ill-equipped to 
make sense of the intuition of transcendent meaning (or presence) beckoning them 
beyond the familiarity of temporal experience, human beings seek to understand, respond 
to, and normalize relations with that “beyond” by whatever means we have at hand. As 
Mircea Eliade and Paul Ricoeur note, we first read the supernatural on the natural 
world—in a sacred rock, river, or mountain. These natural elements become symbols of 
the supernatural—tangible, imaginable elements whereby we might lay hold of that 
which transcends the tangible and imaginable. “It is through symbols,” Eliade writes, 
“that man finds his way out of his particular situation and ‘opens himself’ to the general 
and the universal. Symbols awaken individual experience and transmute it into a spiritual 
act, into metaphysical comprehension of the world.”153 To speak of “religion,” therefore, 
is to speak most essentially of a system of such symbols of the supernatural or sacred.154  
Though primitive religion almost inevitably admits some admixture of 
superstition (as do less primitive forms), theologians and believers resist denigration of 
these symbols of the sacred as mere projections, fabrications of the human mind that 
                                                
153 Eliade, The Sacred and The Profane, 211. 
154 In Clifford Geertz’s oft-cited definition, religion is defined as “a system of symbols which acts to 
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations…by formulating conceptions with 
such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (The Interpretation of 
Cultures, 90). While Geertz defines religion purely in terms of human behaviors without presupposing the 
intervention of supernatural revelation, his definition nevertheless contributes to our present investigation 
insofar as it emphasizes the role of symbols in religion. 
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reflect no actual transcendent reality. As already suggested and as Rahner, Lonergan, and 
many others have argued, the human orientation into the transcendent originates in the 
transcendent itself.155 According to Tillich, when human beings experience the sacred 
through the mediation of certain symbols, we can affirm that the social and psychological 
impulses controlling the selection of these symbols “are themselves the operation of a 
primordial shaping of life, and therefore the intuition of the Unconditioned.”156 That 
human beings from time to time mistakenly deify material things does not negate the fact 
that real knowledge of God is, in the words of Rahner, “mediated by a categorical 
encounter with concrete reality in our world, both the world of things and the world of 
persons.”157 
 
Modes of Revelation 
 According to Christian faith, God not only endows human beings with capacities 
and orientations that aid their meaning-construction vis-à-vis the transcendent; God also 
actively prompts this meaning-construction by revealing Godself to humanity in specific 
historical moments and processes.158 This “divine revelation” is properly regarded a form 
of “grace,” God’s gift of Godself to human beings. What distinguishes revelation from 
                                                
155 This is a another reason why I prefer the term “meaning-construction” over “meaning-making”—
human beings never create meaning ex nihilo but rather employ God-given capacities to act upon divinely-
bestowed signs. 
156 Paul Tillich, “The Religious Symbol,” in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: 
New York University Press, 1961), 306. 
157 Rahner, Foundation of the Christian Faith, 52. Elsewhere Rahner describes revelation as leading 
human beings toward the “transcendental” through the “predicamental”. 
158 While acknowledging that the human person’s orientation to God is itself a gift from God, Catholic 
theology has traditionally distinguished between “natural reason,” through which human beings can come 
to some vague knowledge of God, and “revelation,” in which God reveals truths about Godself not 
accessible to natural reason. 
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other forms of grace is that in this case God’s gift of self takes the form of human 
knowledge of God.  
 Ray Hart’s notion of revelation as “fundament of faith” provides a helpful basis 
for clarifying the nature of this gift and the manner in which we receive it.159 Revelation, 
Hart explains, is neither simply content nor simply process, for process always involves a 
given that cannot be reduced to process. Therefore, to speak of revelation as fundament is 
to speak of “that constitutive process whereby the what or substantive bearing of 
revelation is built up as the intentionality of human being in historical time. This 
constitutive process comprises an inseparably triadic movement; fundament refers to the 
already founded, to founding afresh, and to the yet to be founded.”160 In the first place, 
then, revelation involves an “already founded,” something given. Yet this does not imply 
that God implants propositional truths in the human mind and requires no response on the 
part of humans. To speak of revelation necessarily involves speaking of God’s action of 
revealing—the “founding” in Hart’s terms. Finally, God’s revelation includes an 
invitation to the recipient. Taking up the concept of “obediential potency,” Hart explains 
that it is “that point in man’s reality-sense at which revelation inserts itself.”161 
Revelation is the actualization of this potency, the solicitation to see oneself as existing 
out of the ontological possibility offered by God. In sum, revelation involves not only a 
                                                
159 Hart, Unfinished Man, 83. 
160 Ibid., 85. Italics original. 
161 Ibid., 177. On the meaning of obediental potency, see also Thomas Aquinas, “Quaestiones Disputatae 
de Virtutibus,” a.10, ad 13, trans. Ralph McInerny, St. Thomas Aquinas’ Works in English, 2013, 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVirtutibus.htm, and Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4 
(Limerick, Ireland: Mary Immaculate College, 2000), 167. Rahner employs a closely related term, the 
“supernatural existential,” to refer to the fulfillment of this openness through the gift of God’s self-
communication even prior to human response. 
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given but also the giving and the invitation to respond to the gift. 
As suggested by importing the concept of obediential potency, God’s self-
revelation to humanity accommodates the “mode of the receiver.”162 In the case of human 
beings, the mode of receiving is an embodied, image-centered process of constructing 
meaning.163 Therefore, in order for human beings to come to some knowledge of God, 
God employs a mode of revelation that bridges divine transcendence and human 
materiality. Symbol supplies this bridge. Today most leading Catholic theologians 
therefore consider it most adequate to speak of revelation as “symbolic” in its mediation, 
a position articulated most notably in Avery Dulles’s Models of Revelation.164 Symbols, 
as suggested above, convey that which cannot be immediately experienced or 
intellectually dominated and make visible what is invisible, thereby providing us with the 
means of rising beyond the enclosure of materiality and egocentrism into an awareness of 
the real. Because God transcends the material realm and defies conceptual description, 
                                                
162 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Theologica,” I, q.84, a.1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
New Advent, 2008, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/. Indeed, as Dulles and others note, God’s revelation 
is not restricted to Christian people, images, and rituals. God also reveals Godself in a multitude of ways in 
other religions. 
163 Affirming this point, Anthony Godzieba writes, “The intentional thrust ‘outward’ (the body) and into 
the future (the imagination) function as analogues and indeed the substrata for faith as intentionality, our 
uncontainable seeking for fulfillment in God” (“Knowing Differently: Incarnation, Imagination, and the 
Body,” Louvain Studies 32 (2007): 378). 
164 Similar to Hart, who describes the process and content of revelation as inseparable, Dulles finds it 
appropriate to speak of revelation as symbolic in nature insofar as revelation is both “intelligibility and 
embodiment,” “manifestation and accomplishment” (Models of Revelation, 67). Hart himself writes, “The 
firmament of images is the primal noncategorial schematization of revelation as fundament” (Unfinished 
Man, 95). In the same vein, David Tracy writes,  “all authentic limit-language seems to be initially and 
irretrievably a symbolic and metaphorical one…In fact…even explicitly religious language (e.g., the 
language of the scriptures or of the Christian mystics) is intrinsically symbolic and metaphorical limit-
language” (Blessed Rage for Order, 108). This understanding of revelation is not limited to Catholic 
theologians. H. Richard Niebuhr, for example, defines revelation as “that special occasion which provides 
us with an image by means of which all the occasions of personal and common life become intelligible” (H. 
Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 80). Tillich likewise writes, 
“All knowledge of God has a symbolic character” (“The Religious Symbol,” 316). 
 123 
symbols are the most suitable mode of mediating God’s self-communication to human 
beings. 
When defining “symbol” earlier, I noted that symbols can be images, texts, 
objects, persons, and events. We see the same sort of variety in the ways God reveals 
Godself. To begin with, Christians have always identified the sacred Scriptures—first the 
Hebrew Scriptures and later the New Testament—as a privileged locus of God’s 
revelation. Reading and praying over the images, stories, teachings, and wisdom sayings 
contained therein, Christians have consistently experienced transforming encounters with 
God. In light of this experience, Christians affirm these texts as “divinely inspired”. In 
other words, they recognize that God has inspired certain achievements of human 
imagination that the human authors set down in the texts of Scripture, which through 
subsequent interpretation continue to mediate to others an encounter with the divine.  
In addition to Scripture, God also reveals Godself in the events of human history. 
Relating the historicity of God’s revelation to its symbolic nature, Dulles explains, “If 
God reveals himself in history, he does so by means of symbolic events, and if these 
events are to be revelatory for later generations, they must be recounted in language that 
carries their salvific meaning.”165 As with Scripture, we come to know God through 
interpreting the meaning of these historical events. Because such historical revelations are 
always also trans-historical, grasping their meaning is never a matter of simply seeing 
what God reveals to be seen.  
Most significant among the events of God’s self-revelation is the event and person 
                                                
165 Dulles, Models of Revelation, 206. 
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of Jesus Christ. Picking up on Rahner’s phrase, Dulles asserts, “The whole form of 
Christ’s human existence, from his Incarnation to his Cross and exaltation, is held to be a 
‘realizing’ symbol of God” in the sense that Jesus, the symbol of God par excellence, 
both is God and makes God present.166 He is, in Roger Haight’s words, “the historical 
mediation of God for the Christian imagination.”167 Introducing paradox, tension, and 
questions in one’s mind, Jesus sets the imagination in motion and thereby promotes a 
unique awareness of and invitation to relationship with God. 
If we acknowledge that God’s revelation invites and requires interpretation, it is 
reasonable to affirm that the process of revelation involves not only historical events and 
inspired texts but also “Tradition,” that is, the handing on of these stories and texts along 
with the whole way of life they engender.168 This way of life includes practices, attitudes, 
beliefs, and teachings not explicitly contained in Scripture, including the official 
teachings of the Church known as “doctrines”. Without minimizing their importance, 
doctrines should be considered carriers of God’s revelation in a derivative sense.169 As 
Dulles states the matter, doctrines “are not independent revelation; they live off the power 
                                                
166 Ibid., 159. Dulles explains that a “realizing” symbol, as described by Rahner, involves two levels of 
reality—the ontic level of the concrete object or person itself and the fuller reality, which can’t be reduced 
to the object or person but which the object or person symbolizes. 
167 Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, 112. Haight and other have also referred to Jesus as the “parable” of God. 
Even though Haight’s use of this phrase skirts the issue of Jesus’ divinity, I note it here because the 
appropriateness of this label will assume prominence in my discussion of Jesus’ parables in Chapter Five, 
where I explore how Jesus’ parables in particular mediated this unique revelation. 
168 Cf. Yves Congar, The Meaning of Tradition, trans. A. N. Woodrow (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2004). Highlighting how Tradition influences one’s imagining, Ray Hart asserts, “It belongs to the 
historicity of human being to be ‘oriented,’ to be inserted into human being according to the ways of 
previous active, historical imagination, i.e, according to tradition” (Unfinished Man, 212). 
169 Cf. Dulles, Models of Revelation, 161. 
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of the symbols.”170 Doctrines are formulated through reflection and reasoning about the 
symbols (events, texts, persons) of revelation. In the same way that conceptual thinking 
operates at a further remove from the “extensional wholeness” of a given event than does 
imagination, doctrines exists at a further remove from the power of the revelatory event 
than do symbols.171 Notwithstanding, even doctrines always retain some symbolic 
element “in the sense that they communicate more than can be contained in clear 
concepts.”172 Here I would emphasize again that, regardless of whether we are speaking 
of Scripture, historical events, persons, doctrines, or any other mode of revelation, these 
mediations can only be considered genuinely revelatory insofar as we recognize them as 
objects of interpretation. God addresses God’s revelation to human beings, who 
understand by interpreting. If human beings do not interpret so as to understand, God’s 
self-communication goes unheard. 
 
Knowledge of God 
The matter of interpretation raises a further issue: I have been arguing that 
revelation is essentially symbolic in nature, but I have not yet clarified the nature of the 
“knowledge” mediated through symbolic revelation. In a culture where scientific 
certainty is upheld as the gold standard of all knowledge, many dismiss any form of 
                                                
170 Ibid., 84. To this point, Hart writes, “This imaginative language is the underived language of faith, 
language in closest proximity to the paradigmatic events themselves” (Unfinished Man, 290). Haight 
likewise observes that interpretations of revelation “unfold at various degrees of distance from the core of 
revelatory experience” (Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, 10). 
171 Hart, Unfinished Man, 231. We have seen support for this claim both in research in the cognitive 
science of religion noted in this chapter (cf. Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 180) and in the 
sociological research of Andrew Greeley, which found that professed doctrinal beliefs influence people’s 
lives less than their images. 
172 Dulles, Models of Revelation, 226; cf. Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, 108. 
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knowing that cannot be verified through empirical observation and testing. However, 
much that we know as human beings—including the things that make our lives most 
meaningful—are inaccessible to such limited modes of inquiry. Knowledge of God lies 
within this realm of knowing.173  
In an attempt to clarify the nature of this mode of knowing, Dulles has described 
it as a “participatory knowledge”.174 This form of knowledge is circumspective, 
nonreflective, and pre-theoretical.175 Yet, despite lacking the clarity of concepts, engaged 
participatory knowledge is not an attenuation but rather an extension of the range of 
human awareness.176 Earlier we saw how complex is the process by which human beings 
construct meaning of their experiences and how selective the mind is in admitting 
sensible and imaginal input into consciousness. Given this complexity and the limits of 
human attention, we, in the words of multi-disciplinary thinker, Michael Polanyi, “can 
know more than we can tell.”177 This is especially true when it comes to our relating to 
the transcendent, which evokes an excess of meaning. As Dulles explains, “Revelatory 
knowledge rests on the tacit integration of clues which to conventional thought might 
appear disconnected and incoherent.”178 
God’s self-communication stimulates thought and raises questions. As one 
                                                
173 Dulles, Models of Revelation, 157; cf. Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, 11; Tillich, “The Religious 
Symbol,” 316. 
174 Avery Dulles, “The Symbolic Structure of Revelation,” Theological Studies 41 (1980): 60–1;  cf. 
Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, 9. 
175 Hart, Unfinished Man, 93. 
176 Cf. Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, 9. 
177 Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, 4. 
178 Dulles, Models of Revelation, 258. Dulles continues on to explain how revelation as symbolic effects 
this integration: “By arousing the imagination, the affections, and the heuristic impulses, symbols initiate 
and direct a process whereby the mind, relying partly on unspecifiable clues, perceives radically new 
patterns and meanings in particular constellations of data” (ibid., 258). 
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becomes aware of this communication, one feels compelled to interpret and speak to the 
revelation that God has bestowed, yet our words never succeed in encapsulating the 
fullness of its meaning.179 This is what Hart means when he describes revelation as not 
“terminal and conclusive” but rather “inceptive and provocative.”180 It seizes us in our 
totality and demands a response of our whole being—intellect, affectivity, volition, and 
action.181 In this way, trying to express the meaning of revelation is like trying to describe 
to a third party one’s love for the beloved. One can spill a profusion of words (as those in 
love often do), but they inevitably prove inadequate to express the truth that one feels to 
be crying out from every fiber of one’s being. Still, despite the enamored person’s 
inability to fully articulate all that they know, no one would deny the depth of their 
knowledge of the beloved or that they see things about that person that no one else can 
see. Revelation likewise inspires and invites us to relationship with a reality that can be 
experienced and known but never comprehended or adequately described. 
The change effected in the recipient by revelation is not only epistemological but 
also ontological.182 As we saw above, what and how we imagine constitutes our identity 
and our reality. Recognizing the centrality of imagination, numerous theologians have 
defined the revelatory event as the reconfiguration of one’s guiding images.183 In one 
                                                
179 This is what Hart means when he describes revelation as not “terminal and conclusive” but rather 
“inceptive and provocative” (Unfinished Man, 92). 
180 Ibid., 92. 
181 Cf. ibid., 92. Haight describes it as an “existential” and “experiential” consciousness (Jesus Symbol of 
God, 9). 
182 Citing scriptural convention, Thomas Groome employs the language of “wisdom” (alternatively 
“conation”) to encapsulate the ontological as well as cognitive effects of God’s self-communication to 
human beings. (See Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral 
Ministry: The Way of Shared Praxis (Harper San Francisco, 1991), 26–32.) 
183 See, e.g., Hart, Unfinished Man, 279; Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation, 80. 
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attempt to articulate the dynamics of this transformation, Robert Masson describes it as 
“a tectonic conceptual blend that reconfigures the available field of meanings creating 
new conceptual and logical space that enables otherwise unavailable possibilities for 
understanding and characterizing reality.”184  
David Tracy’s development of the concept of the “religious classic” (a special 
category of the “classics” discussed above) presents another illuminating example. In a 
religious classic—and any symbol deemed genuinely revelatory would certainly qualify 
as a classic—“the most serious questions on the meaning of existence as participating in, 
yet distanced, sometimes estranged from, the reality of the whole are posed.”185 Engaging 
these symbols, one perceives one’s life to be at stake in the meaning expressed therein. 
One senses that one is confronted at this moment with what truly matters most. This 
confrontation demands a response, and, as Tracy explains, “in the actual moment of 
response to a religious classic, religious persons are convinced that their values, their 
style of life, their ethos are in fact grounded in the inherent structure of reality itself.”186 
Anyone who both attends to and responds to God’s revelation will thus find their lives 
radically altered. One’s values, commitments, and behaviors are changed, and, through a 
sort of “symbolic labor,” God’s self-communication penetrates and restructures the most 
real dimension of believing subjects, namely, their relations to God and one another.187 
 The Judeo-Christian tradition tells of God inviting such transformations of human 
                                                
184 Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 133. 
185 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 155. 
186 Ibid., 163. 
187 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 442. Niebuhr echoes this sentiment: “The heart of the participating 
self is engaged in this work and through it the soul is reconstructed” (The Meaning of Revelation, 85). 
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meaning time and again, thereby opening up new possibilities in the lives of God’s 
people. God’s revelation made it possible for the inspired authors of the Book of Genesis 
to envision the world as created by a provident God rather than by capricious, warring 
deities. It made it possible for the Israelites to envision and encode a way of life devoted 
to worship of a single God and care for the marginalized among them. It made it possible 
for the prophets to see a better path and call the people to it when society had fallen into 
dissolution. Finally, in a definitive way, God’s self-revelation in the person of Jesus 
Christ made possible a new vision of reality as encapsulated in the symbol “reign of 
God.”  
As in the economy of God’s salvation, so too in this chapter do we arrive at a 
culmination in this symbol. Hence, it is worth pausing here at chapter’s end to dwell upon 
this symbol of the reign of God, which will be crucial in the rest of this dissertation. 
There is virtual consensus among New Testament scholars that ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ, the 
“reign (or kingdom) of God,” represents the controlling symbol in Jesus’ teaching and 
ministry.188 No such consensus exists, however, regarding the precise meaning of this 
symbol. Jesus’ usage seems to indicate a reality in which all beings recognize God’s 
sovereignty and participate in the universal peace (shalom), justice, and love that God 
wills.189 Beyond this, we can say little more, as Jesus never clearly articulated the 
                                                
188 See John R. Donahue and Daniel J. Harrington, The Gospel of Mark, Sacra Pagina 2 (Collegeville, 
Minn: Liturgical Press, 2002), 72; C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (New York: Scribner, 1961), 
71, 81; Bernard Brandon Scott, Jesus, Symbol Maker for the Kingdom (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 
6; Gerald O'Collins, Christology, 2nd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 54. 
189 Cf. Zachary Hayes, Visions of a Future: A Study of Christian Eschatology (Collegeville, Minn.: 
Liturgical Press, 1990), 44; Pheme Perkins, Hearing the Parables of Jesus (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
1981), 17;  N. Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976); 
Groome, Sharing Faith, 14-17. 
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meaning of this symbol. In truth, we might have expected as much given the 
understanding of symbolic revelation developed in this chapter. God’s revelation cannot 
be neatly described. However, it can be experienced and—if Scripture offers reliable 
witness—was experienced by Jesus’ disciples. Bernard Scott argues that all Jesus’ words 
and actions—his sermons, parables, questions, challenges, prayers, healings, table 
fellowship, and prophetic gestures—together formed an underlying grammar or 
performance of his worldview and beckoned others to enter into that world.190 Sandra 
Schneiders similarly describes how Jesus’ whole life, especially his paschal mystery, 
forged in the minds of his disciples a new way of imagining that made possible a fusion 
of their worlds and his own vision of God’s reign. This “paschal imagination”: 
worked upon the memories supplied by Jesus’ contemporaries, shaking loose the ossified 
forms of their experience so that new connections, hidden meanings, possible 
implications emerged from the words and actions and attitudes of the earthly Jesus. It 
worked upon intention, projecting the significance of Jesus upon the experience of his 
postresurrection followers and inviting them to enter a future that they would share with 
the glorified Jesus in the reign of God. But it worked especially in the present as principle 
of organization, interpretation, and appropriation of the ongoing life experiences of the 
disciples.191 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have drawn upon recent work in philosophy, theology, cognitive 
science, and other fields in order to reestablish an understanding of the centrality of 
imagination in human meaning-construction and living and in our relating to God. I say 
“reestablish” because this insight is not a novel one. It was familiar to rabbinic Judaism, 
                                                
190 Cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol Maker for the Kingdom, 5, 167. 
191 Schneiders, The Revelatory Text, 106-7. Masson similarly writes, “Affirming that Jesus is the Messiah 
makes possible logical moves otherwise unthinkable. It inaugurates a new worldview—ultimately a new 
religion” (Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 59). 
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in which the imagination was seen as key to humanity’s ultimate salvation. Richard 
Kearney explains that in the Talmud “imagination is deemed to be that most primordial 
‘drive’ of man which, if sublimated and oriented towards the divine way (Talmud), can 
serve as an indispensable power for attaining the goal of creation: the universal 
embodiment of God’s plan in the Messianic Kingdom of justice and peace.”192  
 I believe this insight to be absolutely crucial for efforts to rejuvenate the faith 
lives of Christian disciples today. Indeed, so long as educators neglect the imagination, 
all other efforts to foster an integrated, living faith are destined to fail. Fortunately, Jesus 
has set before our eyes a vision of the way forward. In Jesus’ vision of the reign of God, 
the potential of the human imagination reached its pinnacle and fulfillment. That 
worldview—what I propose to call the “Christian imaginary”—remains for us today the 
key to our beatitude and salvation and, I suggest, the key to reintegrating the faith lives of 
U.S. Catholics. In the coming chapters, we will examine more closely the nature of Jesus’ 
vision for the reign of God and how educators can invite others into that vision. 
                                                
192 Kearning, The Wake of the Imagination, 46. Italics original. 
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“For the glory of God is the human being fully alive, 
and the true life of humanity is the vision of God.” 
- Irenaeus of Lyons 
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Introduction 
As we can now better appreciate, the imaginative work of meaning-construction is 
a marvelously orchestrated enterprise that has been carried out by billions of human 
beings over thousands of years. In the previous chapter we explored the dynamics and 
process by which this work normally occurs. However, human beings’ efforts to 
construct meaning sometimes go astray or fail altogether. Most of us have had some 
exposure to such failures, whether in our own lives, in those of people we know, or in the 
news. The most extreme cases are manifested in those tragic incidents when people fall 
so deep into despair and their view of reality becomes so distorted that they take their 
own lives and/or those of others. Until recently such instances of people falling into a 
sense of meaninglessness were relatively rare. Yet, as we observed in Chapter One, a 
sense of meaninglessness has spread to unprecedented proportions in much of the 
contemporary Western world. The old Christian imaginary having been dispelled and 
replaced with a multiplicity of competing accounts, many people today—including many 
American Catholics—lack a unifying vision for their lives and for reality as a whole. As a 
result, they put off the questions of ultimate meaning, distracting themselves with various 
diversions, or else fall into the sort of despair that in past times was viewed as an isolated 
misfortune.1  
Fortunately, the spread of this sense of meaninglessness has not been inexorable. 
Throughout the United States and the world, Christian (and non-Christian) communities 
                                                
1 Psychologist William Lynch describes the source of such despair in this way: “To the degree that our 
images of things and of life are left in fragments we cannot cope. The consequence of not being able to 
cope is hopelessness” (Images of Hope: Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), 
245). 
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continue to thrive and live joyful lives. Their continued witness to the potential of the 
Christian faith to give meaning and purpose to life implores us to keep hope alive by 
looking for solutions to the challenges confronting today’s disciples. I began my search 
for solutions in the first chapter by uncovering some of the historical and social factors 
that have led to the widespread disruption of meaning. In the present chapter, I will 
continue this effort by examining how these disruptions occur on the level of the 
individual’s consciousness. I begin by refining the account of meaning-construction 
articulated in the previous chapter, highlighting the regular transformations through 
which a person’s meaning-construction capacities develop across a lifetime. As I explore 
these different patterns of constructing meaning, I will note the various ways in which 
distortions in one’s imaginative thinking can short-circuit the meaning-construction 
process. At the end of this exploration, I will be in a position to explain why the way 
American Catholics have historically made sense of their faith lives has become 
inadequate in the present era and to propose what more adequate ways of imagining 
reality through the eyes of faith would look like. 
 
Stages in the Development of Meaning-Construction Capacities 
 In Chapter Two we saw how human capacities for constructing meaning develop 
from the impulsive responses of the infant to the complex “world” of the cognitively 
mature person. Impressive though this path of development is, it does not yet offer us a 
complete picture of how our meaning-construction capacities develop. Not everyone who 
is capable of generating a world-image constructs that image in the same way. By this I 
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mean that different people (and the same person at different stages of life) imagine 
differently not only in terms of the specific images operating in their minds but also in 
terms of the way they think about those images.  
 This recognition of variation in the way human beings construct meaning at 
different points in their development is the foundation of developmental psychology. Jean 
Piaget, who is credited with being the progenitor of this field, was the first to observe that 
human beings’ cognitive capacities develop, not only through gradual assimilation of new 
information to existing frameworks, but also in leaps from one distinct “period” or 
“stage” to another.2 A stage is characterized by an overall structure that explains major 
behavioral patterns. According to Piaget, stages are non-interchangeable, follow a fixed 
order of succession, and are integrative (that is, later stages integrate the properties of 
early stages). Piaget identified four developmental stages3—sensorimotor (ages zero to 
two), pre-operational (two to seven), concrete operational (seven to eleven), and formal 
operational (eleven to adult).4  
 Each stage represents a qualitatively different way of structuring thought. In the 
sensorimotor stage, the child mentally constructs action-schemas through sensorimotor 
coordination of actions without the intervention of mental representations. In the pre-
operational stage, the child is able to internalize actions thanks to an emerging capacity 
for symbolic or representational thought (what Piaget terms the “symbolic” or “semiotic 
                                                
2 Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Basic 
Books, 2000), 153. 
3 At times Piaget refers simply to “three great periods,” grouping two of the four stages together (ibid.,152). 
4 Regarding the last of these four, Piaget further distinguishes between “early” and “full” formal 
operational phases. 
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function”), but has not yet attained the capacity for logical patterns of thought.5 In the 
concrete operational stage, the child acquires the ability to think logically about concrete 
objects, and, in the formal operational stage, the child becomes able to abstract from the 
concrete and to think in terms of hypotheticals.  
In keeping with the findings of the previous chapter, Piaget acknowledges that 
there is an affective as well as an intellectual dimension to human development and 
meaning-construction. In fact, according to Piaget, the mechanism driving all human acts 
of intelligence and development is “the need to grow, to assert oneself, to love, and to be 
admired.”6  In this light, the different stages of development can be understood as “a 
series of active compensations on the part of the subject in response to external 
disturbances and an adjustment that is both retroactive…and anticipatory.”7 They are, in 
other words, varied means of reestablishing equilibrium or self-regulation in response to 
threats to one’s affective integrity. 
Developmental psychologist Robert Kegan, inspired by Piaget’s work, likewise 
acknowledges distinct stages of development in the human person’s capacity for 
constructing meaning. For Kegan the “self” is not a static reality but rather an “evolving 
self” that repeatedly reshapes itself so as to attain progressively more adequate cognitive 
means of structuring reality.8 What is most profoundly constitutive of the self is, 
                                                
5 Piaget, The Psychology of the Child, 51. “Logical” rather than “reasonable” is the more precise and 
therefore more appropriate term here since many scholars describe logic and imagining as two forms of 
reasoning. 
6 Ibid., 157-8. 
7 Ibid., 157. 
8 Robert Kegan, The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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therefore, not a particular belief or set of beliefs or even a particular way of viewing 
reality; it is rather the activity of constructing meaning, an activity which looks different 
at different stages of a person’s development. Seizing upon Piaget’s insight that this 
development represents an adaptive response to threats to psychological equilibrium, 
Kegan prefers the terms “balances” or “orders” of consciousness to the language of 
“stages”.9 What distinguishes one order from the next in Kegan’s account is what the 
person regards as self (i.e., “subject”) and what that person regards as distinct from self 
(i.e., “object”). The person’s life-long struggle to establish a sense of self takes the form 
of a back-and-forth movement between “differentiation” (in which the person 
distinguishes subject from object) and “integration” (in which the person establishes a 
new manner of relating to what was previously subject). 
Initially (zero to two years) the child is able to make no distinction between itself 
and anything else. Its reality is a largley unmediated, undifferentiated experience of its 
own reflexes. Advancing from this “Incorporative” self to Kegan’s first order, the child 
(two to seven years) gains control over its reflexes and sensations and so distinguishes 
itself from them. In Kegan’s words, the child “comes to have reflexes rather than be 
them.”10 The new “Impulsive” self is now constituted by that which coordinates the 
reflexes, namely, impulses and perceptions. In like manner, each subsequent order makes 
object what was previously experienced as subject—impulses and perceptions become 
object to a subject constituted by needs, interests, and wishes (the second order 
                                                
9 Ibid., 44; Robert Kegan, In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 34. 
10 Ibid., The Evolving Self, 85. 
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“Imperial” self); needs, interests, and wishes in turn become object to interpersonal 
relating (the third order “Interpersonal” self); interpersonal relating becomes object to 
self-authorship and sense of identity (the fourth order “Institutional” self); and finally 
self-authorship becomes object to the interpenetrability of self systems (the fifth order 
“Interindividual” self). 
What order of consciousness one operates from carries global consequences for 
how one experiences reality and behaves. In In Over Our Heads, Kegan illustrates how 
people operating from different orders interpret and respond differently to various 
situations like assuming the responsibilities of young adulthood, partnering and 
parenting, working, relating to people who are different from oneself, psychotherapy, and 
classroom learning. For example, he contrasts Lynn, a high school educator, and Peter, an 
executive for a bedding manufacturer, both of whom have recently been thrust into new 
positions of leadership.11 By virtue of their new roles, both are expected to assume a 
sense of ownership for their work, evaluate themselves, pursue their own vision, take 
responsibility for what happens at work, achieve mastery of their roles, and recognize 
how their work fits into the organization as a whole. All of these tasks represent fourth-
order demands on consciousness. While Lynn takes policy changes at her school as an 
opportunity to redefine and reestablish ownership of her work, Peter responds to his 
promotion by attempting to preserve what he perceives to be his proper place within the 
company and in relation to his boss. Lynn is able to respond more flexibly and creatively 
because she is constructing her reality from a fourth-order consciousness that allows her 
                                                
11 See Chapter Five of In Over Our Heads. 
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to see not only her personal needs and wishes but also her relationships as object, that is, 
as distinct from herself. Peter, on the other hand, is still embedded in a sense of self 
constituted by his relationships (i.e., third-order consciousness). In consequence, he feels 
unprepared for his new responsibilities at work and finds himself wishing things could go 
back to the way they were before when he was simply responsible for executing the plans 
set forth by his boss.  
It is important to note at this point that the fact that Lynn operates from a fourth-
order consciousness while Peter operates from a third-order consciousness does not 
necessarily make her a better person. When speaking of the human person’s movement 
through developmental stages, I will often employ language like “progressing” and 
“advancing,” which might give the impression that later stages are intrinsically better 
than earlier stages. However, my use of this language is not meant to indicate that a 
person becomes more valuable or holier the more developed that person is. It merely 
indicates that a person who has “progressed” to later developmental stages is able to 
negotiate a greater array of cognitive and affective challenges in a wider variety of 
contexts than is someone operating at an earlier stage. Hence, people should not hurry to 
attain later stages without need. Rather, as James Fowler and other developmentalists 
have advised, each person should strive to realize the full potential of each stage’s 
strengths and to develop as psychosocial demands necessitate.12 
Kegan’s work represents one of numerous efforts by developmental theorists to 
explain how cognitive development impacts the way people interpret and respond to their 
                                                
12 See James W. Fowler, Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1995), 114; cf. Kegan, In Over Our Heads, 351. 
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experiences.13 It is not necessary for my purposes in this chapter to discuss all of these 
theories. However, one additional scholar’s work does require consideration here given 
the concern of the present project with human meaning-construction as it bears upon our 
relating to the divine. I refer to James Fowler’s work on the stages of faith. Fowler, 
linking faith very closely with meaning-construction in general,14 defines it as:  
people’s evolved and evolving ways of experiencing self, others and world (as they 
construct them) as related to and affected by the ultimate conditions of existence (as they 
construct them) and of shaping their lives’ purposes and meanings, trusts and loyalties, in 
light of the character of being, value and power determining the ultimate conditions of 
existence (as grasped in their operative images—conscious and unconscious—of them).15 
 
Faith, Fowler argues, is a universal feature of human beings’ meaning-making, 
not the sole possession of the explicitly religious.16 Given the crucial role imagination 
plays in constructing meaning, it should come as little surprise that Fowler also describes 
faith as a sort of imagination.17 He notes that, by virtue of our existence as beings who 
live by meaning, we are faced with the constant challenge of giving unity and coherence 
to the dynamic fields of forces in our lives. “Faith, as imagination,” he suggests, “grasps 
                                                
13 Some of the most influential include Lawrence Kohlberg, Collected Papers on Moral Development and 
Moral Education (Cambridge: Moral Education & Research Foundation, 1973); Jane Loevinger, Ego 
Development (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1976); Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1954); Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1963). 
14 Kegan, for his part, affirms this central insight in Fowler’s work, asserting that the spiritual dimensions 
of human development are at the very heart of meaning-construction. (See Robert Kegan, “There the Dance 
Is: Religious Dimensions of a Developmental Framework,” in Toward Moral and Religious Maturity, ed. 
International Conference on Moral and Religious Development (1st: 1979: Abbaye de Sénanque) 
(Morristown, NJ: Silver Burdett Co, 1980), 409.) 
15 Fowler, Stages of Faith, 92–3. 
16 William Lynch describes faith in similar terms: “a great primal human force that in its beginning is as 
yet indeterminate and is antecedent to all thought and to all verification” (Images of Faith: An Exploration 
of the Ironic Imagination (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 125). 
17 In this regard, too, Fowler seems to follow Lynch, who describes faith as “a way of experiencing and 
imagining the world” (Images of Faith, 17). 
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the ultimate conditions of our existence, unifying them into a comprehensive image in 
light of which we shape our responses and initiatives.”18  
Fowler identifies six stages of faith development—six “turning points in the ways 
faith imagines”—beyond the initial, undifferentiated faith of infancy.19 The first 
“Intuitive-Projective” stage begins around the age of three when the child gains the 
ability to imitate others and to be influenced by the actions, moods, and faith stories of its 
parents. The child’s imagination at this stage is highly fantastical and uninhibited by 
logical thought. In the second stage, the “Mythic-Literal,” the child begins to appropriate 
for itself in a literal way the stories, symbols, and beliefs of the faith community. In the 
third, “Synthetic-Conventional” stage, a person’s manner of imagining the ultimate 
conditions of existence have become less literal and more finely attuned to the 
expectations of significant relations. In other words, the person’s beliefs mirror those of 
the community rather than expressing a personally-developed perspective. Many adults 
never advance beyond this third stage.20 In the fourth, “Individuative-Reflective” stage, 
the person establishes this sort of personal perspective by critically examining the stories, 
symbols, and beliefs of the community. Attainment of the fifth, “Conjunctive” stage, 
comes with a new capacity to embrace paradox as a result of which the person is able to 
re-appropriate much that was rejected in the previous stage, albeit this time in a more 
critically aware “second naiveté”. In the final, “Universalizing” stage, which Fowler 
                                                
18 Fowler, Stages of Faith, 25. 
19 Ibid., 31. Italics original. Note that in Fowler’s numbering of the stages the undifferentiated faith of 
infancy is designated “stage 0”. In this regard, Fowler’s enumeration of the stages is consistent with that of 
Piaget and Kegan, who identify the sensorimotor stage and Incorporative balance, respectively, as stage 0. 
20 Fowler, Stages of Faith, 112, 114, 161. 
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believes is rarely attained, the person’s sense of an ultimate environment becomes 
inclusive of all being and the person transcends the paradoxes of the Conjunctive stage.  
 
Table 1: Piaget’s, Kegan’s, and Fowler’s Stages/Orders 
 
Age 
 
0-2 yrs 
 
2-7 yrs 7-11 yrs 11-15 yrs Early adulthood 
Early 
middle 
age or 
later 
Midlife or 
later 
Piaget’s 
stages 
Sensori-
motor 
Preoperat
-ional Concrete operat-
ional 
Formal 
operation
-al 
(Early) 
Formal 
operation
-al (Full) 
- - 
Kegan’s 
orders 
Incorpor-
ative Impulsive Imperial 
Inter-
personal 
Institut-
ional 
Inter-
individ-
ual 
- 
Fowler’s 
stages 
Undif-
ferent-
iated 
Intuitive-
Projective 
Mythical-
Literal 
Synthetic
-
Convent-
ional 
Individ-
uative-
Reflective 
Conjunc-
tive Universalizing 
 
A Consistent Pattern: Three Phases 
Despite some clear parallels in the frameworks of the authors discussed above, 
there is little consensus in the field of developmental psychology about what constitutes a 
“stage,” how many stages there are, even whether evidence supports the idea of a 
developmental stage at all. Critics have been particularly skeptical about the existence of 
later stages such as Fowler’s or Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages five and six.21 The fact that 
different authors emphasize different aspects of the developmental process (e.g., 
cognition, faith, moral reasoning) also contributes to the confusion and divergence in 
scholarly opinion. Still, in spite of all the disagreements, it is the rare scholar indeed who 
                                                
21 See, e.g., William Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, “The Development of Moral Thought: Review and 
Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Approach,” Psychological Bulletin 81, no. 8 (1974): 370, doi:10.1037/h0036879. 
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today would deny that human beings develop cognitively, affectively, morally, and 
socially and that there are a number of distinct landmarks along the journey of 
development.  
I would suggest as another minimal claim that we find strong warrant in the 
collective body of developmental research for the existence of at least three general 
developmental phases: (1) an initial pre-critical consciousness, (2) critical consciousness, 
and (3) post-critical consciousness. I employ the term “phase” in order to avoid confusion 
with the specific stages or orders described by Piaget, Kegan, Fowler, and Kohlberg, but 
these three phases as I understand them do meet the general criteria for “stages” as set out 
by these thinkers (namely, they follow a fixed sequence, no stage can be skipped in 
advancing to the next, etc.). In identifying these three phases I am intentionally building 
upon Paul Ricoeur’s writing on the three modes of thought that he calls “first naïveté,” 
“criticism,” and “second naïveté”.22 However, Ricoeur is not the only thinker to identify 
this three-fold development in human consciousness. Other philosophers, theologians, 
and educators have observed a similar pattern.23  
This three-fold pattern is also evident in the stage theories of the 
developmentalists mentioned above. On this very point, Sharon Daloz Parks observes, 
“Current developmental theories (represented by Kegan and Fowler) continue to describe 
                                                
22 See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 
352. 
23 Cf. Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991), 
165; Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1988), 6-14;  Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007), 85-99; Phil Mullins, “Cognitive Development in the Introductory Course: The Pedagogue’s 
Typological Imagination,” Teaching Learning Issues 62 (1988), 8–9.  Mullins’s description of precritical, 
critical, and postcritical “postures” in particular is fully consistent with the one I present here. 
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the movement to mature adult faith as a three-step process whereby conventional (or 
adolescent) meaning-making develops into a critical-systemic faith (or order of 
consciousness), which then evolves into a mature adult faith that can hold both conviction 
and paradox.”24 In Fowler’s theory, the first three stages of faith development describe 
varying degrees of pre-critical, literal consciousness. These are followed by the advent of 
critical reflection and the internalization of authority in the Individuative-Reflective 
stage, which is in turn followed by the re-appropriation of previously demythologized 
beliefs, symbols, and practices in the “second naïveté” (Fowler explicitly borrows 
Ricoeur’s term) of Conjunctive faith. For Kegan, the naive embeddedness in sensation, 
wants, and relationships of the early orders yields to critical thinking and self-authorship 
most notably in the transition to the Institutional order. The critical Institutional self in 
turn gives way to the more integrated consciousness of the Interindividual self. In 
addition to Fowler and Kegan, I might have also mentioned Lawrence Kohlberg, whose 
description of development from early conformist modes of moral reasoning to the 
relativist reasoning of Stage 4½ to the post-critical reasoning of Stages Five and Six 
follows the same pattern.25 In sum, the research of all the above thinkers consistently 
discloses this pattern of development from an initial state of undifferentiated immediacy 
to a critical differentiation and finally to a new integration of critical capacities coupled 
with a renewed appreciation for previously rejected positions. 
 
                                                
24 Sharon Daloz Parks, Big Questions, Worthy Dreams (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 14.  
25 See Lawrence Kohlberg, “Continuities in Childhod and Adult Moral Development Revisited,” in Life-
Span Developmental Psychology, ed. P. B. Baltes and K. W. Schaie (New York: Academic Press, 1973), 
179–204. 
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Table 2: Three Developmental Phases in Kegan, Fowler, and Kohlberg 
  
As discussed above, Kegan describes the process of development as an ongoing 
negotiation between differentiation and integration. This dynamic is evident in the three 
phases I have just described: Challenges to naive meaning-construction demand 
differentiation beyond the initial, pre-critical synthesis. However, this differentiation 
comes at the cost of personal equilibrium, so, after an intermittent period of critical 
consciousness, a new post-critical integration may occur. Of course, people can and do 
remain suspended in different moments of this developmental process. It is one of my 
central contentions in this project that many American Catholics presently find 
themselves so suspended. The causes for arrested development are myriad, each phase of 
development presenting unique challenges and pitfalls.26 Therefore, if we are to 
understand the current struggles in the faith lives of American Catholics, we will have to 
devote further attention to these breakdowns in meaning-construction. In the following 
sections I will explore in greater depth the three general phases of development and the 
                                                
26 A strong case might be made that the style of leadership that has predominated in the Catholic Church in 
the past half century is among the factors contributing to the suspension of Catholics’ development. 
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Fowler’s 
stages 
Undif-
ferent-
iated 
Intuitive-
Projective Mythical-
Literal 
Synthetic
-
Convent-
ional 
Individ-
uative-
Reflective 
Conjunc-
tive Universalizing 
Kegan’s 
orders 
Incorpor-
ative Impulsive Imperial 
Inter-
personal 
Institut-
ional Interindividual 
Kohlberg’s 
stages Amoral 
Punish-
ment-
Obedience 
Instru-
mental 
  
Relativ-
ism 
Social 
contract 
Universal 
principles 
Inter-
personal 
 Social order 
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cognitional errors particular to each.27 As I do so, I will emphasize the imaginal 
dimension of each developmental phase since every new development always involves in 
a central way a transformation of the way one imagines reality.  
 
Pre-critical Symbolic Consciousness 
Description and Capacities  
Concrete Consciousness.28 At the beginning of life, a child’s consciousness is 
constituted by an undifferentiated experience of immediacy. By the second year, the first 
manifestations of the symbolic function emerge. This capacity for generating mental 
representations enables the child to bring to mind objects that are not immediately present 
and to employ objects as signs for other objects. One can observe this capacity coming to 
bloom when a child begins to use gestures and verbal language. Later the child will be 
able to imitate a model after its disappearance and to engage in symbolic play and 
drawing.29 Acquiring this capacity for symbolism opens up a world of new possibilities. 
The child can more effectively communicate its desires and intentions and understand 
those of others. Its store of experiences and understanding of reality increase 
exponentially as it mediates and mentally retains meaning generated immanently and in 
collaboration with others.  
                                                
27 On pages 244-5 of Stages of Faith Fowler provides a helpful chart that includes a breakdown of 
symbolic function by stage. Readers may find this chart a useful supplement to the more detailed 
descriptions I provide in the following pages. 
28 I have borrowed the phrase “concrete consciousness” from Marianne Sawicki. (See Marianne Sawicki, 
The Gospel in History: Portrait of a Teaching Church: The Origins of a Chritian Church (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1988), 15.) 
29 See Piaget, The Psychology of the Child, 53-4. 
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 Still, that meaning is as of yet a confused meaning. As Ernst Cassirer explains, “It 
is typical of the first naive, unreflective manifestations of linguistic thinking as well as 
the mythical consciousness, that its content is not sharply divided into symbol and object, 
but both tend to unite in a perfectly undifferentiated fusion.”30 No clear distinction is 
made between symbol and referent or between the quality of what the child imagines and 
what it encounters in its physical environment.31 The child may have acquired the 
capacity to manipulate mental images of objects that are not physically present, but it still 
thinks of these images in literal, concrete terms.32 For example, talk of Jesus’ resurrection 
from the dead or the Body of Christ will elicit for young children images of Jesus sitting 
up in the tomb and a piece of bread that tastes like human flesh. The child perceives 
practically everything that is sensed and imagined as equally real. In the words of, 
Susanne Langer writes, “In a naive stage of thought, facts are taken for granted; matters 
of fact are met in practical fashion as they become obvious.”33 If the pre-critical thinker 
requires further facts to explain a particular situation, the imagination supplies them. In 
this way, all of reality is made to conform to the limited store of images at the child’s 
disposal.34 The child is unaware of his or her own role in constructing meaning, instead 
perceiving meaning as something given from the outside.35 In short, for a person thinking 
in this naive manner—and that person may be an adult as well as a child—reality is 
                                                
30 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 
pp. 88-89. 
31 Cf. Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, 3rd 
ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 151. 
32 For Sawicki’s discussion of the development of symbolic thinking, see The Gospel in History, 15-21. 
33 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 269. 
34 Ibid., 278. 
35 Cf. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007), 31–2. 
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simply what one senses and imagines, and it never occurs to the person that it might be 
otherwise.36 
Since cultures are comprised of individual human beings, we can see concrete 
symbolic consciousness (and all forms of consciousness, for that matter) expressed 
collectively in communities and cultures throughout history.37 For example, in the 
practices of primordial religion we see the dynamics of this early stage of symbolic 
consciousness writ large. When human beings first began to acquire the symbolic 
function as a species, the world was suddenly charged with meaning and presence. For 
this reason Langer describes this stage as the creative period for religion.38 Suddenly a 
rock was no longer just a rock; it was imbued with the power of the sacred. In the words 
of Eliade, “familiar everyday life….is transfigured in the experience of religious man; he 
finds a cipher everywhere.”39 The primordial human is hemmed in from all sides not only 
by wolves and other human beings but also by gods and spirits. Taylor describes this sort 
of enchanted culture in this way:  
they lived in a world of spirits, both good and bad. The bad ones include Satan, of course, 
but beside him, the world was full of a host of demons, threatening from all sides: 
demons and spirits of the forest, and wilderness, but also those which can threaten us in 
our everyday lives. 
Spirit agents were also numerous on the good side. Not just God, but also his 
saints, to whom one prayed, and whose shrines one visited in certain cases, in hopes of a 
                                                
36 This description coheres with Kegan’s account of the “Incorporative” and “Impulsive” self. 
37 In the words of Robert Doran, “to speak of culture as a function of consciousness is to state that the 
meanings and values that inform and constitute a given way of life will be dependent on the relative 
differentiation or compactness of the realms and functions of meaning in the consciousness of the men and 
women of that culture” (Robert M. Doran, Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations, 2nd ed. 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2006), 37). 
38 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 162. 
39 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1961), 183. 
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cure, or in thanks for a cure already prayed for and granted, or for rescue from extreme 
danger, e.g., at sea.40 
 
As the reader will recall, this was the mentality that occupied Christian minds in the 
United States for most of the first 200 years after the first pilgrims arrived.41 
Conventional Consciousness. With the benefit of additional social interaction and 
cognitive development, children eventually learn to interact appropriately with external 
and internal representations and to understand the meaning of symbols in more abstract 
terms. This leads to a new equilibrium, a form of consciousness that Fowler and 
Marianne Sawicki have described as “conventional”.42 As the “Impulsive” self gives way 
to an “Imperial” and then an “Interpersonal” self, one comes to value and appropriate the 
views of others.43 In this transition, the subject’s world expands yet again, this time 
yielding a vision of reality that includes not just what “I” see but also what “we” see. One 
applies the communal discourse to one’s own thinking. The result, Langer explains is that 
“the wishful imagination of man has been disciplined, by public exposure and realistic 
reflection, into a genuine art-form, as far removed from personal dreaming as the ritual 
dance from self-expressive bouncing and shouting.”44 Fantastical fears about the monster 
under the bed are checked by common understanding that there really is no such thing. 
                                                
40 Taylor, A Secular Age, 32. 
41 Cf. Chapter One, pp. 36-7. See also Sawicki, The Gospel in History, Ch.6 for an extended discussion of 
how a concrete level of symbolic consciousness manifested itself in Western Christianity during the 
seventh century. 
42 Because of the significant differences between concrete and conventional consciousness, it is necessary 
for me to distinguish them here. Most significantly, the achievement of conventional consciousness is 
properly regarded a reintegration rather than an initial synthesis like concrete consciousness. Nevertheless, 
conventional consciousness remains uncritical in several important ways, which I will explain shortly. For 
that reason, it will be most helpful to analyze it here alongside concrete consciousness under the general 
heading of “pre-critical consciousness” rather than categorizing it as its own phase or treating it alongside 
post-critical consciousness. 
43 See Kegan, The Evolving Self, 95-100. 
44 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 174. 
 150 
The image one previously formed of Jesus sitting up in the tomb may remain, but that 
image now takes on the larger meaning of the new possibilities for life and relationship 
with God attached to that image by the believing community. 
Despite the internalization of checks on the subject’s fantastical imagining, 
conventional consciousness remains largely uncritical. One operating from this form of 
consciousness has banished the monster from under the bed, but only because the 
community has declared the monster illusory. People in this developmental phase take for 
granted the beliefs and imaginary of the community just as they formerly took for granted 
the objects of their own imagination. Hence, while conventional consciousness certainly 
marks an advance beyond the utter naïveté of the prior phase, it is still very much 
vulnerable to error. The personal advance from concrete to conventional consciousness is 
typically contingent upon the gradual accumulation of practical insights within a 
community or culture. At this stage, prior to the emergence of critical consciousness 
within the culture, the community’s growth in understanding of reality is adventitious and 
unsystematic. Because the insights of the community are largely the result of trial and 
error rather than systematic, critical reflection, collective conventional consciousness 
often admits a mixture of truth and error. Individual persons operating from a 
conventional consciousness may thus access a more adequate grasp of reality through the 
insights of the community than they could on their own, but they are also limited by the 
limited knowledge of the community.45 This is why, as Taylor notes, the “enchanted” 
                                                
45 On this note, Lonergan’s distinction between “major” and “minor” authenticity provides us with one 
criterion for distinguishing uncritical from critical consciousness. According to Lonergan, one can be 
authentic to the norms of a tradition or a community (minor authenticity) while still being inauthentic to the 
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worldview persisted in the Christian West in varying degrees up until as recent as 500 
years ago (and persists still in many quarters).  
 Before moving on, I note again that concrete and conventional forms of 
consciousness need not carry a pejorative connotation. Many ancient and contemporary 
saints have lived from this form of consciousness. Moral goodness does not depend on 
advanced cognitive development, though it may help. In the words of Lonergan, “A 
person may be apprehending symbolically a very high morality even though he seems to 
be apprehending no more but the particular good.”46 Even when it comes to a person’s 
understanding of reality, an accurate grasp is fully within the capacities of conventional, 
even concrete, symbolic consciousness. “For,” Lonergan explains again, “as long as man 
operates intelligently and reasonably, he will succeed in every particular case in 
determining what is and what is not real and which realities are distinct.”47 
Notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that other desires often interfere with the 
disinterested desire to know, resulting in errors in the way people construct their view of 
reality. To these errors we now turn. 
 
Errors and Limitations of Pre-critical Symbolic Consciousness 
The acquisition of the symbolic function opens up a new world of possibilities to 
human beings, but it simultaneously opens up a new world of dangers unique to humans. 
                                                                                                                                            
demands of authentic cognition. In other words, one can align one’s thinking with that of the community 
and still be mistaken in one’s views of reality. (See Method in Theology, 79–80.) 
46 Ibid., Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 1993), 98. 
47 Ibid., Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Volume 3, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. 
Doran, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 1992), 560. 
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As Langer says, “The cat’s world is not falsified by the beliefs and poetic figments that 
language creates, nor his behavior unbalanced by the bootless rites and sacrifices that 
characterize religion, art, and other vagaries of a word-mongering mind.”48 In addition to 
the physical dangers that are part and parcel of creaturely existence, humans are 
susceptible to illusions, misconceptions, and heartache to which only beings who live 
through a mediated experience of the world are subject. Our imaginative capacities 
expand our world by allowing us to bring to mind what is not immediately, physically 
present… including things that have no objective reality whatsoever. 
Some errors are to be expected as a normal part of the development process. No 
child goes from crawling to walking without taking a few falls. Likewise, no one 
transitions from a world of immediacy to one mediated symbolically without a few 
mental slips. Child psychologist Judy DeLoache has carefully observed and documented 
these sorts of developmental errors over a lifetime of research on symbolic thinking in 
children. She has noted that very young children do not distinguish clearly between 
mental images, fabricated images (e.g., photographs), and physical objects. Where a two-
year old is beginning to understand that a picture represents another object, a nine-month 
old infant will grasp at a picture as if it were a three-dimensional object.49 Crucial to the 
intervening development is the child’s ability to master what DeLoache terms “dual 
representation,” the ability to view a single object simultaneously as a concrete object in 
its own right and in its abstract relation to another entity that it represents or 
                                                
48 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 36. 
49 See Christine J. Ziemer, Jodie M. Plumert, and Anne D. Pick, “To Grasp or Not to Grasp: Infants’ 
Actions Toward Objects and Pictures,” Infancy 17, no. 5 (2012): 479–97, doi:10.1111/j.1532-
7078.2011.00100.x. 
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symbolizes.50 If a child is ever to function “normally” in the world, it must refrain from 
responding to the symbolizing object as if it were the object it represents.51 Though this 
capacity has begun to emerge by the second year of life, it will take years to master.52 In 
fact, as I will explain in the following section, many people never fully master this 
inhibitory function, which is part of the reason idolatry remains a perennial temptation for 
human beings.  
Errors of impatience present another common stumbling block in the development 
of symbolic thinking. Previously I noted that, before we ever attain understanding, we 
desire it. This desire is thus the beginning of all knowledge. However, that desire can also 
be the source of error if it is allowed to race ahead of judgment. Langer explains, “An 
overactive mind is uncritical, as a voracious appetite is unfastidious. Children mix dream 
and reality, fact and fiction, and make impossible combinations of ideas in their haste to 
capture everything, to conceive an overwhelming flood of experiences.”53 Accurate grasp 
of reality requires reflective judgment, that is, the act of confirming the understanding of 
reality generated by one’s images and insights. Mental images themselves are never true 
                                                
50 Judy S. DeLoache, “The Symbol-Mindedness of Young Children,” in Child Psychology in Retrospect 
and Prospect: In Celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the Institute of Child Development, ed. Willard W. 
Hartup and Richard A. Weinberg, vol. 32 (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 78. Cf. 
Langer: “This dual operation of datum as sign and symbol together is the key to realistic thinking: the 
envisagement of fact” (Philosophy in a New Key, 267). 
51 Judy S. DeLoache, “Dual Representation and Young Children’s Use of Scale Models,” Child 
Development 71, no. 2 (2000): 336. 
52 In DeLoache’s experiments, for example, two-year olds were shown to be unable to use scale models to 
learn information about the full-sized rooms they represented because they were so fixated on the models 
themselves. (See Judy S. DeLoache, “Symbolic Functioning in Very Young Children: Understanding of 
Pictures and Models,” Child Development 62, no. 4 (1991): 736–52; Georgene J. Troseth and Judy S. 
DeLoache, “The Medium Can Obscure the Message: Young Children’s Understanding of Video,” Child 
Development 69, no. 4 (1998): 950–65.)  
53 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 148. 
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or false.54 They can, however, be more or less adequate to a given question or problem 
(and the perceptions and insights they generate can be judged incorrectly). Inevitably, a 
young child has a limited store of images to work with and so is poorly equipped to 
interpret the multitude of experiences it undergoes. Every time the mind generates an 
image, it immediately generates the question, Is it true/real? Were the child to have the 
restraint to exercise the judgment that its images are insufficient for providing accurate 
understanding no illusion would arise. Yet, in the child’s eagerness to understand, it 
overextends its limited repertoire of images and, as Lonergan explains, ascribes reality to 
any “object of a sufficiently integrated and a sufficiently intense flow of sensitive 
representations, feelings, words, and actions.”55 It takes for granted that its images are 
adequate rather than judging their adequacy. Again, this sort of error is not limited to 
young children. The fantastical myths and magic typical of primitive cultures are 
products of the same kind of impatient thinking. 
In time children and communities acquire the cognitive capabilities and the 
practice necessary to consistently distinguish reality from fantasy. Yet, even once people 
have overcome these early developmental struggles, other sources of error persist. 
Besides the unrestricted desires for truth and goodness, human beings experience many 
other desires such as the desire for pleasure and the desire for esteem. These latter desires 
have the potential to short-circuit the unrestricted desire for truth and goodness. Even 
                                                
54 Cf. Bernard Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic 
and Existentialism, ed. Frederick E Crowe, Robert M. Doran, and Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2001), 13. 
55 Lonergan, Insight, 561. For Lonergan’s discussion of what constitutes sufficient evidence for a 
prospective judgment see ibid., 305-6. 
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more deeply-rooted than our desires for pleasure and esteem is our desire for self-
preservation. As Roger Haight explains, because the human being “cannot fully commit 
or determine the self in being, because it always suffers the threat of nonbeing, it is 
always tempted and in some measure seeks to secure itself in being on its own terms.”56 
As beings whose sense of identity is every bit as precious to us as the integrity of our 
bodies, the threat of nonexistence menaces us not only in the form of predators and 
perilous situations but also in the form of challenges to our understanding of self and 
reality. The meaning we construct of our experiences is hard earned, and we resist 
staunchly any perceived assault on that meaning. As Jack Mezirow explains, we often 
construct and employ our meaning perspectives in such a way as to self-deceive, block 
attention, and diminish awareness of anything that might provoke the anxiety of 
uncertainty and change.57 In the same vein, Lonergan states, “The whole tendency of 
present perceptiveness, of present affectivity and aggressivity, of present ways of 
understanding and judging, deliberating and choosing, speaking and doing is for them to 
remain as they are.”58 
We are quite ingenious in all the many strategies we employ to this end, most of 
them unconscious.59 When these unconscious cognitive strategies subvert the dynamics 
of authentic cognition (that is, persistent questioning, attention to experience, 
                                                
56 Roger Haight, “Sin and Grace,” in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, ed. Francis 
Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 395. 
57 See Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991), 5, 
18. 
58 Lonergan, Insight, 501; cf. Jack Mezirow and Associates, Learning as Transformation: Critical 
Perspectives on a Theory in Progress (Jossey-Bass, 2000), 18. 
59 Cf. David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 11. 
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understanding, judging, and deciding), we describe them as “biases”. One bias that has 
been well documented in psychological studies is “confirmation bias,” the unconscious 
tendency of people to give more credence to information that supports their current 
beliefs.60 If one believes that all politicians are in cahoots with Big Business, one is more 
likely to notice and remember headlines about government corruption than headlines 
about corporate regulation. Through such selective patterning of attention, people come 
to enclose themselves in what Paolo Freire terms “circles of certainty.”61  
Lonergan has analyzed several other forms of bias, including “dramatic bias”.62 
Dramatic bias is operative when a person’s anxieties actually prevent certain mental 
images from emerging to the level of consciousness for fear of the unwanted 
understandings they might lead to. This is the type of bias at play when a bigoted person 
suppresses positive images of a despised group of people (e.g., gays, African-Americans, 
women). Dramatic bias thus preserves oversimplified understandings of certain 
potentially anxiety-producing realities. The dynamics of this bias are closely related to 
what William Lynch has called humanity’s “absolutizing instinct,” our proclivity for 
turning one part of something into the whole.63 Such absolutizing is exemplified in the 
Catholic who reduces all Christian morality to a crusade against abortion or the scholar 
who believes that his niche interest is the key to unlocking all the secrets of the universe.  
                                                
60 Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Our Minds, Our Memories: Enhancing Thinking and Learning at All Ages 
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011), 172. 
61 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1994), 
20. 
62 For Lonergan’s discussion of bias in its multiple manifestations, see Insight, 214-27, 244-51. I focus on 
dramatic bias here because it is the form of bias that is most relevant to the operations of the imagination. 
63 See Lynch, Images of Hope, 105-28, 243-4. According to Lynch, Erik Erikson referred to this 
phenomenon by the term “totalism” (ibid., 244). 
 157 
All of the above biases and cognitive errors can afflict a person at any 
developmental level, but people operating from an uncritical consciousness are most 
susceptible. 
 
Moral Errors of the Imagination: Sin and Idolatry64 
Because human living involves thinking about not only what is true but also what 
is good, the malfunctioning of the imagination can result in moral as well as cognitive 
errors. In other words, improper use of the imagination can contribute to sin. Most people 
tend to conceive of sin primarily in terms of evil actions, but sinful action proceeds from 
distorted imagining. To say as much is not to reduce all sin to misguided imagining but 
merely to note the central way in which imagination is implicated in sin.65 As H. Richard 
Niebuhr says, “the impoverishment and alienation of the self, as well as the destruction of 
others, issues from a reasoning of the heart that uses evil imagination.”66 In using the 
term “evil imagination,” Niebuhr does not mean to suggest that some imaginations are 
created good and other bad. The problem is not the image or the imagination itself; the 
problem lies, rather, in how human beings employ them.67 When failures to regulate the 
                                                
64 In this chapter, I will discuss idolatry as it is manifested in each of the pre-critical, critical, and post-
critical forms of consciousness. For this reason, it is necessary to establish a foundational understanding of 
idolatry before moving on from this section on pre-critical consciousness to critical and post-critical 
consciousness. 
65 For example, it is common enough for people to imagine clearly the right course of action and still 
choose otherwise. Such inconsistency between imagination and action relates to the concept of “moral 
impotence”.  
66 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 75. 
67 Speaking from a neuroscience perspective, Antonio Damasio similarly writes, “Symbolic processing 
may be advantageous or pernicious, depending on the topic and the circumstance” (Descartes’ Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994), 184). 
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imagination disrupt one’s relationships with God and others, those failures are rightly 
designated sins. 
As suggested in the previous chapter, the imagination is crucial for our relating to 
God. Humans are created in God’s “image and likeness,” and our vocation and beatitude 
lies in conforming to and reflecting that image.68 Yet, many other things vie for our 
attention. “From the moment of birth,” writes Parker Palmer, “other powers imprint our 
souls with images less than divine.”69 Jean-Luc Marion sounds a similar note, observing, 
“The will to power forges ‘gods’ at every instant….each instant not only furnishes them 
but even demands and produces them….The barbarous surging forward of terrible and 
trivial ‘idols’.”70 This incessant surge of idols presents a major obstacle in our efforts to 
image God because we humans are “mimetic” beings (as René Girard and others have 
noted).71 We conform to that which commands our attention, whether it be an image of 
the divine or something less than divine.  
Because God alone offers life in its fullness, we can achieve integration and 
fulfillment only by fixing our sights on God and allowing our imaginations to be formed 
by God’s self-revelation. To focus on anything less is to close the imagination 
                                                
68 Gen 1:26; cf. Rom 8:29; 2 Cor 3:18. The history of debate of the meaning of this phrase is a long one. In 
the following discussion, I primarily emphasize the meaning of image as visible. However, I acknowledge 
that there are other legitimate ways to understanding the meaning of the imago Dei and that there are 
dangers in limiting its meaning to a visible image. Protestant and Orthodox Christians especially tend to be 
wary of these dangers, but there is also a strain in the Catholic tradition of theologians (e.g., Augustine, 
Aquinas, Lonergan) who have found it necessary to suggest a non-imaginable “image” (viz., within the 
human soul) in order to give a sound interpretation of this biblical phrase. 
69 Parker J. Palmer, To Know as We Are Known (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 17. 
70 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University Of 
Chicago Press, 2012), 38. 
71 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1979); Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 48;  Marco 
Iacoboni, Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2008). 
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prematurely, to elevate one part of reality to the whole. It is to reduce reality to what can 
be measured by one’s own gaze rather than receiving reality from its very source.72 The 
temptation to do just this is strong, for our own existence is a constant concern for us. As 
we have seen above, we find comfort in simplifying reality, reducing it to the human 
scale, and clutching to the view of reality we have constructed. And so, Eliade explains, 
we invest our hopes in a particular vision or image and ask it “to put an end to the tension 
and anxiety caused by relativity and disorientation—in short, to reveal an absolute point 
of support.”73 Just as cognitive errors result from closing out further experiences, images, 
and questions, likewise does idolatry result from the premature closure of the religious 
imagination, from the refusal to allow God to continually shape one’s imagination.74 
The effects of this premature closure are dire and wide ranging. Like the Israelites 
at the foot of Sinai, we cut ourselves off from God’s ongoing self-revelation and mistake 
an image of our own making for the one true God.75 Losing sight of the true source of all 
reality, we fixate on this created image (a person, a possession, an image of success) and 
then another and then another in a futile attempt to ground our existence. None is able to 
satisfy for long, and we are left feeling fragmented, unfulfilled and captive. Bound to 
conform ourselves to the objects of our attention, the divine image in us grows faint as 
                                                
72 Marion, God Without Being, 11. 
73 Eliade, The Sacred and The Profane, 27–8. 
74 Cf. Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation, 71; Paul Ricoeur, “The Symbol: Food for Thought,” 
Philosophy Today 4 (September 1, 1960): 203; Rowan Williams, “Language, Reality and Desire in 
Augustine’s De Doctrina,” Journal of Literature & Theology 3(2) (1989), 142. 
75 This idol may be a picture or a statue or—more likely today—an object of our passions or an image that 
represents ourselves. (Cf. Elizabeth A. Johnson, Quest for the Living God: Mapping Frontiers in the 
Theology of God (New York: Continuum, 2007), 98–9.) 
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we become more and more like the worldly things to which we are beholden.76 Unable or 
unwilling to see God’s image in ourselves, we are even less capable of recognizing it in 
others. This is precisely the situation Paul laments in his letter to the Romans: “And since 
they did not see fit to acknowledge God….They were filled with every kind of 
wickedness, evil, covetousness, malice. Full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, craftiness, 
they are gossips, slanderers, God-haters, insolent, haughty, boastful, inventors of evil, 
rebellious towards parents, foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless”  (Rom 1:28-31). Mere 
objects in our eyes, other people receive none of the love and respect they deserve as 
beings created in God’s image. Instead we treat them as means to our personal ends, as a 
screen for the projection of our personal hang-ups and insecurities, and as scapegoats for 
our personal disappointments and fears.77 
Idolatry is a temptation for every human being on account of the tension we all 
experience between the desire to form a stable, reassuring view of reality and the call to 
patiently allow our imaginations to be formed by God’s ongoing revelation. However, 
those who have not yet learned to inhibit their spontaneous responses to powerful stimuli 
or to exercise reflective judgment consistently—that is, those operating from a pre-
critical consciousness—are particularly at risk. As distinct from later manifestations (see 
below), the idolatry of pre-critical thinkers is most often not an idolatry born of pride but 
rather of confused imagining and insufficiently restrained desiring. It is the idolatry of the 
golden calf and the mostly pious but somewhat superstitious pre-Vatican II Catholic. As 
people develop the capacity to judge their imaginings more adequately, this particular 
                                                
76 Cf. Rom 1:23. 
77 Girard has thematized this “scapegoating mechanism” prominently in Violence and the Sacred. 
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form of idolatry becomes less of a temptation. Still, idolatry in varying forms remains a 
persistent temptation for the whole of one’s life, no matter how “developed” one 
becomes. As such it will be necessary to revisit the issue of idolatry in each of the 
following sections on critical and post-critical consciousness. 
 
Critical Symbolic Consciousness 
Description and Capacities 
As noted above, Robert Kegan has described the operative mechanism of 
development as an alternating pattern of differentiation and integration (“decentration” 
and “recentration” in Piaget’s terms).78 We can clearly recognize a movement toward 
differentiation in the transition from pre-critical to critical consciousness. As one 
develops beyond the initial naive consciousness, one gains awareness of the inadequacies 
of one’s former state. However, the transition to critical consciousness does not happen 
all at once. The first, tenuous step occurs in the transition from concrete symbolic 
consciousness to conventional consciousness described above. As the child becomes 
disembedded from radical egocentrism and begins to develop a sense of “other,” it also 
becomes aware of the difference between how it speaks about the world and how others 
do so. Awareness of this difference prompts a crisis that challenges the child’s previous 
way of imagining reality. At the same time, development of the capacity for logical and 
abstract thinking provides new controls over imagination. The child’s hitherto rampant 
imaginings come under the control of the logic of the community as internalized by the 
                                                
78 Kegan, The Evolving Self, 31. 
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child. Thus, while still embedded in the collective consciousness of the community, this 
transition involves a critique of the prior egocentric, undifferentiated consciousness and a 
step toward critical consciousness. 
Many people remain at this conventional level for the whole of their adult lives.79 
However, some undergo a further differentiation of consciousness during their 
college/early employment years or later, through which they become critical of the 
conventional ways of imagining typical of their community. This differentiation marks 
the definitive transition to critical consciousness.80 In critical consciousness, imagination 
is controlled by the imminently generated logic of the individual rather than that of 
external authority. Becoming more aware of their own cognitive operations, people in 
this phase may experience a strong desire to get to the meaning “behind” the symbols or 
to abolish the symbols altogether if they perceive them to be void of any deeper meaning. 
For example, they might conclude that Jesus never physically sat up in the tomb or that 
the bread and wine consecrated in the Eucharist are “mere” symbols. These perceptions 
may lead them to deny previous beliefs and abandon old religious practices and can be 
attended by feelings of loss, dislocation, guilt, or resentment at having been misled by 
others.81  
Critical consciousness enables them to overcome a naive over-reliance on 
supernatural powers and affords greater conceptual clarity and resistance to 
                                                
79 Cf. Fowler, Stages of Faith, 161.  
80 Cf. Ibid., 174-83; Sawicki, The Gospel in History, 18-20. 
81 Cf. Fowler, Stages of Faith, 180. 
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superstition.82 According to Susanne Langer, it is this sort of consciousness that separates 
a civilized mentality from a savage mentality. The difference between uncritical and 
critical thinking, we do well to note, is not that fantastical images cease to emerge for the 
critical thinker but rather that the critical thinker responds to those images differently. In 
the words of Langer, “bizarre and monstrous imagery pops into [civilized] heads, too, but 
is rejected almost instantly by the disciplined reason.”83  
When critical consciousness comes to pervade the common consciousness, a 
culture enters into what Ricoeur calls a moment of “forgetfulness of the signs of the 
sacred”.84 It is an age of “disenchantment” (Taylor) and “demystification” of old myths 
and symbols (Ricoeur), an age when language becomes “more precise, more univocal, 
more technical in a word, more suited to those integral formalizations which are called 
precisely symbolic logic.”85 In such a period, the old enchanted imaginary through which 
people once interpreted their experiences is replaced by an “imminent frame”.86 The 
events of daily life and the workings of the universe are no longer explained by appeals to 
supernatural powers but rather by scientific laws. This period is thus the golden age for 
science and historical method. Such was the ethos that defined the Enlightenment in 
Europe and the United States during the 18th century. Such is the situation that, in many 
respects, we contemporary Americans recognize as our own. 
 
                                                
82 Cf. ibid., 180. 
83 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 181. 
84 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 349. 
85 Ibid., 349. 
86 Taylor, A Secular Age, 542. 
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Errors and Limitations of Critical Symbolic Consciousness 
While critical consciousness brings with it new strengths and abilities, it also has 
its limitations. If the primary limitation of uncritical consciousness is lack of logical 
control over an excess of meaning, the primary limitation of critical consciousness is 
excessive rationalization resulting in a dearth of meaning. On the one hand, disdain for 
symbol and ritual and overvaluation of logical reasoning can amount to its own form of 
idolatry. As Marion notes, the idolatry of the concept is just as real as the idolatry of the 
image.87 On the other hand, by formalizing language and relentlessly searching for the 
meaning “behind” the symbol, a critically-minded person may end up emptying language 
and symbol of its meaning and power.88 That person may consequently conclude that 
there is no truth to the symbol at all and so reject symbol, ritual, and religious belief 
entirely. This experience can lead to a feeling of disillusionment and to a relativist and 
even antagonistic stance toward religion. The person might very well view the symbols 
and beliefs of others with equanimity but fail to experience the deep meaning of any of 
these symbols for him- or herself.89 While recognizing that they cannot in good 
conscience return to their old, naive ways of symbolic thinking, people at this 
developmental phase may nevertheless experience the regret of having lost something 
important. 
Marked as it is by a new capacity for reflexivity, critical consciousness represents 
a state of incomplete self-knowledge. On the one hand, people operating from critical 
                                                
87 See Marion, God Without Being, 22-23. 
88 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 349; cf. Edward Farley, Deep Symbols: Their Postmodern Effacement 
and Reclamation (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996). 
89 Cf. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 354. 
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consciousness are aware that meaning is not simply externally imposed but in great part 
immanently generated. They recognize that they experience reality in this way because 
they construct it so. This self-knowledge makes possible greater precision of thought and 
a fuller grasp of reality than was possible before. On the other hand, Ricoeur explains, 
“the being which posits itself in the Cogito has still to discover that the very act by which 
it abstracts itself from the whole does not cease to share in the being that challenges it in 
every symbol.”90 In other words, such a person may become so narrowly concerned with 
their own thought that they lose sight of their situatedness within the wider realm of 
being. They may fail to recognize that the symbols they interpret are not merely a tabula 
rasa against which they projects meaning but rather a system of signs pointing to a world 
of inexhaustible meaning. It may not occur to this person that their work of constructing 
meaning is an activity done in collaboration with something or someone beyond him- or 
herself and that their meaning-constructing ability is, in the first place, a gift. Critically-
minded people are thus likely to undervalue tradition and overvalue their own rational 
capacities and understanding of faith, which may be blind to real tensions and 
complexities in the world. Such people’s self-knowledge is also incomplete in the sense 
that they fail to recognize their personal need for symbol and the integration it facilitates. 
To the extent that human beings have reduced themselves to a Cogito or a mind, they 
have, in the words of Robert Doran, “transformed the potential operator of human 
integration [viz., the sensitive psyche] into a defective operator of human 
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disintegration.”91 Captivated by their newfound powers of rational analysis, they facilitate 
internal dis-integration through neglect of other dimensions of their being. 
 
Post-critical Symbolic Consciousness 
While Enlightenment thinkers and modern day rationalists would have us believe 
that the critical phase represents the pinnacle of human thinking, the inherited wisdom of 
our religious traditions and the insights of modern psychology reveal that they are 
mistaken. The end of human consciousness is not to expose as illusions the symbols that 
give rise to thought but rather to recover the fullness of their meaning through critical yet 
receptive interpretation. It is, in the words of T. S. Eliot, “to arrive where we started / 
And know the place for the first time.”92 The feelings of loss and longing and the 
“disenchantment with disenchantment”93 that often attends the twilight of critical 
consciousness are hints that there is more to meaning than can be perceived through 
rational analysis. As David Tracy has suggested, even after we acquire the capacity for 
critical thought with all its benefits, “[t]his need for and this possibility of fiction remains, 
it seems, an uncommonly common matter of fact of our shared experience.”94 We find 
that the possibilities for human living disclosed to us through symbols and myths are in 
fact more powerful and more authentic than those revealed through a demythologizing 
lens.  
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At this moment in the developmental journey, the weary critical thinker is primed 
for a new integration. However, unlike the undifferentiated integration of the pre-critical 
phase, this new integration does not come at the expense of true self-awareness. As 
Kegan would say, this integration does not take the form of embeddedness in image and 
symbol. Rather, it is an integration forged by relationship to them. In this way, what was 
dissected in the critical movement is now reintegrated in a more resilient, more adaptive 
synthesis. Paul Ricoeur has famously described this third phase in the evolution of 
symbolic consciousness as a “second naïveté,” “the post-critical equivalent of the 
precritical hierophany.”95  
Post-critical consciousness emerges when symbolic power is reunited with 
conceptual meaning.96 The reintegration of the two—an integration that seems impossible 
to critical consciousness—is made possible by what Fowler, following William Lynch, 
terms the “ironic imagination.”97 Fowler defines the ironic imagination as “a capacity to 
see and be in one’s or one’s group’s most powerful meanings, while simultaneously 
recognizing that they are relative, partial and inevitably distorting apprehensions of 
transcendent reality.”98 Ricoeur, Fowler, and others make clear that this second naïveté 
does not involve a return to naive immediacy or a repudiation of the critical thinking 
achieved in the prior phase. Though development of post-critical consciousness does 
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involve a reclaiming of the immediacy of symbol, it is a thinking from symbols rather 
than thinking within symbols, as was the case in pre-critical consciousness.99 The images 
that arise in imagination are not taken as explanatory but rather understood as 
symbolic.100 Availing oneself of the tools of critical thought, one discovers that it is 
possible to recover the power and meaning of symbols with all their disclosive 
possibilities, now through interpretation instead of naive imaginings.101  
As with previous developmental transitions, the transition to post-critical 
consciousness involves the risk of leaving behind the ways of thinking and imagining that 
one finds most comfortable. In this case, if one is to move into a more adequate form of 
consciousness, one cannot continue analyzing symbols from a safe distance. One must, in 
the words of Ricoeur, make a “wager” that thinking from symbols will enable one to see 
reality more clearly. Ricoeur explains, “It is necessary, then, to participate in the struggle, 
in the dynamics, in which the symbolism becomes a prey to a spontaneous hermeneutics 
that seeks to transcend it…. but then one must abandon the position—or rather, the 
exile—of the remote and disinterested spectator, in order to appropriate in each case a 
particular symbolism.”102 To access the illuminating power of the symbol one must enter 
into the world of the symbol and risk belief in that power.103 From a critical stance such 
belief seems naive and irrational. Yet the truth is that some realities simply cannot be 
known standing at a distance, as we saw in the previous chapter. Especially when it 
                                                
99 Cf. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 355. 
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comes to the realm of the transcendent, knowing requires giving up the neatness of a 
transparent, rationally-ordered world and entering once again into a world of complexity 
and mystery. 
The reward for taking this risk is reclaiming a world infused with meaning and 
wonder. “In fact,” writes Ricoeur, “the symbol, used as a means of detecting and 
deciphering human reality, will have been verified by its power to raise up, to illuminate, 
to give order to that region of human experience, that region of confession, which we 
were too ready to reduce to error, habit, emotion, passivity.”104 Combined with a 
newfound openness to being grasped by the symbol, criticism can now serve a restorative 
rather than merely reductive function.105 Rather than dissecting the symbol into discrete 
elements and translating its meaning into neat concepts, interpretation creates the 
possibility of accessing a more expansive meaning, thereby revivifying thought and 
restoring the feelings of wonder and fulfillment that characterized the first naiveté.  
By way of example, a person transitioning from critical to post-critical 
consciousness might resume participation in the Mass. He or she does so fully aware of 
the superstitious ways people imagine Jesus’ presence in the Eucharist, yet with a deeper 
insight into God’s presence-in-absence and a renewed appreciation for how the sacrament 
of Jesus’ self-gift serves to unite Christians to God and one another. In the process of 
reclaiming the power of symbol, one simultaneously acquires a new depth of self-
knowledge, affirming not only the possibility of accessing a fuller reality through critical 
symbolic thought but also the personal need to do so.  
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This deeper self-knowledge does not preclude cognitional errors and sin entirely. 
Post-critical thinkers still face the everyday exigency of reflectively judging the adequacy 
of their images and insights. They still face the temptation of idolatry, though they are 
less likely to succumb to idolatries of the golden calf variety than pre-critical thinkers or 
to conceptual idolatry than critical thinkers. Thanks to successful self-appropriation of 
their imaginative capacities, the recurring pattern of cognitive operations that makes 
possible a fuller grasp of truth and goodness has become routine if not automatic. 
Therefore, even if authentic cognition is never achieved permanently,106 post-critical 
consciousness does provide a level of protection against error that eludes pre-critical and 
even critical thinkers.107 
How does this post-critical symbolic consciousness manifest itself historically? 
We are yet to see. Those who write about it speak of it primarily as an emerging reality 
and as a need for the (immediate) future. Ricoeur, for his part, asserts, “if we can no 
longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance with the original belief in 
them, we can….aim at a second naïveté in and through criticism.”108 Fowler identifies the 
present moment as “a watershed in the evolution of cultural consciousness” in which the 
emergence of a distinctly postmodern consciousness—that is, one that parallels 
“Conjunctive” faith consciousness—will be necessary to overcome the incommensurate 
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thinking underlying current culture wars.109 Having found scant evidence for the 
existence of Conjunctive consciousness prior to present day, Sawicki deems extensive 
discussion of it to be beyond the scope of her historical survey of Christian education.110 
Lonergan, similarly to Fowler, observes, “The second stage of meaning is vanishing, and 
a third is about to take its place.”111 By all indications, then, we are living at a pivotal 
moment in the evolution of human consciousness. If we are to understand the 
implications of this historic shift, we will do well to consider the dynamics of human 
development more carefully within the present historical and cultural context. 
 
Phases of Symbolic Consciousness in Historical and Cultural Context 
The Transition to Postmodern Culture 
As I have noted briefly in each of the previous sections, it is not only individuals 
but also entire societies that progress through distinct phases of development. Various 
scholars have described this evolution of cultures in different terms. Taylor describes 
development from enchantment to disenchantment to an as yet indeterminate future. 
Lonergan speaks of stages of common sense, theory, and interiority. Kegan and many 
others write about traditional, modern, and postmodern cultural consciousnesses. 
However one describes it, a particular form of consciousness comes to pervade a culture 
on account of products of human meaning becoming expressed and imbedded in 
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language, customs, institutions, and structures112. With the passage of time these 
institutions and structures can seem to take on a life of their own. So it is that human 
beings can come to a point where they find themselves overwhelmed and lost within the 
society they have built.  
Some people become overwhelmed because their cognitive development has not 
kept pace with that of collective society or certain segments of society. Kegan has 
observed that “the distinguishing feature of contemporary culture is that for the first time 
in human history, three mentalities exist side by side in the adult population…the 
traditional, the modern, and the postmodern.”113 Certain populations of the Western 
world have advanced to modern (critical) or even postmodern  (post-critical) 
consciousness while other populations, including much of the so-called “second” and 
“third” worlds, continue to operate from a traditional (pre-critical) consciousness.114 
When people from traditional pockets of society come into contact with pockets imbued 
with a modern or postmodern mentality, misunderstanding and confusion often results.  
Still, even those whose developmental levels are on par with that of the majority 
can find aspects of their daily lives overwhelming. The world as we experience it has 
grown so complex that it is now virtually impossible for the average person to form a 
coherent social or cosmic imaginary or to envision our reality on anything resembling the 
                                                
112 Such manifestations exemplify what Lonergan means by the term “constitutive” meaning (Method in 
Theology, 78). 
113 Kegan, In Over Our Heads, 303–4. 
114 It is precisely for this reason that I have had to carefully limit my investigation to contexts particular to 
the United States. The situation that I describe in following does not apply in the same way to Christian-
colonized cultures like those of Africa, South and Central America, and even certain populations within the 
U.S. For an eye-opening discussion of the Catholic Church of the future, including the rise of 
supernaturalism, see John L. Allen, The Future Church: How Ten Trends Are Revolutionizing the Catholic 
Church (New York: Doubleday, 2009). 
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“human scale”.115 The immediacy of mass media and the ubiquity of electronic 
communication devices create an image- and information-inundated culture in which we 
are incapable of performing even a fraction of the cognitive tasks demanded of us.116 We 
are all (or at least most of us) in this sense “in over our heads” in contemporary 
society.117 Robert Doran describes the situation in this way:  
To the extent that the social relations of the infrastructure have become more complex 
than the cultural differentiations or mentalities whose purpose it is to order them, they 
have become senseless. And because these relations set conditions for the growth and 
decline of persons, because the psyche is a complex of social forces, because the dialectic 
of community has a relative dominance over the dialectic of the subject, the noetic 
senselessness of the social order is joined to an existential and historical 
destructiveness.118 
 
Since the time of the Enlightenment, Western people have engaged in a relentless pursuit 
of what could be done—what regions of Earth and space could be accessed, what 
biological limitations could be overcome, what mechanical power could be harnessed—
with insufficient regard for what should be done or what is genuinely salutary for the 
human person holistically conceived.119 The result is a social situation that is tragically 
out of sync with the psychic, emotional, and social needs of human beings. 
This situation is radically different from anything Christians (and humans in 
general) have confronted in the past. Christianity was born in a classical context, which 
                                                
115 As Wilfred Cantwell Smith explains, “In simpler times, each society had ideally one [Weltanschauung]; 
in a modern complex society, and perhaps even in most of its individual members, several may co-exist” 
(Belief and History (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 54). 
116 Cf. Kegan, In Over Our Heads, 9. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 
501. 
119 Doran describes this dilemma as the result of “anthropological constitutive meaning” (wherein the 
human is the measure of society) coming to dominate “cosmological constitutive meaning” (in which the 
divine cosmos and then society is the measure of the human being). (See Doran, Theology and the 
Dialectics of History, 507.) 
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offered early Christians a particular set of resources for making sense of their lives and 
reality as a whole. Since that time, the world has undergone not one but two major 
transformations with the advent of modernity and now postmodernity. The ways 
Christians previously imagined their world have become outdated and inadequate to the 
mental challenges of contemporary living, leaving most people struggling to cope and, 
more often than not, clueless as to the cause of their disorientation. Hence, the challenge 
to contemporary Christians, explains theologian Paul Lakeland, is “to keep alive in the 
postmodern world a religious vision created in a distinctly premodern cultural 
context.”120 Even though Catholic doctrine has not changed dramatically in recent 
history, the way Catholics think about it has. And the people who still think about it in a 
pre-critical manner are finding it increasingly untenable to do so.  
Simply put, postmodern culture presents challenges to faith that Christians 
operating from a critical or pre-critical consciousness are incapable of handling. Fowler 
and his peers are consistent in their assertion of what is necessary for Christians to adapt: 
“the construction of….postmodern, multiple systemic forms of consciousness represents 
a practical necessity for reflective persons in our era.”121 
 
Criteria for the Adequacy of Forms of Consciousness 
Many of today’s most astute cultural observers assert that the forms of 
                                                
120 Paul Lakeland, Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg 
Fortress Publishers, 1990), 39. 
121 Fowler, Faithful Change, 174. Kegan likewise diagnoses the “lack of fit between what the culture 
demands of our minds and our mental capacity to meet these demands” (In Over Our Heads, 9). Striking a 
similar cord, Lonergan asserts, “[n]ever has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to 
achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater” (Method in 
Theology, 99). 
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consciousness out of which most contemporary people operate have become inadequate 
relative to the challenges of postmodern living. But what makes one form of 
consciousness more adequate than another? In this matter, too, the scholarly opinions 
diverge. Different thinkers propose different criteria in accordance with the particular 
challenges they address in their work on human development.122 Rather than attempt to 
adjudicate among these diverse opinions, I will limit the following discussion by focusing 
on two categories of criteria of particular relevance to American Catholics: (1) the 
adequacy of a form of consciousness vis-à-vis the cognitive demands of the present U.S. 
context and (2) adequacy vis-à-vis the demands of Christian faith. 
Before discussing these two sets of criteria, however, it is important to note some 
baseline indicators of the proper functioning of human cognition that remain valid for any 
and all cultural and religious contexts. First among these is the set of cognitive skills 
required to achieve “human scale” in one’s interactions with one’s environment, namely, 
the ability to compress and integrate diffuse sense and imaginal data, to obtain global 
insight, strengthen vital relations, and synthesize a story. A person who lacks any of these 
basic capacities (which is different from occasionally struggling with these tasks) would 
experience great difficulty in carrying out the practical functions of everyday living. 
Second, proper cognitive functioning at any level requires constant generation of and 
openness to further questions.123 Failure to ask further questions—which we earlier 
associated with bias—drastically limits the person’s understanding of reality and 
                                                
122 For a brief summary discussion of these diverging opinions see Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions 
of Adult Learning, 151. 
123 Lonergan describes this requirement as giving free reign to the unrestricted desire to know. Mezirow 
characterizes it as being inclusive of information and permeable to different points of view. 
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eliminates the mind’s most reliable safeguard against error. Third, in addition to openness 
to further questions, the exercise of reflective judgment plays a crucial role in helping one 
to verify the truth of one’s understandings and to avoid illusion and error.124 Though the 
importance of judgment becomes more explicit in later stages of the evolution of 
consciousness, it is possible even for children to exercise judgment as necessary in each 
particular instance where it is required. Finally, proper cognitional functioning demands 
the emotional resilience necessary to cope with change. Human beings need to adapt to 
new information on a daily basis. Sometimes the new information can be perceived as 
threatening to the integrity of the self, triggering a strong emotional reaction. If the 
person is not capable of coping with moderate amounts of stress and anxiety, any novel 
situation or learning could potentially result in a breakdown of cognitive operations.  
Adequacy vis-à-vis Context. Beyond these baseline requirements, what makes a 
form of consciousness adequate or inadequate to the current postmodern context? 
Susanne Langer has written: 
A mind that is oriented, no matter by what conscious or unconscious symbols, in material 
and social realities, can function freely and confidently even under great pressure of 
circumstances and in the face of hard problems. Its life is a smooth and skillful shuttling 
to and fro between sign-functions and symbolic functions, a steady interweaving of 
sensory interpretations, linguistic responses, inferences, memories, imaginative prevision, 
factual knowledge, and tacit appreciations.125 
 
While we might object to Langer that none of us sails through the whole of life on calm 
waters, her core insight remains valid. A firmly established orienting frame is the 
                                                
124 In Chapter One, we noted Charles Taylor’s observation that the dissolution of the Christian social and 
cosmic imaginary resulted more from subtle shifts in people’s imagining than from a frontal assault on the 
Christian faith. Taylor further argues that people thought themselves to be acting as good Christians even as 
their beliefs and actions became increasingly secular. Had these people been more intentional about 
questioning and judging the fidelity of their imaginings to the Christian faith it is likely that history would 
have turned out differently. 
125 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 289. 
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difference between a life of coherence and purpose and one of confusion and 
purposelessness. Until relatively recently, that orienting frame—which we earlier 
identified as a Christian imaginary—was simply taken for granted in Western 
Christendom. Because this view of reality was seldom if ever challenged, Christians 
could go through their whole lives without ever seriously questioning the accuracy of 
their understanding of reality. Since that time, the multiplication of accounts of reality 
has rendered naive and conventional forms of symbolic consciousness inadequate. Some 
religious groups and individuals have responded with a head-in-the-sand approach, 
harkening back to fundamentalist readings of the Bible, more traditional forms of liturgy, 
and/or stringent doctrinal orthodoxy.126 In so doing they have opted for perceived 
certainty at the expense of openness to new learning. This is a fragile position to adopt, 
one in which a crack in a single brick can bring the whole rigidly constructed edifice 
crumbling down. 
By contrast, a form of consciousness that is adequate to the current context is one 
that is capable of adapting to new information and perspectives in addition to assimilating 
new information to existing frameworks of imagining and understanding.127 This sort of 
cognitive flexibility requires a significant capacity for self-regulation. In the past when 
authority was consolidated in a single source (namely, the Catholic Church), it was 
                                                
126 Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with traditional liturgical forms or doctrinal orthodoxy. 
The trouble lies in the naïve assumption that simply returning to older practices and beliefs will overcome 
the challenges to meaning-construction posed by postmodern life. 
127 This is a major theme in current conversations within the education world. Much of the discussion of 
“21st-century skills” focuses on the importance of teaching students critical thinking skills and strategies 
for making use of information technology rather than mere acquisition of declarative knowledge. (See, e.g., 
Bernie Trilling and Charles Fadel, 21st Century Skills: Learning for Life in Our Times (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2009).) 
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possible to more or less unthinkingly appropriate a unified worldview by absorbing the 
teachings of the Church and participating in the lifestyle built around those teachings. In 
the present context where authority is fractured and diffuse, there is greater need for 
internal authority, that is, for the ability to adjudicate among conflicting truth claims and 
render judgments based on immanently generated criteria. In Kegan’s framework, a 
person acquires this capacity for self-authorship in the transition from “Interpersonal” to 
“Institutional” consciousness. Fowler would describe the development as an advance 
from Synthetic-Conventional to Individuative-Reflective consciousness in which the 
subject attains the ability to “compose (or ratify) meaning frames that are conscious of 
their own boundaries and inner connections.”128 Both claims amount to a demand for 
development from pre-critical to critical consciousness. 
Still, when we consider additional demands placed on contemporary Americans’ 
imagining, it is apparent that even critical consciousness has become inadequate. Robert 
Masson cites the controversy surrounding the critique of Elizabeth Johnson’s Quest for 
the Living God as an illustrative instance of contemporary persons’ struggle to uphold, on 
the one hand, true knowledge about God and, on the other, the value and legitimacy of 
symbolic modes of knowing. According to Masson, the bishops’ concern with affirming 
that revelation transmits true knowledge of God “is legitimate but must be balanced 
against the overly facile conception in the popular media and the current ‘culture wars’ 
that the only alternative to a merely metaphorical, improper knowledge of God is the sort 
of literal knowledge normative in the sciences and in non-analogical, fundamentalist 
                                                
128 Fowler, Faithful Change, 63. 
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understandings of Christianity.”129 Masson’s assessment of the Johnson case (and we 
could cite many more examples like it) suggests that the disparaging of symbol typical of 
critical (i.e., Institutional or Individuative-Reflective) consciousness is contributing to 
social conflict and personal confusion just as much as unreflective conventional thinking.  
In fact, Fowler claims that current culture wars can be largely attributed to 
clashing between two incommensurate forms of consciousness (namely, Synthetic-
Conventional and Individuative-Reflective). Based on this diagnosis, Fowler concludes 
that this impasse is unlikely to be overcome without development to Conjunctive 
consciousness.130 A person imagining reality from Conjunctive consciousness appreciates 
the value and power of symbolic expression but also recognizes the difference between 
symbolic knowing and more literal forms of knowledge. Because people who think in 
this Conjunctive manner are able to hold the concerns of both Synthetic-Conventional 
and Individuative-Reflective thinkers in tension, they would be able to reconcile the 
perspectives of the two warring sides. In this way, Masson and Fowler both point to the 
need for a more self-aware mode of imagining, that is, for post-critical consciousness. 
This last point leads to a final criterion for the adequacy of forms of 
consciousness to the current postmodern context. Beyond the exigencies for adaptability 
and reaffirmation of imagination, postmodernity presents what Lonergan terms the 
“critical exigence,” the necessity of understanding how one knows something, why that 
                                                
129 Robert Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God: Theology After Cognitive Linguistics (Leuven: 
Peeters Press, 2014), 206. 
130 See Ch.10 of Faithful Change. 
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constitutes knowing, and what one knows when one does that.131 The diffusion of 
authority and fracturing of cosmic and social imaginaries makes it necessary for 
contemporary persons to consciously examine and appropriate the dynamics of cognition 
that give rise to all knowledge and value. Addressing similar concerns, Fowler explains 
that thorough self-awareness eludes those operating from a critical or Individuative-
Reflective consciousness, for they are “[f]requently overconfident in their conscious 
awareness, [and] attend minimally to unconscious factors that influence their judgments 
and behavior.”132 Consequently, they are susceptible to being excessively influenced by 
scientific and critical methods, logical analysis, and non-conformist individuals just as 
conventional thinkers are excessively influenced by institutions and tradition.133 Only by 
affirming oneself as an originator of meaning and value can one recognize scientific and 
symbolic knowledge as equally rooted in the dynamics of human cognition that orient us 
into the real. Self-appropriating one’s own knowing and valuing in this way empowers 
one to adjudicate among the multiplicity of truth claims at play in postmodern culture 
while still recognizing one’s dependence upon something greater than oneself, something 
that can be known only tacitly and symbolically. In light of these considerations, we must 
affirm with theologian Walter Conn that “[t]he facts of contemporary life dictate that 
critical self-appropriation, which was once a moral luxury, is now for many a necessary 
                                                
131 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 83. 
132 Fowler, Faithful Change, 63. 
133 Cf. ibid., 168-9. Lonergan points out that philosophy and the sciences can be just as misleading as 
degrading myths. (See Topics in Education, 64.) 
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component of authentic human living.”134 
Adequacy vis-à-vis Christianity. As Lonergan has noted, one can be authentic to a 
tradition or culture while being inauthentic in a more significant sense.135 In this way, a 
form of consciousness can be adequate to the demands of the cultural context while 
failing to measure up to the those of faith. For this reason we now proceed to consider the 
demands of the Christian faith upon symbolic consciousness.  
While certain symbols are certainly more adequate for faith than others,136 their 
adequacy is determined primarily by the manner in which they are used.137 As Marion 
has observed, the same objects can serve both as idols and as true icons: “[T]he idol and 
the icon are distinguishable only inasmuch as they signal in different ways, that is, 
inasmuch as each makes use of its visibility in its own way.”138 The most basic way we 
misuse a symbol is identifying the sign with that which it signals, mistaking the creation 
for the Creator.139 In De Doctrina Christiana Augustine explains that God alone is 
supreme reality and the proper object of our enjoyment while all else are merely signs 
referring us to and helping us in our journey toward that supreme reality.140 For those 
operating from a pre-critical consciousness, such error can result from one’s inability to 
                                                
134 Walter Conn, Christian Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1986), 126. 
135 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 79-80. 
136 It is important to attend to the disparity in the adequacy of various faith images because, in the words of 
Sharon Daloz Parks, “The quality of faith ultimately depends upon the adequacy of the images it employs” 
(The Critical Years: The Young Adult Search for a Faith to Live By (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986), 
110.). 
137 I will devote more attention to the relative adequacy of specific symbols in the coming chapters. 
138 Marion, God Without Being, 9. 
139 Cf. Williams, “Language, Reality and Desire , 147. 
140 See Saint Augustine, Teaching Christianity (De Doctrina Christiana), ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. 
Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1996), II.1.  
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distinguish between symbolic and explanatory meaning. Roberto Goizueta explains, “The 
danger of medieval sacramental or symbolic realism was that, by locating the 
supernatural within the natural, it could lead to an identification of the natural with the 
supernatural. When symbolic truth—the most profoundly real truth—is mistaken for 
empirical truth, the result is idolatry.”141 Symbolic consciousness is thus adequate to faith 
to the extent that it is able to preserve the “transparency” of symbols, that is, to 
consistently see “through” them to their transcendent referent.142 Such seeing becomes 
possible with attainment of conventional consciousness, but its proper functioning can 
remain tenuous for people at any level.143  
In general, a form of symbolic consciousness will be more or less adequate to the 
demands of Christian faith according to the extent that it remains “unfinished” or open to 
that which lies beyond it.144 Sharon Daloz Parks, following Niebuhr, describes the failure 
of religious imagination to remain open as leading to a practical “henotheism.”145 So-
called henotheists are so narrowly focused on a single cause or center of meaning—
career, popularity, even a narrow concept of God—that “they are unable to relate that 
center to any larger frame of trustworthy meaning.”146 As a result, they fall into 
                                                
141 Roberto S. Goizueta, “The Symbolic Realism of U.S. Latino/a Popular Catholicism,” Theological 
Studies 65 (2004): 269. 
142 Cf. Paul Tillich, “The Religious Symbol,” in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. Sidney Hook (New 
York: New York University Press, 1961), 316. 
143 See DeLoache’s research on “dual representation” cited above. 
144 Cf. Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination. 
145 Daloz Parks, Big Questions, Worthy Dreams, 22. 
146 Ibid. Here Parks effectively describes in religious terms the cognitive phenomenon that Mark Johnson 
describes in more general terms, namely, that the metaphors by means of which we make sense of reality 
inevitably limit our patterns of inference, perception, and action. (See Mark Johnson, The Body in the 
Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), 113, 136.) 
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fanaticism or succumb to disillusionment when challenged by complexity. Although it is 
possible for anyone to remain open to mystery on a case-by-case basis, those operating 
from a post-critical consciousness will be best able to tolerate paradox, disruption, and 
uncertainty. Their greater consistency derives in part from their enhanced self-awareness 
and ability to recognize the need to seek mechanisms for keeping the disruption alive or 
at least retrievable.147 For example, post-critical thinkers might intentionally alternate the 
God-images they use in reflection and prayer or regularly seek to be exposed to new 
ways of thinking about God. 
In the same vein, a symbolic consciousness that is adequate to the demands of 
Christian faith is one that remains active and dialectical. The primary source of error for 
the pre-critical consciousness is its lack of logical controls over imagination. For the 
critical consciousness, it is over-regulation and stifling of imagination. The unchecked 
imagination is inevitably seduced by idolatrous images; unimaginative reasoning 
invariably loses sight of the divine. Vibrant faith therefore requires constant interplay of 
the two,148 for, in the words of Marion, “we can glimpse GØd only in the intermittent 
halftimes of our idolatries.”149 While it is possible for uncritical thinkers to avoid these 
double horns, their lack of differentiation makes it extremely difficult. By contrast, those 
operating from a post-critical consciousness are better able to strike the balance between 
symbol and logic, imagination and explanation. Thanks to greater awareness of the 
                                                
147 Cf. Masson, Without Metaphor, No Saving God, 72. 
148 Relating these matters to the theological enterprise, Roberto Goizueta writes, “As the primary 
expressions of religious faith, symbols and rituals demand theological explanation and critique, but 
theology can never forget its roots in the symbols and rituals that embody the lived faith” (Goizueta, “The 
Symbolic Realism of U.S. Latino/a Popular Catholicism,” 270). 
149 Marion, God Without Being, 108. 
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differentiation among their cognitive operations, they can sustain a consistent dialectic 
between imaginative and logical thought, alternating between each as the situation 
dictates.  
Finally, post-critical consciousness is most adequate to the demands of Christian 
faith because only one imagining in this manner can maintain a coherent vision of reality 
in spite of being fully aware of the paradoxes of faith and symbol. Parks, again following 
Niebuhr, describes people who are not able to form such a coherent vision as 
“polytheists.” These individuals “find themselves living fragmented lives, piecing 
together various scraps of discrete meaning….each with its own god.”150 People 
operating out of a critical consciousness are particularly susceptible to this error on 
account of their proclivity for analytical thinking. Driven to get at the “real” meaning of 
the symbol, they dissect it into discrete components but then are unable to re-envision a 
new synthesis. What they lack that post-critical thinkers possess is the capacity for the 
“ironic imagination” mentioned above. William Lynch explains that the ironic 
imagination, the imagination proper to faith, “deals not with appearances, but with the 
very opposite of appearances, and….its main task is to keep opposites together in a single 
act of imagination.”151 The reconciliation of opposites is precisely what critical 
consciousness finds impossible, and yet such reconciliation seems essential for enduring 
                                                
150 Ibid. 
151 Lynch, Images of Faith, 83. In this sense, the images of faith serve a salutary and necessary function. In 
the words of Lynch, they “do not try to destroy the imagination but give it freedom and life” (Images of 
Faith, 22). In the same vein, Sharon Daloz Parks writes, “Religion, at its best, provides a dynamic 
distillation of images (symbols, stories, smells, sounds, songs, and gestures…) powerful enough to shape 
into one the chaos of existence—powerful enough to name a community’s conviction of the character of 
the whole of reality that its members experience as both ultimate and intimate” (Big Questions, Worthy 
Dreams, 118). ⁠ 
 185 
faith. Theologian James Cone states the matter eloquently: “One has to have a powerful 
religious imagination to see redemption in the cross, to discover life in death and hope in 
tragedy.”152  
Though we could certainly point to other criteria (and I will do so in subsequent 
chapters), those identified here will suffice for the time being for framing our thinking 
about what forms of symbolic consciousness or imagining are most adequate to the 
demands of Christian faith.153  
 
Conclusion: The Goal—Promoting a More Adequate Christian Imagination 
The consensus among the major authors discussed in this chapter is that the forms 
of consciousness through which most contemporary people think and imagine are 
incommensurate with the social and psychological challenges presented by postmodern 
culture. Their assessment coheres fully with the description of American Catholics’ 
situation in Chapter One and offers us significant insight into the underlying causes of 
their struggles to live as faithful disciples. Having established this diagnosis, further 
questions now emerge: Is it possible to facilitate people’s transition to a more adequate 
form of Christian imagination? If so, how? Upon these questions, we now pivot from the 
analytical portion of this project to the constructive. In the next chapter, I will lay the 
foundation for a (partial) solution to the imaginal challenges confronting today’s 
                                                
152 James H. Cone, The Cross and the Lynching Tree (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2011), 157-8. 
153 In this section I have consistently employed the qualified language of “most adequate” so as not to 
exclude the possibility of pre-critical or critical thinkers living healthy lives of faith. The deficiencies of 
these modes of consciousness may make faithful living more difficult but not impossible, as proven by the 
example of Jesus, who in all likelihood did not operate from a post-critical consciousness. 
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American Catholics. However, it will do to gesture here toward a crucial component of 
the proposed solution.  
What is needed is a new form of consciousness, a new way of imagining reality 
through the eyes of faith. Yet it is no easy thing to change the way people imagine their 
world. As we saw in the previous chapter, a person’s manner of imagining reality is 
profoundly personal and inextricably wound up with affectivity and sense of self. 
Because imagination is such a personal matter, it is highly resistant to external 
modification. Laws can compel certain behaviors and policing can enforce them, but 
neither can force human beings to alter the way they view reality. Even inculcation of 
moral imperatives does not always succeed in penetrating to the depths of the 
imagination. In fact, Charles Taylor argues that this is precisely the way Christian elites 
attempted to remedy society’s woes in the past, but these methods failed to produce the 
desired result.154 “Codes, even the best codes,” writes Taylor, “can become idolatrous 
traps, which tempt us to complicity in violence.”155 Though codes in some form or 
another are indispensable, they cannot change a person’s heart or worldview, and they are 
just as capable of leading people to hypocrisy as they are of leading them to holiness.156 
For this reason, Taylor suggests, “We should find the centre of our spiritual lives beyond 
the code, deeper than the code, in networks of living concern.”157 
If not through civil or moral codes, then how does a society nurture such networks 
of living concern? To answer this question one must recognize that the wellbeing of 
                                                
154 See Taylor, A Secular Age, 707. 
155 Ibid., 743. 
156 Consider the hypocrisy and hardheartedness of the Pharisees and scribes who Jesus so often criticized. 
157 Taylor, A Secular Age, 743. 
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society depends on the wellbeing of individual persons. As go the lives of individual 
citizens, so goes society as a whole. Whenever real social transformation has transpired 
in history, it began with individual conversion. As Taylor explains, “many of the great 
founding moves of a new spiritual direction in history, involve a transformation of the 
frame in which people thought, felt and lived before. They bring into view something 
beyond that frame, which at the same time changes the meaning of all the elements of the 
frame. Things make sense in a wholly new way.”158 As examples, Taylor cites 
individuals like Jesus, the Buddha, Francis of Assisi, and Saint Teresa, whose personal 
transformation provided the impetus for wider social transformation. 
Nothing less than this sort of momentous transformation of the frame is needed in 
our own day. The imaginative synthesis that held together the world and the faith lives of 
our ancestors has dissolved. We postmodern women and men struggle to integrate our 
thoughts, feelings, and actions and to grab hold of something that will enable us to give 
unity and purpose to our lives. We are well past the point where clearer presentation of 
Church teaching or more impassioned admonitions to moral rectitude might have sufficed 
to right the ship. The storm has raged for too long. In some quarters, the disorientation is 
virtually complete. Whatever the solution is, it will have to involve a total reorientation. 
It will have to go straight to the center of the human person, to that place from which 
people live and love. For nothing less than a radical transformation of people’s orienting 
frame of reference will suffice to restore Catholics to the life of meaning, joy, and 
                                                
158 Ibid., 730-1. The reader will recall that Masson described the “tectonic reconfiguration” effected by 
metaphor in very similar terms. 
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purpose that Jesus promised.159 What is needed, in other words, is a conversion of the 
imagination. How we are to understanding this conversion, how it differs from natural 
human development, and how it can be facilitated—these are the questions that will 
occupy us in the next chapter. 
 
                                                
159 Doran conceives the solution in similar terms: “I understand this task as one that, by evoking a change 
in the meaning constitutive of the situation, will mediate a transition from this situation to an alternative 
situation more closely approximating the reign of God in human affairs” (Doran, Theology and the 
Dialectics of History, 4). ⁠ 
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Chapter 4 
Converting the Imagination 
 
 
 
 
 
“…every real conversion is first a revolution at the level of our directive images.” 
- Maria Harris 
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Introduction 
Ever the astute observer of the seasons and subtleties of the human spirit, spiritual 
writer Ronald Rolheiser has described the reality of today’s adult Christians in this way: 
“we often find ourselves living in that time between Good Friday and Easter Sunday, 
when the God we were raised on has been crucified but a sense of the resurrection has not 
yet sufficiently illumined our imaginations so that we can recognize the God who is 
walking beside us.”1 Rolheiser’s words give poetic expression to the situation I have 
described in the preceding chapters—that of many American Catholics whose traditional 
ways of understanding life and faith have largely passed away, leaving them without a 
clear vision of a way forward. 
Yet, as Rolheiser insinuates, Christians have found themselves in this sort of 
situation before. It surely must have seemed to Jesus’ disciples that their former hopes 
and beliefs were so much folly when he was taken from them and executed in the public 
eye. It was only when Jesus appeared to them on the third day that their hope was 
renewed and reinvigorated as never before. Given the prognostications of some of 
today’s most perspicacious scholars, we have good reason to believe that, like the 
disciples on the third day, American Catholics are presently entering into a third phase of 
faith consciousness. As was the case for the disciples, a period of adjustment will be 
necessary. The new relationship to which Jesus called his followers after the resurrection 
went beyond the concrete, flesh-and-blood manner of relating to which they had grown 
                                                
1 Ronald Rolheiser, Sacred Fire: A Vision for a Deeper Human and Christian Maturity (New York: Image, 
2014), 99, paraphrasing Edward Schillebeeckx from a workshop at the American College, Louvain, 
Belgium, March 1983. 
 191 
accustomed. Their post-resurrection faith was more complicated but also more resilient. I 
believe that today’s Christians are likewise being called to a more mature, more resilient 
form of faith consciousness. Many have predicted that the future of the Christian faith 
will hinge upon how Christians respond to this call.2  
In the previous chapter, I utilized the resources of developmental psychology to 
flesh out a picture of what this new form of consciousness might look like: It will be 
marked by greater awareness of the one’s own cognitional operations and affectivity, an 
ability to reconcile critical thought with humans’ psychic and existential need for symbol 
and myth, and an enhanced capacity for holding together in a coherent imaginative 
synthesis the paradoxes of faith as well as the many facets of pluralistic postmodern 
experience. It will provide the ground for a faith that is intentionally affirmed rather than 
passively presumed. Furthermore, this form of consciousness (like those that preceded it) 
will eventually pervade the consciousness of entire communities and societies. That is to 
say it will shape not only individual imaginations but also communal imaginaries. 
An imaginary is the result of innumerable factors, many of which are beyond the 
direct control of any person, community, or network of organizations. However, we are 
not without means of shaping a Christian imaginary in our society. One such means is the 
                                                
2 Cf. Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 20 (Limerick, Ireland: Mary Immaculate College, 
2000), 143; Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Volume 3, ed. Frederick E. 
Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 
1992), 552;  James W. Fowler, Faithful Change: The Personal and Public Challenges of Postmodern Life 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 175; Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination: Toward a 
Postmodern Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 27; Thomas Merton, The Asian 
Journal of Thomas Merton, ed. Patrick Hart, James Laughlin, and Naomi Burton Stone (New York: New 
Directions, 1975), 338; Walter Conn, Christian Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy 
and Surrender (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 265. 
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production and manifestation of Christian art, film, music, and literature.3 Others include 
participation in liturgy and in Christian practices and works of justice.4 Instrumental 
though these elements are in forming Christian imaginaries, it goes well beyond the scope 
of the current project to develop their role in any depth. Instead I will focus my attention 
on the possibilities for reviving a Christian imaginary through the conversion of 
individual imaginations in the more personal and local context of the classroom. My 
focus on converting or transforming individual imaginations further distinguishes my 
approach from other religious educators who have written more generally about forming 
Christian imaginations.5 I will make the distinction between formation and 
transformation more explicit later in the chapter. 
 This focus on transforming individual imaginations in no way implies neglect of 
the social dimension of imagining.6 Though not sufficient in itself for shaping a collective 
imaginary, transformation of individual imaginations and thereby the individual person is 
the sine qua non of social transformation. While Jesus undoubtedly challenged the unjust 
                                                
3 I do not think it overstating the matter to say that authors of fiction like Flannery O’Connor and especially 
C. S. Lewis did more to bolster Christian faith in their day than any of their contemporaries in academic 
theology. 
4 In the words of Craig Dykstra, “These symbolic actions have a way of training us and shaping us at 
preconscious levels so that over time their order becomes imbedded in us” (Craig Dykstra, Vision and 
Character (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 106).  
5 See, for example, Maria Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1987);  Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and 
Pastoral Ministry  : The Way of Shared Praxis (Harper San Francisco, 1991), 26-32; Robert Imbelli, 
Rekindling the Christic Imagination: Theological Meditations for the New Evangelization (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 2014); Phillip S. Keane, Christian Ethics and Imagination: A Theological Inquiry 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1984). 
6 Any conversion, including a conversion of the imagination, always affects the convert’s relationships. In 
this sense, no conversion is ever a solely individual affair. Notwithstanding, I employ the language of 
“individual” rather than “personal” conversion because the language of personal conversion has 
connotations in the conversion literature that I do not mean to implicate here. (Cf. Rosemary Haughton, The 
Transformation of Man: A Study of Conversion and Community (Springfield, Ill: Templegate, 1980).) 
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social, political, and religious structures of his day, he strived to usher in the reign of God 
first and foremost by extending personal invitations to conversion.7 From the seeds of 
those individual conversions grew a community of loving disciples that has transformed 
societies around the world and across the ages. I aim to proceed in like manner. 
Devoting greater attention to the imagination will unavoidably pose challenges to 
old models of education. In suggesting as much, I am far from the first to point out that 
we cannot continue to educate the way we have in the recent past. Jack Mezirow, for 
example, argues that formerly accepted models of learning no longer suffice for a 
population faced with rapid change and an irreducible plurality of beliefs, values, and 
practices.8 Mezirow’s observations are corroborated by the data analysis I presented in 
Chapter One and the discussion of cognitive errors in Chapter Three. Accumulation of 
knowledge cannot ward off the disorientation and fragmentation precipitated by 
postmodern culture, nor, as Chauvet reminds us, can conceptual sophistication overcome 
idolatry.9 Today’s Christian religious education must transform learners at a deeper level, 
namely, that of the imagination.10 To this point, David Tracy offers, “one may state that 
                                                
7 Cf. Gerhard Lohfink, Jesus of Nazareth: What He Wanted, Who He Was (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical 
Press, 2012), 45. 
8 See Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991), 2. 
Speaking more directly to the Christian experience, historian Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that “a fateful 
change of vision” has resulted from the simultaneous impoverishment of the concept of “belief” and its 
elevation to the center of Christian life and, we might add, of religious education. (See Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith, Belief and History (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 68.) 
9 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University Of 
Chicago Press, 2012), 42-3, 535. 
10 Transformation of the imagination can effect change far beyond that effected by mere accumulation of 
knowledge. In the words of Maria Harris, we “alter our existence by changing our imaginations” (Teaching 
and Religious Imagination, 4). Harris is in good company in making this claim. (Cf. William F. Lynch, 
Images of Faith: An Exploration of the Ironic Imagination (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1973), 56; Craig Dykstra, Vision and Character, 78.) Thomas Groome, in describing his educational 
approach for “conation” (a word that for him implies holistic transformation), likewise argues for the 
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the present need becomes that of finding symbolic language which can allow the 
disclosure of the Christian God to ‘happen’ for the present actual situation.”11 If we could 
reach people at the level of the imagination, “we might experience again a dimension to 
life which renders it whole.”12 
Christian educators are not the only ones concerned at present with transforming 
imaginations and promoting personal integration. The work of developmental 
psychologists like James Fowler and Robert Kegan is immensely helpful for 
understanding the dynamics of development in people’s cognitive and imaginative 
capacities, although they offer less in the way of practical strategies for promoting such 
development.13 Fortunately, scholars in two other areas of contemporary research—
transformative learning and conceptual change—are also deeply interested in these issues 
and have made valuable discoveries regarding why people come to see things differently 
and how educators can facilitate the process. Indeed, the research in these areas has 
yielded far greater clarity about the functioning of human cognition and learning than 
related research in religious education. Discussion of transformative learning and 
conceptual change thus provides an ideal starting point for our work of developing a 
pedagogy for converting imaginations and as such will receive sustained attention in the 
first half of this chapter.  
                                                                                                                                            
importance of intentionally engaging learners’ imaginations (Groome, Sharing Faith, 9, 26-32). I believe it 
is necessary to sharpen Groome’s claim further. Given the centrality of imagination for human meaning-
construction and living, holistic transformation of the person necessitates, not just exercising the 
imagination, but transforming it. 
11 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (Chicago: University Of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 189. 
12 Ibid., 133. 
13 This is not to say that they do not offer some helpful advice. What they do offer will be interjected 
intermittently in the following. 
 195 
Notwithstanding, for all its valuable contributions, the research in these areas does 
not provide us with all the resources we need in order to develop the desired pedagogical 
approach. The following discussion of transformative learning and conceptual change 
will raise the question of the relationship between the types of changes facilitated by 
these approaches and conversion as we understand it in the Christian tradition. Hence, the 
latter portion of the chapter will elucidate this relationship and explain what Christian 
religious education can contribute that transformative learning and conceptual change 
cannot. At that point we will be in better position to discuss the possibilities for 
facilitating conversion, which invariably involves a conversion of the imagination.  
 
General Strategies for Transforming Meaning Frameworks 
Overview 
The development from pre-critical and critical to post-critical consciousness 
demanded by postmodern culture constitutes a transformation of the human being at its 
core, of the very “self,” as Robert Kegan would say. It is a transformation of the 
“subject,” that through which one experiences and interprets reality.14 As I mentioned in 
Chapter Two, the interpretive frameworks that constitute subjective experience have been 
variously described as “meaning perspectives” (Mezirow) and “horizons” (Lonergan, et 
al), among other terms.15 Whatever the term employed (I will use “meaning framework” 
as a generic term in this chapter), all the authors mentioned here describe these 
                                                
14 Robert Kegan, The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), 39. 
15 Again, I would remind the reader that the two terms are not strictly interchangeable. Mezirow’s concept 
of a meaning perspective is narrower than is Lonergan’s concept of a horizon. 
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interpretive frameworks as a function of the human person’s imaginative capacities.  
Contemporary research in the fields of transformative learning and conceptual 
change has yielded significant insights into how people come to change their ways of 
constructing meaning and what educators can do to facilitate such change. The 
transformative learning field has built up around the work of Jack Mezirow, whose 
writings we engaged occasionally in the preceding chapters.16 Mezirow and his associates 
aspire to articulate a theory of learning that can “explain how adult learners make sense 
or meaning of their experiences, the nature of the structures that influence the way they 
construe experience, the dynamics involved in modifying meanings, and the way the 
structures of meaning themselves undergo changes when learners find them to be 
dysfunctional” and to develop educational practices based on this theory.17 Among the 
“structures that influence the way people construe experience,” the most crucial for 
transformative learning theory are meaning perspectives. Transformative learning can be 
described essentially as learning aimed at transforming learners’ meaning perspectives. In 
other words, transformative learning aims to change not merely what learners know but 
rather how they know and interpret their experiences. Though Mezirow does not speak 
about transformation in terms of developmental stages, it is helpful for our purposes to 
note that transformation of meaning perspectives is inherent in development from one 
form of consciousness to another.  
Related work is currently being done on the topic of “conceptual change”—
                                                
16 The reader should note that I will consistently employ the phrase “transformative learning” in the 
technical sense suggested by Mezirow. I will occasionally employ “transformation” and “change” as the 
more generic terms. 
17 Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, xii. 
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defined as changing prior misconceived knowledge to correct knowledge rather than 
adding knowledge—which has attracted interest from scholars in cognitive 
developmental psychology, science education, and history and philosophy of science. 
Researchers in these fields typically approach the topic with questions about how 
people’s concepts (most commonly scientific concepts) change over time and which 
learning strategies facilitate this change. Conceptual change involves a narrower, more 
localized type of change, one that is less likely to involve a global revolution in a 
person’s worldview as is the case with transformation of meaning perspectives and 
development between orders of consciousness. Notwithstanding, this body of research 
provides valuable insights into how people change their minds and suggests strategies 
that can contribute to transforming thinking on a global level.     
Though the questions and perspectives of scholars in transformative learning and 
those in conceptual change differ in many cases, research in both fields has converged on 
several key findings. One of these findings concerns the indispensable role of learners’ 
active engagement (i.e., “student-centered learning,” etc.) in facilitating change of 
entrenched beliefs and ways of knowing.18 As Mezirow explains, a person’s thinking 
grows increasingly resistant to change as it becomes reified in concepts and cognitive 
habits. In order to overcome this resistance, educators need to “reactivate the 
intentionality implicit in perception,” that is, they need to reopen questions for learners 
                                                
18 As Patricia Cranton notes, “learner empowerment is both a goal of and a condition for transformative 
learning” (Understanding and Promoting Transformative Learning: A Guide for Educators of Adults, (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), 72). For a conceptual change perspective, see John Clement, “The Role of 
Explanatory Models in Teaching for Conceptual Change,” in International Handbook of Research on 
Conceptual Change, ed. Stella Vosniadou (New York: Routledge, 2008), 421-2, 432; and Ference Marton 
and Ming Fai Pang, “Phenomenography and the Pedagogy of Conceptual Change,” in International 
Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, ed. Stella Vosniadou (New York: Routledge, 2008), 540-1. 
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and prompt them to approach the matter with fresh eyes.19 A second, related finding 
concerns the role of mental images and imagining in the transformative process. Scholars 
in both fields consistently draw attention to how understanding the function of images in 
cognition illuminates the dynamics of this process and to the effectiveness of employing 
images in efforts to facilitate change in meaning perspectives and conceptual 
understandings. Given the focus of this dissertation, I will devote special attention to this 
imaginative dimension of their research in the following sections. 
While the body of research produced in transformative learning and conceptual 
change is extensive and the recommended strategies diverse, certain patterns emerge in 
the research, making it possible to group most of these strategies within a few categories. 
Jennifer Garvey Berger has done as much in her exceptionally helpful article, “Dancing 
on the Threshold of Meaning: Recognizing and Understanding the Growing Edge.”20 
Based on her research and personal experience of coaching people though transformative 
learning, Berger concludes that the essential responsibilities of teachers in facilitating 
transformation are (1) helping learners to find and recognize the edge, (2) being good 
company at the edge, and (3) helping learners to establish firm ground on the other side.21 
These three categories will offer us a convenient framework for examining educational 
practices that facilitate significant changes in the way learners think and imagine. 
                                                
19 Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, 22; Paolo Freire describes this sort of approach 
as “cointentional” education (Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New 
York: Continuum, 1994), 51). Bernard Lonergan similarly describes the necessity of employing “active 
methods” (Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of 
Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 1993), 104, 197. 
20 Jennifer Garvey Berger, “Dancing on the Threshold of Meaning: Recognizing and Understanding the 
Growing Edge,” Journal of Transformative Education 2, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 336–51, 
doi:10.1177/1541344604267697. 
21 Ibid., 345-6. 
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Phase I: Finding the Edge 
The indispensable first step in facilitating transformation is raising learners’ 
awareness of the limits or inadequacy of their knowing and imagining. A major reason 
for the difficulty in effecting change at the level of meaning frameworks is that these 
frameworks are the lenses through which we experience everything else. We take these 
frameworks for granted and seldom think about them just as a person wearing contact 
lenses seldom thinks about them during the course of a day. It is precisely because these 
frameworks are so close to us and contribute seemingly automatically to our experience 
of reality that we often fail to notice their inadequacies. Only when contact lenses begin 
to irritate do we pay them any mind. 
The first step in facilitating transformation, then, involves causing irritation. 
Educators must help learners to recognize the distortions and blind spots in their way of 
seeing things. Paulo Freire, whose work influenced Mezirow tremendously, describes this 
as a process of “conscientization”.22 Educators can promote such awareness or 
conscientization in numerous ways. Freire proposes that teacher-students (i.e., the 
educators) enter into conversation with learners about the “generative themes” that 
concern them most deeply, having them “name” their praxis of those themes for 
themselves, and then re-present learners’ thematic universe to them in familiar but 
problematized terms.23 For example, one might enter into a discussion about the well that 
sustains the life of the village before raising questions about who owns the well and why 
no one else can share in ownership of the well. Ference Marton and Ming Fai Pan, 
                                                
22 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 90. 
23 Ibid., 89. 
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writing from the perspective of their research in conceptual change, similarly note the 
value of focusing learners’ attention on the “the lived object of learning” as opposed to 
more abstract or theoretical objectives.24  
Scholars and practitioners in various other fields have affirmed the importance of 
problematizing the topic of interest for participants. For example, scholars in psychology 
of learning maintain that an appropriate level of challenge promotes greater engagement 
and more resilient learning—a principle referred to as “desirable difficulty”.25 
Communications scholar Paul Messaris explains that the power of images in advertising 
and propaganda derives in great part (somewhat counter-intuitively) from their lack of 
clear syntax and univocal meaning. Because people tend to pay little attention to things 
that fit readily into their existing schemas, creators of advertisements will often seek to 
create minor confusion in viewers’ minds in order to intensify and prolong attention.26 
Lack of explicitness can also have the desirable effect of requiring greater mental 
participation from the audience. As a result of such increased participation, writes 
Messaris, “the viewer’s interpretation of a visual argument is more of a product of her or 
his own mind than it would be if the argument were completely explicit to begin with.”27  
These insights fly in the face of traditional approaches to education, perhaps 
especially in Catholic catechesis in which doctrinal orthodoxy has sometimes seemed the 
                                                
24 Marton and Pang, “Phenomenography and the Pedagogy of Conceptual Change,” 555. Emphasis added. 
25 Robert A. Bjork and Marcia C. Linn, “The Science of Learning and the Learning of Science: Introducing 
Desirable Difficulties,” The APS Observer 19, no. 3 (2006). 
26 See Paul Messaris, Visual Persuasion: The Role of Images in Advertising (SAGE, 1997), 171, 178. 
27 Messaris, Visual Persuasion, xviii. Messaris cites the example of the original 1984 Apple commercial 
for the new Macintosh computer, which most viewers found confusing and yet is regarded as one of the 
most successful commercials of all time. This commercial can be viewed at 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtvjbmoDx-I>. 
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sole concern of Church officials.28 In this traditional mindset, education consists 
primarily (if not entirely) in eliminating ignorance and confusion and attaining 
knowledge and clarity.29 However, advances in psychology of learning have helped us to 
recognize the inadequacy of this approach to education. The fact of the matter is that 
people tend not to devote much thought to that which seems clear to them. The 
appearance of clarity can thus actually short-circuit learning, if by learning we mean 
expansion of a person’s thinking rather the mere accumulation of declarative knowledge. 
It is in the liminal space, in which things seem less clear, where such robust learning is 
most likely to occur.30 Some degree of confusion and uncertainty is therefore desirable 
for educators whose goal is facilitating the transformation of learners’ frameworks for 
imagining reality and constructing meaning.  
Like professionals in the advertising business, educators can intentionally 
generate this sort of healthy uncertainty, prompting what Lonergan calls a “crisis” and 
Mezirow calls a “disorienting dilemma”.31 As Lonergan suggests, one cannot reason 
people out of an inadequate meaning framework because, by the logic of their own 
framework, their present perspectives and positions seem perfectly reasonable and 
alternative logics unreasonable.32 Neither does the mere addition of new information 
                                                
28 Cf. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Belief and History. 
29 One recalls the adage “error has no rights,” which was so commonly evoked by Catholic officials in the 
years prior to Vatican II. Cf. John Dewey on traditional education (John Dewey, Experience and Education 
(New York: Collier Books, 1963), 17-18). 
30 Berger, “Dancing on the Threshold,” 338. 
31 Lonergan, Topics in Education, 101; Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions, 148. Psychologists 
generally refer to the precipitation of mental discomfort arising from conflicts in a person’s beliefs or 
understandings in terms of creating “cognitive dissonance.” For a seminal work in this area, see Leon 
Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).  
32 See Lonergan, Topics in Education, 105, 179. 
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suffice for such transformation, as researchers in the field of conceptual change have 
consistently discovered.33 Transformation of meaning frameworks requires more drastic 
methods.34 
Educational scholars and practitioners have developed an array of such methods. 
When it comes to prompting learners to critically examine their own beliefs and 
assumptions, nothing is more effective than direct, personal experience (with social 
injustices, different cultures, etc.).35 The ever-growing popularity of service learning 
programs and experiences in secondary and tertiary academic institutions testifies to this 
fact.36 On a related note, Mezirow strongly advocates for undertaking the transformative 
learning process within “communities of discourse”.37 He explains that, when engaged in 
reflective discourse together, people with different experiences and assumptions naturally 
challenge one another and validate new perspectives. Questions raised in such a context, 
whether by other learners or by the teacher, can be a highly effective means of 
transformation when learners are unable to answer those questions within their current 
meaning framework. For example, a person operating from a critical consciousness, who 
engages in regular discourse with post-critical thinkers who faithfully celebrate the 
Eucharist yet betray no sign of magical thinking about the ritual, may begin to wonder if 
                                                
33 See, e.g., Stella Vosniadou, “Conceptual Change Research: An Introduction,” in International Handbook 
of Research on Conceptual Change, ed. Stella Vosniadou, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), xiv. 
34 In Lonergan’s phrase, learners must be “dynamited” out of a horizon that has become a closed system 
(Topics in Education, 179). 
35 It was, of course, John Dewey who reoriented the world of education toward pedagogy that takes serious 
the role of experience. (See Dewey, Experience and Education.) 
36 On the effectiveness of service-learning in facilitating meaningful learning, see Janet Eyler, Dwight E. 
Giles, Jr., and Alexander W. Astin, Where’s the Learning in Service-Learning, 1st ed. (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1999), and Roger Bergman, Catholic Social Learning: Educating the Faith That Does Justice 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2010). 
37 Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions, 212. 
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perhaps they know something that he/she doesn’t.38 Whatever the method, Lonergan and 
Mezirow and his associates recommend prompting such crises indirectly rather than 
directly challenging learners’ deeply held beliefs and assumptions.39  
While I could spend pages upon pages examining the roles of these various 
strategies for disrupting complacent thinking (and others have), my present concerns 
demand that I focus my attention on the role of images in this process, a role that has 
emerged as particularly important in my research and that of others. Lonergan contends 
that, while employing old words in a new way may suffice to expand an existing 
viewpoint (i.e., meaning framework), the emergence of a totally new viewpoint demands 
new experience and images.40 Walter Brueggemann similarly observes, “The deep places 
in our lives—places of resistance and embrace—are not ultimately reached by 
instruction. Those places of resistance and embrace are reached only by stories, by 
images, metaphors and phrases that line out the world differently.”41 Modification of 
people’s mental images transforms their thinking at its source, at the level of imagination 
whence their explicit beliefs and reasonings originate. 
Numerous researchers of conceptual change offer corroborating evidence for the 
                                                
38 Mezirow and his associates suggest that engagement with literature and media can be another way of 
raising such questions. 
39 Lonergan, Topics in Education, 105; Jack Mezirow and Associates, Learning as Transformation: 
Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress (Jossey-Bass, 2000), 156. Even though some research shows 
that intense emotion, particularly surprise, facilitates transformative learning, direct challenges to learners’ 
deeply-held beliefs and assumptions can produce a level of anxiety that impedes new learning. (See 
Edward Taylor, “Analyzing Research on Transformative Learning Theory,” in Learning as 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 291;  
cf. S. J. Egan, “Learning Process in Family Therapy” (University of Toronto, 1985) and C. Gehrels, “The 
School Principal as Adult Learner” (University of Toronto, 1984), both cited in Taylor, “Analyzing 
Research,” 303.) 
40 Lonergan, Insight, 569. 
41 Walter Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet: Daring Speech for Proclamation (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1989), 109-10. 
 204 
effectiveness of transforming students’ thinking by means of image-centered 
interventions.42 According to scholars in this area, knowledge is represented in various 
“grain sizes,” including individual beliefs (e.g., “the human heart has four chambers”) 
and mental models (e.g., a general image of the human circulatory system).43 Because a 
mental model is composed of many beliefs and because a flawed model often contains a 
mixture of correct and incorrect beliefs, correcting beliefs one by one is a tedious and 
often ineffective method of transforming an inaccurate mental model. Cognitive scientist 
Michelene Chi hypothesizes—and an initial experiment has confirmed44—that a more 
effective method might be a process she terms “holistic confrontation” in which visual 
representations of flawed models are compared with correct models.45 Even though the 
transformation of mental models represents a change on a smaller scale than the 
transformation of meaning frameworks, this research in conceptual change is highly 
suggestive of subtler strategies that might cumulatively contribute to the more dramatic 
transformations with which we are concerned.46 
Chi’s hypothesis finds support in the work of John Clement on the role of 
                                                
42 See Michelene T. H. Chi, “Three Types of Conceptual Change: Belief Revision, Mental Model 
Transformation, and Categorical Shift,” in International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, ed. 
Stella Vosniadou (New York: Routledge, 2008), 63. 
43 In her 2008 chapter, Chi identified three grain sizes (beliefs, mental models, and categories). In her 
revised 2013 chapter, she identifies at least four (adding schemas). (See Michelene T. H. Chi, “Two Kinds 
and Four Sub-Types of Misconceived Knowledge, Ways to Change It, and the Learning Outcomes,” in 
International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, ed. Stella Vosniadou, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 49–70.) 
44 S. Gadgil, T. J. Nokes, and Michelene T. H. Chi, “Effectiveness of Holistic Mental Model Confrontation 
in Driving Conceptual Change,” Learning and Instruction 22 (2011): 47–61. 
45 Chi, “Three Types of Conceptual Change,” 68; cf. ibid., “Two Kinds and Four Sub-Types of 
Misconceived Knowledge,” 55. 
46 In the discussion of disruption vis-à-vis conversion below, it will become clearer how similar strategies 
for exposing misleading images can contribute to changes not only in people’s mental models but even in 
their meaning frameworks as a whole. 
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explanatory models in teaching for conceptual change. Clement defines an explanatory 
model as “a (mental) representation of a system that focuses the user on certain features 
in the system and that can predict or account for its structure or behavior.”47 According to 
Clement, explanatory models are “the qualitative core of meaning for scientific theory 
and the center of sense making for students.”48 Clearly, then, the question of how to 
correct erroneous models is a crucial one. Clement has found the use of multiple, 
complementary visual analogies, particularly when employed as “bridging analogies,” to 
be more effective than use of a single analogy in helping learners to overcome 
misconceptions.49 As an example of a series of bridging analogies, Clement describes 
how an instructor aiming to help students recognize that a table exerts force on an object 
resting upon it might show them in sequence an object resting on a spring, a piece of 
foam, a flexible wooden board, and finally a table. Though the image of the spring 
exerting force on the object might strike students as too dissimilar to the image of the 
table to serve as a pedagogically effective analogy, the series of bridging analogies (e.g., 
foam and wooden board) helps them to gradually recognize in the table the same 
properties that are more obvious in the spring. Clement cites a dozen studies that 
corroborate the effectiveness of this method in a range of academic subjects.50 Messaris 
                                                
47 Clement, “The Role of Explanatory Models in Teaching for Conceptual Change,” 418. 
48 Ibid., 443. Emphasis original. Many if not most researchers in conceptual change are primarily 
concerned with applications in science education. 
49 Cf. M. H. Chiu and J. W. Lin, “Promoting Fourth Graders’ Conceptual Change of their Understanding of 
Electric Current Via Multiple Analogies,” Journal of Research in Science Teaching 39, no.8 (2005): 688-
712. However, Clement does note that different kinds of conceptual change may require different 
approaches. 
50 Clement, “The Role of Explanatory Models,” 431-2. Marton and Pang argue that a 
“phenomenographical” approach to conceptual change is even more effective than one that focuses on 
mental models. Their approach establishes outcomes related to the world experienced, seen, and lived by 
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supplies examples of similar tactics in propaganda and advertising.51  
Concerning this strategy, too, scholars emphasize the need for teachers to eschew 
an unhelpful fixation on correct understanding. More specifically, Clement enjoins, 
“teachers and students using such approaches need to become comfortable with the idea 
of discussing intermediate models that are partially incorrect, prior to students developing 
a more sophisticated model.”52 This process, though perhaps uncomfortable at times, 
prompts students to engage more actively and, consequently, to achieve a more resilient 
form of knowledge. Resolving learners’ discomfort too quickly only prevents them from 
engaging in the cognitive struggle necessary for transforming erroneous thinking. 
Chi’s and Clement’s research exemplifies the work of a field of scholars who take 
seriously the role of mental images in effecting changes in the way people think and who 
have achieved impressive educational results as a result. Still, prompting the imaginative 
insight into the inadequacy of learners’ old habits of thought is only a small, first step. 
Mezirow and Taylor suggest that, in order for learners to continue forward in the process 
of transformation after this initial disorienting dilemma, they must (1) gain further 
awareness of the contexts of their beliefs and feelings and (2) critically assess their 
assumptions about the content, process, and premises of their meaning perspectives.53 
Because of the threat such self-examination poses to a person’s sense of self, learners will 
typically require significant support in order to overcome the affective resistance to 
                                                                                                                                            
the learner rather than what educators suppose learners have in their minds. (See “Phenomenography and 
the Pedagogy of Conceptual Change.”) 
51 Messaris, Visual Persuasion, 169-70. 
52 Clement, “The Role of Explanatory Models,” 432. 
53 See Mezirow and Associates, Learning as Transformation, 290. Though Groome does not engage 
Mezirow’s work, it so happens that movements 1 and 2 of Groome’s shared praxis approach, respectively, 
serve to achieve these two exigencies identified by Mezirow. 
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change and make the daunting leap into a new meaning framework.  
 
Phase II: Being Good Company at the Edge 
Mezirow, Berger, Kegan, and many others acknowledge the need for support as 
learners transition into new ways of thinking and imagining. Berger notes that, when 
learners have had the foundations of their sense of reality shaken, “the past seems 
untenable and the future unidentifiable.”54 In this situation, new learning is not a merely 
intellectual matter; it becomes highly personal and fraught with emotion. Given human 
beings’ affective resistance to change, explains Edward Taylor, an associate of Mezirow, 
“critical reflection can only begin once emotions have been validated and worked 
through.”55 On this point, he receives support from numerous authors and studies.56 
Educators must therefore find a way to give learners hope of going forward lest they 
despair and retreat backward. Coupling this advice with the imperative for educators to 
disrupt students’ complacent thinking, we recognize the delicate balance teachers must 
strive for when aiming to promote transformation. Kegan describes the ideal this way: 
people grow best when they continuously experience an ingenious blend of support and 
challenge….Environments that are weighted too heavily in the direction of challenge 
without adequate support are toxic; they promote defensiveness and constriction. Those 
weighted too heavily toward support without adequate challenge are ultimately boring; 
                                                
54 Berger, “Dancing on the Threshold,” 344. 
55 Mezirow and Associates, Learning as Transformation, 303. 
56 Cf. Robert Kegan, “What ‘Form’ Transforms?: A Constructive-Developmental Approach to 
Transformative Learning,” in Learning as Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress, 
ed. Jack Mezirow (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 35–70; Haughton, The Transformation of Man, 38; 
P. M. Coffman, “Inclusive Language as a Means of Resisting Hegemony in Theological Education: A 
Phenomenology of Transformation and Empowerment of Persons in Adult Higher Education” (Northern 
Illinois University, 1989); J. H. Morgan, “Displaced Homemaker Programs: The Transition from 
Homemaker to Independent Person” (Teachers College at Columbia University, 1987); K. Sveinunggaard, 
“Transformative Learning in Adulthood: A Socio-Contextual Perspective,” in 35th Annual Adult Education 
Research Conference Proceedings, ed. D. Flanner (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1993). 
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they promote devitalization.57 
 
How, then, do educators provide the support learners need without undermining 
the transformation process? Here the support of a learning community proves 
invaluable.58 Mezirow highlights the benefit of learners receiving the assurance that 
others have shared the discontent that they are currently experiencing and eventually 
overcame it.59 Pairing learners with a person who is one step ahead in the process can be 
especially helpful in this regard since it provides them with a relatable image or model of 
how to move forward. Crucial to the success of this strategy is empowering learners. As 
in the initial disorienting dilemma, so too in this second phase educators must take pains 
to recruit learners’ active participation in their own transformation. Lonergan’s 
observation that “the failure of intellect to develop entails the failure of the will” 
highlights the need for educators to persuade as well as instruct learners.60 They must 
help learners recognize the advantages of the new form of consciousness and invite them 
to decide for themselves to develop rather than coercing them. Lonergan recommends 
satire and humor as effective means of softening the ill will of one who resists other 
forms of persuasion.61  
Recognizing the overly cognitive emphasis of Mezirow’s early work, some of his 
                                                
57 Robert Kegan, In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 42.  
58 For a conceptual change perspective, see Naomi Miyake, “Conceptual Change Through Collaboration,” 
in International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, ed. Stella Vosniadou (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 453–78. 
59 Kegan additionally points out the value of helping learners recognize that they have successfully made 
their way through such transformations in the past. (See Kegan, “What ‘Form’ Transforms?,"  58-9.) 
60 Lonergan, Insight, 714. Augustine makes a similar case in Teaching Christianity (De Doctrina 
Christiana), ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1996), XII.27. 
61 Lonergan, Insight, 647-9. 
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associates have highlighted the need for an extra-rational complement to Mezirow’s 
method of “critical reflection”. They describe this complementary approach as a sort of 
“discernment,” a method of critical self-examination that attends to the learner’s affects 
and images through “a process of seeing patterns of relational wholeness that begins with 
an attitude of receptivity and appreciation.”62 By way of initial suggestions, they propose 
incorporation of visual and dramatic arts as well as intentional modification of the 
learning environment as some means of inviting discernment. 
In a similar vein, Robert Kegan emphasizes the need for “sympathetic coaching” 
in helping learners to transition from one order of consciousness to another. Utilizing D. 
W. Winnicott’s term, Kegan speaks of creating a “holding environment” for learners,63 a 
learning context “that provides both welcoming acknowledgement of exactly who the 
person is right now as he or she is, and fosters the person’s psychological evolution.”64 
An ideal holding environment validates learners’ feelings and struggles even as it 
challenges presently held assumptions. Take for example the holding environment 
appropriate for a person transitioning from a fourth-order Institutional self to a fifth-order 
Interindividual self (one aspect of the transition from critical to post-critical 
consciousness).65 For a learner at this stage, educators should affirm the person’s 
                                                
62 Elizabeth Kasl and Dean Elias, “Creating New Habits of Mind in Small Groups,” in Learning as 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 231. 
Building upon Lonergan’s work, Robert Doran and Patrick Byrne have similarly sought to develop 
approaches for transforming the feeling and valuing dimensions of the human subject along with the 
cognitive dimension. (See Robert M. Doran, Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations, 2nd ed. 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2006).)  
63 Kegan, The Evolving Self, 115. 
64 Ibid., In Over Our Heads, 43. 
65 Kegan presents a chart of bridges between the different orders of consciousness in The Evolving Self, 
118-20. 
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independence and self-authoring while also encouraging actions and attitudes of self-
surrender and efforts to risk new levels of intimacy. Here the educator’s challenge is to 
help the learner relinquish his or her identification with the form of the Institutional self 
while protecting the form itself. Kegan cites ideological self-surrender (either religious or 
political) as one “bridge,” or medium of transition, for this particular evolution of self. 
In sum, whatever particular means educators employ, at this transitional moment 
in the transformation process they must provide learners with emotional support while 
continuing to challenge them to synthesize a more adequate way of thinking and 
imagining.  
 
Phase III: Helping to Establish Firm Ground in a New Place 
Part and parcel of instilling learners with the confidence to change is showing 
them how. Such is the emphasis of the third responsibility Berger sets forth for educators. 
One element of helping learners to re-establish a foundation is providing them with 
appropriate language for describing the process they are going through and for the new 
meaning framework that is coming into focus.66 Kegan suggests that images and 
metaphorical language are particularly well suited to facilitating such transitions, 
especially when employed with an ear to learners’ own usage.67 One benefit of 
imaginative, metaphorical language is that it invites learners’ participation. Kegan 
                                                
66 See Jack Mezirow, Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and 
Emancipatory Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1990), 154. Lonergan is addressing this 
need when he describes the “heuristic structure” of all human inquiry, which makes possible the transition 
from unknowing to knowing. That structure is (1) name the unknown, (2) work out its properties, (3) use 
those properties to guide inquiry (Insight, 68). 
67 See Kegan, In Over Our Heads, 260. 
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explains, “A metaphor is interpretive, but it is an interpretation made in soft clay rather 
than cold analysis. It invites the client to put his hands on it and reshape it into something 
more fitting to him.”68 Especially when the image or metaphor captures something of 
learners’ internal circumstances, students, by taking up and playing with that image or 
metaphor, can shape the very way they think and imagine. In this way, images, symbols, 
and metaphors can serve as a sort of mental pivot point that engages learners with 
something familiar and enables them to temporarily hold onto that familiarity even as 
they move into a new mode of thinking.69  
Mezirow suggests several additional steps for helping learners to establish 
themselves firmly within a new meaning framework.70 First, learners explore new roles 
and actions that are compatible with the new meaning framework. Educators can assist in 
this step by creating the necessary opportunities (or, alternatively, by leading students in 
imaginative exercises).71 For example, a person transitioning from critical to post-critical 
consciousness, who had stopped attending Mass, might start attending again with a post-
critical thinker and discuss the ritual’s significance afterward. These experiences—
supplemented with conversations that reinforce them in the learner’s memory and 
imagination—help to verify personally the viability of the new perspective and to 
cultivate a felt sense of comfort in the new role. Second, learners plan a course of action 
                                                
68 Ibid., 260. 
69 The language of “mental pivot point” is my own. Clement’s explanatory model approach to conceptual 
change operates upon a similar principle. (See Clement, “The Role of Explanatory Models.”) 
70 See Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning,168-9. 
71 An analogous strategy in conceptual change is the model-based instruction discussed above. (See 
Clement, “The Role of Explanatory Models in Teaching for Conceptual Change.”) Presenting learners with 
viable replacements for their old, defunct models helps them to take constructive steps forward when 
former ways of understanding collapse. 
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consistent with their new perspective (e.g., regular participation in the sacraments, a daily 
prayer routine) and then acquire—from the educator or elsewhere—the knowledge, skills, 
and resources they will need to carry out the plan. As noted above, one of the greatest 
obstacles to transformation is the inability to envision a way forward. Developing plans 
with the help of a trusted guide diminishes this obstacle significantly. Finally, educators 
provide continued support so as to build learners’ confidence and competence as they 
reintegrate their life as a whole in accord with the new meaning framework.72   
 
The Ethics of Transformation 
This brief overview of research in transformative learning theory and conceptual 
change has manifested some of the pedagogical possibilities for facilitating changes in, 
not merely the quantity of learners’ knowledge, but the very way people imagine reality. 
That educators have employed many of these methods with considerable success over the 
past three decades assures us that religious educators need not resign themselves to 
waiting passively for the new evolution in consciousness described in the previous 
chapter. Educators have the ability—limited though it is—to facilitate transformation by 
(1) helping learners recognize the limits of their present means of constructing meaning, 
                                                
72 It may seem to the reader that Mezirow repeats himself in this last point. In anticipation of this charge I 
offer two important considerations: The first is that educators need to support learners—cognitively and 
emotionally—throughout the entire learning process. This admonition bears repeating because it is so 
integral to the process of transformative learning. Second, this process seldom unfolds in the sequential 
manner I have described here. I have enumerated three general phases for the sake of clarity, but 
researchers and practitioners of transformative learning maintain that the process is typically “recursive, 
evolving, and spiraling” rather than linear (Colleen Aalsburg Wiessner and Jack Mezirow, “Theory 
Building and the Search for Common Ground,” in Learning as Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a 
Theory in Progress (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 333; cf. James W. Fowler, Stages of Faith: The 
Psychology of Human Development (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995), 274; Kegan, The Evolving 
Self, 108.). Strategies that I have organized under one heading or another often bear upon other phases of 
the learning process. 
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(2) supporting them as they struggle with this realization, and (3) helping them to 
construct meaning in a new way.  
Notwithstanding, the fact that educators have the ability to prompt such 
transformation does not necessarily give them the right to do so. Respect for the 
autonomy and dignity of our students demands that we ask, When is it appropriate for 
educators to prompt transformation, and what is the difference between facilitating 
people’s cognitive development and manipulating their thinking? It must be stated, first 
of all, that educators should never push learners to new forms of consciousness before the 
latter are developmentally capable of negotiating the transition.73 Methods of 
transforming thinking should be employed as resources for helping people to cope with 
the cognitive challenges they encounter in their everyday lives, not for the personal 
gratification of educators. In this dissertation, we have been investigating the dilemma of 
Catholics whose critical or pre-critical manner of constructing meaning has become 
inadequate to the challenges for faith in postmodern American culture. I present the 
strategies and resources of this chapter and the following for use by religious educators 
who seek to address this dilemma, but the reader should beware of imposing them on 
Catholics who do not fit the profile described here and for whom an invitation to post-
critical consciousness would be premature.  
Regarding the manipulation question, it is difficult to compel the transformation 
of another person’s meaning framework against their will given the desire and activity 
                                                
73 I made this point in the previous chapter, as have Kegan and Fowler in their writing. 
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required on the part of the learner. Still, we should not rule out the possibility.74 The 
difference between persuasive invitation to change and manipulation lies in the extent to 
which the educator promotes the active participation and authentic cognition of learners. 
People exhibit authentic cognition insofar as they consistently perform patterned acts of 
attending, understanding, judging, and deciding.75 Manipulative methods subvert these 
actions. For example, many advertisers design commercials in such a way as to demand 
viewers’ attention and entice an impulsive (rather than thoughtfully considered) decision 
to buy a particular product. By contrast, educators seeking to invite their students to 
imaginative transformation should encourage them not only to attend to their own 
cognition and feelings but also to understand the changes occurring within them, judge 
whether or not they want those changes to occur, and personally decide to go forward or 
avoid change.76 Furthermore, educators and those who supervise them should take care to 
regularly inquire into their own methods and motivations: Do I make transparent the 
methods I am using to facilitate transformation, or do I keep my students in the dark as to 
what is happening? Do I raise my students’ awareness of the changes in their thinking, or 
do I downplay these changes? Such self-examination not only helps to guard against 
manipulation but also provides a model of growth for students (see Phase II above). 
 
 
                                                
74 Indeed, the success of the advertising industry makes it clear that it is entirely possible—even easy—to 
seduce people into imagining and feeling a particular way. (Thanks to Professor Patrick Byrne for raising 
this point.) 
75 See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 104-5. 
76 To say that educators should promote authentic cognition in learners is not to say that all students must 
fully understand the transformation in order for it to happen to them. (See Haughton, The Transformation 
of Man, 137.) Still, promoting such understanding does add another safeguard against manipulation. 
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Transformative Learning, Development, and Religious Conversion 
The above discussion of research in transformative learning and conceptual 
change demonstrates that people do undergo radical change in the ways they construct 
meaning and that educators can play a significant role in facilitating that change. 
Mezirow and his associates especially offer us valuable resources for promoting more 
adequate forms of consciousness through which postmodern people can achieve the 
personal integration that evades so many today. Nevertheless, despite their efforts to 
address affective and social as well as cognitive dimensions of the human subject,77 these 
approaches fall short of effecting a total transformation and integration of the human 
person. For it is not only postmodern culture that foments personal fragmentation but also 
sin, a factor for which educational research does not account.  
Since sin is an aberration of the spiritual realm—the realm of reality with which 
religion is ultimately concerned—Christian education can supply something that research 
in transformative learning and conceptual change cannot. A truly holistic account 
requires addressing the spiritual dimension of the person, the faith that Fowler argues is 
the driving force for human meaning construction. Inclusion of the spiritual dimension 
leads to a more expansive understanding of the transformation required for personal and 
communal integration. It is to this more expansive notion of transformation that the 
Christian tradition refers by the term “conversion”. Since my concern in this project is 
with the faith lives of American Catholics, it is essential to elucidate this key concept and 
its relevance for the education of contemporary Catholics. 
                                                
77 See Mezirow, Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood, 12. 
 216 
The Meaning of Conversion 
The concept of conversion is an important one in the Bible. The word employed 
in the Hebrew Scriptures for this concept, shub (בוּשׁ), means to turn back or return. The 
primary term in the New Testament, metanoeó (µετανοέω), means to change one’s 
mind.78 Both terms imply a total transformation or reorientation of the person, as 
suggested in Joel 2:12: “Yet even now, says the Lord, return (shub) to me with all your 
heart.” Consistent with this meaning, Lonergan describes religious conversion as “total 
and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations.”79 In more 
explicitly Christian terms, it is being in love with God on account of “God’s love 
flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us.”80 This definitive self-surrender 
involves transcending one’s egocentric concerns, biases, distractions, and sins such that 
God is allowed to take over the very center of the self.  
Because this transformation is of the whole person in all its anthropological 
complexity, conversion can and has been described in myriad ways. James Fowler 
describes conversion in terms of change in cognitive content.  Others like William James 
and Virgil Bailey Gillespie define conversion in terms of the process by which it occurs 
and its function, or the effects it has on the subject. Lonergan distinguishes between 
intellectual conversion (i.e., transcending a naïve realist understanding of reality, 
objectivity, and knowing), moral conversion (i.e., transcending the desire for personal 
satisfaction as the primary criteria for one’s choices and decisions), and religious 
                                                
78 The Hebrew nacham and Greek epistrophe are also used. 
79 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 240.  
80 Ibid., 241. 
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conversion, which I have just described above. Robert Doran adds psychic conversion to 
the list.81  
Even though I will discuss psychic conversion in more depth below, it will 
illuminate the present discussion to clarify here the meaning of two dimensions of 
conversion that are of central interest in this chapter—namely, psychic conversion and 
what I am calling “imaginative” conversion—and their relationship to religious 
conversion.82 From one perspective, the gift of God’s love that constitutes religious 
conversion is always the cause of psychic conversion, imaginative conversion, etc.83 It is 
“an under-tow of existential consciousness” pulling one toward development and 
conversion in all dimensions of one’s being.84 From another perspective, however, 
imaginative and psychic conversions (as well as intellectual, moral, and affective 
conversions) contribute to the full flowering of religious conversion in one’s life. 
Through imaginative conversion, one’s spontaneous way of imagining reality is 
transformed in a manner consistent with Jesus’ vision of the reign of God. Through 
psychic conversion, one’s sensitivity and affectivity are transformed such that one 
achieves the willingness required to consistently enact that vision in one’s life. Both are 
necessary components of what it means to be a “subject in love,” that is, a religiously 
converted person in the sense that Lonergan and I intend.85 From a pedagogical 
                                                
81 Related but distinct is Walter Conn’s concept of affective conversion. (See Conn, Christian Conversion, 
134-53.) 
82 For Lonergan’s explication of the relationship among intellectual, moral, and religious conversions, see 
Method in Theology, 238-43. 
83 Cf. ibid., 243. 
84 Ibid., 240. 
85 Ibid., 242. 
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viewpoint, both serve as invitations and steps toward full-fledged religious conversion. 
For the purposes of the present exploration, I will take as my point of departure 
Lonergan’s dual description of conversion as self-surrender and self-transcendence, 
which characterization I believe captures the essence of this radical change.86 These two 
terms imply a transformation conducing to the fulfillment (insofar as fulfillment is 
possible in this life) of the very “self,” the core of one’s being. What, we might ask, 
constitutes the person or self who is transformed? Lonergan suggestively describes a 
gradually unfolding thrust, an “eros of the human spirit,” a desire for self-transcendence 
that orients the human subject toward fulfillment.87 This description suggests that the self 
that is surrendered, transformed, and (for a time) fulfilled in conversion cannot be 
identified with the manifestation of the self at any particular stage in this process but 
rather is more closely identified with the unfolding itself. 
The writings of Robert Kegan and Walter Conn, an interpreter of Lonergan, 
further illuminate the nature of this unfolding thrust at the core of the human person. 
Kegan describes an “evolving self” rather than a static reality. The self, he argues, is as 
much a process as it is a thing. In other words, what is core to the self is not a particular 
belief or set of beliefs or even a particular way of viewing reality, but rather the activity 
of making meaning, which looks different at different stages of a person’s development. 
Making use of the term “conscience,” Conn describes a similar activity constituting the 
                                                
86 While acknowledging the benefits of these various approaches, I privilege Lonergan’s and Conn’s 
descriptions of conversion in the following because they present a more adequate account that encompasses 
content change, process, and function. When I henceforth employ the term “conversion,” I mean it in the 
more general, religious sense of the word unless otherwise specified. 
87 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 13, 242. 
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core of the self.88 This conscience is “the radical desire of the human spirit for meaning, 
truth, value, and love,” a desire and activity that leads the personal subject through 
successive levels of self-transcendence.89 Conn argues that this drive for self-
transcendence is consistently implied, if not explicitly recognized, in the developmental 
theories of Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg, James Fowler, and Robert 
Kegan.90 All dimensions of the human spirit—cognitive, affective, volitional—are 
involved in this self-transcending activity, and the transformation of the self that occurs 
in conversion involves the transformation of all the above.   
The picture of the human person that emerges from conversion literature is 
therefore that of a work in progress, a “homo viator,” in Gabriel Marcel’s classic 
phrase.91 This makes for a paradoxical manner of existence. Lonergan describes the 
paradox in terms of a tension between limitation and transcendence, between the desire to 
maintain a comfortable status quo and the desire to become something more. The human 
person, he explains, “functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and 
                                                
88 Conn defines the “self” as “a dynamic, developing, dipolar, embodied reality constituted by two 
dialectically related poles, subjective (‘I’) and objective (‘me’), and radically oriented beyond itself to the 
other” (Walter Conn, The Desiring Self: Rooting Pastoral Counseling and Spiritual Direction in Self-
Transcendence (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 138. 
89 Ibid., 35. 
90 Piaget describes this “decentering” process as a development from cognitive egocentrism to critical, 
realistic judgment. Erikson describes psychosocial/affective development from self-centeredness to 
mutuality of love and communality, from internalized prohibitions to universal sense of values. Kohlberg 
describes a development in moral reasoning from egocentric hedonism to universal principles. Fowler 
describes development from an egocentric Intuitive-Projective to a Universalizing faith. Kegan describes 
development from embeddedness in personal needs to objectification of needs, relationships, and self-
authorship.  
91 Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Hope, trans. Emma Craufurd and Paul 
Seaton (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2010). In his treatment of conversion, William James points 
to this paradox by his description of the “divided self” (The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in 
Human Nature (New York: Modern Library, 1929), Lecture VIII. Though James coined the phrase, its 
paradigmatic expression comes from Paul’s letter to the Romans (7:14-25). 
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self-interested center within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses.”92 However, 
it also functions as an inquiring and reflecting subject that by virtue of an unrestricted 
desire to know and value “is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different 
mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness.”93 
The same tension lies at the heart of Kegan’s subject-object theory. Therein he describes 
the evolution of the self as a series of differentiations from and reintegrations with that 
which is not the self, an ongoing process aimed at resolving the tension in the person’s 
desire for both autonomy and relatedness.94 Humanity’s struggle with idolatry is yet 
another manifestation of this tension: We simultaneously yearn for the fulfillment that 
only the true God can bestow and desire a god that we can comprehend and control. This 
tension at the heart of human existence has only been exacerbated by the conditions of 
21st-century life.95 Compounded by the radical plurality and profit-driven multiplication 
of desires that characterize postmodern culture, this internal struggle has deteriorated into 
outright fragmentation for many of today’s Catholics. 
So long as we live we never resolve this tension completely.96 Nevertheless, it is 
possible for human beings to make considerable strides toward personal integration and 
authenticity insofar as we transcend our sensitive, affective, intellectual, and volitional 
                                                
92 Lonergan, Insight, 498. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Kegan, In Over Our Heads, 326. 
95 We found ample evidence of this growing tension in Chapter One. Cf. Kenneth Gergen, The Saturated 
Self: Dilemmas Of Identity In Contemporary Life (New York: Basic Books, 2000), Ch.3, on the “populated 
self” and the “expansion of inadequacy”. 
96 As Lonergan says, “no matter how full the success, the basic situation within the self is unchanged, for 
the perfection of the higher integration does not eliminate the integrated or modify the essential opposition 
between self-centeredness and detachment” (Lonergan, Insight, 499). 
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egocentrism.97 Indeed, our native desire for intellectual and moral transcendence orients 
us toward God, who alone can bestow the integration for which we yearn.98 When people 
undergo conversion and achieve this integration, they commonly recognize that it has 
come from beyond themselves. David Tracy explains: 
they find themselves compelled to honor that realized experience as an eruption of a 
power become self-manifestation from and by the whole in which, by which, and to 
which they live. They employ language like ‘liberation,’ ‘emancipation,’ ‘wholeness,’ 
‘salvation’ to articulate the conviction elicited and empowered by that experience itself. 
That conviction, that faith, takes many forms: ethos and worldview are radically united; 
wholeness in life has come not as personal achievement but as gift from the whole; above 
all, how one ought to live is ultimately grounded in what reality itself is.99 
 
Conversion can occur in various ways—suddenly or gradually, quietly or dramatically, 
individually or communally—but, when it happens, it always comes as God’s free gift.100  
Human beings can cooperate with the gift of God’s grace that makes conversion 
possible, but they can never cause it on their own, whether by pedagogical methods or 
any other means.101 Still, God never converts a person without their cooperation.102 In 
fact, conversion involves a great deal of human effort, for it is never a permanent 
                                                
97 The criterion of human authenticity, suggests Conn, “is the very self-transcendence which is effected in 
the realization of value through critical understanding, responsible decision, and generous love,” that is, 
through conversion (Christian Conversion, 18). 
98 Lonergan puts it this way: “There is to human inquiry an unrestricted demand for intelligibility. There is 
to human judgment a demand for the unconditioned. There is to human deliberation a criterion that 
criticizes every finite good. So it is…that man can reach basic fulfilment [sic], peace, joy, only by moving 
beyond the realm of common sense, theory, and interiority and into the realm in which God is known and 
loved” (Method in Theology, 83-4). 
99 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1981), 173. 
100 For a variety of descriptions of the nature and dynamics of religious conversion, see Newton Malony 
and Samuel Southard, Handbook of Religious Conversion (Birmingham, Ala: Religious Education Press, 
1992). 
101 See Aquinas, ST II.I, q.111, a.2 on cooperative grace. Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 107; Doran, 
Psychic Conversion, 148. 
102 According to Lonergan, God presents to each person an enticement to conversion as an “under-tow of 
existential consciousness,” which one may willingly submit to or resist  (Method in Theology, 240). 
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achievement.103 It is a once-in-a-lifetime event in the sense that it effects a radical 
reorientation of one’s life. Once it happens, there is no returning to the way one saw 
things before. Nevertheless, even once one has received God at the center of one’s life, 
one struggles to live consistently for love of God and neighbor.104 Hence, conversion 
remains an ongoing activity even for the so-called converted. As for what role religious 
educators might play in inviting conversion in others, that will be a topic for later in this 
chapter. 
 
Conversion Versus Development       
Conversion is identical with neither ordinary cognitive development nor with the 
transformation of meaning frameworks that attends such development. Exploring more 
precisely the relationship of development to conversion will afford us greater clarity 
regarding the respective contributions of transformative learning theory and Christian 
religious education to facilitating learners’ conversion. 
To begin with, conversion can be distinguished from development in that 
development is characterized by a predictable pattern of changes leading progressively 
toward the enhancement of certain capacities. By contrast, conversion marks a radical 
reorientation, turning, or about-face in a person’s way of thinking and living. As 
Lonergan puts it, conversion “comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; 
it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing greater depth and breadth and 
                                                
103 Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 110; Conn, Christian Conversion, 157. 
104 The classic articulation of this struggle is Paul’s words in Romans 7:14-25. Theologians in the Christian 
tradition have described this disconnect between a person’s conviction of what is right and actually doing 
what is right by the phrase “moral impotence” (see, e.g., Lonergan, Insight, 650-3). 
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wealth.”105 Where development implies continuity, conversion implies disruption. 
The distinction becomes even clearer when we look closely at the transitions 
between certain developmental stages. People may or (more often) may not be aware that 
they are going through a stage change, yet, Conn observes, at certain points some sort of 
conscious decision is necessary for further development. For example, Conn claims that 
the transition from Kohlberg’s stage six to stage seven requires one to answer for oneself 
the question, Why be moral? and subsequently to decide for or against morality in 
general. Conn identifies similar decision points in the transitions to Kohlberg’s stages 
four and six; Erikson’s stages five, seven, and eight; Fowler’s stages four and six; and 
Kegan’s level four.106 Developmental theory cannot fully account for why some people 
choose to progress at these points and others do not; it merely presents evidence that this 
is the case. Hence, for Conn, conversion is distinguished from natural development by 
conscious decision.107 He explains: “The one transforming process has two dimensions: 
one unconscious and spontaneous, one conscious and deliberate.”108 The unconscious and 
spontaneous dimension is that which developmentalists describe as stage transition; the 
conscious and deliberate dimension pertains to conversion.  
Transformative learning represents an interesting middle ground. Because 
                                                
105 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 237-8. 
106 Interestingly, Kegan himself cites religious self-surrender as one medium of the transition from fourth-
order to fifth-order consciousness (i.e., the transition from critical to post-critical consciousness with which 
we are most interested). (See chart in The Evolving Self, 120.) 
107 Conn also argues from other grounds for the necessity of the concept of conversion in addition to that 
of natural development. In particular, he explains that a stage by definition must be commonly recurring in 
the human population, yet Kohlberg and Fowler insist upon the existence of later stages that are rarely 
attained. Conn suggests that the reason for the rarity of these later stages is that their attainment depends 
upon conversion. 
108 Conn, Christian Conversion, 129. 
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transformative learning typically recruits learners’ willing, active participation in the 
process, it would seem to fall on the conscious side of the line that Conn draws between 
development and conversion. Yet, transformation of meaning perspectives need not 
always be conscious, and, as we will see presently, other factors distinguish 
transformative learning from conversion. 
Though distinct, conversion and development are intimately intertwined. On the 
one hand, conversion presupposes development.109 In some instances, normal 
developmental crises provide the occasion for conversion.110 Conn explains, “The 
adolescent and adult crises of psychosocial development occasion and provide the 
necessary existential conditions for conversions as well as for major structural stage 
transitions.111” It also may be the case that conversion does not occur until a person has 
attained a certain level of development, for “conversion requires at least the previous 
acquisition of basic formal cognitive operations, a successful identity integration reaching 
toward intimacy, and moral reasoning of a conventional level. Typically, then, Christian 
conversion would minimally require the development of advanced adolescence.”112 
Indeed, it stands to reason that, if we do not consider people psychologically prepared to 
                                                
109 James Fowler would challenge this claim, asserting that conversion can occur without stage change (see 
Stages of Faith, 285). His dissenting opinion can be accounted for by two considerations: (1) Fowler 
employs a narrower (and, I would argue, less helpful) definition of conversion as change in contents of 
faith. (2) Following from (1), conversion in the sense employed by Conn presupposes certain levels of 
development for reasons explained below, even if the decisive moment of conversion does not coincide 
with development to a new stage.  
110 Fowler does believe that development can precipitate conversion, however. 
111 Conn, Christian Conversion, 157. 
112 Ibid., 209. Edwin Starbuck, William James, and numerous others affirm the conclusion that conversion 
seldom if ever occurs prior to adolescence. (See James, Varieties of Religious Experience, Lecture IX.) An 
exception is James Fowler, who, because he defines conversion in terms of change in contents of faith, 
allows for the occurrence of conversion during childhood. (See Fowler, Stages of Faith, 286.) 
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commit themselves to marriage until the age of 18, we would not suppose them prepared 
to accept God as the center of their being before achieving a certain level of cognitive and 
emotional maturity.113 Notwithstanding, assuming that this baseline level of development 
has occurred, conversion can occur at any stage of adult development and will manifest 
itself according to the level of the individual.114  
On the other hand, full human development is impossible without conversion.115 
As developmentalists point out, development from one stage to another is not automatic. 
Many people remain suspended at an intermediate stage, as we saw with regard to 
American Catholics in the previous chapter. In some cases, such stabilization in 
development may merely be the result of having achieved a level of reasoning, faithing, 
etc. that is adequate to the demands of one’s environment. In other cases, however, 
people are unable to progress due to psychological impediments such as bias, sin, and 
moral impotence.116 They may be unwilling to admit that their current beliefs are 
mistaken or to trust a person whom they have held in suspicion or to give up their current 
place at the center of their imagined world. Whatever the specific impediment, when 
development to a new stage requires a conscious decision, these people are unable to 
make the requisite affirmative decision. Eventually they may be able to overcome this 
                                                
113 Even if we would not restrict the occurrence of conversion to older adolescents and adults as Conn and 
others do, all evidence suggests that instances of conversion at earlier stages in life are rare. 
114 Conn argues that conversion can be “critical” or “uncritical,” meaning that people who have 
surrendered themselves unconditionally to God may understand that self-surrender in terms of conventional 
or postconventional moral reasoning (Kohlberg) or faithing (Fowler). 
115 As Conn puts it, “optimal resolution of psychosocial crises requires conversion” (Christian Conversion, 
157). Though Fowler asserts that conversion can prompt stage change, he also maintains that it can actually 
block development (Stages of Faith, 286). Clearly this cannot be the case if conversion is understood in the 
sense employed in this chapter rather than in Fowler’s narrower sense. 
116 Cf. Doran, Psychic Conversion, 148. 
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resistance, but developmental theory cannot offer an explanation for what enables them 
do so, nor can transformative learning theory.  
The reason, explain Lonergan, Conn, and Doran, is that only conversion, which 
comes as God’s gift, can overcome the bias and moral impotence that block 
development.117 Without God’s intervention, human beings remain trapped in a vicious 
cycle: they require a more developed, authentic intelligence in order to recognize and 
correct the deficiency in their willingness (i.e., moral impotence), but their deficient 
willingness impedes the disinterested inquiry that engenders authentic intelligence. God’s 
gift of conversion endows human beings with a love for God motivated by something 
beyond themselves (namely, God’s own goodness), thereby reorienting them towards 
knowing and valuing all that is as it really is, that is, as God has ordered it.118 It is 
because human overcoming of bias and moral impotence depends upon God’s gift of 
willingness that even transformative learning, with its strategies for recruiting the 
conscious cooperation of learners, is insufficient for causing conversion. 
In sum, Conn offers these words concerning the relationship between conversion 
and development: “development requires conversion [at key points], and conversion 
always occurs within a developmental process.”119 
 
 
                                                
117 In Lonergan’s terms, intellectual conversion is the transcending of cognitive self-centeredness, moral 
conversion is the transcending of self-centered pursuit of satisfaction, and religious conversion is the 
remote cause of both. 
118 Doran offers and in-depth explanation of the need for universal willingness and its origin in God’s gift 
in Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 185-206. 
119 Conn, Christian Conversion, 157. 
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The Imaginal Dimension of Conversion 
In Chapter Two we saw the central role imagination plays in human meaning 
construction. In this chapter’s discussion of transformative learning and conceptual 
change, we again saw how greatly attention to images facilitates educational efforts to 
alter learners’ meaning frameworks. It should come as little surprise, then, that 
transformation of the imagination turns out to be a crucial aspect of conversion. I have 
described conversion as a radical reorientation of the self. Other theologians employ the 
language of reorientation of the person’s “fundamental option”120 or “dominant 
direction”.121 To speak of conversion in these terms necessarily implicates the 
imagination, the combination of capacities that synthesizes and projects this basic 
existential orientation.  
Many authors make the imaginal dimension of conversion explicit in their 
treatment of the phenomenon. James Fowler, for example, describes conversion as “a 
significant recentering of one’s previous conscious or unconscious images of value and 
power, and the conscious adoption of a new set of master stories.”122 Conn asserts, 
“Christian conversion involves a new set of images, symbols, values constituting the 
effective central interpretative story in one’s life.”123 Mary Boys highlights the particular 
                                                
120 For an overview of various theologians’ use of this term in relation to conversion, see Conn, Christian 
Conversion, 199. 
121 Ray L. Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 219. 
122 Fowler, Stages of Faith, 282. Italics original. 
123 Conn, Christian Conversion, 208. Italics original. 
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importance of ongoing expansion of one’s images of God and God’s Kingdom.124 None 
of these authors would consider it adequate to describe conversion purely in terms of the 
acquisition of new mental images and symbols (like stamps or baseball cards added to 
one’s collection), for what one chooses as one’s orienting images shapes one’s whole 
perception of and living in the world.125 Therefore, even though the acquisition of new 
images is not sufficient in itself, a change that does not touch a person’s orienting images 
cannot be regarded as conversion in the full sense of the word developed here. 
 
The Possibility of Facilitating Conversion in General 
Now that I have described the nature of conversion and distinguished it from 
natural development, I am in better position to describe the possibilities for facilitating 
conversion. As already noted, conversion is always a gift from God, yet it is a gift that 
requires human cooperation. The need for human cooperation points to the possibility of 
religious educators facilitating the conversion process in others (and in themselves).126 To 
be sure, that role is limited.127 As theologian Rosemary Haughton qualifies, no amount of 
formation can ever amount to transformation. Stating the matter even more forcefully, 
                                                
124 Mary C. Boys, “Conversion as a Foundation of Religious Education,” Religious Education 77, no. 2 
(1982): 223. 
125 Even Fowler, who defines conversion essentially in terms of change of content, indicates that this 
change of images is wrapped up with the reshaping of one’s life as a whole. (See Stages of Faith, 281-2.) 
126 On the importance of educators themselves undergoing conversion as an aid to promoting it in others, 
see Boys, “Conversion as Foundation of Religious Education,” and Thomas H. Groome, “Conversion, 
Nurture and Educators,” Religious Education 76, no. 5 (1981): 482–96. 
127 Religious educator Anton Vrame notes that teaching is like a sacrament in that human beings play a 
role in the transformation, but that transformation ultimately depends on God (Anton C Vrame, The 
Educating Icon: Teaching Wisdom and Holiness in the Orthodox Way (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross 
Orthodox Press, 1999), 182-3).  
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she asserts, “Transformation therefore can only occur when formation breaks down.”128 
In fact, Haughton and others suggest that trying to force conversion upon others can 
actually do serious harm. A challenge to convert issued too soon might create an obstacle 
to future transformation.129 Furthermore, suggests Virgil Bailey Gillespie, manipulative 
methods aimed at compelling conversion can lead to “counter-conversions,” or 
superficial changes that appear to indicate conversion but that are accompanied on a 
deeper level by negative effects on the person’s identity.130 
Notwithstanding, Haughton insists that, even if formation does not cause 
transformation, still no transformation is possible without some sort of formation. Indeed, 
a third party (such as a religious educator) may very well be the means by which God 
invites someone to conversion. This view is very much in line with the many biblical 
narratives in which God’s work is not neatly distinguished from that of God’s 
creatures.131 So it seems that, even if human beings can force neither God’s hand nor 
another person’s free decision to accept conversion, it is possible for them to serve as 
mediators of God’s grace and to support others in accepting God’s invitation to be 
transformed.132  
What particular forms this mediation and support might take has been explored 
                                                
128 Haughton, Transformation of Man, 35. 
129 See ibid., 166. 
130 Virgil Bailey Gillespie, Religious Conversion and Personal Identity: How and Why People Change 
(Birmingham, Ala: Religious Education Press, 1979), 193. 
131 For example, in the story of Joseph and his brothers (Genesis 37-50), Joseph declares that God had been 
at work in the events of the narrative, even though God is never explicitly mentioned prior to then (Gen 
50:20). 
132 Religious educator Michael Corso captures the role of the educator in the phrase “giving access to 
conversion” (“Christian Religious Education for Conversion: A Lonerganian Perspective” (Unpublished 
dissertation, Boston College, 1994), 327). 
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extensively in conversion literature.133 While it lies beyond the scope of the present 
chapter to discuss this literature in any great depth, it will suffice for our purposes to 
identify several general strategies that recur in this body of research. In examining these 
approaches, the reader will notice many parallels with those employed by practitioners of 
transformative learning and conceptual change. Indeed, as Mezirow himself has noted, 
any conversion will include the sort of transformation of meaning perspectives targeted in 
transformative learning.134 In this respect, the pedagogical strategies associated with 
transformative learning can certainly contribute to conversion. What distinguishes the 
following strategies is the concern they imply for holistic transformation (including 
attention to the spiritual dimension of the person) and the manner in which they explicitly 
seek to open people to the workings of God’s grace. Because conversion occurs in many 
contexts, not only that of the classroom, I have opted to describe the following strategies 
for promoting conversion in general terms, deferring explicitly pedagogical 
considerations to the final two chapters. 
An essential first step toward conversion involves increasing one’s receptivity to 
God’s grace. Minimally, one must be aware of God’s offer of grace and the possibility of 
conversion in order to receive it.135 The enduring imperative to Christians to proclaim the 
Gospel follows from this exigency.136 More often than not, however, this receptivity 
                                                
133 For a compendium of a variety of approaches to this question, see Malony and Southard, Handbook of 
Religious Conversion; cf. Corso, “Christian Religious Education for Conversion.” 
134 See Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, 91, 180. 
135 God can certainly prompt a conversion at any time without forewarning. The first time one becomes 
aware of the possibility of conversion may very well be the moment God offers it. Still, conversion stories 
of this sort are rare. Most often people undergo a conversion following a period of preparation. 
136 See Mk 16:15. 
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emerges only after many distractions and obstacles—biases, addictions, vices—have 
been exposed and one is finally forced to confront one’s inability to save oneself.137 
Sometimes people “bottom out” on their own. In other cases, it takes a concerned third 
party to bring the matter to a head and reflect a person’s shortcomings and oversights in a 
way that the latter cannot help but acknowledge them.138 The conversion literature often 
describes this moment as a “crisis,” which shares many similarities and in some cases 
corresponds with the “disorienting dilemma” described by Mezirow.139 Since we already 
have some understanding of strategies that instigate a disorienting dilemma from that 
discussion above, I will forestall further explanation until the next section, in which I 
describe in greater depth how the use of images can prompt such a crisis.   
Second, as in transformative learning, so too in the midst of conversion do people 
require emotional and intellectual support. To this point, Fowler emphasizes the 
importance of “sponsorship” in helping people work through their conversion.140 Such 
sponsorship may include providing encouragement, guidance, modeling, a safe space for 
exploring new possibilities, accountability and challenge, as well as experiences and 
spiritual direction that serve to deepen commitment and growth. Even more 
                                                
137 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 242; Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 195-6. 
138 Indeed, sometimes we are blind to the “plank in our own eye,” as Jesus puts it (Mt 7:3-5; cf. Lk 6:42). 
139 See, e.g., James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Lecture I; and Lewis R. Rambo, “The 
Psychology of Conversion,” in Handbook of Religious Conversion, ed. H. Newton Malony and Samuel 
Southard (Birmingham, Ala: Religious Education Press, 1992), 165. In common parlance, the term “crisis” 
generally connotes a negative experience. However, even though a crisis in the sense described here 
inevitably involves unpleasant feelings, the outcome can be highly beneficial. Kegan speaks to this double 
nature of crisis in these terms: “the Chinese draw ‘crisis’ with two characters: one means ‘danger,’ the 
other ‘opportunity.’ This, literally, is the character of crisis; for the crisis is the transformation of meaning, 
the costs of evolution, and the death we fear may be, as much as anything, the death of the old self that is 
about to be left behind” (Kegan, The Evolving Self, 266). 
140 Fowler, Stages of Faith, 286-8. Sharon Daloz Parks makes a similar argument, preferring the term 
“mentorship”. (See Sharon Daloz Parks, Big Questions, Worthy Dreams (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2000).) 
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fundamentally, community affords the opportunity for loving relationships, which open 
the human heart to conversion and to the life of love that follows.141 Most authors dealing 
with the topic of conversion are similarly adamant about the individual’s need for 
communal support throughout the conversion process.142  
Third, converts need help building a new foundation upon their conversion 
experience. It is at this point that formal and informal religious education plays a key role 
by providing people with the language they need to articulate what they are experiencing 
and by giving them access to the inherited wisdom of generations of Christians who have 
undergone similar experiences.143 Prayer—both communal and private—is likewise 
valuable in building a new foundation.144 Participation in communal liturgy in particular 
facilitates the ritualizing and ingraining of habits, attitudes, and sensibilities that accord 
with the convert’s new values and orientations.145 Engaging in the practice of 
discernment—for example, as developed in the Ignatian tradition—helps one to grow 
more attuned to the promptings of God’s Spirit and to respond appropriately to one’s 
conversion.146 All of the above leads in the direction of personal decision.147 This 
                                                
141 Cf. Haughton, The Transformation of Man, 114. 
142 Cf. Rambo, “The Psychology of Conversion,” 171-3; Eddie Gibbs, H. Newton Malony, and Samuel 
Southard, “Conversion in Evangelistic Practice,” in Handbook of Religious Conversion (Birmingham, Ala: 
Religious Education Press, 1992), 282; Corso, “Christian Religious Education for Conversion,” 29; 
William Sims Bainbridge, “The Sociology of Conversion,” ed. H. Newton Malony and Samuel Southard 
(Birmingham, Ala: Religious Education Press, 1992), 189. 
143 See Haughton, The Transformation of Man, 74, 99, 136, 224; Groome, Sharing Faith, 217-8; Corso, 
“Christian Religious Education for Conversion,” 291-300. 
144 Cf. Corso, “Christian Religious Education for Conversion,” 301-7. 
145 Cf. Dykstra, Vision and Character, 106. 
146 See Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius: A Literal Translation and a 
Contemporary Reading, ed. David L. Fleming (St. Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1978), 204-19. 
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personal decision is the final, indispensable ingredient needed for God’s offer of grace to 
materialize into a life lived for love of God and neighbor. The initial crisis, the support 
and guidance of others, further learning, and experiences of worship and prayer can bring 
one to this point, but, without the decision to risk one’s life on God’s offer of grace, it all 
amounts to no more than new trappings on an essentially unchanged life. 
I have indicated here some of the general guidelines Christian scholars have 
proposed for facilitating conversion. Acknowledging that others have developed these 
proposals in far greater depth, I have kept my treatment of them brief in order to allow 
more space to explore the possibilities for facilitating conversion through the 
transformation of the imagination specifically. To that task we now turn. 
 
Converting the Imagination 
Back in Chapter One I made note of Andrew Thompson’s study of the NCEA 
ACRE, from which he deduces the importance of the imagination in religious education. 
In that study Thompson concludes, “motivating participants and helping them in the 
process of ongoing conversion…depends heavily on the ability of the catechist to evoke 
images which capture the imagination of the students.”148 Walter Conn arrives at a 
similar conclusion based on his work with developmental psychology: “when our 
concern is the affective, cognitive, moral, and religious totality of the person, we must 
                                                                                                                                            
147 Cf. Groome, Sharing Faith, 266-7; David H. Read, “The Evangelical Protestant Understanding of 
Conversion,” in Handbook of Religious Conversion, ed. H. Newton Malony and Samuel Southard 
(Birmingham, Ala: Religious Education Press, 1992), 142.  
148 Andrew D. Thompson, That They May Know You (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Educational 
Association, 1982), 61. 
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focus as sharply as possible on that communicator of human reality that best relates in an 
integrated way to the many dimensions of that totality,” namely, the symbol.149 Since we 
are in fact seeking methods capable of transforming Christians in their totality, we will 
follow Conn’s advice and focus our attention on the role of symbols—and by implication, 
imagination—in promoting conversion. We have already made a good start in examining 
the image-focused strategies of transformative learning and conceptual change. However, 
the transformation of meaning perspectives does not necessarily amount to conversion in 
the fuller Christian sense. If we are to address the particular dilemma of contemporary 
U.S. Catholics beyond the more general struggle of people to make sense of the 
postmodern world, then we need to push beyond transformative learning to conversion. 
As we do so, it will be convenient to organize the following strategies for converting the 
imagination into the same three phases enumerated above.  
 
Phase I: Disrupting the Imagination 
The first step in inviting a conversion of the imagination involves a moment of 
crisis.150 Where above I described the moment of crisis in terms of a challenge to 
previous knowing, numerous authorities point out that the most forceful (and potentially 
most effective) challenge is a disruption of the way one imagines.151 Jesus’ image of a 
Samaritan man stopping to care for the victim lying on the roadside would have 
                                                
149 Conn, Christian Conversion, 75-6; cf. 150. 
150 Craig Dykstra calls it the phase of “discovery” (Dykstra, Vision and Character, 81) and James Loder 
the period of “conflict” (James E. Loder, The Transforming Moment: Understanding Convictional 
Experiences (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 31). 
151 Ray Hart employs the phrase “imaginative shock” to describe this sort of disruption (Unfinished Man, 
216). Hart notes that “imaginative shock” is the mental correlate of the “ontological shock” described by 
Tillich. 
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precipitated such an imaginative disruption for his Jewish audience, disturbing their 
accustomed way of envisioning this despised social group.152 Real-life tragedies can have 
a similar effect: The image of a loved one lying in a casket or of oneself stuck in an office 
cubicle for the rest of one’s life can provoke major disruptions in one’s view of life.  
Such disruptions shake up one’s imaginative syntheses and ossified categories of 
thought. They force one to reactivate the imagination, which originally generated those 
images and categories but then grew complacent once those images and categories were 
confirmed by subsequent experience. Imagining anew, one begins to ask questions again 
and to reexamine ontological possibilities. This disruption is not identical with 
conversion, but it opens one up to the possibility of conversion. It creates the space 
wherein conversion might take hold. 
As Hart explains, the imagination is disrupted “only by language spoken in its 
own tongue,” that is, the first-order language of metaphor, symbol, and poetry.153 
Language that does not engage the emotions or penetrate to the level of one’s being 
whence meaning is constructed and from which one spontaneously lives does not disturb 
or even significantly alter one’s thinking.154 Even within the realm of symbol, not all 
images are equally effective to this end, for some bear greater disruptive potential than 
                                                
152 Though our focus is on imaginative disruption as conducing to conversion, it is important to note that 
such an experience of disruption can cut both ways. The image of Catholic priests abusing children so 
shocked the imaginations of many Catholics that it disrupted their whole image of the Church and 
precipitated their departure from the Catholic community. 
153 Hart, Unfinished Man, 216; cf. Haughton, The Transformation of Man, 136. As Richard Lennan argues 
and as I will explain further in subsequent chapters, both metaphorical and critically reflective language 
play crucial roles in the Christian life. (See Richard Lennan, “The Church as Sacrament of Hope,” 
Theological Studies 72 (2011), 274.) However, when it comes to the initial invitation to conversion, the 
first-order language of the imagination is indispensable. 
154 This was the central import of much of the transformative learning and conceptual change research 
discussed above. 
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others. The “classics” David Tracy describes in The Analogical Imagination (which we 
discussed in Chapter Two) are an example of a class of symbols with this special 
potential. Classics, Tracy claims, facilitate the sort of journey of intensification through 
which contemporary persons might experience an encounter with the “uncanny,” that is, 
with something supremely meaningful that breaks one out of the flatness of postmodern 
culture.155 The classic unsettles us and provokes us to think that “something else might be 
the case.”156 Because it evokes our deepest human concerns, engaging the classic 
compels us to confront questions of profound existential meaning. Religious classics in 
particular—for example, the Exodus, the crucifix, the Buddha, Gandhi—draw us into an 
encounter with reality as a whole and with the Source of all that is.157 They attract us, but 
at the same time they baffle us and confound our comfortable ways of understanding and 
imagining.  
As Tracy explains, “The classic images for the Christian are those related to that 
event [viz., God’s self-manifestation in Jesus the Christ] and that person: the dialectics of 
the symbols of cross-resurrection-incarnation.”158 William Lynch affirms that Jesus 
Christ is “in a completely literal way, the basic image of faith.”159 Not insignificantly, 
Lynch adds, “It seems to me that if Christ is the most central image of faith he is also the 
                                                
155 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 362. Richard Kearney makes a similar argument regarding the function 
of the “sublime” in Kant’s The Critique of Judgment. (See The Wake of Imagination, 175.) 
156 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 102. 
157 Susan Langer likewise notes the inescapable draw of religious symbols: “The contemplation of sacra 
invites a certain intellectual excitement….the excitement of realizing life and strength, manhood, contest, 
and death” (Susan Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, 
3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 152). 
158 Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 249. 
159 Lynch, Images of Faith: An Exploration of the Ironic Imagination, 96. 
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most bothersome image of faith.”160 Indeed, Jesus of Nazareth disrupts many of our 
categories and expectations: In his person, God manifests Godself, not in power and 
might, but in humility and weakness.161 Through this one man, who lived in a particular 
time and a particular place, people of every nation and every age receive the offer of 
salvation. Perhaps most shockingly of all, it is Jesus’ ignominious death that restores the 
possibility of life for God’s children.162 In this manner, the image of Jesus Christ disrupts 
the complacent imagination and inspires an “ironic imagination,” the imagination Lynch 
believes proper to Christian faith. 
Jesus’ invitation to a new manner of imagining is an indispensable element in the 
economy of salvation. Its significance becomes more apparent when we consider that 
humanity’s rejection of God was (and is) in large part a failure of the imagination. Paul 
explains, “Claiming to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the 
immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed 
animals or reptiles” (Rom 1:22-23; cf. 2 Cor 4:4). In other words, human beings were 
beholden to images of their own making and consequently lacked awareness of their 
inadequacy, which we identified above as a prerequisite for conversion. In response to 
this state of affairs, God condescended to accommodate humanity’s fallen condition and 
sent a true image of Godself, Jesus the Son, to correct human imaginations.163 As the one 
true image of the living God, Jesus holds a unique power to confound misguided 
                                                
160 Ibid., 121. 
161 Cf. 1 Cor 1:25 
162 Lynch places this irony—that of the image of the curse being converted into the image of the 
blessing—at the very heart of the ironic imagination: “To believe in this irony is precisely faith”  (Images 
of Faith, 162). 
163 Cf. Rom 8:29; 2 Cor 4:4; Col 1:15. 
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imaginations, bestow meaning on life, and constitute a new reality for those who pursue 
this new vision.164 That new vision and reality is expressed in a definitive way in Jesus’ 
symbol of the “reign of God.”165 I will explore the import of this symbol in greater depth 
in the following chapter, particularly as it is evoked by Jesus’ parables. 
 
Phase II: Reintegrating the Psyche    
Once the imagination has been disrupted, one needs time and support to cope with 
the shock.166 In our discussion of transformative learning, we recognized the necessity of 
attending to learners’ emotional state as their world is turned upside-down. All the 
recommendations discussed there apply here as well. The supporting role of community 
is particularly relevant. For one thing, observes Conn, “all personal conversions are so 
intrinsically dependent on the quality and vitality of the symbols and stories available in 
one’s community.”167 Not only does the Christian community “tradition” (i.e., hand on) 
the symbols that prompt conversion; it also provides a supportive environment and 
mentoring relationships in the context of which one can begin to make sense of those 
disconcerting symbols and eventually develop fluency with them. Hence, intentionality 
concerning the supporting community’s use of symbols is of the utmost importance for 
                                                
164 Cf. Gerhard Lohfink, Jesus of Nazareth: What He Wanted, Who He Was (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 2012), 127; Anthony Godzieba, “From the Editor,” Horizons 41, no. 2 (December 2014), vi. 
165 While maintaining Jesus as the central image of faith, Lynch also asserts that the “ultimate image” is 
that of a new heaven and a new earth (Images of Faith, 165). Lynch does not contradict himself, for the 
image of Jesus is only properly understood in relation to the image of the reign of God that Jesus put at the 
center of his ministry. 
166 Loder describes this phase as an “interlude for scanning” during which time one engages in further 
dismantling erroneous ways of thinking, wondering, waiting, and grasping for solutions (The Transforming 
Moment, 32). 
167 Conn, Christian Conversion, 125; cf. 133; cf. Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 307. 
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facilitating converts’ adjustment given the strong influence mental images exert on 
people’s affectivity. 
Robert Doran has made this concern a central theme in his work on “psychic 
conversion,” which sheds considerable light on the sort of support converts need. Doran 
describes the exigency motivating his work in these terms:  
The role of the neglected psyche in the reconstitution of humanity is central. We might 
say that even now, at the tether of its exasperation with the blindness of biased 
practicality to its enriching potentialities, the psyche is projecting those very images that 
are needed for the insights, the judgments, and the decisions through which alone we can 
reverse the longer cycle of decline.168  
 
Conversion in the full sense cannot be realized simply by teaching the right propositional 
statements, nor is it enough to show people the right images. As an additional condition, 
the psyche (i.e., the human being’s sensitive consciousness) must first be freed up to 
generate and receive the images required for intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and 
loving action in the course of daily life (e.g., personalized images of the reign of God). 
Furthermore, even once the free flow of salutary images is established, there remains the 
matter of bringing one’s existential spontaneity into correspondence with the vision of the 
Christian life afforded by those images. Psychic conversion is the achievement of this 
integration, “the acquisition of the capacity for internal symbolic communication among 
spirit, psyche, and organism.”169 
Doran’s notion of psychic conversion supplies the valuable insight that the psyche 
is not merely a nuisance to be assuaged in order to prevent a sabotaging of the 
transformation of the intellect. Neither, I might add, is emotional support beneficial only 
                                                
168 Doran, Psychic Conversion, 145. 
169 Ibid., 222. 
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to the extent that it furthers cognitive development. Rather, the psyche is an indispensable 
collaborator in the conversion of the human person and in God’s solution to the problem 
of evil. Psychic conversion is the achievement of a new level in the functioning of the 
sensitive dimension of the human person corresponding to the new form of consciousness 
described in the previous chapter as a “second naiveté”. As Doran says, “The existential 
and psychic complement to the disinterestedness of the pure desire to know is a 
movement toward the second innocence of agape…It is a movement toward the non-
alienation of those who are free to seek only the kingdom of God and his 
righteousness.”170  
How, then, is psychic conversion facilitated and supported? As we might expect, 
Doran claims that the process can be aided symbolically. Most basically, prompting 
psychic conversion involves learning to attend to one’s mental images and the feelings 
they evoke. To the extent that one increases one’s awareness of how one spontaneously 
responds to different images, one is better able to modify those responses and so bring 
them into ever closer alignment with the objective scale of values.171 Doran’s 
recommendations may recall for the reader Mezirow’s prescription to help learners 
discern the context of their former views, beliefs, and feelings as might the sort of 
consciousness-raising facilitated by Saint Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises.172 For his part, 
                                                
170 Robert M. Doran, Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977), 178. 
171 Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 32; Doran, Psychic Conversion, 103-4.  
172 In all likelihood this affinity is not coincidental given the fact that Doran is a Jesuit formed in the 
tradition of the Exercises. On a related note, Robert Imbelli suggests that the Greek term for conversion, 
“metanoia,” might also be translated as “consciousness raising” (Rekindling the Christic Imagination 
Theological Meditations for the New Evangelization. (Liturgical Press, 2014), 54). 
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Doran emphasizes the value of explanatory narrative for such consciousness-raising.173 
He maintains that, through telling one’s personal story, one is better able to objectify, 
interpret, affirm, and evaluate the mental images and symbols that influence one’s 
feelings and behavior.  
Doran’s notion of psychic conversion also goes beyond the fostering of 
attentiveness suggested by Mezirow insofar as the former devotes greater attention to the 
possibilities of actively modifying one’s spontaneous desires and affective responses. The 
necessity of this psychic training is evident in light of our anthropological explorations in 
Chapter Two, which yielded the insight that, in the context of life’s quotidian tasks and 
situations, we operate most often on the basis of our spontaneous imaginings and feelings 
rather than discursive reasoning. Because it is on this level that we primarily live, 
conversion must transform people in their spontaneous manner of imagining, feeling, 
desiring, and relating if it is to truly reorient their living toward love of God and 
neighbor. Indeed, from the Christian perspective, a change that impacts only the way one 
thinks in the tranquil confines of a classroom or study leaves much to be desired.  
Doran highlights the role of persuasion in effecting change at this deeper level.174 
Even once one recognizes intellectually the worthwhileness of Christian values, it 
requires further effort and persuasion—by oneself and others—to fully embody those 
values. Communal persuasion might come in the form of praise for one’s triumphs of 
virtue and accountability for one’s shortcomings. Yet, for as helpful as the community 
can be in this capacity, Doran is careful to point out that the willingness to submit to the 
                                                
173 See Doran, Psychic Conversion, 204, 211. 
174 See ibid., 148. 
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persuasion of others in the first place (not to mention full religious conversion) can only 
come through God’s grace.175 
 Doran discusses these factors in psychic conversion primarily with reference to 
the context of clinical psychotherapy, but he does acknowledge the viability of other 
approaches as well.176 Religious retreats, group workshops, and classroom instruction are 
all contexts in which the community can facilitate and support psychic conversion.177  
 
 Phase III: Reintegrating the Imagination  
 Like conversion in general, psychic conversion is an ongoing process. Even after 
the definitive experience of conversion in which one accepts God as the focal point of 
one’s meaning-construction and living, one continues to imagine anew, which 
necessitates continuous reintegration and realignment of the psyche, intellect, and will. 
For this reason we cannot clearly separate this phase of conversion from the next. 
Likewise, the final phase we will examine here, the integration of a new form of 
imagination, should not be presumed to follow neatly upon the prior phase. Subtle 
changes in the affect effect the imagination and vice versa. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
                                                
175 Ibid., 150-2. 
176 Theologian Timothy O’Connell in his book Making Disciples discusses a technique called “Neuro-
Linguistic Programming,” which serves a similar purpose. NLP employs clinical strategies such as guiding 
subjects to associate or dissociate from particular mental images and memories and helping people to 
negotiate troublesome feelings through imaginative exercises. (See Timothy E. O’Connell, Making 
Disciples: A Handbook of Christian Moral Formation (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1998), 106.) 
177 Doran has also endorsed Eugene Gendlin’s method of “focusing”. (See Eugene T. Gendlin, Focusing, 
2nd ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1981).) Towards the end of Stages of Faith, James Fowler describes 
the role of these sorts of experiences and methods in facilitating people’s reworking or “recapitulating” 
their images of power following conversion (see Stages of Faith, 286-91). Specifically, Fowler mentions 
consistent experiences of community worship and education as well as individual or small-group prayer, 
spiritual direction (including guided meditations), and psychotherapy. He also references psychoanalyst 
William Meissner as someone who has explored this process of recapitulation in greater depth. 
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clarity, we will focus in this section on how the imagination can be reintegrated following 
a disruption. 
 According to James Loder, this period of reintegration is characterized by 
constructive acts of imagination, the release of tension created by the initial conflict, an 
experience of openness to new ideas and images, and interpretation (i.e., application) of a 
new imaginative synthesis in one’s world.178 Before converted subjects can coherently 
reinterpret their world, they must reconstruct an imaginative synthesis to replace the one 
that was disrupted. Obvious though it seems, this fact is often overlooked. Too often 
parents, educators, and community leaders, overwhelmed by the ubiquity and 
seductiveness of degrading images in popular media and advertising, default to simply 
criticizing these images and prohibiting young people from looking at and listening to 
them. Given the ceaseless manner in which images present themselves to the human 
consciousness, this approach is doomed to fail from the start. As H. Richard Niebuhr 
explains, “The errors and superstitions fostered by bad imagination in this realm cannot 
be overcome by eliminating ideas of self and of value for selves but only by more 
adequate images of the same order.”179 In other words, the only viable solution is to 
populate people’s imaginations with salutary images and to help them to imagine in a 
manner more consistent with Jesus’ vision of the reign of God. 
  Christian symbols are able to function in this double capacity as disruptors of 
distorted imagination and integrators of healthy imagination. Doran’s notion of 
                                                
178 See Loder, The Transforming Moment, 32-4. 
179 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 79. Fowler likewise 
notes the necessity of reworking or “recapitulating” old images and the negative consequences of naive 
attempts to simply reject old images or leave them behind. (See Stages of Faith, 288.) 
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“anagogic” symbols pertains to this second mode. Doran defines the anagogic symbol as 
“the transformation of psychic energy by grace,”180 typically in the subject’s dreaming.181 
Following Lonergan, Doran maintains that these anagogic symbols play a crucial role in 
the divine solution to the problem of human evil. In this role, they serve a double 
purpose: first, they facilitate the integration of the whole human person, who experiences 
an unending tension between limitation and transcendence, between creaturely needs and 
a transcendent vocation; and, second, they make possible humans’ overcoming the 
struggle between good and evil. Doran elaborates, “as sacramental transformations of 
psychic energy, these symbols give what they manifest,”182 that is, they “simultaneously 
reflect and bring about the conversion of human sensitivity to participation in the divinely 
originated solution to the problem of evil.”183 Through them, God operates upon the 
psyche so as to lead human beings into cooperation with the work of ushering in the reign 
of God.  
 Anagogic symbols are thus a manifestation of God’s grace, without which human 
beings would not be able to overcome evil or even to achieve the life of faith, hope, and 
love for which God created humanity. Lonergan explains the function of these symbols 
this way: “since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope 
reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man’s sensitivity 
needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the 
                                                
180 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 289-90. 
181 One finds ample biblical support for the idea that God communicates with human beings through their 
dreams. Cf. Genesis 15:1; 37:5-9; 41:1-7; 46:2; Judges 7:13-15; Job 4:13-16; Daniel 2:19; Matthew 1:20. 
182 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 291. 
183 See Doran, Psychic Conversion, 242. 
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vast but impalpable pressure of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing 
charity.”184 In other words, these divinely bestowed symbols provide human beings with 
the material means of realizing their spiritual vocation. 
 Though Doran’s treatment of anagogic symbols focuses on symbols encountered 
in dreams, it draws our attention to the broader category of divinely revealed symbols.185 
To be sure, God’s self-revelation is not limited to oneiric symbols. The functions of 
anagogic symbols noted above—integrating the human person and drawing humans 
toward their eschatological finality—are also fulfilled by the images of Scripture, the 
sacraments of the Church, and the witness of holy people, to name a few examples. Each 
of these symbols represents an instance of God leading human beings through material 
and psychological phenomena toward spiritual realities that they could not grasp 
otherwise. 
 It hardly needs saying that engaging these divinely revealed symbols goes far 
beyond the strategies for “establishing firm ground in a new place” described in the 
transformative learning literature. While supporting people in new roles and providing 
the language people need to understand changes in their meaning framework can 
certainly help them to consummate their conversion, such strategies will never lead to a 
complete reorientation in their living without the intervention of God’s grace. For this 
reason, any Christian striving in earnest to facilitate conversion in themselves or others 
                                                
184 Lonergan, Insight, 744. 
185 Doran provides this reason for focusing on dream symbols and their exploration in psychotherapy: “I 
grant a privileged role to dreams in the ongoing commerce of the poles of the subjective dialectic because 
their elemental symbolic expressions of the energic complexes of the sensitive psyche are less under the 
control of the repressive censorship of unwilling intentionality” (Psychic Conversion, 269). 
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must look to utilize the symbols God has given us for the purpose of facilitating a 
transformation of the whole person—intellect, will, imagination, and affect. The 
opportunities for making use of revelatory symbols to this end are legion. Pastoral 
counseling, liturgy, and art (film, music, literature, visual and performance art) all carry 
their unique potential.186 However, it is the possibilities available to us in the realm of 
religious education that will occupy our attention in the final two chapters of this 
dissertation. 
 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter, we have looked to the fields of transformative learning and 
conceptual change to learn what we can from them for the purpose of helping American 
Catholics develop a form of consciousness that is more adequate to the demands of 
postmodern culture. While these secular fields have much to offer us, it has become clear 
from our discussion of conversion that they are not sufficient for achieving the ends 
aspired to by Christian religious educators. Religious educators would thus do well to 
appropriate the methods of these educational fields while also looking to the resources of 
Christian faith for what it alone can contribute to the work of promoting conversion. 
Religious educators also do well to utilize these pedagogical resources—whether secular 
or religious—with a sensitivity to their historical-cultural context. Among the various 
strategies and approaches explored in this chapter, we have discerned at least three 
                                                
186 For an example in pastoral counseling see Conn, The Desiring Self: Rooting Pastoral Counseling and 
Spiritual Direction in Self-Transcendence; in literature see the writings of C. S. Lewis, Flannery O’Connor, 
and Graham Greene. 
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common responsibilities or phases in the pedagogical process—disrupting learners’ 
imaginations, providing support during the transition, and facilitating a new integration. 
Although all three are always necessary in some form or another, certain phases may be 
more or less crucial in different contexts.  
 In our present postmodern context, disruption and dis-integration of the 
imagination is the everyday reality for many American Catholics. (Such was the 
argument of Chapter One, where I highlighted the serious challenges to faith caused by 
this disruption.) Yet, what appears a challenge from one perspective can be seen as an 
opportunity from another. In previous eras, religious educators had to struggle mightily to 
break through Catholics’ complacent assumptions about faith and reality as a whole, and 
many Catholics went through their whole lives never thinking to question accepted views 
of God, the world, or the Church. Today far less is taken for granted. Fewer people 
identify with the Catholic Church, but at the same time a movement of spiritual seeking 
and openness to discovering God’s work in a variety of forms has seized large segments 
of the world’s population. This openness represents a major opportunity for today’s 
religious educators. Therefore, while the need to unsettle the complacent undoubtedly 
remains, the main work today lies in helping Catholics to synthesize a new vision of 
faithful living and to live into that vision.  
 Fortunately, this is a work well underway. Today’s religious educators have the 
benefit of following upon the precedent of gifted pedagogues and scholars who have 
addressed similar challenges in their own historical and social contexts. Although some 
of them taught long ago, others are contemporary thinkers who have wrestled with many 
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of the postmodern challenges addressed in this dissertation. Examining the work of the 
latter especially will enable us to build upon the more general strategies for converting 
imaginations discussed in this chapter and thereby develop a pedagogical approach 
designed with particular attention to the need for post-critical consciousness in our time. 
 249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Pedagogical Foundations for Converting the Imagination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In the wilderness prepare the way of the Lord… 
Then the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, 
and all people shall see it together.” 
 
-  Isaiah 40: 3, 5 
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Introduction 
I have been arguing that many American Catholics’ current struggles in faith have 
resulted in great part from the failure of their collective cognitive development to keep 
pace with the emergence of new cognitive demands in postmodernity. Drawing upon the 
research of scholars like Robert Kegan, James Fowler, and Jack Mezirow, I have 
proposed that an evolution in consciousness will be necessary if these people are to 
continue finding meaning for their lives in the Christian faith. This evolution in 
consciousness will crucially involve (as do all such evolutions) a transformation of the 
ways people imagine.  
In the preceding chapter, I examined research from secular and Christian 
educators that demonstrates the general possibility of such transformation and that 
presents numerous approaches for realizing this possibility. This body of research also 
points to the many additional benefits of an imagination-focused pedagogy. For one, such 
a pedagogy operates in accord with the dynamics of human cognition that we explored in 
Chapter Two, attending to the images that underlie learners’ mental categories and habits 
of thought. Engaging cognition at this level facilitates the occurrence of insights and 
learners’ rapid grasp of meaning. It also promotes learner interest, motivation, and ability 
to apply learning in meaningful ways. Furthermore, placing symbols at the center of the 
educational process creates pedagogical anchors that provide continuity in learning from 
one year to the next and facilitate the integration and deepening of learning. Such an 
approach is conducive to meeting the learning needs of people at all stages of cognitive 
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development and from a variety of backgrounds, cultures, and faith traditions.1 Perhaps 
most importantly for religious educators, symbol is the form of expression that is most 
adequate to mediating God’s self-revelation and the human responses and participatory 
knowing elicited by revelation.  
Having acknowledged these many benefits, I now intend to advance the 
discussion beyond the previous chapter’s general treatment of transforming imaginations 
to a discussion of specifically pedagogical (versus clinical, liturgical, etc.) approaches 
suggested by prominent Christian educators. To this discussion I bring a particular 
concern for how these educators’ work can help us meet the educational exigencies that 
we identified in the preceding chapters. The reader will recall that the overarching goal 
established for the current project is the reintegration of the lives of American Catholics. 
Our investigation of the research in Chapters Three and Four converged upon several key 
pedagogical strategies for facilitating the sort of transformation that leads to reintegration. 
The most important of these were: 
⁃ attend to the needs and limits of human cognition (i.e., respect human 
limitation), 
⁃ promote transcendence of egocentrism and openness to God’s grace (i.e., 
facilitate human transcendence), 
⁃ recruit the active participation of learners in their own transformation, 
                                                
1 While most people may lack the intellectual differentiation of consciousness necessary for making sense 
of theoretical formulations, symbolic thinking is within the capacity of virtually all human beings. (Cf. 
Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 276; ibid., 
“Sacralization and Secularization,” 1973, 11-12.) On the advantages of symbol-centered learning for people 
from a variety of faith traditions, see Patrick R. Manning, “Engaging Our Symbols, Sharing Our World: 
Forming Young People Around Symbols for Participation in the Public Sphere,” Religious Education 109, 
no. 4 (2014): 440–54. 
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⁃ provide emotional and communal support during the transition. 
In Chapter Four we saw that attending to these goals consistently gave rise to a threefold 
pattern in the transformative process: (1) engage and disrupt current ways of 
thinking/imagining, (2) support the expansion of learners’ thinking/imagining, and (3) 
invite willing appropriation of the new manner of thinking/imagining. 
In this chapter, I begin to put flesh on the skeleton of this transformative, 
imagination-focused pedagogy. I start by examining how the above-mentioned strategies 
found expression in the teaching of Jesus, who is the model par excellence for all 
Christian educators. In the latter half of the chapter, I supplement this discussion of Jesus’ 
teaching by surveying the contributions of several contemporary educators, who present 
helpful proposals for adapting Jesus’ image-centered pedagogy for the present context.2 
In so doing, I aim to establish the foundations of a pedagogical approach to converting 
the imaginations of today’s Christian disciples. 
 
Jesus’ Teaching for the Conversion of Imaginations 
General Overview 
Regardless of whether one professes Jesus’ divinity or not, there is no denying his 
pedagogical genius. His preaching and prophetic actions so inspired and provoked his 
hearers that people continue to recount them 2,000 years later. Those of us who call 
ourselves Christians believe that, beyond being a great pedagogue, Jesus was God’s 
definitive self-revelation to humanity. In his teaching we recognize, not just an 
                                                
2 In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I will consign to the footnotes suggestions from other educators 
that merely reiterate or reinforce rather than further developing Jesus’ pedagogy. 
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exceptional cleverness and penetrating insight into the inner workings of human minds 
and hearts, but God’s own teaching incarnate. 
Jesus intended his teaching to promote wholeness in those who received it (see Jn 
10:10). He warned against that which divides one within oneself (see Mt 6:24; Lk 16:13) 
and admonished his disciples to devote their full selves to the one thing that matters 
above all else: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind” (Lk 10:27).3 Jesus did not need 
the methods of modern cognitive science to recognize that singleness of vision is the key 
to unity within oneself.4 All that he said and did, therefore, aimed at drawing others into 
his vision of reality as originating from and ordered to God’s love, a vision he conveyed 
through the symbol “the reign of God.”5 
There is a virtual consensus among biblical scholars that this symbol constitutes 
the focal point of Jesus’ preaching and ministry.6 All that he said and did flowed from the 
horizon of meaning emanating from this symbol and aimed at inviting others into that 
                                                
3 Jesus was quick to add that one should also love one’s neighbor as oneself, but even this second 
command remains subordinate to the first. We are to love neighbor and self first and foremost out of love 
for God. (Cf. Saint Augustine, Teaching Christianity (De Doctrina Christiana), ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. 
Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1996), I.20-21 (pp.114-5).) 
4 To this point, Jesus said, “The eye is the lamp of the body. So, if your eye is healthy, your whole body 
will be full of light; but if your eye is unhealthy, your whole body will be full of darkness” (Mt 6:22-23). 
5 Cf. Bernard Brandon Scott, Jesus, Symbol Maker for the Kingdom (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 
16. 
6 Cf. Norman Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 1; Hans 
Conzelmann, Jesus, trans. Raymond Lord (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 51; John Dominic Crossan, 
In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 23; Scott, 
Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 6; John R. Donahue and Daniel J. Harrington, The Gospel of Mark, Sacra Pagina 2 
(Collegeville, Minn: Liturgical Press, 2002), 71; Zachary Hayes, Visions of a Future: A Study of Christian 
Eschatology (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1990), 44; Bruce Chilton, “Kingdom of God, Kingdom 
of Heaven,” The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: I-Ma (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2008), 521; 
José Antonio Pagola, Jesus, an Historical Approximation (Miami, Fla: Convivium Press, 2009), 125. It is 
Norman Perrin who deserves credit for properly classifying the reign of God as a symbol rather than a 
concept or myth. (See Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom; cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 2.) 
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manner of imagining reality.7 Jesus gave expression to this vision through diverse signs 
including proverbs, parenetical sayings, beatitudes, apocalyptic images, and prophetic 
words and gestures.8 The most distinctive form of his teaching, however, was the parable. 
The Gospels even go so far as to say, “he did not speak to them except in parables” (Mk 
4:34; cf. Mt 13:34-35). In this sense, Jesus’ parables constitute the primary source for our 
understanding of the symbol of God’s reign.9  
The word “parable” (mashal in Hebrew, parabole in Greek) covers a range of 
meanings, including a comparison, symbol, proverb, riddle, simile, similitude, allegory, 
or illustration. The term is appropriately vague since Jesus spoke parables in a variety of 
forms and lengths.10 C. H. Dodd’s definition manages, without imposing restrictive 
categories, to capture how Jesus employed parables. According to him, “the parable is a 
metaphor or simile drawn from nature or common life, arresting the hearer by its 
vividness or strangeness, leaving the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application 
to tease it into active thought.”11 Like symbols in general, it is parables’ indeterminate 
nature that makes them particularly suitable mediators of Jesus’ vision of the reign of 
God.12 Rather than illustrating information that could stand on its own, Jesus’ parables 
prompt the hearer’s participation in the reality of the reign of God to which they refer. 
Indeed, this participation goes beyond the merely cognitive. Pheme Perkins explains, “we 
                                                
7 Cf, Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 2; Chilton, “Kingdom of God,” 516. 
8 Cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 128; Pheme Perkins, Jesus as Teacher (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
9 Perrin, Jesus and the Language, 1. 
10 Many scholars have offered their own categorizations of the parables, but in practice these distinctions 
tend to break down as arbitrary designations. 
11 C. H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (New York: Scribner, 1961), 5. 
12 Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 11. 
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respond to a parable on many levels with our minds, with our feelings, and perhaps even 
with an unconscious resonance to its archetypal themes. Such levels of response,” she 
adds, “are the ground of any conversion.”13 
Perkins’s observation highlights why Jesus’ teaching—his parables especially—
present fertile ground for our thinking about the sort of pedagogy that is capable of 
transforming imaginations, and through them, the whole person. As the following 
sections will demonstrate, Jesus’ parable-telling incorporates many of the pedagogical 
strategies discussed in the previous chapter. Though we must be careful not to 
anachronistically project modern ideas and methods onto Jesus’ teaching, the truth of the 
matter is that many of the methods we have examined are merely new manifestations of 
old pedagogical insights. In the following sections, I will take a closer look at the 
“grammar” or dynamics of Jesus’ parables in order to better understand how they prompt 
a conversion of the imagination.14 My examination will follow a similar pattern to that 
employed in Chapter Four, for in Jesus’ parables we observe a recurring pedagogical 
pattern of (1) engaging the audience’s imagination, (2) disrupting their imagination 
(while still offering support), and (3) inviting appropriation of a new way of imagining.15  
 
Parables as Engaging the Imagination 
                                                
13 Pheme Perkins, Hearing the Parables of Jesus (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1981), 4. 
14 Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 2. 
15 I do not presume to encapsulate Jesus’ pedagogical genius within these three strategies. Rather, drawing 
upon the research of the previous chapter in this way allows us to focus in on the dynamics of Jesus’ 
parables that make them so conducive to inviting conversion of the imagination. 
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Though the authors we discussed in the previous chapter seldom made the point 
explicit, it was nonetheless evident how necessary it is to engage people’s imaginations 
en route to transforming them.16 This fact is perhaps so obvious that we can understand 
why these authors tend to skip over the initial moment of engagement in their discussions 
of the process and jump straight to the moment of disruption. Indeed, the two moments 
frequently overlap, chronologically speaking, in the transformative event. Jesus’ parables 
are no exception in this regard, and yet his mastery of engaging imaginations is so 
striking that it merits at least a brief discussion here.  
Jesus possessed a true talent for speaking to the situation of his audience and for 
expressing his message in language that captured people’s attention.17 He tended not to 
speak in maxims and abstractions but rather to paint stories in living color, an approach 
that Dodd characterizes as Jesus’ “realism”.18 The events he described in his parables 
corresponded to the everyday activities of his hearers—casting nets in the sea, laboring in 
vineyards, baking bread, shepherding sheep. Conspicuously missing among these 
activities are woodworking and construction, which one would expect to hear plenty 
about from a man who presumably spent the better part of three decades observing his 
                                                
16 By contrast, other religious educators like Thomas Groome and Maria Harris are quite explicit about the 
importance of engaging learners’ imaginations. (See Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive 
Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry: The Way of Shared Praxis (Harper San Francisco, 
1991), 205; Maria Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).) 
17 Groome attributes great importance to this pedagogical strategy in his approach. (See Sharing Faith, 
155-214.) Anne Marie Mongoven likewise affirms the importance of beginning learning on people’s own 
terms. (See Anne Marie Mongoven, The Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis: How We Share the Fire in Our 
Hearts (Paulist Press, 2000), 125.) 
18 Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom, 10. As Dodd puts it, Jesus’ parables “are the natural expressions of a 
mind that sees truth in concrete pictures rather than conceives it in abstractions” (Parables of the Kingdom, 
5). For contemporary perspectives on the importance of the concrete and particular in religious education, 
see Nicola Slee, “‘Heaven in Ordinarie’: The Imagination, Spirituality and the Arts in Religious 
Education,” in Priorities in Religious Education: A Model for the 1990s and Beyond, ed. Brenda Watson 
(Washington, D.C.: Falmer Press, 1992), 54, and Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 41-59. 
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father and working himself as a craftsman. The lack of such stories perhaps points to the 
intentionality with which Jesus spoke to the experiences of his audience.19 Another way 
Jesus heightened the realism of his parables was by portraying complex characters. These 
include a rich master who expects to reap where he did not sow, a despised Samaritan 
who shows uncommon compassion, and a man who gathers the outcast into his home for 
a great banquet and then casts out a poor man who lacks the proper attire. Such characters 
reflect the complexity of human nature, compelling more thought and self-identification 
than would caricatures and stereotypes.20  
In addition to describing familiar activities and realistic characters, Jesus told 
parables about the objects and events of the natural world that constituted the background 
of everyday life in first-century Galilee and Judea. He described the natural beauty of 
flowers, birds who neither sow nor reap, and seeds that sprout into plants. Some scholars 
have even suggested that, while telling stories, Jesus took cues from his immediate 
setting in order to add to their realism.21 For example, James Martin describes arriving at 
the so called “Bay of Parables” on the shore of the Sea of Galilee and finding himself 
standing upon terrain marked by rocky ground, fertile ground, and even a thorn bush—
precisely what Jesus described in the parable of the sower (see Mt 13:1-23; Mk 4:1-34; 
                                                
19 On a similar note, Michael Corso has commented, “The teacher who seeks to communicate the message 
of Christianity to a particular culture conducts various sorts of research on that culture in order to discover 
the commonsense language and symbols which will most effectively embody and realize the good news of 
Jesus Christ” (Michael J. Corso, “Christian Religious Education for Conversion: A Lonerganian 
Perspective” (Unpublished dissertation, Boston College, 1994), 422). That Jesus conducted such “research” 
is evident in examples like these from his storytelling. 
20 Cf. Perkins, Hearing the Parables of Jesus, 156. 
21 See Thomas H. Groome, Will There Be Faith?: A New Vision for Educating and Growing Disciples 
(New York: HarperOne, 2011), 35. 
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Lk 8:4-18).22 Jesus also drew liberally from the imagery of the Hebrew Scriptures, which 
would have been so familiar to his mostly Jewish audience. In so doing, he often 
heightened the realism of these images by reducing the cosmic language of Scripture to a 
more personal scale.23 For example, rather than speaking in grandiose terms of God and 
the nation of Israel (e.g., Ps 14:7; Isa 1:4; Jer 3:6), Jesus preferred to compare God’s 
action to that of a shepherd tending his flock (Mt 18:12) or a woman looking for a coin 
(Lk 15:8-10). 
Whether describing everyday activities, realistic characters, scenes from nature, or 
Scriptural images, Jesus kept his teaching rooted in concrete images and stimulating 
symbols. To be sure, he also taught in moral exhortations and the legal language of his 
Jewish tradition, but these were not the starting point for his teaching and he evidently 
did not consider them adequate to his message. His teaching embodied the insight 
articulated by Avery Dulles that laws and doctrines “live off the power of the revelatory 
symbols.”24 Like concepts and theories more generally, laws and doctrines are more 
remote from the religious experiences whence they derive and more limiting of meaning 
and feeling than are symbols. Symbols engage people more readily, mediate the reality of 
God’s mystery more powerfully, and are more congruent with common sense living and 
                                                
22 James Martin, Jesus: A Pilgrimage (New York: HarperOne, 2014), 198. 
23 Cf. Perkins, Hearing the Parables of Jesus, 22, 35. 
24 Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1983), 143. Parker Palmer 
strikes a similar cord when he writes, “Indeed, if truth is personal, then creeds and institutions are only the 
objectified shells of the truth-seeking life that pulses in every human heart” (Parker J. Palmer, To Know as 
We Are Known (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 50). 
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practical and dramatic patterns of consciousness.25 Once experience and symbol have 
drawn one into mystery, however, more technical language can serve the useful purpose 
of clarifying, extending, and differentiating one’s thinking.26 Still, image and symbol 
offer the most propitious starting point for teaching about God and God’s reign.  
This much is evident in the teaching of Jesus, who deliberately spoke his message 
in imaginative language and on the scale of everyday life. He made his hearers feel, see, 
taste, smell, and hear the reality of God’s reign. In this way, he showed great attention to 
the needs and limits of human cognition and invited his audience into active participation 
in the realities he taught about—two of the key pedagogical exigencies mentioned above. 
Though Jesus would not have described what he was doing in these modern terms, he 
surely knew that such an approach was the best way to prepare his hearers to receive a 
new vision of the reign of God and to engender trust in that vision.27 
 
Parables as Disrupting (and Supporting) the Imagination28 
Jesus clearly recognized the pedagogical necessity of respecting the inclinations 
and limitations of the human mind. Nevertheless, he also recognized the spiritual 
                                                
25 For this reason, Niebuhr asserts, “the preacher’s use of the dramatic image comes nearer the 
requirements of the reasoning heart than does the theologian’s application of a conceptual pattern” (H. 
Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 92). 
26 Cf. David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New 
York: Crossroad, 1981), 294, n.57. 
27 Cf. Pagola, Jesus, 126; Perkins, Hearing the Parables of Jesus, 76. Consider this pedagogical approach 
in comparison with modern commercials, which attempt to establish credibility by giving viewers a visual 
experience of the superiority of a product (e.g., video of their product in action alongside an inferior 
competitor). (Cf. Paul Messaris, Visual Persuasion: The Role of Images in Advertising (SAGE, 1997), 
186.) 
28 In Chapter Four, I discussed strategies of disruption and support in two distinct sections for the sake of 
elucidating each. However, I made clear even there that these two elements are seldom cleanly separated in 
the transformation process. While continuing to acknowledge the importance of both elements, I will treat 
them together in the present section in order to better represent their interaction. 
 260 
imperative (another of the exigencies mentioned above) to open up his hearers to divine 
mystery, inviting them to transcend the constraints of their egocentric perspectives and 
accustomed ways of thinking.29 As effective as Jesus’ parables were in engaging what 
was familiar to his audience and presenting his teaching in concrete terms, he never 
rested upon the familiar and easy for long. More often than not the familiar elements of 
his teaching quickly gave way to a major disruption. Commentators generally agree that 
such disruption was the express purpose of Jesus’ parables.30 In the words of Walter 
Conn, “it is the parable’s precise design and purpose to shake the foundations of our safe 
and comfortable world of convention.”31  
Jesus’ parables effect this disruption in a number of ways. First, he constructed 
narratives in such a manner as to lead the hearer down a seemingly familiar path before 
delivering an unexpected outcome.32 One manifestation of this approach is the so called 
“rule of three,” a rhetorical strategy common in folklore in which two instances set up an 
expectation that is upset by the third.33 For example, in the parable of the lost sheep in 
                                                
29 This theological imperative is likewise evident in movement 2 of Groome’s “shared Christian praxis,” 
which challenges to learners to critically examine their own actions and thinking. (See Sharing Faith, 187-
214.) For another perspective on generating fruitful conflict in the classroom, see  Palmer, To Know as We 
Are Known, 96. 
30 See, e.g., Amy-Jill Levine, Short Stories by Jesus: The Enigmatic Parables of a Controversial Rabbi 
(San Francisco: HarperOne, 2014), 223; Terrence W. Tilley, Faith: What It Is and What It Isn’t 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 85. That Jesus’ parables are intended to confuse and discomfort may 
not be obvious to the average reader. Indeed, many of the parables seem to have perfectly straightforward 
meanings (e.g,. Mt 13:1-9, 18-23). However, most New Testament scholars agree that explanations of the 
parables are later insertions of the evangelists. Hence, when I speak of Jesus’ parables, I refer primarily to 
the parables as Jesus told them as opposed to these later versions (as best we can distinguish the two). 
31 Walter Conn, Christian Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1986), 213. 
32 Cf. Perkins, Jesus as Teacher, 47; Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 29, 100. 
33 Cf. Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 45. This strategy might be thought of as an inversion of the “bridging 
analogy” strategy discussed in Chapter Four (see John Clement, “The Role of Explanatory Models in 
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Luke 15, the shepherd realizes that he has lost one of his one hundred sheep and 
diligently goes out in search of it.34 In the parable of the lost coin that follows, a woman 
recognizes that one of ten coins has gone missing, and she diligently searches for it. In 
the following parable of the prodigal son, the pattern is disrupted when the father with 
only two sons fails to go in search of the lost son. In fact, according to Levine’s 
interpretation, the father does not even recognize which son he has lost. So concerned is 
he with the younger son that he is in danger of losing the elder at the end of the story.35 A 
similar pattern occurs in the parable of the good Samaritan. All Jews of Jesus’ time would 
have heard the story beginning with a priest and a Levite and expected the third figure of 
the Scriptural trio, an Israelite, to follow.36 Instead a Samaritan appears. As Levine 
playfully suggests, “In modern terms, this would be like going from Larry and Moe to 
Osama bin Laden.”37 More generally, Jesus seems to have commonly deployed parables 
and images in pairs and triplets,38 often developing a theme in one set of parables and 
then reversing that theme in another set.39 Making use of a variety of images in this way, 
Jesus safeguards God’s transcendence by preventing the audience from identifying God 
                                                                                                                                            
Teaching for Conceptual Change,” in International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change, ed. 
Stella Vosniadou (New York: Routledge, 2008), 417–52). 
34 Here I am following the interpretation of Amy-Jill Levine. (See Short Stories by Jesus, 45.) 
35 Cf. ibid. Levine also points out that the parable of the prodigal son disrupts the well-established 
expectation that it is best to identify with the younger of two sons in a story (e.g., Cain and Abel, Esau and 
Jacob). 
36 Ibid., 94-5. Cf. Ezra 10:5 and Nehemiah 11:3. 
37 Ibid., 95. 
38 See Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom, 154. 
39 As an example, Crossan contrasts the expected outcomes of one set of parables about servants (the 
doorkeeper, the overseer, the talents, the throne claimant) with the unexpected outcomes of another set (the 
unmerciful servant, the servant’s reward, the unjust steward, the wicked husbandman) (In Parables, 96-
119). 
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or God’s reign with any particular image.40 
Another way Jesus disrupted his hearers’ imaginations was by pivoting upon a 
familiar image into an unexpected vision or meaning.41 By way of example, in the 
parable of the mustard seed Jesus describes the seed growing into a large shrub or 
vegetable with large branches in which “the birds of the air can make nests in its shade” 
(Mk 4:32).42 This phrase is likely an illusion to Hebrew Scriptures (e.g., Ps 104, Ez 31, 
Dn 4) in which it is usually a mighty cedar tree giving shade to birds and animals.43 
However, Jesus has unexpectedly substituted the cedar tree with the mustard vegetable, a 
plant that carried ambivalent connotations for his Jewish audience.44 This substitution 
would have had the effect of shaking up the facile categories of his audience, prompting 
them to think afresh about what God’s reign is like. In creating such dramatic contrasts—
particularly as set up by the juxtaposition of two fundamentally different categories of 
reality in a metaphor—Jesus invites a transformation in people’s experience of reality 
that no other mode of language can effect.45  
                                                
40 For a modern religious educator’s perspective on how to educate people for healthy relationships with 
religious images, see Anton C Vrame, The Educating Icon: Teaching Wisdom and Holiness in the 
Orthodox Way (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1999). 
41 The transitions from movement 2 to movement 3 in Groome’s shared praxis and from movement 1 to 
movement 2 in Mongoven’s “symbolic catechesis” reflect a similar dynamic, although neither Groome nor 
Mongoven emphasizes the unfamiliarity or surprise of the new vision to the extent that Jesus’ parables do. 
42 The NRSV translates λαχάνων as “shrub,” but Levine argues that “vegetable” is the better translation 
(Short Stories by Jesus, 157). 
43 Cf. Crossan, In Parables, 105; Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 163-4. 
44 Cf. Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 160-3. Levine argues that the mustard seed is not unambiguously 
noxious, as some commentators contend. 
45 See Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, 195, 202. Perrin’s explanation of the effect of 
metaphor in Jesus’ parables is consistent with Robert Masson’s account of how metaphor effects “tectonic 
reconfigurations” in people’s thinking (see Chapter Two). Recognizing the unique power of this sort of 
language, Groome, Harris, Mongoven, and Eileen Mary Daily all give symbol and metaphor a prominent 
role in their educational approaches. (See Groome, Sharing Faith, 197-8; Harris, Teaching and Religious 
Imagination, 47-50; Mongoven, Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 87-112.) 
 263 
Nevertheless, Jesus’ use of “pivot” images serves not only to disrupt but also to 
support his hearers cognitively as they transition into this new experience of reality. Like 
the “bridges” proposed by Robert Kegan, these pivot images allow the hearer to keep one 
foot planted in the familiar while stepping with the other into an unfamiliar and 
uncomfortable world of meaning. Even if Jesus’ parable completely overturns the 
meaning of a particular image, the familiarity of the image itself provides some limited 
sense of continuity in the hearers’ efforts to make sense of reality and their relationship to 
God. 
A third strategy Jesus employed to disrupt his hearers’ imaginations (while also 
attending to their emotional needs) was his use of humor, frequently in the form of 
exaggeration and hyperbole. For example, Jesus tells a story of a servant who owes 
10,000 talents, which in modern terms would be like saying he owed several billion 
dollars.46 No single person—no matter how prodigal—could possibly amass such a debt. 
In another parable a woman hides some yeast in three measures of flour (somewhere 
between 40 and 60 pounds), a similarly outlandish amount.47 For the people listening to 
Jesus as he told these stories, the effect of such comic hyperbole would have been to put 
them at ease and loosen up their thinking.  
Use of humor would thus have been a valuable strategy for Jesus as he 
endeavored to uproot his audience from their prior assumptions and ingrained ways of 
                                                
46 See Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 124. For purposes of comparison, Perkins notes that the annual 
income for Herod the Great’s entire kingdom was 900 talents. 
47 See Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 121. 
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thinking48. As we have seen in previous chapters, human beings instinctively feel 
threatened when their world of meaning is disrupted. Humor mitigates the sense of 
perceive threat on the emotional level—even if the cognitive challenge is every bit as 
poignant—because we associate humor primarily with positive feelings and benign 
intentions. By adding an element of humor to his parables, Jesus was able to challenge 
his audience while mitigating the resistance and resentment that his stories might (and 
often did) elicit.49 In the words of Levine, “Jesus knew that the best teachings come from 
stories that make us laugh even as they make us uncomfortable.”50 
Questions also played an important role in Jesus’ disruption of imaginations.51 His 
parables raise questions about what is most important in life, how to deal with other 
people, what God expects of us, how to respond to Jesus’ message, and how we have 
been living our lives, among many others.52 Sometimes Jesus posed these questions 
explicitly. He asked the lawyer which person in the parable of the good Samaritan had 
been a neighbor to the victim. In like manner, at the end of the parable of the man with 
two sons, he asks, “Which of the two did the will of his father?” (Mt 21:31). At other 
times the questions were merely implicit in the parables. Whether the questions were 
                                                
48 Cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 72-3; Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 135. 
49 Cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 72-3; Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 109-10, 135. 
50 Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 276. 
51 Cf. ibid., 275; Perkins, Jesus as Teacher, 49. The ability to pose generative and insight-prompting 
questions is a hallmark of good teaching. On the essential role of questions in religious education see 
Groome, Sharing Faith, 182-4, and Mongoven, Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 123. 
52 Because honest questioning is indispensable in the human search for God, in the words of Roger Haight, 
Jesus (and, by extension, his parables) “will not function as a mediation of God for a person with no 
religious question” (Jesus Symbol of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 200). 
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stated or implied, it seems that Jesus preferred to leave them open for his hearers to mull 
over rather than answering them himself.53  
These various rhetorical strategies at play in the parables—plot twists, pivot 
images, humor, questions—all serve the purpose of shaking Jesus’ audience out of their 
complacent ways of thinking (or rather assuming) and reactivating their imaginations.54 
Conn describes the parables’ effect eloquently: “Having robbed us of the certainties of 
our given world, they would leave us at the brink of relativity, naked and totally 
vulnerable before the divine mystery that is God.”55 As capable as Jesus was of speaking 
to people in their own terms, he clearly told his parables with the intent to discomfort. His 
parables destroy the hearer’s sense of certainty, compelling one to rely upon God rather 
than oneself.56 
This is an outcome all of us tend to resist. We have already discussed from a 
psychological perspective the roots of this instinctual resistance in human affectivity and 
the desire for ego integrity. Biblical scholars, too, recognize resistance as the natural 
reaction to challenging teachings like those of Jesus. Levine offers, “As much as we 
might respect the idea of divine freedom and mystery, we are ultimately more 
comfortable with answers rather than questions, with the tried and true rather than new 
                                                
53 Cf. Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom, 98; Jeremias, Parables of Jesus, 37; Pagola, Jesus, 148. Most 
scholars believe that in many places the evangelists have supplied answers to questions that Jesus himself 
left open. This strategy of Jesus’ recalls the advice of Clement and other educational specialists to resist the 
urge to resolve students’ questions and discomfort too quickly. (Cf. Harris, Teaching and Religious 
Imagination, 64, 73.) 
54 As Ray Hart puts it, “the parable shocks the intention of a world…in which, and only in which, one can 
see what the parable says” (Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of 
Revelation (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 225). 
55 Conn, Christian Conversion, 214. 
56 Cf. Pagola, Jesus, 126, 143, 152. 
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thoughts,”57 with “proclaiming a creed than prompting a conversation or pursuing a 
call.”58 It is an anxiety-producing experience to have the foundations of our world 
shaken, and that is precisely what the parable is designed to do. It should perhaps come as 
little surprise, then, that people resisted the import of Jesus’ parables in his own time just 
as we do today. Indeed, efforts to domesticate Jesus’ parables are evident in the Gospels 
themselves.59 The evangelists appended explanatory endings and morals to the parables, 
which may have served a legitimate purpose within their respective communities but 
which undermine the parables’ intended effect. Such is the inevitable result of imposing 
allegorical interpretations or reified categories upon Jesus’ parables: the experience of the 
reality Jesus intended his parables to mediate is lost. Therefore, suggests Levine, if we 
are to let Jesus’ parables speak as he intended, “We might be better off thinking less 
about what they ‘mean’ and more about what they can ‘do’: remind, provoke, refine, 
confront, disturb….”60 
As I conclude this section and anticipate the next, I put Jesus’ disruptive approach 
in context by noting that, for him, such disruption was always a means to an end. In 
addition to urging reliance on God, Jesus’ parables encouraged his disciples to rely more 
on each other. (This is one more way in which he provided support even as he disrupted 
people’s worlds.) Precisely because Jesus’ parables are startling and confusing, they 
                                                
57 Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 278. 
58 Ibid., 3. 
59 Cf. Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom, 9, 99; Crossan, In Parables, 21; Chilton, “Kingdom of God,” 517-8; 
Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 277. 
60 Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 4. 
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prompt further conversation.61 Evidence of such conversation comes through in 
numerous places the Gospels, and the parables continue to generate conversation today.62 
If not conversation about the parables specifically, most of us have had the experience of 
conversation with others about a complicated film, book, or piece of art that sent our 
minds racing. We can therefore appreciate the community-forging power of Jesus’ 
parables. For even if others cannot give us the answers we seek, we find comfort in 
wrestling with the questions together.63 In just this way, Jesus’ parables formed people 
into community—a foretaste of the reign of God—even as they struggled to understand 
what his perplexing stories meant.64  
 
 
Parables as Inviting Appropriation of New Ways of Imagining and Living 
Jesus told parables with the intent of disrupting people’s ways of imagining 
reality, but he did not do so for the pure pleasure of pulling the rug out from underneath 
people. Rather, he did so in order to help them imagine reality more adequately. This is to 
say that Jesus’ parables do not deprive the one who hears them of meaning; they beckon 
one into a richer realm of meaning than anything one has experienced previously. To be 
more precise, the parables invite one into the world of meaning constituted by Jesus’ 
                                                
61 Groome, Mongoven, Harris, Palmer, and many other contemporary educators reaffirm the importance of 
promoting dialogue not only between teacher and students but also among students themselves. (See 
Groome, Sharing Faith, 244; Mongoven, Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 126; Harris, Teaching and 
Religious Education, 110-2; Palmer, To Know as We Are Known, 17-18.) 
62 See Mk 4:10; Mt 13:10, 13:36. 
63 The reader will recall that Jack Mezirow makes this same point, which we discussed in Chapter Four. 
64 Levine again glosses the matter fittingly: “Jesus knew that the best teaching…comes from stories that 
community members can share with each other, with each of us assessing the conclusions others draw, and 
so reassessing our own” (Short Stories by Jesus, 275). 
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experience of God and generated by his symbol of the reign of God and the myth that 
symbol evokes.65 Essential to one’s entry into that world of meaning (i.e., into the reign 
of God) is responding to Jesus’ invitation to imagine reality as he does. In order to 
understand how Jesus elicits such participation in this imaginative enterprise, we need to 
examine more closely the focal symbol of the reign of God. 
In Chapter Two, where I first introduced this symbol in the context of my 
discussion of symbolic revelation, I pointed out that Jesus never offered a clear 
articulation of its meaning.66 It even seems at times that Jesus intentionally frustrates his 
hearers’ efforts to understand his meaning. He offered no explanations for his parables.67 
He employed one set of images for God’s reign and then employed a different set that 
seems to contradict the first. He also had an affinity for comparing the reign of God to 
actions (rather than or in addition to static objects), which has the effect of frustrating our 
instinctive attempts to visualize God’s reign in terms of one or even a few standard 
images.68 The reason for Jesus deliberately confusing our understanding of God’s reign 
will become clear in subsequent sections, but for now this leaves us with relatively little 
to say about the central symbol of his ministry. 
                                                
65 Cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 16; Andrew D. Thompson, That They May Know You (Washington, 
D.C.: National Catholic Educational Association, 1982), 62. Norman Perrin explains that the function of 
the symbol of the reign of God in Jesus’ preaching is to evoke a myth, namely, that of God acting as king 
on behalf of God’s people. (See Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, 5, 22.) The reader will 
recall the relationship we established in Chapter Two among symbol, myth, and world: A myth is a 
narrative extension of a symbol or set of symbols, and the myth sets up a world. 
66 Cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 11; Chilton, “Kingdom of God,” 522. 
67 Biblical scholars generally consider explanations like those in Mk 4:13-20, Lk 18:1, 6-8, and Mt 13:18-
23 to be later insertions of the evangelists. (See Pagola, Jesus, 127, and Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 
226). In a similar vein, Slee emphasizes the importance of religious educators “letting the symbol speak” 
for itself, tempting though it is to explain (“Heaven in Ordinarie,” 55). 
68 Cf. Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 90. 94. For example, Jesus compares the reign of God, not to a seed, 
but to the scattering and growth of that seed (Mk 4:26-29). Again, he compares God’s reign, not to a 
merchant, but to a merchant searching for pearls (Mt 13:45-46). 
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What can we say? To begin with, Jesus’ usage of the word translated as “reign,” 
“rule,” or “kingdom” (basileia in Greek and malkuth in Hebrew), primarily denotes 
God’s activity in shaping human experience.69 Its meaning as a geographic area of rule is 
secondary, making “reign” a more appropriate translation than the more static 
“kingdom”.70 According to Jesus, God’s reigning or activity in the world involves casting 
out evil elements (Mt 12:28; Lk 11:20), liberating the captive, healing the infirm (Mt 
11:5; Lk 7:22), and raising the dead (Mt 11:5). It meets us from the outside and yet is 
within us (Lk 17:21).71 Its coming occurs subtly, like a bit of hidden yeast leavening a 
huge batch of flour (Mt 13:33), and as a gift, like a seed growing through the night (Mk 
4:26-27). It reverses the order of things in the world like a landowner who gives the same 
payment to workers arriving late as to those who began early (Mt 20:1-13). That this 
activity is manifested in the person of Jesus indicates that God’s reign is already here (Lk 
17:21) but not yet fully realized (Mk 9:1). Jesus claimed to be ushering in God’s reign in 
his ministry (Mt 11:5; 12:28; Lk 7:22; 11:20), yet invited his disciples to pray for its 
coming and to work for it themselves (Mt 6:10; 6:33; 7:21 Lk 11:2). 
Much hinges upon this final observation, for it suggests that God’s reign pertains 
not just to divine activity but to human affairs as well. As Bruce Chilton explains, “in 
Jesus’ teaching the kingdom is an activity, emanating from God but taking human beings 
up within its performance in the world.”72 Chilton’s point offers us an insight into why 
Jesus taught in parables and why he crafted them in the form he did. Jesus refrained from 
                                                
69 Chilton, “Kingdom of God,” 512. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Cf. ibid., 522. 
72 Cf. ibid., 521. 
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describing God’s reign in literal, explanatory language because it is not a static object or 
place that can be so described. In the words of Pheme Perkins, Jesus’ message about 
God’s reign “is not knowledge to be remembered. It is a reality that is to reshape the 
whole life of the disciple.”73 Chilton corroborates, “the kingdom of God is not merely a 
concept, but a task that is ever more necessary.”74 If the reign of God is not a place or a 
concept but a reality and a task, then, like Godself, it can only be known by participating 
in it.75 Hence, Jesus taught about God’s reign in parables because, as we have already 
discussed at length, only the language of symbol and metaphor is capable of facilitating 
this sort of participatory knowing.  
It follows that, if we are to share the vision of the reign of God that Jesus 
mediated through parables, we need to, in the words of Levine, “take them seriously not 
as ‘meaning’ but as soliciting our meaning making.”76 Jesus did not explain his parables 
and even told seemingly contradictory parables because he sought to draw his hearers 
into actively imagining reality as ordained by God’s rule.77 It is precisely the parables’ 
lack of obvious meaning that requires one to make an active effort to understand and 
                                                
73 Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 9. 
74 Chilton, “Kingdom of God,” 522. 
75 See my discussion of “engaged participatory knowing” in Chapter Two. Groome and Harris both 
emphasize the necessity of striving for this deeper sort of knowledge. (See Groome, Sharing Faith, 30, and 
Harris, Teaching and Religious Education, 68, 130.) 
76 Levine, Short Stories by Jesus, 276. The educational approaches of Groome, Harris, and Palmer all strive 
to promote learners’ active meaning-construction. (See Groome, Sharing Faith, 119-31; Harris, Teaching 
and Religious Imagination, 38-40; Palmer, To Know as We Are Known, 69, 80, 82, 99.) 
77 Saint Augustine reinforces the practicality of what we would anachronistically call a “constructivist” 
approach to teaching: “Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don’t consult a speaker 
who makes sounds outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind itself, though perhaps words 
prompt us to consult Him” (Augustine, “The Teacher,” in Against Academicians and The Teacher, trans. 
Peter King (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), XI.38). 
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imagine in this way.78 As any experienced teacher knows, providing answers with the 
appearance of completeness tends to shut down learners’ thinking.79 Attaching a facile 
interpretation to a parable (as the evangelists often did) is like teaching exclusively 
through lecture or simplifying a complex advertisement: It might make the message more 
clear, but it does so at the expense of its power to engage and form the audience’s 
imaginations. Jesus told stories that resisted easy interpretation because the truth of God’s 
reign transcends moral precepts and doctrinal propositions. We know its truth when we 
participate in it. When Jesus told parables, therefore, he did not tell his audience what to 
think about the reign of God but rather invited them to “come and see” for themselves (Jn 
1:39).80 
In this sense, the parables are better conceived as exercises of the imagination 
than fables with clear morals.81 Put otherwise, the point of the parable lies in what it does 
to us rather than in the information it conveys. That Jesus’ parables do not give us a set of 
definitive, unambiguous images for God’s reign is not a pedagogical shortcoming.82 
More than bestowing a particular set of images, Jesus’ parables train us how to imagine 
as he did. They train us to see beyond reified religious and social categories (e.g., Jew 
and Samaritan, Pharisee and publican, man and woman) and beyond worldly standards of 
power and worth (e.g., physical and military strength, wealth, self-reliance). They train us 
                                                
78 Cf. Perkins, Hearing the Parables of Jesus, 23, 38. In the previous chapter, we saw the same strategy 
utilized in transformative learning and modern advertising. 
79 Cf. Groome’s distinction between “closure” and “disclosure” styles of teaching (Sharing Faith, 243-4). 
80 Cf. Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 149; Perrin, Jesus and the Language, 202. 
81 Cf. Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom, 87, 117; Jeremias, Parables of Jesus, 21, 169, 182; Crossan, In 
Parables, 68; Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 39; Pagola, Jesus, 126. 
82 This is not to say that Jesus’ parables do not have unique pedagogical value. In fact, they do. However, 
their effectiveness derives, not from the clarity of the images they bestow, but from the manner in which 
they engage and form one’s imagining. 
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to recognize opportunities for real happiness when they arise. They train us to see 
ourselves and others as God sees us—with compassion and mercy. Most of all, they train 
us to keep seeing the world anew and to remain open to God’s activity breaking into our 
lives in ever new and unexpected ways. And yet the word “training” does not do justice 
to the change parables effect in our imaginations. The change is not a partial or easy one; 
it is a complete overturning and reorientation of one’s imagination. It is, in a word, a 
conversion.83 
As with any real conversion, this conversion of the imagination requires a 
personal decision. Indeed, Jesus constructs his parables so as to invite just such a 
decision. For example, in the parable of the prodigal son, Jesus abruptly ends the story 
without telling us the elder son’s response to his father’s plea. The hearer must fill in 
what happens next, and how one does so constitutes a judgment that reveals one’s 
presuppositions about God and humanity.84 In general, Jesus’ parables bear the character 
of an argument that entices the hearer to make a judgment upon the situations Jesus 
describes.85 The judgment may be about God, as in the parable of the vineyard workers 
(Mt 20:1-16), or about Jesus and his mission, as in the parable of the wicked tenants (Mk 
12:1-11).86 Perhaps most often it is a judgment upon oneself elicited before one knows 
                                                
83 B. B. Scott sums up the point nicely: “The parable is an invitation to enter, but in order to enter one must 
in a sense undergo a conversion, in which the parable becomes a lens refracting everyday experience under 
the symbol Kingdom of God” (Scott, Jesus, Symbol-Maker, 29). 
84 Cf. Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 4. 
85 See Dodd, Parables of the Kingdom, 11, 86. 
86 Cf. Jeremias, Parables of Jesus, 230. 
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that one has condemned oneself, as in the parable of the good Samaritan (Lk 10:29-37).87 
Regardless of whom the object of this judgment turns out to be, Jesus’ parables 
always also prompt a decision about how one will respond in one’s life.88 Because Jesus 
crafted his stories in such a way that his audience would experience rather than merely 
hear them, the parables are not like textbook lessons from which people learn information 
that may or may not interest them.89 One cannot remain indifferent in the face of a 
parable, for one recognizes one’s life at stake therein.90 Because the situations Jesus 
described in his parables were so familiar, it was difficult for his hearers to remain at a 
psychological distance. The parables’ inviting familiarity, coupled with their open-
endedness, encourages hearers to blend their life stories with the narratives of the 
parables.91 In consequence, rendering a judgment about the persons and realities 
described in the parables naturally leads to not only judgments but also decisions 
concerning one’s own life. Once one enters into Jesus’ vision of the reign of God, one 
cannot continue living as before.92 Conversion of one’s imagination leads to conversion 
in one’s living.  
What the reign of God is becomes clear when, and only when, we enact in our 
lives the vision into which Jesus draws us through his parables. Jesus did not intend his 
                                                
87 Cf. ibid., 29. After asking the lawyer which person had been a neighbor to the robbery victim, Jesus 
turns the man’s judgment upon himself with the admonition, “Go and do likewise” (Lk 10:37). 
88 Likewise recognizing the importance of decision-making for translating learning into lived faith, 
Groome devotes the final movement of his shared praxis to inviting decisions. (See Sharing Faith, 266-93.) 
89 Chilton puts it this way: “Because God as kingdom is active, response to him is active and ethical, not 
merely cognitive” (Chilton, “Kingdom of God,” 516). 
90 In this sense, the parables function as “religious classics”. (See Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 115-6.) 
91 See Perkins, Hearing the Parables, 48-9. 
92 Cf. Pagola, Jesus, 127. 
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parables as carriers of information about God and God’s activity in the world; he 
intended them to coax us into an experience of God’s ways, to convert our imaginations 
to a God-like perspective, and to invite a decision to live life from that vision. Therefore, 
Jesus’ vision of the reign of God cannot be fully described in words or drawn in pictures. 
It only becomes visible in the lives of those people who live from that vision as Jesus 
did.93  
At the heart of Jesus’ vision of the reign of God is community (koinonia). This is 
the goal toward which his parables—indeed, his whole teaching and ministry—aim.94 To 
enter Jesus’ vision of reality in which God reigns supremely and lovingly is to enter into 
the community that shares and is constituted by that vision. That is to say that this vision 
of the reign of God is inherently communal. Only when the personal “world” of the 
individual Christian unites with the “imaginary” of the Christian community does it attain 
its fulfillment. Jesus’ preaching for the reign of God was so efficacious that it forged an 
imaginary that dominated Western culture for the better part of two millennia. However, 
the inheritors of that imaginary have struggled to maintain its vitality in the face of 
postmodernity, and that failure has contributed to the dis-integration we see in the faith 
lives of many American Catholics today. Fortunately, a new generation of Christian 
educators has emerged in recent decades with ambitions to reclaim and reinvigorate 
Jesus’ vision of the reign of God. 
                                                
93 In the words of Chilton, “Once experience and activity are taken to be the terms of reference of the 
kingdom, what one actually does is also an instrument of its revelation, an aspect of its radiance”  
(“Kingdom of God,” 516). 
94 Faithful to this central tenet of Christian life, contemporary religious educators identify community as 
both the means and end of religious education. (See, e.g., Groome, Sharing Faith, 20; Mongoven, 
Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 141-3; Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 110-16.) 
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Contemporary Approaches to Converting Imaginations 
Adapting and Expanding upon Jesus’ Pedagogy 
We have now seen how Jesus’ teaching through parables embodied in a 
preeminent way the pedagogical desiderata that have emerged in the course of the present 
investigation: His engaging use of familiar, human-scale images respected the limits of 
human cognition even as he pivoted upon those images into the unfamiliar and thereby 
prompted openness to God’s transcendence. He invited hearers’ participation in 
imagining God’s reign by smashing hardened categories, posing questions, and eliciting 
judgments and decisions. At the same time, he provided cognitive and emotional support 
in the midst of his audience’s transformation by employing humor and forming 
community. All of the above transpired within a consistent pattern of engaging 
imaginations, disrupting them, and inviting appropriation of a new way of imagining.95 
As we turn to contemporary developments in Christian religious education, it is 
important to acknowledge that these desiderata still apply. Although I could cite many 
ways in which the educators discussed below address these desiderata (and I attempted to 
do so in the footnotes above), this would prove somewhat redundant with the above 
discussion of Jesus’ teaching. Therefore, I will focus the ensuing discussion on how these 
educators have adapted and expanded upon Jesus’ pedagogy in order to meet the 
exigencies of postmodern culture.  
                                                
95 It is worth noting that Thomas Aquinas (following Pseudo-Dionysus) followed a similarly trifold pattern 
in his teaching about God. The so called “triplex via” begins with the “via affirmationis,” which affirms 
some creaturely perfection in God. Second follows the “via negationis,” a critical moment in which one 
acknowledges the inadequacy of the analogy. Finally, the “via eminentiae” reaffirms the creaturely 
perfection as belonging to God in a supereminent way. (See, e.g., ST I, q.13, a.2; cf. Haight, Jesus Symbol 
of God, 11; Elizabeth A. Johnson, Quest for the Living God: Mapping Frontiers in the Theology of God 
(New York: Continuum, 2007), 18.) 
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While Christian educators should obviously aspire to teach as Jesus did, a number 
of factors make a strict imitation not only impossible but undesirable as well. For one, the 
symbolic resources available to today’s teachers differ in several respects from those 
employed by Jesus. To be sure, some symbols we can make use of much as Jesus did. For 
instance, many of the symbols of the Hebrew Scriptures retain significant meaning and 
power for modern audiences (e.g., the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the tower of 
Babel, the golden calf). Likewise, Jesus’ parables by and large maintain their ability to 
engage and transform modern persons. However, other symbols—for example, leaven, 
the cedar tree, the Samaritan—are not meaningful for modern audiences in the way that 
they were for Jesus’ original hearers. Such symbols therefore require rehabilitation or 
replacement.  
Conversely, modern educators have a wealth of Christian symbols at their 
disposal that Jesus did not.96 Primary among these is Jesus himself.97 Though Jesus did 
engage in prophetic actions and so made a symbol of himself in a sense, his subsequent 
death, resurrection, and situation at the center of Christian faith have greatly enhanced his 
symbolic significance. Consequently, Christian educators can present Jesus as a symbol 
or “parable” of God in a way that he could not during his lifetime.98 Jesus’ central place 
in Christian faith points to another difference between Jesus and modern educators: Jesus 
                                                
96 Given the impossibility of a strict imitation, Christian educators are confronted with the question of how 
properly to select and interpret symbols for religious education. While I will attend to this question in the 
final chapter, other educators have already developed substantial guidelines. See, e.g., Groome, Sharing 
Faith, 156-60. 223-40; Tracy, Analogical Imagination, 154-92. 
97 Others include the cross, the saints, and the symbols of the sacraments and liturgy. 
98 David Tracy, “Approaching the Christian Understanding of God,” in Systematic Theology: Roman 
Catholic Perspectives, ed. Schussler Fiorenza, Francis and John P. Galvin, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2011), 113. 
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is the definitive symbol of God in salvation history, and we are not. Therefore, while 
Jesus rightly drew attention to himself (albeit always as a symbol of God’s reign), it 
would be blasphemous for us to do likewise for ourselves.  
Finally, there are significant differences in context and audience. Jesus had the 
pedagogical advantage of being able to presume a relatively coherent Jewish imaginary in 
his audience, given their shared cultural context. When he spoke of the reign of God, he 
evoked a myth and a worldview that most people in his audience held in common and 
understood thoroughly. His challenge was getting his hearers to see beyond their reified 
categories of what God’s reign is like and how they should live their lives. Disruption 
was thus a pedagogical priority for Jesus. The audience for today’s religious educators, 
by contrast, largely lacks a coherent imaginary. The most salient feature of their 
imagining is its fragmentary nature. As a consequence, modern educators lack the benefit 
of being able to appeal to a widely shared imaginary. Their primary task, therefore, is not 
disruption as it was for Jesus. Certainly disruption remains a perennial exigency to some 
degree. In addition to the disruption that exposes bias, sin, and moral impotence, 
postmodern people can benefit from disruptions that expose the limits and blind spots of 
critical consciousness. Notwithstanding, it is reintegration of the imagination that 
constitutes the primary task of today’s religious educators. 
The priority of reintegrating imaginations is one of several pedagogical exigencies 
that our investigation has shown to have emerged in recent decades. In addition to the 
perennial desiderata enumerated above, today’s religious educators must address the 
following:  
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 ⁃ reintegrate the fragmented imaginations of today’s learners, 
⁃ promote the cognitive flexibility needed to adapt to the radical 
pluralism and rapid pace of change of postmodern culture,  
 ⁃ foster awareness of learners’ own cognitive operations and psychic 
activity, including a post-critical re-appropriation of symbols. 
The task of today’s Christian religious educators, in short, is to facilitate the formation of 
Christian imaginations that reflect post-critical symbolic consciousness. This task along 
with the more specific desiderata listed here will provide the foci for the following 
discussion of contemporary imagination-centered approaches to Christian religious 
education. 
 
Reintegrating Fragmented Imaginations 
Among contemporary approaches to religious education, three stand out for their 
attention to symbol and imagination, namely, those of Thomas Groome, Anne Marie 
Mongoven, and Maria Harris. Though I will occasionally interject contributions from 
other educators, the following discussion will focus primarily on these three. These 
educators all have much to say about the role of imagination in religious education. 
However, for the purposes of this chapter, I will limit my treatment of their work on 
imagination to those elements which bear upon the three pedagogical exigencies in focus 
in this latter part of the chapter. 
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Groome’s “shared Christian praxis” approach (or “life to Faith to life,” as he calls 
it in his later works)99 aims to educate “for lived Christian faith and for the wholeness of 
human freedom that is fullness of life for all,” in the service of promoting God’s reign in 
people’s lives and in the life of the world.100 Pursuant to this end, Groome develops an 
approach in five movements (plus an opening activity to focus the learning event): (1) 
help learners to identify their current praxis101 in relation to a generative theme, (2) invite 
critical reflection on learners’ current praxis, (3) give access to the Christian “Story” and 
“Vision,”102 (4) invite critical appropriation of that Story and Vision, (5) invite decision 
and action based on learners’ appropriation. Due to the fact that Groome intends shared 
Christian praxis (henceforth SCP) as a comprehensive approach to religious education 
and pastoral ministry, it is less contextually specific and less focused on the imagination 
than the approach I am developing in this dissertation.103 Nevertheless, the role of 
imagination is so crucial in shared praxis and SCP is so well suited to the postmodern 
context that Groome’s approach merits serious attention here. 
                                                
99 See Groome, Will There Be Faith?. 
100 Groome, Sharing Faith, 14. 
101 Groome defines “praxis” as “the consciousness that emerges from and the agency expressed in their 
whole way of ‘being’ as ‘agent-subjects-in-relationship’ in place and time” (Sharing Faith, 135). 
102 For Groome’s explanation of what he means by the terms “Story” and “Vision,” see Sharing Faith, 
216-7. 
103 Where my project specifically addresses dis-integration in the lives of postmodern Catholics, Groome 
by and large does not frame his project as a corrective to a particular educational exigency. If anything, his 
earlier writing evinces a concern to correct overly cognitive, knowledge-focused models of Christian 
religious education. (See Thomas H. Groome, Christian Religious Education: Sharing Our Story and 
Vision (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 12; Sharing Faith, 2.) However, Groome’s most recent book 
does acknowledge the challenges of postmodernity more explicitly. (See Groome, Will There Be Faith?, 1-
2.) 
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Groome’s body of work offers religious educators a number of valuable resources 
for addressing the fragmented imaginations of today’s learners.104 In Sharing Faith, for 
example, Groome demonstrates a healthy awareness of the potential for dis-integration in 
the lives of Christians (and even in Christian religious education itself). He warns that 
critical consciousness—an instrumental aspect of SCP and a hallmark of postmodern 
thought—“can deteriorate into personal arbitrariness and/or total relativism” under the 
wrong conditions.105 Groome proposes dialogue and communal testing as safeguards 
against such deterioration, but SCP offers additional resources for promoting integration 
that he does not call attention to as explicitly.106 In his description of movement 3, 
Groome, drawing upon Avery Dulles’s theology of symbolic revelation, highlights the 
pedagogical benefits of providing learners with symbolically rich encounters with the 
Christian faith.107  
Though not mentioned among these benefits, Groome might have included the 
power of symbolic education to counteract the dis-integration that can result from overly 
critical educational approaches and the fragmenting forces of postmodernity.108 As we 
have seen, it is the imagination that gives unity to human experience, and symbolically 
rich teaching is more likely to nurture this work of the imagination. In line with Jesus’ 
teaching, Groome points to the reign of God as a symbol with unique potential for 
                                                
104 The reader should again note that my discussion of Groome’s work on imagination will be limited in 
this chapter to those elements which bear upon the three above-mentioned pedagogical exigencies, the first 
of these being the need to reintegrate fragmented imaginations. 
105 Groome, Sharing Faith, 107. 
106 See ibid. 
107 See ibid., 196-8. 
108 Groome elsewhere notes the potential of the imagination to give unity and order to people’s lives. (See 
ibid., 205). 
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unifying educators’ presentation of the faith. As Groome puts it, the reign of God 
provides the “metacriterion” for interpreting and sharing the Christian Story and 
Vision.109 This is to say it provides a touchstone for decisions about what to teach and a 
reference point to which all material should be related. In this way, Groome builds upon 
Jesus’ pedagogy by explaining more precisely how this symbol can guide teachers’ 
pragmatic decisions about curriculum and presentation of material.110 
Even more directly to the point, Groome explains that movement 4 of SCP aims 
to help learners “integrate Christian Story/Vision by personal agency into their own 
identity and understanding.”111 Movement 4 facilitates this integration or appropriation 
by means of “dialectical hermeneutics” in which learners reflect on how a particular 
symbol of Christian faith affirms, challenges, and/or calls them beyond their current 
praxis.112 Groome’s proposal is helpful insofar as it offers a practical approach to helping 
learners integrate new learning in a controlled setting, but it is limited insofar as the work 
of integration he describes does not directly address the challenges posed by the 
fragmenting forces of postmodern culture.113 Facilitating learners’ integration of the 
                                                
109 See ibid., 227-9. In a similar vein, James Fowler explicitly links the vision of the reign of God with 
Stage 6 faith. (See James W. Fowler, Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995), 210-11.) 
110 The symbol “the reign of God” can only be conceived as a criterion in a very loose sense, for criteria 
presuppose a level of conceptual clarity that symbols by definition do not possess. Technically speaking, 
then, the reign of God can serve as the starting point for reflection on educational praxis (including the 
articulation of educational criteria) but not as a criterion itself. I believe Groome’s explanation of what he 
means by “metacriterion” to be consistent with this distinction (Sharing Faith, 227-8). 
111 Groome, Sharing Faith, 250. Groome’s explicit use of the language of “integration” is rare. His writing 
evinces a preference for the language of “appropriate” and “make one’s own.” 
112 Ibid., 251. 
113 This is not to say that Groome is unaware of social influences on people’s imagining. To the contrary, 
in his writing on SCP he takes great pains to attend to people’s social contexts. Groome occasionally notes 
(see, e.g., Sharing Faith, 178) and more commonly presumes that social influences inform learners’ 
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Christian Story/Vision with their personal stories and visions, as is Groome’s aim, is 
different from aiding the daily work of integrating one’s imagining in the face of the 
multitudinous, conflicting imaginal influences that people encounter in postmodern 
culture. Immediately following a SCP learning event, learners might emerge with a clear, 
unified vision of some aspect of Christian life, but what happens when in a week’s time 
they have watched several movies and TV shows, listened to hundreds of songs, and 
viewed thousands of advertisements, many of which contradict that Christian vision and 
each other? 
Anne Marie Mongoven presents an alternative approach to catechesis, which she 
calls “symbolic catechesis”. Symbolic catechesis proceeds in four movements: (1) 
reflecting together on common human experience, (2) correlating the experience with a 
faith symbol (usually under the catechist’s direction), (3) moving outward from the 
experience to acts of justice together, (4) praying together about the experience through 
rituals.114 The purpose of the four movements and of symbolic catechesis as a whole is to 
call both individuals and the community to conversion.115 Even though genuine symbols 
(in the sense that we have been using the term) do not function as prominently in 
Mongoven’s writing as one might expect, her approach nevertheless offers some useful 
suggestions for forming the imaginations of postmodern Christians.116  
                                                                                                                                            
personal stories and visions. Notwithstanding, he does not offer explicit guidelines for dealing with the 
fragmenting effects of these social influences on learners’ imaginations. 
114 The reader will note that Mongoven’s approach is more general than Groome’s and less contained to 
the learning event itself. Consequently, Mongoven’s book offers far less pedagogical guidance than does 
Groome’s work. 
115 See Mongoven, Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 26. 
116 Mongoven categorizes a number of things as symbols (e.g., Church doctrines) that would not qualify 
under the definition employed in this dissertation. The author explains, “I call this approach ‘symbolic 
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Like Groome, Mongoven does not directly address the challenge of fragmented 
imaginations in the lives of contemporary Christians. Still, despite lacking an explicit 
focus on promoting personal integration, her process of symbolic catechesis is somewhat 
conducive to this outcome. Mongoven describes symbolic catechesis as a venue through 
which participants can seek meaning in the Christian faith.117 Indeed, her approach 
provides an effective medium for synthesizing meaning to the extent that it centers 
reflection around the generative symbols of the Catholic faith. Like shared praxis, 
symbolic catechesis begins from the participants’ experiences and questions (movement 
1) before bringing them into sharper focus through correlation with a faith symbol 
(movement 2). The third movement then encourages participants to relate their needs and 
concerns with those of the wider world through communal service. Though Mongoven 
organizes the learning process slightly differently from Groome, the effectiveness of the 
two approaches in facilitating integration derives from the same source: It is the symbols 
of Christian faith that give unity to the process and to participants’ thinking about their 
experiences and questions and those of the people they encounter through service. 
Maria Harris gives fuller attention to the imagination in her writing on teaching. 
In Teaching and Religious Imagination, she describes teaching explicitly as an activity of 
religious imagination. She argues that teaching should be an incarnation of the subject 
matter in such a way that leads to its revelation, a revelation through which students 
                                                                                                                                            
catechesis’ because in this approach the catechist and the community seek meaning by correlating the 
events of their daily lives with the primary Christian symbols of God’s presence: the Sacred Scriptures and 
the teaching, life, and worship of the Church” (Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 3). Mongoven’s comment 
that she thought of calling her approach “relational catechesis” instead of “symbolic catechesis” is 
revealing of the fact that deep engagement with symbols is perhaps not as central to her approach as the 
label suggests. (See Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 142.) 
117 See ibid., 123. 
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discover themselves as subjects possessing the power for re-creating themselves and the 
world.118 Harris identifies five crucial steps or moments in the teaching process: First is 
the moment of “contemplation” in which the teacher takes in and visualizes what will be 
involved in the teaching act. Second comes the moment of “engagement” wherein 
teachers immerse themselves deeply in the subject matter so as to achieve intimate 
knowledge of it. Third, the teacher “gives form” to the subject matter, selecting from 
among many possibilities what to present to learners. In the fourth step, the moment of 
“emergence,” learners take possession of the received form. At this point the teacher 
must “release” (step five), allowing new possibilities to come to fruition in students’ 
interaction with the subject matter.  
More so than Groome or Mongoven, Harris addresses the challenge of 
fragmentation in contemporary society, although she is more concerned with restoring 
relationships and personal integrity in general than with integrating the imagination 
specifically. On the topic of integration of the human person, she notes that metaphor is 
more integrating and leads to more holistic knowing than mechanical, technical 
language.119 For this reason she advises teachers to choose their words with care and to 
show a preference for metaphorical, poetic language. Expanding upon this insight, Harris 
writes, “the sense of wholeness seems to come through more easily by helping the 
students encounter the material universe by working in the intuitive, the imaginative, and 
the perceptual modes proper to art.”120 Art, she argues, engages not only the intellect but 
                                                
118 See Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, xv. 
119 Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 46-7. 
120 Ibid., 154. 
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also feeling and experience in a mode compatible with the manner in which they are 
intermingled in the human mind. Providing opportunities for artistic exploration 
“provides an oasis where people can, in peace, let their understanding, their intellect, and 
their feeling come together without pressure.”121  
A chorus of other voices joins Harris in calling for a more prominent place for art 
in educational practices.122 For his part, Groome often recommends artistic learning 
activities in his descriptions of SCP.123 Eileen Mary Daily has devoted an entire 
dissertation to the topic.124 Nicola Slee argues with particular force and eloquence about 
the integrating potential of art in the context of religious education. Slee writes, “It is 
perhaps by a growing ability to discern the shape, pattern and coherence of things in the 
work of the creative artist, that pupils may be enabled to discern such shape and pattern 
in their own lives and in the wider world of confusing and disparate experience.”125 Here 
Slee makes explicit the reason why art presents such a valuable resource to educators 
striving to promote their students’ personal integration in a fragmented age: Art can 
contribute to the training of learners to once again imagine their lives in a coherent way. 
Slee’s research also points to the potential of art for helping critical thinkers move into 
post-critical consciousness. She offers, “the arts can perhaps penetrate the sceptical [sic] 
consciousness of secular human beings in a way which religious language and myths can 
                                                
121 Ibid., 148. 
122 This convergence of opinions concerning the integrating power of art no doubt derives in part from the 
hard lessons of the modern marginalizing of the arts in most school curricula. 
123 See, e.g., Groome, Sharing Faith, 185-6, 240. 
124 Eileen Mary Daily, “Seeing and Being Seen: A Visual Approach to Religious Education” (dissertation, 
Boston College, 2001). 
125 Slee, “Heaven in Ordinarie,” 55. 
 286 
no longer do.”126 For a population that has grown disenchanted with religion, art may be 
the best candidate for a means of rediscovering the transcendent in their lives. 
In summary, the above authors propose numerous strategies that can assist today’s 
religious educators in reintegrating the imaginations of postmodern Christians. Still, these 
proposals are not sufficient in themselves for meeting the exigencies of postmodern 
religious education. Groome’s and Mongoven’s work points to the potential of symbol—
especially the symbol of the reign of God—to give unity to teachers’ presentation of the 
faith, but neither addresses the question of how to promote unity in people’s imagining in 
the face of the daily onslaught of conflicting images and messages. The symbols that 
learners engage in religious education are only one imaginal influence among many to 
which they are exposed, and their exposure to the images of popular media and 
advertising is typically far more extensive and intense. What, if anything, can religious 
educators do to increase the likelihood that Christian symbols take pride of place in the 
imaginations of their students? Furthermore, even if Christian symbols come to occupy 
that central place, is that enough to unify people’s imaginations? The proposal of Harris 
and others that art plays an important (and often neglected) role in religious education is a 
fertile one. Even though Harris does not speak specifically to how art can serve to 
integrate imaginations, her writing points to the potential of focusing educational efforts 
on imaginative activity rather than on content. I will pick up this thread when I address 
these lingering questions in the final chapter. 
 
                                                
126 Ibid., 52. 
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Promoting Cognitive Flexibility 
A second exigency to emerge in postmodernity is that of promoting a form of 
consciousness resilient enough to adapt to regular challenges to one’s existing meaning 
frameworks. The rapid pace of change and radical plurality of postmodern culture pose a 
constant threat to those who construct meaning at a pre-critical level. Some people’s 
edifices of meaning are so rigidly constructed that a blow to any part could bring the 
whole structure tumbling down. This is a precarious state to live in today since such 
blows are now a virtually daily occurrence. Though generally more adaptable than pre-
critical consciousness, critical consciousness too remains somewhat susceptible on 
account of its own rigidities (e.g., resistance to religion and myth).  
Thomas Groome, appropriating the thought Freire and Lonergan, presents a vision 
of Christian religious education that promotes the sort of cognitive flexibility needed. 
Groome makes the achievement of “critical consciousness”127 of faith an explicit goal of 
SCP and describes “engaging people’s dynamic structure for conation” as the 
indispensable means to that end.128 His understanding of what constitutes “authentic 
cognition” (echoing Lonergan) informs the whole of his shared praxis approach.129 In 
contrast with “domesticating” pedagogies that constrain students’ thinking and imagining 
even as they impart new information,130 Groome articulates a pedagogy that actively 
encourages learners to: attend carefully to their own experiences (movement 1), grow in 
                                                
127 See Groome, Sharing Faith, 188, where he explicitly draws upon Lonergan. Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1994), 33. 
128 Groome, Sharing Faith, 115. 
129 Ibid., 119-31. 
130 Cf. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 33, 47. 
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critical awareness of their personal history, social context, and current praxis (movement 
2), participate actively in the Christian Story and Vision rather than receiving it as a 
closed message (movement 3), render informed judgments about and critically 
appropriate the truth and value of the Christian Story and Vision for their lives 
(movement 4), and make responsible decisions regarding how they will translate their 
learning into new praxis (movement 5). By engaging learners regularly in these activities, 
SCP facilitates their liberation from intellectual dependence on others and bolsters their 
capacity to autonomously process and act upon information. Groome rightly notes that 
this sort of pedagogical approach requires a degree of “relinquishment” (kenosis) by 
educators.131 That is to say it requires a willingness to cede some control of the learning 
event so as to allow students to exert their agency.  
Harris and others likewise argue for the value of allowing learners creative space 
in the learning process.132 If students are to develop their cognitive and imaginative 
capacities rather than merely repeating what the teacher says and imitating what she does, 
the teacher must allow them some degree of freedom. Such freedom includes mental and 
physical space for learners to explore and experiment in their own way as well as the 
flexibility to pursue new directions that emerge in the learning event. Provision for 
spontaneity, Harris is careful to point out, should not be equated with lack of planning. 
To the contrary, creativity and innovation are most likely to result from careful 
preparation and intentionality vis-à-vis the learning environment.133 Speaking to this 
                                                
131 Groome, Sharing Faith, 263. 
132 Cf. Palmer, To Know as We Are Known, 69-74; Slee, "Heaven in Ordinarie,” 55. 
133 See Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 134. 
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point, Mongoven recommends that catechists be prepared to discuss multiple faith 
symbols for any learning event, given that one never knows where conversation may lead 
or what symbols will seize people’s imaginations.134 Michael Corso observes that 
regularly changing the artwork in a learning space stimulates creativity and invites new 
awareness on the part of learners.135 In addition to creating a stimulating environment, 
educators seeking to promote cognitive flexibility can plan creative and artistic projects, 
group work, time for independent thinking and writing, and encounters with different 
perspectives.136 In short, Harris says, teachers must take risks and encourage learners to 
take risks. For the goal of a truly transformative education is not for the students to say at 
the end, “the teacher did it,” but “Ah! We did it ourselves!”137 
All of the above recommendations point to the necessity of a more dynamic mode 
of education for postmodern learners. Today’s educators generally recognize that, though 
it would be a mistake to abandon content, curricula, and textbooks altogether, our 
teaching must prioritize formation of mental habits and cognitive capacities over 
memorization of information if our students are to survive and thrive in the postmodern 
world of rapid change and radical plurality. The strategies proposed by the above-
mentioned educators all contribute to this sort of cognitive flexibility. Still, for the most 
                                                
134 Mongoven, Prophetic Spirit of Catechesis, 129. 
135 Corso, “Christian Religious Education for Conversion,” 447. 
136 Cf. Slee, "Heaven in Ordinarie,” 51; Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 98. Mongoven’s 
work does not offer much in the way of guidance for promoting cognitive flexibility. However, one aspect 
of her approach that may prove beneficial in this regard is the opportunity to engage the needs and concerns 
of others in movement 3. 
137 Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 39, paraphrasing Lao-Tzu. Along similar lines, what 
William Lynch says about the artist could also be said of the teacher: “In the case of the artist, not all the 
images he creates are his own work; they are as much the images he makes us form ourselves, and he is a 
better artist if he makes us thus active, if, that is, he makes us do half the work” (Images of Faith: An 
Exploration of the Ironic Imagination (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 19). 
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part they do so in a merely incremental fashion. A more reliable way to promote the 
cognitive capabilities needed to sustain faith in a postmodern context is to facilitate 
learners’ “self-appropriation,” a task we will now discuss in detail. 
 
Promoting Self-Appropriation 
Related to but distinct from the task of promoting cognitive flexibility is that of 
promoting “self-appropriation,” that is, enhancing learners’ awareness and intentional 
performance of the operations constituting authentic thinking, imagining, and valuing. As 
noted in previous chapters, many American Catholics today operate out of a critical 
consciousness that is sophisticated enough to recognize the naiveté of many religious 
practices and beliefs yet lacking sophistication insofar as it fails to grasp the necessity of 
symbol and ritual for human integration and general well-being. Coming to greater 
awareness of one’s own cognitive operations and psychic activity is thus crucial for 
reclaiming faith in a post-critical manner. 
It is my opinion that Lonergan’s work on self-appropriation and Doran’s 
complementary approach to psychic conversion offer the most robust guidance available 
on this topic. However, their writing does not generally explicate the dynamics of self-
appropriation in terms that are practicable for the average teacher. I intend to incorporate 
such a practicable adaptation of their work in my constructive proposal in the final 
chapter, but, first, it will be helpful to comment on how Groome’s shared praxis approach 
relates to this work of self-appropriation. 
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As mentioned above, Groome’s SCP aims to bring learners to “critical 
consciousness”. For the most part, Groome focuses on promoting critical consciousness 
of learners’ praxis rather than critical consciousness of their cognitional structure, as 
Lonergan does. For example, he explains that the intent of movement 2, “is to deepen the 
reflective moment and bring participants to critical consciousness of present praxis: its 
reasons, interests, assumptions, prejudices, and ideologies (reason); its socio-historical 
and biographical sources (memory); its intended, likely, and preferred consequences 
(imagination).”138 Notwithstanding, as this quotation illustrates, Groome’s consciousness 
raising vis-à-vis praxis often involves some critical reflection on cognitive operations 
(e.g., reason, memory, imagination). At times he makes this latter focus more explicit. 
Concerning movement 4, for instance, Groome says, “The educator is also to fashion 
questioning activities that prompt participants to turn to their own interiority.”139 These 
activities might include questions like “Is it true for you, and how do you know? What 
consequences do you perceive, and why do you perceive them?,” which prompt 
participants to attend to, understand, and judge not only their praxis but also their 
cognitional acts of attending, imagining, understanding, and judging.140 Furthermore, 
even though Groome does not make the point himself, I would add that inviting learners 
to make decisions (e.g., in movement 5) can have the effect of bringing the inner 
workings of the mind and heart to light. Indeed, our decision-making and behavior often 
reveal desires and motivations that we subconsciously hide from ourselves. 
                                                
138 Groome, Sharing Faith, 187. Emphasis added. Cf. “Conversion, Nurture and Educators,” 493-4. 
139 Groome, Sharing Faith, 252; cf. 257. 
140 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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When addressing the imagination specifically, Groome’s writing exhibits the 
same focus on praxis, though he does acknowledge obliquely the value of heightening 
awareness of one’s imagining activities.141 Recognizing that “there is nothing inevitable 
about people appropriating their symbols in a dialectical way,” Groome designs 
movements 4 and 5 in such a way as to promote learners’ critical appropriation of the 
Christian Story/Vision, including its faith symbols.142 Since the questions and activities 
that Groome describes for these movements focus on the Story/Vision and participants’ 
praxis more so than on the dynamics of their imagination, those dynamics may remain 
obscure to participants even as they gain a more mature understanding of particular 
Christian symbols. The difference, in other words, is between, on the one hand, coming 
to recognize the Eucharist as more than a visible reminder of Jesus and, on the other, 
gaining awareness of the limitations of one’s former critical symbolic consciousness and 
the superiority of one’s new post-critical consciousness.143 It is the difference between 
raising consciousness of what images occupy one’s imagining and raising consciousness 
of how one’s imagination works upon images in general. 
Hence, even though Groome’s shared praxis is already well disposed to 
promoting learners’ self-appropriation, several minor shifts in emphasis and 
implementation of SCP would greatly enhance its effectiveness in consistently, 
systematically prompting the sort of self-appropriation demanded by postmodern culture. 
                                                
141 See especially Groome, Sharing Faith, 205-8. 
142 Ibid., 359. 
143 More specifically, the superiority of post-critical consciousness lies in the ability to recognize the 
Eucharist as a symbolic mediation of grace and meaning that cannot be adequately expressed in words, an 
ability that is lacking in a person who can only accept more literal expressions of meaning. 
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One such shift would be making explicit for learners the hermeneutical guidelines that 
Groome explicates for educators in his discussion of movement 3.144 In this discussion, 
Groome encourages teachers to systematically reflect on their own interests and 
perspectives (guideline 2) and to employ a “hermeneutic of suspicion” (guideline 5) when 
selecting and presenting the Christian Story and Vision to learners.145 This reflection has 
the effect of making educators more aware of their imaginative and cognitive operations. 
However, Groome nowhere suggests making these or similar hermeneutical guidelines 
explicit for learners in the same way that he does for educators. Doing so (perhaps in 
movement 4) would greatly facilitate the learners’ self-appropriation of their imagining. 
Furthermore, supplementing Groome’s approach to fostering critical consciousness 
(primarily of one’s praxis and social context) with Lonergan’s approach to self-
appropriation of cognitive operations is more likely to provide learners with the 
awareness of and control over their imagining needed for today’s Christians to maintain 
their faith in a disenchanted, often antagonistic culture. 
Guidelines for self-appropriation are more notably absent in the work of the other 
religious educators discussed above. Mongoven’s process of symbolic catechesis includes 
opportunities for reflection on personal experiences and group conversation in which 
participants might mirror each other’s thinking back to one another. Such activities could 
incidentally facilitate self-appropriation. Nevertheless, Mongoven does not identify self-
appropriation as a goal, nor does she develop the sort of questioning and activities that 
                                                
144 See ibid., 227-35. 
145 Groome also discusses other hermeneutics. I mention the hermeneutic of suspicion because it is the 
most relevant for critical examination of oneself and others. 
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would promote self-appropriation in any substantial sense. Similarly, Harris focuses on 
helping learners come to intimate knowledge of the subject matter more so than of 
themselves. Some aspects of her approach—for example, her insistence on allowing 
learners time and space to explore and think creatively—might create circumstances 
conducing to learners growing in awareness of their abilities and limitations.146 However, 
like Mongoven, she does not explicitly target this outcome or develop strategies that 
make such an outcome likely.  
Other educators have described strategies that might prove more useful for our 
purposes. Scholar of art history and visual studies Margaret Miles proposes several 
strategies for training oneself to use images appropriately. These include attending 
carefully to the messages one receives from the images with which one lives, asking 
questions about the images employed in the media, and intentionally building a repertoire 
of life-giving images.147 Ethicist Timothy O’Connell, writing about possibilities for moral 
formation, takes a cue from a psychological approach called “Neuro-Linguistic 
Programming” (NLP), which modifies undesirable behaviors and emotional responses by 
deliberately modifying a person’s mental images.148 One common technique employed 
by practitioners of NLP called “reframing” involves calling people’s attention to the 
“intent” of the feelings arising from certain images, for example, feelings of guilt 
resulting from a recent memory of an episode of binge eating. Drawing attention to the 
                                                
146 See, e.g., Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 76, 88. 
147 See Margaret R. Miles, Image as Insight: Visual Understanding in Western Christianity and Secular 
Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 147-9; cf. Daily, Seeing and Being Seen, 16-17. 
148 See Timothy E. O’Connell, Making Disciples: A Handbook of Christian Moral Formation (New York: 
Crossroad Publishing, 1998), 106-11. 
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fact that these feelings arise from the desire for some value (e.g., health), NLP 
practitioners invite clients to discern the value those feelings intend and negotiate within 
themselves more positive ways of achieving that value.149  
Both Miles’s and O’Connell’s proposals suggest concrete practices that could 
contribute to students’ self-appropriation of their imagining capabilities. As I now move 
into the final chapter and my constructive proposal, I will look to incorporate these 
various strategies and the suggestive possibilities of Groome’s approach to fostering 
critical consciousness into a pedagogical process that systematically promotes learners’ 
progress toward post-critical consciousness. 
 
Conclusion 
Daunting though the task may seem, our review of pedagogical precedents in this 
chapter offers much hope for the future of Catholic religious education in this country 
(and elsewhere). We have identified in the teaching of Jesus, especially his parables, an 
unsurpassable model of how to invite learners into a life lived for the reign of God 
through the conversion of imaginations. We have also examined the efforts of several 
distinguished religious educators to carry on Jesus’ work of teaching for God’s reign in a 
way that responds to the new pedagogical challenges of postmodernity. Helpful as these 
educators’ work is, our examination has made it clear that additional pedagogical 
exigencies remain to be fully addressed. In order to nurture a Christian imaginary capable 
of withstanding the challenges of postmodernity and reintegrating the lives of American 
                                                
149 O’Connell proposes additional imaginative exercises, including some in the tradition of Ignatian 
contemplation. (See Making Disciples, 106, 109-14.) 
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Catholics, religious educators will require more comprehensive guidance for converting 
imaginations than is currently available. In my final chapter, I aim to show how the 
insights of this dissertation can be synthesized into a pedagogical process that will meet 
this need. 
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Chapter 6 
A Pedagogy for Converting Imaginations in the Postmodern World 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your minds.” 
- Romans 12:2 
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Introduction 
In this dissertation we have been asking how Catholic religious educators can 
prepare their students to meet the imaginal challenges of postmodern culture and so 
promote integration and wholeness in their lives of faith. Exploring the dynamics of 
human cognition and development, we came to a greater appreciation for the centrality of 
the imagination in constructing meaning. Investigating diverse research on how and why 
people change the way they see things, we recognized the instrumentality of imagination-
focused strategies in prompting this sort of transformation. In the most recent chapter, we 
saw how Jesus and notable contemporary educators have incorporated these strategies in 
their teaching for Christian faith. Emboldened by the promise of these pedagogical 
precedents, I move in this final chapter to synthesize their educational wisdom and my 
own constructive proposals into a pedagogical approach suited to the needs of 
postmodern disciples. 
Many of those needs are the same for today’s learners as they were for learners in 
Jesus’ time. Regardless of differences in cultural and historical context, teaching that 
aims to transform people’s ways of thinking and imagining must: 
⁃ attend to the needs and limits of human cognition, 
⁃ facilitate transcendence of egocentric thinking, imagining, and feeling, 
⁃ recruit the active participation of learners in their own transformation, 
⁃ provide emotional and communal support during the transition. 
Historical and cultural developments have given rise to additional exigencies that are 
specific to the postmodern context. As we have seen, these include the need to: 
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⁃ reintegrate fragmented imaginations, 
⁃ promote cognitive flexibility,  
⁃ foster learners’ awareness of their own cognitive operations and psychic 
activity. 
In Jesus’ teaching, especially his parables, we find a preeminent model of how to 
meet the former set of exigencies in the context of converting imaginations to the reign of 
God. In the work of contemporary educators like Thomas Groome, Maria Harris, and 
Anne Marie Mongoven, we find some helpful resources for addressing the needs of 
learners that are particular to postmodernity while still addressing these perennial 
exigencies. Still, despite their many valuable contributions, these educators’ work 
nevertheless leaves a number of questions unanswered: Concerning the integration of 
postmodern learners’ imaginations, we are left wondering, What, if anything, can 
religious educators do to help anchor Christian symbols at the center of their students’ 
imagining? Furthermore, even if Christian symbols come to occupy that central place, is 
that enough to unify people’s imaginations? Our survey of these authors likewise left us 
still in search of a systematic approach to promoting learners’ self-appropriation of their 
imagining, another of the major exigencies identified above.  
In this final chapter, I will address these lacunae in the religious education 
literature, proposing an imagination-focused pedagogical approach capable of 
engendering and sustaining lived faith in the midst of postmodernity’s fragmenting 
forces. I begin with some prefatory comments about the current exigencies and potential 
for U.S. Christian religious education in general in order to situate my own pedagogical 
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proposal. The remainder of the chapter will detail the three phases of the proposed 
pedagogical process, explicating how the dynamics of this process satisfy the perennial 
and postmodern exigencies described above. 
 
A More Imaginative Approach to Catholic Religious Education in the United States 
The work of forming disciples in a Christian imaginary is an endless labor that 
requires the efforts of an entire community and utilizing the diverse gifts of all its 
members. Formal religious education is, therefore, only one aspect of a comprehensive 
formation that also includes liturgy, works of justice and charity, art and literature, family 
life, personal relationships, and each person’s daily choices and actions. In a well-
rounded Christian formation, religious education works in concert with these less formal 
formative experiences. Religious education relies and draws upon people’s grace-filled 
encounters in the liturgy, the personal growth achieved in serving and relating to one’s 
fellow human beings, and the aesthetic power of artistic expressions of faith. In turn, 
religious education provides the venue for intentional reflection on these areas of 
Christian praxis, helping disciples to better learn from their experiences and to return to 
them with eyes more open to the grace at work in those experiences. In this way, formal 
religious education plays a crucial, albeit limited role in forming a community’s 
imaginary.  
Our investigations in this dissertation point to a number of ways in which 
Catholic religious education (which I understand to encompass parish catechesis, 
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Catholic school religion classes, adult faith formation, and sacramental preparation1) 
might better fulfill its role in forming the individual imaginations that together shape the 
community’s Christian imaginary. To begin from the most general, Catholic religious 
education programs in this country consistently fail to form people in habits of ongoing 
learning.2 It is a widely acknowledged problem that many Catholics emerge from their 
childhood religious education under the impression that they have learned all that they 
need to learn in order to faithfully live a life of Christian discipleship (or, more 
minimally, to achieve salvation). In consequence, they live their entire adult lives based 
on an eighth-grade level understanding of the Christian faith. The fact that most 
Catholics’ participation in formal religious education ends before they have reached an 
age where they are capable of developing post-critical consciousness is a major reason 
American Catholics’ faith has proven so vulnerable to the intellectual and cultural 
challenges of postmodernity. This problem is only exacerbated by the regular failure of 
Catholic religious education programs to challenge naive assumptions about the adequacy 
of an elementary education.  
The research examined in previous chapters has demonstrated the need for 
cognitive flexibility in the face of the rapid change, instantaneity of communication, and 
radical plurality that characterize today’s world. In this context, a faith that stands still is 
                                                
1 I exclude from this list college theology courses, which practically speaking serve a function distinct from 
that of these other forms of faith education. College theology courses tend to be more exploratory in nature 
and to eschew the sort of formative exercises described below. Therefore, while much of what I say below 
may apply, such courses typically are not the most appropriate venue for providing the sort of Catholic 
religious education I intend. This raises the question of where college-age young adults can receive the sort 
of faith formation I describe in this chapter. Campus Ministry programs are the immediately obvious 
possibility, but Catholic religious educators would do well to consider what other options would be viable. 
2 Protestant churches tend fair better than Catholic parishes in this regard, offering more in the way of adult 
faith formation. 
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sure to be left behind. Modern media form people’s imaginations continuously and for 
the duration of their lifetimes. Catholic religious education must do likewise if it is to 
provide sufficient counter-formation. Speaking on more theological grounds, the 
exigency for ongoing education also arises from the fact that we can never fully 
comprehend God’s mystery. Religious education should disabuse learners of the 
assumption that we can, and the most effective way to do so is to set the expectation and 
create the capacity for life-long education for all Christian disciples. 
Leaders in Catholic education could take a number of steps to address this need. 
To begin with, parishes and schools should make it a priority to convey to students who 
have reached the perceived end of their formal religious education (e.g., Confirmation 
candidates, high school seniors) the importance of continuing their education in faith and 
to direct them to available resources and programs. Needless to say, this creates the 
imperative for parishes and schools to develop adult faith formation programs where they 
do not already exist. Furthermore, many religious educators will need to adapt the 
curricula and methodology of their programs so as to provide learners with the 
preparation they need to live out their faith in a culture that is dynamic and sometimes 
antagonistic to faith. More specifically, curricula should clearly target the development of 
cognitive skills (e.g., evaluating information sources, judging truth claims, asking and 
answering key existential and religious questions) in addition to outlining doctrines to be 
covered.3 
                                                
3 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework (2008), an 
outline for religion curriculum in U.S. Catholic high schools, falls short in precisely this regard. I have 
presented an argument for how educators could teach this curriculum in a more adequate way in Patrick R. 
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Since it is the imagination that integrates people’s feeling, thinking, and living, it 
is imperative that formation of learners’ imaginations be established as a central objective 
of Catholic religious education. With the exception of the authors discussed in Chapter 
Five, this focus on the imagination is generally lacking in Catholic education.4 When 
textbook publishers and teachers incorporate art and media into instruction, they typically 
do so in a haphazard manner and merely for the sake of maintaining learner interest. 
Meaningful formation of learners’ imaginations, by contrast, requires instructional 
activities carefully designed with this end in mind. Designing instruction of this sort 
requires at least a basic understanding of how images function in human cognition and 
living. Increasingly Catholic schools are adopting outcomes-based methods of 
instructional design that target certain cognitive capacities, particularly methods based on 
the research of Benjamin Bloom and Grant Wiggins and Jay McTighe.5 Schools have 
been slower to apply such methods to religious instruction and slower still to target 
imaginative capacities (e.g., planning, creating, evaluating mental images).6  
                                                                                                                                            
Manning, “That Your Education May Be Complete: Implementing the Bishops’ Curriculum Framework in 
Continuity with the Christian Teaching Tradition,” Catholic Education 15, no. 2 (2012): 160–78. Other 
religious educators are increasingly giving voice to the need to focus on skills and dispositions in addition 
to content. For example, see Eileen Mary Daily, “Core Outcomes for Catholic Religious Education,” 
Religious Education 110, no. 1 (2015): 10–15. 
4 Scholars of religious education have given considerable attention to the topic, but so far scholarly interest 
has by and large not translated into practice in Catholic schools and parishes. 
5 See Benjamin Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals 
(New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1956) and Grant Wiggins and Jay McTighe, Understanding by 
Design (Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1998). 
6 To say that the application of outcomes- and assessment-based practices to the imagination has been slow 
is not to say that it is non-existent. The NCEA IFG: ACRE (Information for Growth: Assessment of 
Child/Youth Religious Education), for example, has for years included questions about learners’ religious 
perceptions and images of God (see https://www.ncea.org/our-services/religious-education-assessments). 
Even still, it is a giant leap from assessing learners’ images and forming them in an effective and 
authentically Christian way. 
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In general, religious instruction in Catholic elementary and high schools remains 
essentially content-focused, and parish programs are seldom better in this regard. 
Students learn the seven sacraments, the Ten Commandments, and official Church 
teaching on a variety of topics. In more advanced departments and programs, they might 
also learn to “analyze” scriptural and theological texts. Catholic religious education that 
took the imagination more seriously would balance (not eliminate or water down) 
attention to Church doctrine in curricula, textbooks, and lesson planning with attention to 
the central symbols of the Christian faith. Without a doubt, Christian symbols usually 
find their way into textbooks and lesson plans. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to avoid 
them. Even official Church doctrines can be seen as elaborations of key faith symbols. 
Notwithstanding, teachers are rarely encouraged to engage these symbols qua symbols. 
More common is to discuss them in the abstract language of definitions and doctrines, 
which deprives these symbols of their engaging, thought-provoking power. A more 
adequate education would engage these symbols as symbols, which requires openness to 
questioning, storytelling, poetic expression, and spontaneity.  
In a similar vein, a more adequate approach to teacher preparation would involve 
training educators to function as symbol-makers and exploration-leaders rather than mere 
information-dispensers. The symbols and stories of our faith have no life if people do not 
share them. Sharing symbols is every bit as much an art as creating them. It requires 
training and practice in pedagogical skills like selecting appropriate symbols around 
which to focus learning, telling stories, designing artistic projects, and incorporating 
media and art into one’s teaching. Such skills are seldom included in teacher training 
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with more common pedagogical skills like scaffolding students’ thinking, facilitating 
group work, and differentiating instruction. These gaps must be addressed if we expect 
our teachers to adequately prepare students to live out their faith in today’s postmodern 
context. 
 
A Pedagogical Proposal: A Three-Phase Process for Converting Imaginations 
Overview 
Of all the various factors involved in learners’ formal education, none is more 
important than the way the instructor teaches the subject matter. This is particularly true 
for religious education in which the primary objective is not so much students 
understanding certain facts or even developing a particular skill set as it is their growth in 
relationship with God and neighbor. A teacher can cover all the appropriate topics and 
explain every term and doctrine with exceptional clarity and still fail to achieve this goal. 
For this reason, an adequate response to the educational exigencies of today’s 
postmodern context requires a re-envisioning of not only the curriculum, materials, and 
outcomes of Catholic religious education but also the teaching methods we employ to 
give students access to the faith. In the introduction above, I outlined the most pressing of 
these exigencies, which can serve as guideposts for a pedagogical approach capable of 
promoting integration in people’s living through the conversion of imaginations to a 
Christian imaginary. Though a single chapter is hardly sufficient to explore all the 
possibilities of this approach, I will flesh it out as best I can within the constraints of the 
 306 
remaining pages of this dissertation.7 
The pedagogical process I describe here presumes Groome’s shared praxis 
approach as its foundation. As we saw in the previous chapter, SCP offers the most 
comprehensive guidance for forming imaginations of any existing approach to Christian 
religious education. The process I describe builds upon Groome’s insights and 
supplements them with insights drawn from other educators; the research in Chapters 
Two, Three, and Four; and my own praxis, which addresses pedagogical exigencies that 
are not addressed or not fully developed in SCP. In the following description, I will 
clearly indicate how the three phases of this process and the strategies employed therein 
align with the five movements of SCP. I have elected to structure this process in three 
phases rather than simply adopting the five-movement structure of Groome’s approach 
because doing so makes it easier for teachers to attend to the dynamics of imagination 
transformation that we saw evidenced in the cognitive science, transformative learning, 
and conceptual change research and in Jesus’ teaching. 
The three phases of this pedagogical process are as follows: Phase One—
Engaging the imagination: The purpose of this first phase is to engage learners 
cognitively and affectively by stimulating activity at the level of their mental images 
where dramatic, enduring changes in thinking and behavior originate. Key to this phase is 
presenting images and questions that prompt learners to actively imagine reality as they 
experience it and encouraging them to give expression to their mental images. Phase One 
corresponds to the focusing activity and movement 1 of Groome’s SCP. Phase Two—
                                                
7 The strategies and examples I provide below should thus be taken as illustrative rather than exhaustive of 
the possibilities for this approach. 
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Challenging learners’ imagining: Having activated learners’ imagining in Phase One, 
Phase Two aims to challenge their current imagining so as to open them up to ways of 
imagining that are more adequate and more authentically Christian. It involves 
questioning and/or activities that problematize or expose limits in learners’ current 
imagining as well as exploration of key symbols from the Christian tradition that offer 
greater promise. This phase corresponds to movements 2 and 3 of SCP. Phase Three—
Appropriation of Christian imagining: After Phase Two has disrupted learners’ 
inadequate ways of imagining and posed the possibility of more adequate ways, Phase 
Three presents the opportunity and support needed to forge a new, more adequate 
imaginative synthesis. Key activities in this phase include exercises that promote growth 
in awareness and control over learners’ imagining as well as opportunities to render 
personal judgments about the adequacy of their orienting symbols and those of the 
Christian tradition and to make decisions about their lives based on those judgments. This 
phase corresponds to movements 4 and 5 of SCP. 
Table 3: Relationship of Three-Phase Process and 
Groome’s Shared Christian Praxis 
Three-phase process Shared Christian praxis 
  
Phase One 
focusing activity 
movement 1 
 
Phase Two 
movement 2 
movement 3 
 
Phase Three 
movement 4 
movement 5 
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As will become more evident in the following, this pedagogical process provides 
a salutary structure not only for individual lessons but also for the long-term process of 
facilitating learners’ cognitive development (ideally toward post-critical consciousness). 
Like Groome’s SCP, a learning event conducted in accord with this approach may 
progress through these three phases within a 45-minute class or over the course of a week 
or even a semester. Although previous chapters have provided an anticipatory glance of 
how the process can facilitate long-term development and even conversion, this will 
become fully clear only after I have described in greater detail the dynamics of the three 
phases and the process as a whole. How this process facilitates learning of a particular 
topic in shorter learning events will likewise become clear in the following. 
The major moments of this process are more appropriately described as “phases” 
or “movements” than “steps” in the sense that the activities of the different phases 
frequently overlap and blend with one another.8 For example, the invitation in Phase One 
to identify patterns in learners’ imagining may instantaneously generate awareness of the 
inadequacy of this manner of imagining, an awareness that is targeted specifically by the 
disruptive exercises of Phase Two. The language of “steps” is also less appropriate 
insofar as it suggests a linear process leading to a definitive endpoint. It is one of the key 
assertions of this chapter that the process I prescribe, in order to achieve its intended 
outcomes, must be carried out in a recursive manner. That is to say that it will be most 
effective when learners become habituated to the process through repeatedly engaging in 
the three-phases over an extended period of time. Furthermore, in its ideal execution, 
                                                
8 When describing my pedagogical process, I will employ the term “phases” in order to avoid confusion 
with the movements of Groome’s SCP since I will be regularly relating the two. 
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learners will revisit the same Christian symbols at least every year or so but as often as 
multiple times in the same semester or meeting period.  
I will be in a better position to explain why repeating the process is essential to 
achieving its aims after I have discussed the three phases of the process in greater depth. 
For now suffice it to say that only an ongoing educational process that prioritizes habits 
of imagining above and beyond memorization of content can foster faith resilient enough 
to withstand the challenges of postmodern living. Indeed, the three-part process of 
attending to one’s imagining, challenging that imagining, and appropriating new ways of 
imagining is not only the means but also the goal of postmodern religious education. By 
leading learners through the process repeatedly over time, this approach ingrains habits 
that will enable them to consistently imagine their reality in a manner consonant with and 
likely to nurture Christian faith. 
Conducting this process in a recursive manner does not mean repeating the same 
content in the same way year after year. Rather, returning to the same topics repeatedly 
over time allows for deepening and nuancing of learners’ understanding of those topics.9 
An illustrative image for this dynamic would an upward spiral as opposed to a flat circle 
(see illustration below). High school students are capable of thinking about the stories of 
Scripture in a more sophisticated way than second graders, and adults are capable of 
more sophisticated thinking still. Catholic religious education should therefore challenge 
learners to continuously deepen their learning to the extent possible for their level of 
                                                
9 This “spiraling” approach to curriculum, originally advocated by Jerome Bruner, is a common approach 
among textbook publishers. Cf. Jerome S. Bruner, The Process of Education, Revised (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009). 
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cognitive development and reinforce the idea that there is always more to learn, 
especially when it comes to the mystery of God. Such continued growth requires an 
openness on the part of learners, a willingness to continually reach beyond themselves to 
something greater. A recursive process that regularly challenges learners to expand their 
imagining is well suited to promoting this disposition.10 
 
Illustration 1: Graphic Representation of Recursive Pedagogical Process  
 
 
Another advantage of this pedagogical approach is its flexibility. Although the 
process is distinctive in its capacity to meet the particular needs of postmodern learners, it 
is designed such that its basic movements accord with the invariant dynamics of human 
cognition, making the process suitable for nearly all learners.11 This imagination-focused 
pedagogy is appropriate for young children since the prominent use of images is more 
                                                
10 This recursive pedagogical process might be appropriately characterized as “perichoretic” insofar as its 
dynamics reflect those of the Trinitarian community. Within the Trinity, God goes out from Godself in 
begetting the Son, who returns back to his source in the Father. Their union in turn spirates the Spirit, who 
likewise returns to her source in the Father and Son. In a similar way, learners undergoing this three-phase 
process go out from themselves and their former ways of imagining (i.e., they self-transcend or decenter) 
for the sake of eventually incorporating their new horizons into a stronger personal integration. In both 
cases, there is an ongoing process in which an ec-static movement results in something more than was 
originally present while paradoxically tending toward unity. 
11 As with any pedagogical approach, this one too requires considerable adaptation for learners with 
cognitive disabilities. 
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likely to attract and hold their attention than, for example, an approach that focuses on 
definitions and doctrines. Yet it is no less appropriate for adults in whose cognitional 
processes images continue to fulfill essential functions. For this reason, the basic 
pedagogical pattern of engaging learners’ imaginations, challenging their imagining, and 
inviting a new appropriation effectively expands and integrates the imaginations of 
people in all age groups.  
Of course, as with any pedagogical approach, the effectiveness of this process 
depends to a degree upon the teacher differentiating instruction according to the needs of 
learners. For young learners, more time will be spent on examining images, telling 
stories, and undertaking artistic projects so as to respect the limits of their short attention 
spans and concrete manner of thinking. Adults, by contrast, possess longer attention 
spans and the ability to engage in abstract thought. In their case, learning experiences can 
and should incorporate more detailed presentation of Christian teaching and more 
sophisticated questions. In addition to differentiating instruction according to learners’ 
age, teachers should adapt this approach according to the learners’ social context and 
cultural background, emotional maturity, and comfort level with one another. 
The flexibility of this approach also makes its implementation feasible for 
teachers of all abilities. In its most sophisticated form, the process is designed to promote 
post-critical symbolic consciousness in learners, which requires teachers themselves to be 
operating from a post-critical consciousness. After all, teachers cannot help learners to 
develop awareness of the way images function in their cognition and living if the teachers 
do not understand these dynamics themselves. This might seem to pose a problem for this 
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pedagogical approach since, as we have seen, post-critical consciousness requires a high 
level of development that most people have not yet attained. However, the dearth of post-
critical thinkers does not spell doom for this approach. What it does highlight is the need 
for training teachers of adolescents and adults in a certain skill set and nurturing their 
growth in post-critical consciousness. When it comes to more basic forms of this 
approach (e.g., those used with children learners), it is less important for teachers to be 
post-critical thinkers since children are incapable of attaining post-critical consciousness. 
For younger age groups, this pedagogical process aims at forming imaginations in a 
Christian manner and deepening learners’ understanding of and thinking about religious 
and existential matters but not promoting post-critical consciousness. Achieving these 
more limited aims is within the capabilities of virtually all competent teachers. 
With these preliminaries out of the way, I will now proceed to describe in detail 
the three phases of this pedagogical process. In the following I will explicate the goal(s) 
and function of each phase, the presuppositions about human cognition underlying the 
strategies of each phase, and the methods and procedures themselves. In describing the 
methods for each phase, I will presume young adult and adult learners as the default 
audience, since that is the demographic with which this dissertation is primarily 
concerned. However, I will occasionally offer suggestions in-text and in the footnotes 
concerning how this process can be adapted for younger learners. Two appendices at the 
end of the chapter provide (1) an example of a learning event that embodies these 
guidelines and (2) a quick-reference comparison of how this approach can be adapted for 
learners of different ages. 
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Phase One: Engaging the Imagination 
Goal(s) and Function  
Phase One’s primary function is to engage learners’ interest and activate their 
imaginations. The process as a whole aims to promote integration through conversion of 
learners’ imaginations, but, as we saw in previous chapters, radical transformation in 
people’s imagining rarely happens quickly and cannot be imposed from the outside. No 
significant learning and no transformation will occur if teachers are not first successful in 
recruiting learners’ active engagement with the subject matter and the questions it 
generates. The design of Phase One respects these limitations by beginning the learning 
event from what is familiar and interesting to learners and consonant with their 
accustomed ways of imagining reality. In this way, Phase One addresses two of the 
pedagogical exigencies outlined above, namely, attending to the limits of human 
cognition and inviting learners’ active, conscious participation in the process of 
constructing meaning. 
  
Cognitional Underpinnings  
Where the dynamics of Phases Two and Three will prove especially conducive to 
promoting development toward a particular form of symbolic consciousness (viz., critical 
and post-critical consciousness, respectively), the dynamics of Phase One reflect the 
necessary starting point for imaginative growth for people of all ages and developmental 
levels. Whether a pre-critical, critical, or post-critical thinker, development and 
conversion only occur when one’s imagination is engaged and active. In Lonerganian 
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terms, only if one first attends to the data presented to consciousness can one generate the 
insights that lead to new understanding and, perhaps, new behaviors.12  
The pedagogical strategies of Phase One are designed to accord with what 
cognitive science has revealed about the invariant dynamics of human cognition. To 
begin with, the decision to begin the learning event with image- and experience-focused 
activities is based on the understanding that thought originates in sense impressions that 
the brain represents as mental images. All the research examined in earlier chapters leads 
us to believe that, since conceptual thinking derives from more basic mental images, the 
most meaningful and durable learning is that which modifies not only learners’ 
conceptual understanding but also their image schemas. Another relevant insight from 
research in the cognition of learning is that new learning depends on the learner’s ability 
to make sense of novel input in terms of what is already familiar and understood. This 
finding likewise highlights the advantage of beginning instruction at the level of the 
imagination since images are inherently more familiar than concepts and therefore 
present a more propitious starting point for learning events. For example, describing—or 
better yet, showing—the movements and significance of a particular sacrament creates 
more fertile ground for future learning and connection-building than does having learners 
memorize a general definition of a sacrament.  
In Chapter Two, I explained the interrelatedness of cognition and affectivity. One 
of the implications of this relationship is that the more one’s feelings and emotions are 
aroused during a learning event the more resilient one’s learning will be. Since images 
                                                
12 Each of the three phases described here facilitates fulfillment of one or more of Lonergan’s 
transcendental precepts. Phase One encourages learners to “be attentive.” 
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generally carry a stronger affective charge than concepts, definitions, and theories, 
teaching that begins from images is more likely to result in significant, lasting changes in 
learners’ thinking. Engaging learners on an emotional level becomes even more 
important when the goal is, not just modifying their thinking, but inviting a conversion in 
their imagining. The reason for this is that a person must desire conversion or at least be 
emotionally amenable to it in order for it to occur. In other words, they must be both 
intellectually and emotionally open to being changed. For this reason as well, a learning 
experience that begins from affect-laden images is more likely to lead to meaningful 
growth. 
  
Method and Procedures 
Phase One corresponds to the focusing activity and movement 1 of Groome’s 
shared praxis approach. Therefore, all the activities and procedures he describes vis-à-vis 
these moments of SCP apply here as well. For all the reasons mentioned in the section 
above, I, like Groome, argue that the learning event should begin with an activity or 
experience that stimulates learners’ imaginations and relates to their personal experiences 
and concerns—what he, echoing Freire, often calls a “generative theme” (i.e., a “focusing 
activity”). The activity should present or evoke an image or images that resonate with the 
way the learners imagine reality. Jesus began his stories with familiar images like a 
mustard seed and a shepherd tending his sheep. Contemporary teachers might begin with 
the image of an iPhone or a young professional working at an office desk. Whatever the 
image(s) teachers choose, it is important that it have an inherent connection to the 
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Christian symbol or symbols that they intend to engage in Phase Two.13 The reason this 
connection is so important will become clearer when I discuss “pivot” images below. For 
the time being, however, it will suffice to note that if teachers employ an image that is 
interesting but loosely related to the Christian symbol in focus, learners will likely 
remember the image or the story but not the point of the lesson.  
Teachers might present an image using a paper handout, by projecting a picture 
on a screen, playing an audio recording or a video clip, telling a story, leading learners in 
a guided imaginative meditation, or (less ideally) describing the image verbally. 
Alternatively, they might ask questions that prompt learners to imagine an image for 
themselves.14 Regardless of how one elicits the image, the most effective images will be 
those that are vivid, on the human scale, and easily reproduced in the imagination. Since 
the purpose of the focusing activity is to engage learners on the level of their everyday 
imagining and living, teachers should conduct this preliminary activity in a way that taps 
into reality as learners know and experience it and makes them feel at home in the 
discussion.15 To this end, images drawn from quotidian experiences and popular culture 
will prove most effective.16 Teachers might present such images, for example, by telling a 
                                                
13 See the section on Phase Two below for guidance concerning the recommended order teachers should 
follow in planning learning events. 
14 Less experienced teachers may be more comfortable presenting images than constructing and posing a 
series of questions. 
15 Teachers will find two superb models of this approach in the writings of C.S. Lewis (e.g,. Mere 
Christianity) and a contemporary preacher named Rob Bell (e.g., Velvet Elvis; see also Bell’s Nooma video 
series at http://nooma.com). These two authors/teachers exhibit exceptional deftness in using everyday 
objects and experiences as a means of leading people to a deeper understanding of and appreciation for the 
teachings of the Christian faith. 
16 Since the concrete language and imagery appropriate to this focusing activity is accessible to all school-
age learners, the only significant difference in presentation styles among different age groups will pertain to 
the kinds of images and background experiences learners can relate to. 
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relatable story (about hanging out with friends, the frustrations of work, etc.) or by 
playing a popular song in the current radio rotation. Teachers should generally avoid 
abstract, technical language at this time, instead favoring the language of people’s 
everyday lives. 
Once the focusing activity has sufficiently stimulated learners’ imaginations, the 
teacher begins to shift the cognitive burden to the students by inviting them to identify 
and give expression to some aspect of their current imagining (à la Groome’s movement 
1). Teachers can prompt this transition in a variety of ways. Most simply, the teacher 
might ask learners a question or series of questions or invite them into conversation 
around the focusing image. The conversation might even take the form of learners 
sharing personal stories that relate to the focusing image. Or, rather than telling stories, 
learners might work together in groups to create and perform skits that express the way 
they collectively imagine and think about the topic at hand. Alternatively, learners might 
engage in an art project wherein they give expression to their imagining through the 
media of paper, paint, clay, etc. For learners who are less imaginative or have a harder 
time articulating their mental images, forced decision exercises can prove helpful (e.g., Is 
the society you live in more like a wild jungle or one big family?).  
All of these activities can be easily adapted for teachers and learners of different 
abilities. Although teachers might appropriately rely on conversation more with adult 
learners than with children, a healthy dose of conversation is appropriate for children just 
as opportunities for artistic expression are beneficial for adults. Regardless of the specific 
activity or level of sophistication, it is important than teachers encourage learners to 
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express their imagining as they experience it. If students are preoccupied with giving 
responses that they think the teacher wants to hear, the exercise is less likely to generate 
the openness and active imagining upon which the subsequent phases depend for their 
effectiveness.  
Most of the time these activities will focus on a particular image or set of images. 
However, from time to time, it is beneficial for learners to give expression to their 
symbol system as a whole.17 Doing so can shed additional light on the significance of 
particular symbols in addition to facilitating the process of integrating one’s imagining, 
which I will address more fully under the heading of Phase Three. At the center of any 
personal symbol system are the person’s God-image, self-image, and world-image (the 
“master images” identified by Sandra Schneiders). All other symbols somehow relate to 
and derive their meaning from these master images/symbols. Learners might thus begin 
this exercise by sketching or labeling these master images (e.g., God as Father, self as 
middle child and office manager, world as competitive jungle) and then mapping out their 
relationship to other personally significant symbols (e.g., church/temple, heroes, enemies, 
objects of desire). It is entirely possible—even likely in postmodern contexts—that some 
learners will lack a coherent symbol system or way of imagining their life experiences. In 
such cases, teachers should encourage learners to represent their imagining as is rather 
than imposing a contrived order. Again, the important thing is to tap into learners’ 
imagining as it spontaneously occurs.  
                                                
17 For example, it would be entirely appropriate for teachers to lead learners in this sort of exercise at the 
beginning and again at the end of a course or program. 
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Whether giving expression to one’s symbol system as a whole or to particular 
images within it, expressing one’s imagining is the first step in imaginative and psychic 
conversion. The exercises that precipitate conversion come, for the most part, in Phases 
Two and Three. However, the critical reflection, judging, and deciding that happens in 
these later phases presupposes learners having already become aware of the images and 
symbols that influence their imagining and living. Only when learners are able to move 
beyond naively thinking in symbols to thinking from and about symbols and how they 
influence their perceptions (i.e., rendering them “object,” as Kegan would say) can they 
do the work of self-appropriating their imagining.18 
The activities of Phase One serve to make learners’ imagining visible not only to 
the learners themselves but also to teachers. In so doing, these activities provide teachers 
with the means of making a preliminary assessment of learners’ levels of symbolic 
consciousness and their personal need for development. In smaller groups, teachers may 
be able to make such an assessment on the fly during the course of the learning event. For 
larger groups, teachers will likely need to collect learners’ work and review it when time 
allows.19 Regardless of the size of the group, the more familiar teachers are with learners’ 
needs and capabilities, the better they are able to plan instruction that will suit those 
needs and capabilities.  
                                                
18 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “The Symbol: Food for Thought,” Philosophy Today 4 (1960): 205. When I say “move 
beyond” thinking in symbols, I do not mean that one ceases to interpret one’s experiences through the lens 
of those symbols. It is impossible to take off these interpretive lenses completely. I merely mean that one 
becomes capable of objectifying these symbols even as one continues to see the world through them. 
19 See Appendix I for examples of specific criteria for evaluation of learners’ levels of symbolic 
consciousness. 
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Taking learners’ developmental levels into account is particularly important when 
the aim is not merely dispensing information but rather promoting development and even 
conversion. Challenging learners who are not cognitively or emotionally capable of 
coping with the challenge can result in setbacks and obstacles to future growth. Failing to 
challenge learners who are ready deprives them of opportunities to grow.20 When 
assessing learners’ developmental levels, teachers do well to remember that advanced 
development should not be pursued for its own sake. What matters most is that learners 
are equipped with the cognitive and affective capacities they need to make sense of their 
experiences, maintain a healthy sense of self, and live as loving, responsible disciples and 
members of society. Especially when teachers observe these guidelines, regularly 
reevaluating learners’ needs and capabilities can significantly enhance the effectiveness 
of this pedagogical process. 
As a final note to this section, I acknowledge the temptation for teachers to rush 
through this first phase of the process or to skip it altogether. Confronted with 
expectations to cover a prescribed amount of material or in their eagerness to “get to the 
real substance,” many educators regard preliminary activities of this sort as added 
enrichment or “fluff”. Such activities are the most likely to be neglected in lesson plans 
and skipped over in textbooks. However, teachers who neglect to engage learners’ 
imaginations in a meaningful way at the outset will find themselves stymied later in the 
learning event. They may succeed in cramming more facts and definitions into students’ 
                                                
20 These considerations highlight why studies in learner psychology are such a valuable component of 
teacher training. More specifically, religion teachers who teach older adolescents and adults will improve 
their effectiveness as instructors by learning about the different levels of symbolic consciousness described 
in Chapter Three in addition to studying more common aspects of human development like Piaget’s stages 
of cognitive development. 
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heads, but a predominantly content-focused approach fails to effect real change in the 
ways people imagine and live their lives. To be sure, engaging learners’ imaginations 
requires a considerable investment of time, but it pays dividends in the long run. 
 
Phase Two: Challenging Learners’ Imagining 
Goal(s) and Function  
Phase Two is the pedagogical moment in which new learning primarily occurs. 
Many people assume that learning is simply a matter of adding new information to one’s 
mental repertoire. However, no learning is ever a matter of mere addition, and 
transformative learning in particular (i.e., learning to construct meaning in a different 
way) often requires challenging—even disrupting—former ways of imagining. Rather 
than merely building upon an existing foundation, it can demand demolishing the base in 
order to begin anew. To state the matter more theologically, it requires a conversion of 
the imagination. Such challenging, disrupting, and inviting to conversion is the function 
of this second phase. Where Phase One accommodates learners’ human need for 
concreteness and familiarity for the sake of engaging imaginations, Phase Two pushes 
learners beyond what is comfortable, beyond the world bounded by learners’ own narrow 
interests and desires, in order to open them up to God and reality as God creates it. That 
is to say it addresses the pedagogical exigency to facilitate learners’ transcendence of 
their egocentric thinking, imagining, and feeling.  
In the course of expanding learners’ imagining, Phase Two addresses several 
other pedagogical exigencies in addition to the need to promote learners’ self-
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transcendence. As is true of Phases One and Three, the activities of Phase Two are 
intentionally designed to invite learners’ active participation in constructing meaning. 
One aspect of learners’ active engagement in this phase of the process is reflecting 
critically upon the patterns in their imagining that they began to attend to in Phase One. 
This critical self-examination marks a crucial step forward in the process of self-
appropriation that will be consummated in Phase Three. Learners’ critical questioning 
and engagement with disruptive symbols in this phase also contribute to the development 
of their cognitive flexibility. 
 
Cognitional Underpinnings  
If Phase One encourages learners to heed the transcendental imperative to attend 
to their imagining, Phase Two encourages them to heed the imperative to understand 
more deeply their imagining and the Christian manner of imagining. Everyone, regardless 
of their level of development, benefits from expanding their understanding. Critical self-
examination yields ever more precise understanding of oneself and the world and 
heightens one’s vigilance against the ever threatening menace of bias. In Chapter Three 
we noted that post-critical thinkers are less susceptible to bias than pre-critical or even 
critical thinkers. This is the case precisely because they are more aware of the threat of 
bias and more intentional about examining themselves for it. Pre-critical thinkers are 
especially susceptible because they generally lack such awareness and habits of self-
examination. As such, it is they who benefit most from the exercises of Phase Two. 
Teachers who work primarily with pre-critical learners will thus want to place extra 
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emphasis on this phase of the process and proceed through it with special care. Critical 
thinkers also benefit from the exercises of Phase Two insofar as their continued 
development depends upon coming to awareness of the need for symbol in personal 
integration and the limits of their insistence upon “literal” truth. 
In the previous section, I explained that images (versus concepts, definitions, etc.) 
offer a propitious starting point for learning because they bear the texture of everyday 
experience and so prove highly stimulating of thought. It is pedagogically advisable to 
keep instruction rooted in images as the process moves into Phase Two because, beyond 
attracting learners’ attention, images play an essential role in coming to new 
understanding. Phase Two aims to expand—even transform—learners’ thinking. As we 
have seen in previous chapters, teaching strategies that focus on learners’ mental images 
and employ metaphorical, poetic forms of expression are the most conducive to this sort 
of radical change. Emphasis on imagery is particularly advantageous in the context of 
religious education given the nature of the knowledge into which religious educators 
aspire to lead their students. Religious education aims to give learners access to an 
engaged participatory knowledge of God, and, as we know from our explorations in 
Chapter Two, symbols are uniquely suited to mediating this sort of knowledge. A 
preference for imaginative, image-centered pedagogical strategies is thus most 
appropriate in this moment of the learning process. 
 
Method and Procedures  
Phase Two corresponds to movements 2 and 3 of Groome’s shared praxis 
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approach. In this phase, engagement with symbols of the Christian faith challenges 
learners to more expansive and adequate ways of imagining. Implicit in this description 
are two distinct tasks: (1) challenging learners to recognize the inadequacy of their old 
ways of imagining and (2) inviting them to consider a potentially more adequate way 
(viz., imagining as Jesus did). Although we can distinguish these two tasks for clarity 
sake and although they sometimes occur sequentially, they often occur simultaneously 
during the learning event.21 In the case of both tasks, teachers can only ever extend an 
invitation to self-examination. It cannot be forced from the outside but rather must be 
willed by the learner.  
Critical self-examination.22 Often engagement with the Christian symbol will 
itself serve to prompt learners to examine their current habits of imagining and the origins 
of those habits. However, at times it may be more effective to invite self-examination 
before explicitly introducing Christian content into the discussion. This will especially be 
the case when teaching learners who have little interest in or active disdain for Christian 
teaching. Even in the case of learners who are not adamantly opposed, people tend to be 
more receptive to new ideas—even ideas that they would have previously resisted—when 
their accustomed ways of thinking prove untenable.  
Teachers can proceed by inviting learners to reflect more critically upon the 
images they gave expression to in Phase One (as Groome prescribes in movement 2 of 
                                                
21 I have organized this section into subsections in order to highlight these distinct tasks, but my comments 
throughout will emphasize their overlapping nature. 
22 As noted in the previous chapter, I am supplementing Groome’s approach to promoting critical 
consciousness, which emphasizes learners’ social context, with a related but distinct approach to promoting 
self-awareness of the operations of learners’ imaginations. While I fully endorse all of the strategies 
Groome recommends vis-à-vis promoting critical consciousness, imaginative operations rather than social 
context will be my focus in this section. 
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SCP). Most basically, this invitation might take the form of questions about learners’ 
manner of imagining: Have you even considered looking at the matter differently? Why 
do other people see the matter differently? How did you come to see things this way? 
What effect do these images have on your relationships, behavior, and values? What 
would your life be like if you imagined things otherwise? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of imagining in this way? In cases where learners seem to lack a coherent 
symbol system or way of imagining, teachers can invite them to consider why that is the 
case: What are the competing visions causing conflict in your imagining? What would it 
take to unify your vision of life, your self-image, etc.?23 Learners might discuss these 
questions in pairs, small groups, or with the whole class or journal about them 
independently. Because this is the first step in what can be a traumatic experience for 
learners, teachers do well to support them by employing humor and encouraging learners 
to empathize with one another. 
Teachers working with older learners might lead general discussions about how 
images influence our thoughts and actions before inviting learners to examine their own 
habits of thinking and imagining. Crucially, such discussions should touch upon the 
distinction between the integrative, exploratory functions of symbols in human cognition 
and the explanatory function of technical language like concepts and definitions. The 
point should be emphasized by discussing the cognitive and psychic benefits of symbolic 
expression and the ways in which mistaking symbolic language for explanatory language 
can lead to error and/or confusion. Because of the exigency for post-critical 
                                                
23 The repertoire of questions will be more limited and their formulation more basic for young learners 
who do not have as much life experience as do adults. 
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consciousness in many American contexts, it is imperative that teachers go beyond 
discussion of particular Christian symbols and, through conversations like this one, raise 
learners’ awareness about how symbols function in general. At this historical moment, 
such explicit discussions about the symbolic operations should be a standard component 
of adolescent and adult religious education. Both these meta-level discussions and 
conversations about particular images facilitate the self-appropriation that has become a 
practical necessity for faithful living in the postmodern context. 
Selecting symbols. Before going any further in our discussion of the activities of 
Phase Two, we must discuss the process by which teachers select the Christian symbol or 
symbols that will be the focus of the learning event. Although we take it for granted that 
Christian themes will constitute the heart of Christian religious education, the dissolution 
of the Christian social and cosmic imaginary in postmodernity has rendered this 
assumption problematic. Today Christian educators must grapple with questions that 
have directly or indirectly challenged the faith of many postmodern Christians. For 
example, Why do Christians privilege Christian symbols over non-Christian symbols? 
Even if teachers are themselves convinced of the value of Christian symbols, they must 
ask themselves why their students would elect to appropriate these symbols rather than 
others for the personal symbol system that guides their imagining and living. Why should 
learners place more value on Christian symbols than any of the countless others they 
encounter on a daily basis? 
For Christians, the most obvious answer to these questions is that these particular 
symbols assume special value because they are revealed by God. Taking the human need 
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for symbol into account, God has revealed certain symbols as part of the divine solution 
to the problem of human sin. Since humanity’s salvation depends upon these symbols, 
their importance for religious education is obvious. So the argument goes. The 
importance of these symbols is obvious if one believes in divine revelation, but today 
many people do not. Neither are they inclined to accept teaching on anyone else’s 
authority. For them, the proof of a symbol’s value lies in its effects—in its capacity to 
hold their attention, illuminate their experiences, and give coherence to their imagining 
and living. Therefore, when teaching learners of this persuasion, religious educators do 
best to present Christian symbols as David Tracy does in the Analogical Imagination, 
namely, as classics. A classic is by definition a symbol, text, etc. that illuminates and 
gives coherence to experience. As religious classics, the core symbols of the Christian 
faith have the power to do all of the above. Because they do so, recognizing Christian 
symbols as classics and centering religious education around them provides a partial 
solution to the question raised in the previous chapter regarding the possibility of 
unifying postmodern imaginations.24  
Still, as I have said, postmodern audiences are not inclined to take it on faith that 
Christian symbols are classics. They demand to see and experience their power for 
themselves. Their insistence upon personal verification places the onus on teachers not 
merely to tell them about Christian symbols but rather to draw learners into an encounter 
with them. Therefore, when selecting symbols for instruction, teachers must carefully 
consider which symbols are capable of delivering on this promise. 
                                                
24 Note that making use of revealed symbols is only one part of the solution. I will address the other 
elements of the solution in my discussion of Phase Three. 
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Practically speaking, the selection of the Christian symbol or symbols that will 
serve as the focal point of the learning event is typically the first step in the planning 
process. Once the teacher has made a selection, he or she can then plan out the Phase One 
activities that will lead to exploration of those symbols and the Phase Three activities that 
will follow upon this exploration. Exceptionally gifted teachers may have the ability to 
spontaneously present a Christian symbol in response to the student questions and 
reactions generated in Phase One. However, such ability is rare, and even gifted teachers 
are more likely to achieve their aims when they plan learning events carefully. If the 
teacher is following a textbook or established curriculum and topics for lessons are 
predetermined, the teacher’s role is to bring into relief the symbols at the heart of those 
topics. For example, at the heart of a lesson on salvation stands the symbols of the cross 
and resurrection. At the heart of a lesson on the Church stand the symbols of the Body of 
Christ and the People of God (among others).  
If teachers have the freedom to select topics for exploration, they should be 
intentional about the criteria guiding their selection. In the previous chapter, I highlighted 
Groome’s criteria for faithfully presenting the Christian Story and Vision. First among 
these was employing the reign of God as the metacriterion for pedagogical decisions. 
Other criteria concerned fidelity to the Christian tradition and community. If teachers are 
to do justice to the tradition, they cannot limit their teaching of Christian symbols to their 
personal favorites. Rather, teachers should look to incorporate the symbols that the 
Church has consistently found to be illuminating and revelatory through the ages. The 
official teachings of the hierarchical magisterium—for example, the General Directory 
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for Catechesis—are helpful resources for identifying these symbols.25 While drawing 
upon the wisdom of the universal Church, teachers should also select symbols with a 
sensitivity to the wisdom, concerns, and customs of the local church community. For 
example, a teacher working with a Mexican population would be making an egregious 
error by failing to incorporate the symbol of Our Lady of Guadalupe in the curriculum. 
Age-appropriateness is another factor to consider when selecting symbols.26 
Christian disciples’ reflection upon the history of God’s dealings with human 
beings has over the millennia yielded a coherent story (albeit with many sub-plots) and a 
symbol system that provides the (potential) framework for a coherent Christian 
imaginary. The integrity of a person’s or community’s interpretation of any particular 
Christian symbol depends upon interpreting that symbol with reference to the system as a 
whole. Coherence, therefore, constitutes another key criterion for teachers’ selection of 
symbols.27 Every symbol system includes a controlling symbol to which all other 
symbols refer and which norms interpretation of those symbols. In the Christian symbol 
system, Jesus Christ is that controlling symbol. Whatever the preferred hermeneutic and 
generative symbols for a particular teacher or community, these must consistently refer 
back to Jesus and his vision of the reign of God. Without this primary reference point, all 
other symbols lose their proper meaning and run the risk of becoming idols unto 
themselves. 
                                                
25 See Congregation for the Clergy, General Directory for Catechesis (Washington, D.C.: USCCB 
Publishing, 1998), no. 130. 
26 For example, graphic pictures of Jesus’ crucifixion would not be appropriate for young children. 
27 In proposing this criterion, I go beyond what Groome explicitly prescribes in Sharing Faith. 
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Thus far I have been speaking largely in generalities, but the Church does offer 
some concrete guidance concerning the particular symbols at the heart of the Christian 
symbol system. The locus classicus for this guidance is the Creed (Nicene-
Constantinopolitan or Apostles’), also referred to since its inception as the “symbol” of 
faith.28 The Creed expands upon the symbols of God the Father, Jesus the Son, the Holy 
Spirit, the Church, sin, and the resurrection of the dead using biblical and philosophical 
language. Implicit in the text is a three-phase account of salvation history—creation, 
redemption, and sanctification—with the saving work of Jesus constituting the center. 
These are the central symbols that Christians have discerned through lived experience to 
be revealed by God for our salvation. Therefore, these are the symbols that should form 
the core of all Christian religious education.  
For the sake of developing these core symbols in terms that are more practicable 
for teachers, I propose the following examples as appropriate symbols for Christian 
religious education. Concerning creation, teachers might focus instruction around the 
symbol of God the Father and Creator, the narrative of Genesis 1-2, and the symbols 
contained therein (e.g., the first man and woman, the garden, the tree of life). Concerning 
sin, important symbols include those in the narrative of Genesis 3-4 (e.g., the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil, expulsion from Eden, the first murder), Satan, Israel’s 
idolatry, the sins of Israel’s kings, and hell. Concerning redemption, important symbols 
include those found in the gospels and epistles, particularly Jesus’ birth/incarnation, 
                                                
28 To describe the Creed as a “symbol” is to use the term differently than I have employed it in this 
dissertation. Originally the Greek σύµβολον carried the meaning of a broken seal which, when united with 
the corresponding piece, verified the bearer's identity. Therefore, to refer to the Creed as a symbol is to 
indicate its function in confirming a Christian’s identity. 
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parables, miracles, death on the cross, resurrection, and ascension.29 Key symbols 
concerning sanctification include the Holy Spirit, the liturgy and sacraments (especially 
the Eucharist and baptism), the Church, apostles, disciples, saints, heaven, Scripture, and 
Tradition. Again, all of the above should be taught with reference to the controlling 
symbol of Jesus and his vision of the reign of God. 
Invitation to more adequate imagining. Once the teacher has settled upon the 
Christian symbol or symbols that will anchor the learning event, she or he can then plan 
out how to engage learners with the symbol in ways that will expand their imagining. 
Depending on the disposition of the learners, teachers can take a number of approaches to 
expanding and converting their imaginations, a few of which I will describe here. Of 
course, any group of learners will include people occupying very different mental spaces 
at any given moment, so the most effective teaching will incorporate a combination of 
these approaches over time.  
Teaching Christian symbols. The most basic approach to expanding imaginations 
is teaching Christian symbols to learners who have little or no prior exposure and no 
resistance to them. This would be the primary approach taken by teachers working with 
young children and converts to the Christian faith. Teachers can give learners access to 
these symbols in a variety of ways. In addition to the typical lectures, demonstrations, 
and media-enhanced presentations, teachers can lead learners in imaginative exercises 
(e.g., meditations upon Scripture passages). They can enhance learners’ engagement with 
these symbols further by modifying the learning environment itself (e.g., classroom 
                                                
29 As noted in the previous chapter, Jesus’ parables are uniquely suited to converting imaginations to the 
reign of God and should therefore be featured prominently in Christian religious education. 
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artwork, art supplies, access to literature and the internet) and creating opportunities for 
students to use, examine, and modify their imagining capabilities.  
In the case of neophyte learners, relatively few obstacles stand in the way of 
forming their imaginations in a Christian manner. Any engagement with Christian 
symbols is likely to expand their imagining. Nevertheless, no matter how young, learners 
are never a tabula rasa. From the moment of their birth and even before, they are 
influenced by their interactions with other human beings and by the media they consume. 
Some of these interactions and images may be compatible with a Christian imagination. 
In such circumstances, teachers have a readymade foundation upon which to help 
learners construct meaning about Christian symbols. For example, many young people 
today believe strongly in the values of tolerance, service, and social justice. Underlying 
these beliefs are images like those of a non-Christian friend, homeless people in a soup 
kitchen, and figures like Martin Luther King, Jr., which are compatible with Christian 
faith but not rooted in it (at least not in their minds). Because these images are highly 
compatible with Christian faith, teachers can use them as “pivot” images (more about 
which below) in order to help learners make meaningful connections with Christian 
symbols. For example, one might juxtapose an image of MLK leading a civil rights 
march with one of Jesus tending to the marginalized persons of his day (e.g., women and 
the poor) and explain the importance of King’s Christian faith for his social justice work. 
By contrast, many of the learners’ images will not be compatible with Christian faith. In 
these cases, teachers have recourse to other approaches described below. 
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Enriching Christian symbols. Aside from teaching symbols to those with no 
previous exposure, the most basic approach of those described here is teaching so as to 
enrich the Christian symbols from which learners are already living their lives. The 
reality of today is that teachers are less and less in a position to take this approach—at 
least initially—on account of the diminishing importance of Christian symbols and 
teachings in the lives of contemporary Catholics. Even if many contemporary students 
demonstrate some familiarity with Christian symbols, it is a much smaller contingent for 
whom those symbols exert an appreciable influence upon their imaginations and 
behaviors. However, that does not mean that this approach has become obsolete. In 
addition to serving the minority with some significant Catholic formation, this approach 
becomes highly useful for advanced learners who have already been educated in this 
pedagogical process for some time and have therefore built up a strong foundation of 
Christian symbols.30  
Both novice and advanced learners can benefit from the additional instruction and 
reflection on Christian symbols that this second approach provides. The more context one 
has and the more one learns about the ways Christians have understood symbols (like the 
tree of knowledge or the cross), the better one is able to interpret and appropriate their 
meaning for oneself. Another universal benefit of this approach is helping learners to 
develop and maintain a balanced understanding of the Christian symbol system. By 
further contextualizing and exploring more deeply these Christian symbols, learners 
acquire a more thorough understanding of their interconnectedness. Fostering this sense 
                                                
30 We will be better able to appreciate this claim at the end of the chapter where I emphasize the 
importance of the recursive nature of this pedagogical process. 
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of interconnectedness mitigates the temptation to fixate narrowly on any one symbol or 
set of symbols and generally promotes learners’ openness to receiving God’s revelation 
in a variety of forms.31 Indeed, an essential task of Phase Two—regardless of the 
particular approach—is instilling in learners an awareness of the inadequacy of any and 
all images or descriptions of God that human beings can generate. Any image can harden 
into an idol if fixated upon exclusively or if one’s imagining grows lethargic. 
Furthermore, in addition to promoting learners’ cognitive understanding, this approach 
supports their affective development. Additional instruction and reflection can help 
learners to see the same symbols in a different light, infusing those symbols with new 
feeling tones. In this way, an overly familiar symbol can take on new life and re-energize 
learners’ imagining and living. 
Teachers can enrich learners’ thinking about Christian symbols in a variety of 
ways. One strategy that we noted in Jesus’ teaching and have already mentioned above is 
the use of “pivot” images. One reason for Jesus’ pedagogical effectiveness was his genius 
for giving his hearers insights into a mysterious, transcendent reality (viz., the reign of 
God) through the mediation of familiar, everyday images. For example, pivoting upon the 
image of the common mustard seed, Jesus helped his hearers come to a new realization 
about the subtle yet powerful growth of God’s reign. Contemporary teachers do not need 
to possess Jesus’ pedagogical genius to do likewise. All that is needed, most basically, is 
to connect faith symbols to images drawn from learners’ everyday experiences. For 
                                                
31 For example, while the image of God as Father is a perfectly appropriate starting point for imagining 
God, further exploration of images of God as Mother and Creator can prevent the Father image from 
ossifying into an idol and chauvinistic habits of thought. 
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instance, by relating the Eucharist to the image of a family meal or baptism to an image 
of bathing, teachers can help learners discover deeper, more personal meaning in those 
Christian symbols. No symbol—including Christian symbols—reveal God or cause 
personal integration automatically, that is to say, independently of the workings of human 
minds. These symbols must be explored and interpreted. To the extent that teachers give 
learners a personal context for interpreting Christian symbols and the time to explore 
them, learners are more likely to find meaning in them and be transformed by them. 
A number of other strategies are available to teachers for the purpose of enriching 
learners’ thinking about Christian symbols. Two of these include pairing learners with 
others who imagine in a more sophisticated way during discussions and learning 
activities and teachers modeling more sophisticated imagining themselves. As an 
example of the latter, while reading a passage of Scripture, teachers might employ the 
“talk aloud” technique, externalizing their thought processes for interpreting the meaning 
of the story. Engaging with students in this exercise repeatedly over time helps not only 
to deepen learners’ understanding of these stories but also to form them in similar habits 
of imagining. Teachers can also enrich students’ imagining by consistently employing 
multiple symbols with reference to any given topic (e.g., imagining the Church as Body 
of Christ, community of believers, and servant of the world). Doing so stretches learners’ 
imaginations and guards against narrowly identifying God, grace, etc. with any particular 
image. 
A different way teachers can enrich the imagining of learners is by gradually 
introducing postmodern intellectual challenges into class discussion. Modernity and then 
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postmodernity have brought successive waves of critique to the shores of the traditional 
Christian imaginary. They have cast aspersions on the credibility of Christian teachings 
and biblical accounts in light of modern scientific discoveries (e.g., evolution, the Big 
Bang Theory) and the findings of historical-critical scholarship. They have questioned the 
legitimacy of Church authority as well as the efficacy of the sacraments and all religious 
ritual. It is highly likely that Catholics living in the U.S. today will encounter these 
critiques throughout the course of their lifetimes. If not in the form of direct 
argumentation, these challenges commonly come in the form of offhand comments and 
the subtext of pronouncements from public figures, educators, and colleagues.  
Given this likelihood, it is far preferable that teachers address these challenges in 
the classroom context, where they can lead learners in thoughtful reflection upon them 
and provide learners with theological and mental resources for responding to such 
critiques. More than arming students with stock apologetic rejoinders to critiques of 
Christian faith, this preparation should train them in critical thinking skills (e.g., 
adjudicating truth claims, identifying biases, distinguishing between appropriate and 
inappropriate modes of knowing for a given context) that will enable more versatile 
responses to these challenges. For example, while reading Genesis 1-2, the teacher might 
ask students if this account conflicts with scientific theories about the origins of life on 
Earth, leading into a conversation about literary genres in the Bible and the compatibility 
of faith and reason. Such activities are one way that Phase Two explicitly promotes a 
more resilient faith and greater cognitive flexibility, which has become a practical 
necessity in many postmodern cultures. 
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Challenging unChristian images. In contrast to enriching the Christian symbols 
from which learners already live, often teachers will have to challenge images that 
conflict with and undermine Christian faith. This approach typically requires a more 
dramatic disruption of learners’ current ways of imagining as well as offering more 
salutary alternatives. To be clear, the intent of this approach is not to coerce learners of 
different faith traditions into converting to Catholicism. The decision to change religious 
affiliations may result from this process, but that is not its aim. It is true that this 
pedagogical process aims to convert learners’ imaginations to Jesus’ vision of the reign 
of God. However, in the first place, the reign of God transcends the symbols, concepts, 
and teachings of any particular religion, including Christianity. People of different faiths 
can and do seek the reality Jesus symbolized as “God’s reign” without ever describing 
their actions and intent in these Christian terms. In the second place, this process 
promotes the conversion of imaginations in a manner that invites and requires learners’ 
willing, active participation. Remember, conversion always requires a conscious 
decision. Therefore, when I speak of images that undermine Christian faith, I think not of 
the Jewish Law or the prophet Muhammad but rather of the image of piles of cash that 
serves as a person’s symbol of fulfillment or the high-tech weaponry that serves as 
another’s symbol of strength and security.32 This is the sort of imagining that needs 
converting most urgently. 
In the previous chapter, we explored how Jesus prompted such conversion 
through his parables. Learning from Jesus’ example, we can identify a number of 
                                                
32 In some circumstances, it might even be appropriate to use symbols from other faith traditions as the 
focal symbols in this pedagogical process. 
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strategies for disrupting and expanding learners’ imaginations. The most direct way to 
disrupt people’s current imagining is to give them a first-hand experience that challenges 
their way of imagining things. This is what Jesus did when, for example, the scribes 
doubted his authority to forgive sins and he healed the man’s paralysis (see Mk 2:1-12). 
Today teachers might disrupt learners’ stereotypes about homeless people being lazy and 
drunk by arranging for them to meet actual homeless people. Given the effort and time 
planning this sort of experience demands, teachers typically are not able to arrange such 
experiences very frequently and so must find alternatives. One alternative is providing 
learners with opportunities to converse with people who see things differently than they 
do. This might involve arranging a video chat via Skype or Google Chat with a person 
from a different cultural or religious background or, more commonly, allowing time for 
classmates to talk to one another. No two people see the world exactly the same, and 
more often than not an earnest conversation with another person can be enough to make 
us question whether there might be another way of looking at things.  
Although personal interactions of this nature tend to be the most powerful when it 
comes to disrupting imaginations, teachers also have other means at their disposal. The 
most effective of these show rather than tell learners that their imagining is inadequate. 
Artwork, movies, music, and literature, because of their symbolic nature, have special 
potential for breaking through reified mental categories and touching people at the deeper 
level of their imaginations. In addition to teaching Jesus’ parables, which possess a 
unique power to disrupt and convert imaginations to the reign of God, teachers can also 
profitably draw upon the work of modern artists and authors. Flannery O’Connor is a 
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wonderful example of a contemporary author whose stories draw readers into a vicarious 
experience of the world and then turn that world on its head.  
If teachers cannot arrange an experience, a conversation, or an artistic encounter 
that suits their needs, they can provide learners with vicarious experiences through 
imaginative exercises of their own devising. For example, so many movies and TV 
programs glorify the pleasures of premarital sex, thereby forming viewers’ imagining 
about this aspect of life in a decidedly unChristian manner. In order to challenge this 
formation, teachers might have their students watch a TV episode of this sort in class or 
at home and then invite them to imagine alternative—perhaps more realistic—endings to 
the episode: What if, rather than feeling exhilarated by the one-night-stand, the character 
feels used and cheapened? How might they respond? This exercise could then lead into a 
fruitful conversation about why the Church teaches what it does about premarital sex. 
Another strategy for disrupting imaginations that we saw operative in Jesus’ 
parables was pivoting upon a familiar, comfortable image into a decidedly discomforting 
vision. I have already twice mentioned pivot images, but the difference between this case 
and those above is that here the teacher uses the image not to help learners relate to 
Christian symbols but rather to draw them in before overturning their way of seeing 
things. For example, a teacher might invite learners into a discussion about why they like 
Apple products (iPhones, iPads, Apple Watches, etc.) before pivoting upon the image of 
the apple into a discussion of the fruit Adam and Eve took from the forbidden tree33: 
                                                
33 Making use of transition effects on PowerPoint is one way that teachers can effect this transition 
visually. 
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What is the allure of this fruit? How does the temptation distract or lead people away 
from God?  
In addition to employing this pivot technique, teachers can employ images in 
different ways to the same effect. Rather than pivoting upon a particular image, they 
might directly contrast a less adequate symbol (e.g., sports figure as hero) with a more 
adequate Christian symbol (e.g., saint as model). They might also employ a “bridging” 
technique (see Chapter Four) that gradually leads learners from a more familiar but less 
adequate image though progressively more adequate images until they arrive at a 
Christian symbol that is most adequate. For example, a teacher might play a popular song 
from the radio with a message about what constitutes the good life (e.g., "Time Of Our 
Lives" by Pitbull and Ne-Yo) and discuss the (in)adequacy of that vision. Then the 
teacher would play and discuss several other songs that evince progressively more 
adequate visions, culminating in a song with explicitly Christian lyrics.  
In all of these strategies for disrupting inadequate imagining, teachers will be 
better able to achieve their intended goal the more familiar they become with the ways 
people’s imagining deviates into idolatry and error.34 The likelihood of success will 
likewise be increased to the extent that teachers attend to learners’ emotional needs 
through the use of humor, peer empathizing, and the other strategies discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
                                                
34 Other subjects provide analogues for what I mean. The most effective foreign language teachers, for 
example, know and anticipate the mistakes non-native speakers commonly make. While there is no 
substitute for experience, religious educators will benefit in this regard from familiarizing themselves with 
studies of symbolic thinking such as the one we undertook in Chapter Three. 
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A common culmination. Whether teaching Christian symbols to learners with no 
prior exposure, enriching learners’ imagining, or disrupting it, all of the above strategies 
should culminate in or include a compelling presentation of a Christian symbol or 
symbols and the way of imagining they engender. In the context of this three-phase 
pedagogical process, this presentation constitutes the most crucial invitation to learners to 
a new, more adequate manner of imagining and possibly to a full conversion of the 
imagination. At this moment in the process, the teacher invites learners to go beyond 
what they previously knew and imagined and open themselves to a Christian way of 
seeing reality.  
As I have already said, in some cases the challenge to learners to expand their 
imaginations will coincide with the teacher’s presentation of the Christian symbols. This 
might be the case, for instance, when teaching with Jesus’ parables, which in themselves 
both pose a challenge to their audience and invite them into an experience of God’s reign. 
In other cases, presentation of the Christian symbols will follow upon the challenge 
sequentially. This presentation can take myriad forms, many of which I have already 
mentioned—storytelling, reading Scripture and other Christian literature, viewing art and 
film, and imaginative exercises, to name a few. Whatever the form, it is at this point that 
teachers will explore with learners the Christian symbol or symbols they selected to serve 
as the focal point for the learning event. If learners find that this exploration of the 
Christian vision illuminates their experience, they are more likely to consummate their 
conversion by making a decision for the reign of God in Phase Three.  
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Because this is the moment of the teaching process with which educators are most 
familiar, I will not go into great depth explaining the various ways in which teachers can 
give learners access to the imaginative riches of the Christian tradition. It will suffice to 
offer a couple of guidelines concerning this phase of the process. First of all, it cannot be 
stressed enough how important it is to keep learners’ imaginations active during this 
second phase of the process. That is to not to say that teachers must refrain entirely from 
lecture or from using abstract language. Indeed, this is the appropriate moment in the 
process to introduce doctrinal formulations and technical language, which here can serve 
the indispensable function of differentiating and refining learners’ thinking about the 
topic at hand. Rather, it is only to say that teachers should strive to strike a balance in 
their use of symbolic and explanatory language. If teachers over-explain the symbols and 
inundate learners with definitions and technical qualifications, they will stifle their 
imaginations, sap them of their interest in the topic, and increase the likelihood that they 
will cease making meaningful connections with what the teacher says.35 On the other 
hand, if teachers limit their teaching to symbolic expressions with no recourse to 
explanatory language, they deprive learners of the intellectual resources that would 
enable them to understand their experiences clearly and to judge the reality of what they 
imagine. Alternating regularly between symbolic and explanatory language and activities, 
combined with frequent questioning activities, increases the likelihood that learners will 
remain imaginatively engaged throughout the process. 
                                                
35 The reader will recall that Jesus rarely seemed concerned to clear up his disciples’ confusion. More 
important to him was drawing them deeper into an encounter with God, even if they did not understand 
perfectly what they were experiencing. Contemporary religious educators, too, must be willing to tolerate a 
certain amount of confusion in the midst of the learning process. 
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Secondly, it is important to reiterate yet again that teachers should regularly relate 
the symbols in focus to Jesus and his vision of the reign of God. This is not to say that 
teachers must mention Jesus in every sentence or even in every lesson, but relating the 
various symbols of the Christian symbol system to its controlling symbol (viz., Jesus) 
should be an ingrained habit for teachers. Only in relation to the person of Jesus do these 
other symbols convey their full meaning, and only by referring them back to Jesus can 
teachers be relatively assured that no symbol will become an idol or distraction from the 
proper focal point of Christian faith. Even if the teacher is confident that students 
understand intellectually that Jesus is the cornerstone of Christianity, regularly relating 
other topics to this central symbol makes it more likely that this intellectual 
understanding will permeate to the level of learners’ spontaneous imagining and so 
transform their very way of seeing and living in the world. 
In contexts where assessment of students’ learning is required, the end of Phase 
Two provides the most appropriate occasion for administering a traditional test that 
evaluates students’ mastery of the aspects of Catholic faith highlighted in the learning 
event. As we will see momentarily, the growth achieved in Phase Three is of a more 
personal, spiritual nature and therefore not something that can be easily assessed by 
traditional means or assigned a grade.  
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Phase Three: Appropriation of Christian Imagining 
Goal(s) and Function 
Following upon the disruption of Phase Two, Phase Three aims primarily to 
facilitate learners’ reintegration of their imagining in an authentically Christian imaginal 
synthesis. Of course, this is the goal of the pedagogical process as a whole, but it is only 
through the activities of this third phase, which builds upon the work of the first two, that 
an integration of the sort we seek can be achieved. Phase Two may itself initiate this 
reintegration by engaging learners with revelatory symbols that bear special potential for 
unifying the human person. However, these symbols also tend to disrupt the average 
person’s imagining, especially upon initial exposure, so it is important to devote time 
specifically to this work of reintegration.  
Since achieving a stable imaginal integration demands not only synthesizing 
fragmented experiences but also overcoming fragmenting habits of imagining, Phase 
Three aims at a conversion—rather than a mere modification—of the imagination. Since 
the most resilient integration comes as a result of learners’ deliberate imagining, it aims 
to facilitate their critical appropriation of the Christian imaginary by inviting them to 
make judgments about and decisions based on that imaginary. In this regard, two sub-
goals contribute significantly to Phase Three’s primary goal of integrating imaginations, 
namely, to promote learners’ cognitive flexibility and facilitate their self-appropriation. 
 
Cognitional Underpinnings 
Our exploration of human cognition in Chapter Two helped us to appreciate the 
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astonishing orchestration of sensory and mental functions required to achieve integration 
in one’s imagining (to say nothing of the additional bodily and affective orchestration 
needed to achieve integration in one’s living). Such integration is a remarkable 
cognitional achievement in any circumstance, but it has become a particularly 
challenging feat in postmodernity given the fragmenting effect of modern media and 
advertising. With increasing numbers of people struggling to forge a coherent vision of 
life, an emphasis on integrating activities has becomes an urgent pedagogical exigency 
for most American Catholics.  
While addressing this general exigency, the activities of Phase Three carry special 
benefits for critical thinkers, the population with which this dissertation has been 
primarily concerned. As the label suggests, today’s critical thinkers are perfectly capable 
of high-level, analytical thinking, perhaps more so than any preceding generation. 
However, for all their perspicacity in seeing through the potential distortions of symbolic 
consciousness, they typically fail to recognize the importance of symbol for alternative 
modes of knowing and for personal integration. The growth in self-awareness 
culminating in post-critical consciousness that Phase Three facilitates helps critical 
thinkers to overcome this myopia and restore integration to their lives. Not only is 
integration a need for people at all levels of cognitive development; it is a need that must 
be addressed every day. Given the ubiquity of this exigency, addressing it must be a 
standard function of religious education, especially when helping learners to process 
challenging new images and information. 
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As we have learned from the research in previous chapters, pedagogical attention 
to image and symbol is among the most effective strategies for promoting integration in 
learners’ thinking and living. Still, although activating learners’ imaginations is necessary 
for the task of promoting integration, it is not sufficient. Something needs to give order to 
the barrage of images rushing through the mind. Such is the role of reflective judgment. 
If one’s imaginal integration is to be a differentiated synthesis rather than an unremitting 
stream of random images, one must be deliberate about judging the adequacy of the 
images that flow through one’s mind. For there is a unity to the imagining of the 
adolescent boy who spends every spare minute playing Grand Theft Auto and who looks 
upon the wider world as if it were an extension of that virtual reality. Likewise, there is a 
unity in his living to the extent that he replicates in his real life the reprehensible actions 
that earn him points in that video game. However, this unity in his imagining derives 
from the intensity of the images in the game, not their adequacy to representing reality as 
it is. His living is integrated insofar as he acts upon what he imagines and his actions are 
consistent, but it lacks integration in the deeper sense that his actions are at odds with the 
values toward which his own intelligent questioning orients him and which he would 
affirm were he to judge them reasonably.36 Hence, imagination that is not only integrated 
but also true to reality requires an ingrained habit of judging one’s mental images.  
Living that is not only integrated but also authentically Christian involves acting 
upon one’s judgments of the worth of what one envisions. Phase Three facilitates such 
                                                
36 Similar observations might be made about the patterns of imagining that led to the dissolution of the 
Christian cosmic and social imaginary described by Taylor. There was a unity to 18th- and 19th-century 
Christians’ imagining (viz., an image of the world as the work of a Deistic God and, later, as a mechanistic, 
self-sustaining universe). However, had these Christians been more deliberate about judging the adequacy 
of these images, they would have found them inconsistent with the Christian tradition. 
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action in two ways. First, the activities of this phase encourage learners to express their 
learning from Phase Two in concrete images, which are more readily acted upon than 
abstractions. Second, they deliberately facilitate the work of self-appropriation, which 
requires patterned acts of judging and deciding. By encouraging consistent performance 
of these acts, Phase Three aims at empowering learners for integrated, authentically 
Christian living. 
 
Method and Procedures 
Phase Three corresponds to movements 4 and 5 of Groome’s shared praxis. As 
with Phases One and Two, I presume the procedures Groome describes as a foundation 
for Phase Three and so will focus on activities that augment what he has prescribed or 
that are particularly important for the work of converting learners’ imaginations. The 
activities of Phase Three invite learners to make informed judgments about the adequacy 
and value of their imagining and of Christian symbols, to make responsible decisions in 
accord with the values expressed in those symbols, to enhance their awareness of and 
control over their judging and decision-making, and generally to undergo a conversion in 
their imagining.  
As I and other authors have consistently emphasized, it is outside the power of 
religious educators to compel conversion in their students. Hence, the procedures I 
describe below are best understood as invitations to learners to abandon old ways of 
imagining in favor of imagining as Jesus did. In addition to conducting these learning 
activities in a manner that shows respect for students’ agency, teachers guard against 
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coercion in their teaching by leading learners in exercises that promote their self-
appropriation. I have designed the dynamics of Phase Three so as to make these exercises 
a standard component of the learning process and to provide teachers with clearer 
guidance for facilitating self-appropriation than is available in existing works on religious 
education. 
Building upon the work of the first two phases, the next step in the process of 
self-appropriation involves objectifying the role of reflective judgment in authentic 
cognition and habituating learners in making reasoned judgments upon their imagining. 
To this end, teachers invite learners through a variety of exercises to make judgments 
about the adequacy of Christian symbols and their own manner of imagining. Once again, 
the emphasis here is on “invite”. If these faith symbols are to become and remain the 
orienting images in learners’ lives, learners must affirm their value for themselves and 
appropriate them deliberately. They must be able to render reasoned judgments about the 
value and adequacy of Christian symbols based on immanently generated norms rather 
than the say-so of others. Without this sort of deliberate, effortful process of 
appropriation, these symbols are likely to get lost in the mix with all the others learners 
absorb from the wider culture.  
The most basic step teachers can take to empower learners to make such 
autonomous judgments is forming them in a habit of constantly asking questions about 
the images foisted upon them and about their own imagining.37 Cultivation of this habit 
                                                
37 More sophisticated forms of judging and decision-making exercises are beyond the capacity of young 
children. Nevertheless, young children can at least begin forming habits of questioning, judging, and 
deciding, even if the criteria for their judgments are not well considered or especially rigorous. 
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occurs throughout the pedagogical process, but the third phase is a particularly fruitful 
time for asking questions like, Do these images illuminate my experiences? Who created 
them? What were their motivations? What experiences have given rise to my own mental 
images? What values and potential biases underlie them? Developing a habit for asking 
questions such as these strengthens one’s resistance to bias as well as one’s abilities to 
know reality accurately and to process new experiences and input in a coherent way.38 On 
a related note, it is important that teachers encourage learners to articulate their lingering 
questions at the end of any learning event. Doing so not only promotes the habit of 
critical questioning but also conveys to learners that formal religious education cannot 
provide exhaustive answers to every question. There is always more to learn, especially 
when it comes to God, and religious educators should make that fact abundantly clear to 
their students 
A second way teachers can assist learners in developing their powers of judgment 
and self-appropriating their imagining is one I mentioned in the previous chapter, namely, 
suggesting hermeneutical guidelines for assessing the value of images.39 Intentional 
appropriation of such guidelines is necessary lest learners base their assessments of 
images on tacit, less rigorous criteria. I am careful to say that teachers should “suggest” 
hermeneutical guidelines because they must be deliberately appropriated rather than 
imposed if learners’ judgments are to genuinely be their own. Drawing upon a few of the 
                                                
38 Insofar as these questioning activities raise one’s consciousness of the dynamics of and influences on 
one’s imagining, they contribute to the process of psychic conversion, which is a key component of what I 
mean here by self-appropriation. 
39 In the last chapter, I pointed out that teachers would greatly assist their students by presenting such 
guidelines to their students as Groome does for educators in Sharing Faith. 
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guidelines Groome proposes for educators that are also appropriate for guiding learners’ 
judging, I recommend that learners should: (a) employ the reign of God as the 
metacriterion or controlling symbol for their imagining, (b) attend to the distorting and 
illuminating potential of their own interests and perspectives, and (c) strongly favor 
continuity with the Christian tradition and union with the Christian community. 
Furthermore, learners should also (d) place value upon images to the extent that they 
illuminate their experiences, reveal God, and lead to holy living.  
Beyond simply presenting these criteria to learners for their affirmation, teachers 
can employ several strategies to encourage appropriation. First, they can demonstrate the 
importance of these particular criteria, perhaps by contrasting them with less helpful 
criteria that might be operating implicitly in learners’ thinking. Teachers can also walk 
learners through assessing various symbols using these criteria, and then, based on this 
experience, invite learners to decide whether or not it makes sense to them to adopt these 
criteria as their standard of judgment. While learners should by no means wait to make 
judgments until they have been trained in this way, objectifying their personal criteria for 
judgment provides a more solid basis for judging the adequacy of images.  
Once learners have established this basis, they are in better position to make 
reasoned judgments about the value of the Christian symbols presented by the teacher 
and about their own mental images. Typically judging activities will follow immediately 
after learners’ engagement with the Christian symbol(s). Since Phase Three also involves 
learners judging the adequacy of their own mental images, teachers may need to invite 
learners to recall the observations they made about their own imagining at the beginning 
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of Phase Two (or whenever they did so). Beyond teachers simply asking questions that 
elicit learners’ judgments (the most common activity in movement 4 of SCP), Groome 
suggests that teachers can invite learners to express their judgments through speaking, 
writing and sharing, drawing and explaining, creating a symbol or aesthetic expression, 
journaling, movement, role playing, panel discussions, debates, and other activities.  
As Groome’s list of activities suggests, sometimes learners need to feel their way 
into a judgment or creatively explore the possibilities suggested by the Christian symbols 
before making a judgment.40 In addition to the activities Groome describes, this 
exploration might take the form of learners telling stories or sketching out what a 
personal symbol system consistent with that of Christianity would look like. Teachers 
might also encourage learners to try out behaviors and roles consistent with Christian 
imagining and then provide opportunities for reflection upon those experiments in class. 
Whatever the means, these activities should culminate in an opportunity for learners to 
render explicit judgments about the adequacy of the Christian symbols and their own 
imagining. In so doing, they not only appropriate these Christian symbols in a more 
meaningful way but also reintegrate their imaginations (at least for the time being). 
Once learners have made a judgment concerning the adequacy of Christian 
symbols and their own imagining, teachers should make explicit and encourage learners 
to address the existential question that naturally follows: If this way of imagining is really 
true and worthwhile, what will I do about it? That “what” may involve performing a 
                                                
40 In this regard, Groome’s pedagogical guidance supports the work of psychic conversion described by 
Doran. Like Groome, Doran argues that, more than intellectual understanding, authentically Christian 
living requires the integration of sensing, feeling, and thinking. 
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discrete action, like apologizing for wrongdoing, or it might involve something more 
comprehensive, like submitting oneself to long-term training that will form one’s 
imagining in a more Christian way.41 In the most extreme case, the question is a question 
of accepting conversion: Will I reorient my imagining to this vision of the reign of God 
with all it implies for my life? This is the question and the decision toward which the 
whole pedagogical process leads. The teacher’s efforts in Phases One and Two to engage 
and challenge learners’ imaginations serve primarily to bring them to this moment in 
which they might make the crucial decision to imagine otherwise, to willingly accept the 
conversion to which God is calling them.  
Even though these questions naturally present themselves to consciousness when 
one judges something to be true and worthwhile, it is important that teachers make the 
questions explicit for learners lest they ignore them or defer a response. Indeed, such a 
(non)response is entirely likely given the resistance typically generated by radical 
challenges to a person’s current ways of constructing meaning. Making these questions 
explicit is one more way in which teachers play an instrumental role in facilitating the 
integration of learners’ imagining and living that is so integral to psychic conversion. 
 By way of example, at the end of a learning event centered around the creation 
stories of Genesis 1-2, the teacher might ask learners to decide how they will concretely 
show respect for themselves and others, who are created in the imago Dei. Or, in a 
learning event about Jesus’ parable of the good Samaritan, learners might decide how to 
                                                
41 Submitting to long-term training might involve, for example, committing oneself more intentionally to 
the learning process described here or seeking clinical assistance (e.g., the Neuro-Linguistic Programming 
described by Timothy O’Connell or the sort of psychotherapy prescribed by Doran as part of the process of 
psychic conversion). 
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be better neighbors to the people they encounter in their lives. Often the larger question 
of accepting a conversion of one’s imagination will arise spontaneously for different 
persons at different times. However, teachers can raise the issue explicitly from time to 
time by asking questions like, Does your new understanding of this symbol demand a 
change in the way you imagine reality as a whole? Responses to these questions may be 
written or not, but either way teachers should allow adequate time for learners to reflect 
in concerted and imaginative ways.  
While teachers must be careful to respect the autonomy of learners in making 
judgments and decisions, it is neither necessary nor possible nor advisable to create a 
vacuum for learners’ decision-making. Depending on the context, it may be more or less 
appropriate for teachers to persuade learners to decision and action. As noted in Chapter 
Four, persuasion is not to be confused with coercion or manipulation. Persuasion appeals 
to learners’ emotions and reasoning, encouraging them to make full use of their cognitive 
abilities to arrive at the best possible decision. Coercion and manipulation obscure 
alternatives, circumvent learners’ reasoning, and/or constrain decision-making. Still, even 
when it comes to genuine, non-coercive persuasion, the fervor of the teacher’s appeal 
must be appropriate to the setting. Good teachers help their students to see the beauty and 
value in any subject matter they engage, but the nature of a teacher’s appeal to a parish 
catechesis class will differ significantly from another’s appeal to a high school religion 
class that includes non-Catholics. 
The reality of the situation is that we all rely heavily on the testimony of others in 
various matters. No decision is ever completely free from outside influence. Given the 
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ubiquity of less salutary influences, it is entirely appropriate in most circumstances that a 
Christian teacher should encourage his or her students to make what the more 
experienced and presumably wiser teacher has found to be the best choice. Indeed, as we 
learned from Doran in Chapter Four, willingly submitting to the persuasion of others is 
often necessary to bring one’s living into alignment with one’s imagining. There are 
many ways teachers can make their presentation of Christian symbols persuasive (e.g., by 
offering personal testimony, seriously engaging Jesus’ parables, or sharing stories of holy 
people like Dorothy Day and Oscar Romero, who provide an exceptional witness to the 
Christian way of life). However, it need not be only the teacher who makes a persuasive 
case for the value of Christian symbols. Learners are much more likely to appropriate a 
Christian manner of imagining if they see others—especially their peers—doing so and 
thriving as a result. Whatever the source of this persuasion and encouragement, it can 
offer the support learners need to make the bold step from imagining to acting.  
Once learners have made a decision for faith, teachers should provide them with 
opportunities to translate their decisions into action and synthesize their new manner of 
imagining. Creating such opportunities is of the utmost importance, for nothing 
consolidates new ideas and images more effectively than acting upon them in a consistent 
fashion. Obviously there are constraints on what teachers typically are able to do within 
the classroom context or in limited excursions, but teachers can certainly engage learners 
in activities that help to bridge decision and action. Most basically, learners can develop a 
plan of action specifying how they will act upon their decisions. This plan might take the 
form of a month-long prayer schedule or something as simple as a text message reminder 
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to oneself to say “I love you” upon returning home to one’s spouse. For learners who 
have undergone a full-scale conversion of the imagination, the changes in their behavior 
are likely to be more drastic and wide-ranging.  
Many of the judging activities described above, when employed in the wake of a 
significant decision, can also facilitate the integration of newly appropriated images into 
the person’s spontaneous level of imagining. Storytelling, for example, weaves new 
images into the personal narrative that gives coherence to a person’s life. Artistic 
expression similarly helps to integrate one’s ideas, images, and feelings in a way that 
approximates commonsense, everyday patterns of thought. Whatever particular activities 
are employed, it is crucial that they help learners to synthesize their new imagining in a 
manner that reaches all the way down to the level of concrete, human-scale images. If the 
reign of God is really to take hold in people’s lives, it must become populated with 
images of what it looks like to embody God’s reign while taking a school exam, shopping 
for groceries, or arguing with one’s spouse. Hence, teachers should dedicate the final 
moments of this process to allowing learners to imagine the implications of the day’s 
topic in concrete, personal terms and to identify key images that will root God’s reign in 
the ordinariness of their everyday lives.42 For example, at the end of a learning event 
about baptism, a learner might resolve to sign herself with the sign of cross before drying 
off from her morning shower and when washing up at day’s end as a daily reminder of 
her baptismal vows. 
                                                
42 This concrete image might even provide the point of departure for the next iteration of the learning 
process. See the following section for an explanation of the recursive nature of this process. 
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For all of these Phase Three activities, time is of the essence. Teachers must allow 
learners time and mental space to appropriate new patterns of imagining in meaningful 
ways. If teachers are in too much of a hurry to move on to the next topic, learners may 
remember the content covered, but the learning event is less likely to lead to self-
appropriation and conversion. 
As mentioned above, one cannot place a point value on a person’s transformation 
or assign it a grade. Nevertheless, assessing learners’ progress in a less formal manner 
will help teachers in responding to students’ learning needs as it will learners in 
recognizing their personal growth. If the teacher is immediately beginning another cycle 
of the three-phase process with the same group of learners, the assessment conducted in 
Phase One (see Appendix I) may suffice for evaluating learners’ progress in the previous 
cycle. If the teacher will not be continuing with the same students or the next cycle will 
focus on an unrelated topic, the teacher may conduct an assessment at the end of Phase 
Three using the same set of questions and criteria employed in Phase One. 
 
Repeating the Process—The Key to Effectiveness 
Lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, it will do to synthesize the preceding 
sections with some comments about how this pedagogical process functions as a whole. 
The sum effect of the process is truly greater than that of its parts. Although the diverse 
procedures described within each of the three phases play a significant role in integrating 
imaginations and promoting self-appropriation, the single most important factor in the 
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effectiveness of this pedagogical approach is disarmingly simple: The process must be 
conducted in a recursive manner. 
Why is the repetition of this process so crucial for its effectiveness? The reasons 
are several. First, there are those pertaining to the dynamics at play in the integrative 
work of the imagination. Imaginal integration requires relative stability in the core of 
one’s symbol system, but postmodern criticism of metanarratives, embrace of plurality, 
and the explosion of imagery in modern technological cultures all conspire against such 
stability. Given this state of affairs, lessons about Christian symbols without subsequent 
reinforcement are bound to be lost in the mix. Even more dynamic educational 
approaches like Groome’s shared praxis and my own, which produce more resilient 
learning on account of their experiential, engaging methodology, are inadequate to 
preparing learners for sustaining imaginal integration if they are conducted as merely 
one-off or occasional learning sessions.43  
The symbols that exert the greatest influence over people’s imagining are those 
that carry the strongest emotional charge and that are most interconnected with other 
personally important symbols, invested with the richest meaning, and reinforced most 
consistently by experience. If Christian symbols are to constitute the core of people’s 
symbol systems, those people must continue to discover ever new levels of beauty and 
meaning in them through their education, the liturgy, art, and other formative 
experiences. This is to say that, in today’s context, Christian religious education will only 
                                                
43 In Sharing Faith, Groome clearly envisions SCP as a process that can be used in an ongoing manner 
(see, e.g., p.293), but he does not make the case that conducting SCP in an ongoing manner is essential for 
achieving its aims as I do for my approach. 
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succeed in forming disciples’ imaginations for the reign of God insofar as it continuously 
revisits the central symbols of Christian faith, building more and more connections with 
other faith symbols and images from everyday life and giving learners reason to return to 
those symbols time and again. 
Still, even the most thorough religious education constitutes a relatively small 
portion of the sum of a person’s life experiences. The influence of this education is 
dwarfed by the continuous formation people receive from television, the internet, movies, 
popular music, and advertising. In order to contend with these competing influences, 
religious education must train learners to take control of their imagining. This, too, 
requires more than occasional exercises in Christian imagining; it requires continuous 
formation. For young learners, whose mental habits are still highly malleable, an 
extended period of training (perhaps three, five, or ten years) might be adequate to form 
life-long habits of Christian imagining.44 For adults, who are more set in their ways of 
thinking and imagining, a much longer (if not indefinite) period would likely be required.  
Most basically, this formation involves training learners to regularly revisit core 
Christian symbols, seeking new meaning in them, and to reintegrate their imagining in 
light of new images and experiences. The ideal process for this training is none other than 
that laid out in three phases in this chapter. Of special importance in the dynamics of 
those three phases is the manner in which they encourage learners to critically examine 
not only the symbols of Christian faith and the images in their own minds but also the 
                                                
44 This is not a precise estimate. Further quantitative research would be necessary to gather more precise 
data. My key point is only that habits that are deeply ingrained in children’s formative years often persist 
throughout their lifetime. However, even in the case of children, an extended period of training is required. 
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manner in which their imaginations operate upon those images. This critical self-
examination—which I have been referring to as a process of self-appropriation of one’s 
imagination—involves deliberately attending to one’s imagining (especially in Phase 
One), understanding one’s imagining and the Christian way of imagining (especially in 
Phase Two), and judging the adequacy of one’s imagination and that of Christianity and 
making existential decisions based on those judgments (especially in Phase Three).45 
While establishing these habits of imagining (which I have identified as characteristic of 
post-critical consciousness) demands great effort initially, with time many of them 
become second-nature, requiring less of one’s conscious attention. 
There is an additional reason why continuous repetition of this process is 
instrumental for achieving its aims, one that pertains less to the postmodern context than 
to perennial challenges. In Chapter Two, we noted the paradox of the human relationship 
to the divine: While our human experiences and images never adequately convey to us 
the reality of God and the transcendent realm, it is only by such means that we have any 
access to God at all. This state of affairs confronts us with the dilemma of having to 
pursue and relate to God through material means that constantly threaten to mislead us 
and inevitably fall short of a full communication. A recursive approach to Christian 
religious education helps to ameliorate this situation. By starting from learners’ own 
mental images in Phase One and returning to the same level of familiarity and 
concreteness in Phase Three, this pedagogical process caters to the limitations of human 
                                                
45 Insofar as this pedagogical approach provides a means of systematically self-appropriating one’s 
imagining (as distinct from achieving critical consciousness of particular images and symbols), it goes 
beyond those examined in the previous chapter. 
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cognition. By incorporating critical self-examination in Phase Two, it challenges learners 
to acknowledge the inadequacy of their images and expand their imagining. By requiring 
that the process be repeated continuously and that learners be formed in the habit of 
reexamining their imagining in the same recursive manner, it offers a built-in safeguard 
against idolatrous and reductionistic imagining, for the imagination that persistently 
imagines anew is the safest from idolatry. This ever-active, ever-open manner of 
imagining is what Jesus sought to foster in his teaching and what I intend to foster 
through this pedagogical process. 
 
Conclusion 
I have proposed here a three-phase pedagogical process as a partial remedy for the 
dis-integrated imaginations at the root of many Americans’ current crisis of faith. At the 
outset of this chapter, I asserted the claim that, in order to meet the challenges of 
educating for Catholic faith in postmodernity, religious educators must address several 
pedagogical desiderata. Namely, they must attend to the needs and limits of human 
cognition; facilitate transcendence of egocentric thinking, imagining, and feeling; recruit 
the active participation of learners in the transformation of their own imaginations; 
provide emotional and communal support during the transition; reintegrate fragmented 
imaginations; promote cognitive flexibility; and facilitate self-appropriation. I argued 
that, by pursuing these sub-goals, religious educators have the best chance of promoting 
the conversion of learners’ imaginations that is necessary to restore wholeness to their 
imagining and living. 
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In an effort to design a pedagogical process that meets these exigencies, I have 
synthesized contemporary research in cognitive science, transformative learning theory, 
conceptual change, and religious conversion; the pedagogical guidance of Jesus and 
leading contemporary Christian educators; and my own constructive contributions. The 
resulting process both attends to human limits and pushes learners for transcendence by 
beginning and ending the process at the level of familiar images while challenging 
personal images in Phase Two. It involves learners actively in every phase of the process, 
constantly posing questions, incorporating various activities, and explicitly inviting 
learners’ judgments about their learning. It supports learners through difficult cognitive 
changes by bringing humor into the classroom, inviting learners into conversation with 
one another, and persuading learners to follow through on their own best judgments. It 
promotes cognitive flexibility by habituating learners to asking critical questions, forming 
them in habits of reflective judgment, training them in a controlled setting to respond to 
postmodern intellectual and imaginal challenges, facilitating their self-appropriation, and 
generally encouraging their agency in the learning process. One of the most distinctive 
contributions of the approach I propose here is the manner in which it integrates learners’ 
fragmented imaginations by means of a recursive pedagogical process that trains them in 
post-critical habits of imagining and self-examination. Another is the manner in which it 
facilitates learners’ self-appropriation of their imagining through imaginative exercises 
and questioning activities systematically imbedded in the three-phase process. 
 The path that has led us to this pedagogical approach was full of sophisticated 
research and careful theological qualifications. In the end, however, my central argument 
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is simple—faithful Christian living, in this age or any other, requires an imagination that 
is at once centered and active. Put otherwise, if Christian disciples—especially those 
living in today’s postmodern culture—are to live an integrated, meaningful, God-centered 
life, they must intentionally engage in ongoing exploration of the symbols that God has 
revealed for human benefit. All the technical work of this dissertation has been for the 
sake of making this point, which Jesus clearly grasped two millennia before the first 
study in cognitive science was ever produced.  
 When disciples grow lethargic in their imagining or lose sight of the whole, the 
Christian imaginary dissipates and with it the unity in people’s lives. That American 
Catholics have succumbed to such a fate was apparent in our examination of the 
sociological data in Chapter One. It is also apparent to many of us in our daily 
interactions with other Catholics and (increasingly) former Catholics. I personally have 
witnessed the sense of meaninglessness and disorientation in the lives of people like 
Michael, whom I introduced at the beginning of this dissertation. Michael undoubtedly 
possessed an intellectual understanding of the teachings of the Catholic faith. What he 
lacked was an imaginative grasp of how a Christian imaginary might illuminate and 
integrate his experience of the world. In the absence of such an imaginative frame, the 
Catholic faith offered little meaning for his life. 
 For those who do find profound meaning and fulfillment in the Christian way of 
life, it is heartbreaking to see fellow disciples floundering in the postmodern melee. They 
recognize what people like Michael do not (at least not yet)—that a fuller, more joyful 
life is possible and could be theirs if they could only envision and embrace it. However, 
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this is precisely the difficulty; they do not see. For this reason Jesus came into the world 
proclaiming his vision of the reign of God, a vision with the power to restore sight to the 
blind and liberate those who are bound by the forces warring within them and in the 
world (Lk 4:18). Those who have the courage to undergo the conversion of the 
imagination that entering into Jesus’ vision requires find that a fuller life does indeed 
await. And so the task of today’s Christian religious educators remains essentially the 
same as that undertaken by Jesus long ago, namely, to invite conversion of imaginations 
to the reign of God.  
 I have aspired in this dissertation to provide guidelines for how Catholic religious 
educators might go about this work. My focus has been limited primarily to classroom 
pedagogy, and as such many important questions remain to be explored: For example, 
how might teachers be best trained in this approach? And what implications might this 
research carry for the other ministries of the Church, which are likewise instrumental in 
forming the people of God in a Christian imaginary? Answering these questions will 
require further research and reflection. My hope is that this dissertation will provide a 
touchstone for these future investigations. Still, even if important questions remain to be 
addressed, one thing has become manifestly clear through the present investigation: At 
the heart of the Church’s work of forming disciples is the activation and reorientation of 
people’s imaginations. If the pedagogical approach I have developed here furthers this 
work, I truly believe that I will have contributed something with the potential to help 
restore meaning and coherence to the lives of today’s Christian disciples. 
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Appendix I: Model Learning Event 
  
Phase One 
For this example, let us assume a teacher is teaching a lesson on the topic of the 
Eucharist with the goal that her or his college-age students will understand how the 
sacrament of the Eucharist bonds people together into a community of love. As a 
focusing activity, the teacher might begin by playing a video clip that illustrates 
dysfunctional community. Ideally this clip would be from a movie or TV show that the 
learners know and enjoy (e.g., the sitcoms “New Girl” or “Big Bang Theory”) or at least 
one that learners find entertaining. Using a humorous clip will help to put learners at ease 
as they enter into conversation, but employing a clip that elicits other strong emotions 
might also be appropriate.1 The clip’s focus on the theme of community sets up the focus 
for the lesson. 
The teacher might then lead the group in a discussion of the clip, focusing on the 
source of dysfunction and what might improve the situation in this fictional community. 
This conversation segues into an opportunity for learners to give expression to their 
images of perfect community and how this sort of community might be formed. For 
example, learners might share stories of times when they found themselves in the midst 
of people who made them feel peaceful, happy, and valued. They might share about a 
close group of friends, a retreat they attended, their own family, or any number of other 
experiences and people. After participants have shared stories for a time, the teacher 
                                                
1 I suggest a clip of dysfunctional rather than ideal community because the former is more likely to be 
humorous. 
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invites them to further consider how such community is formed. The teacher might ask 
questions like, What would it take to form a community that resembled the one you 
described all the time? Is such a community even possible? What gets in the way? 
Participants might refer back to the video clip as helpful but should focus primarily on 
their personal experiences. Learners then have an opportunity to express how they 
imagine such a community forming and/or what prevents the formation of perfect 
community. Again, the teacher should encourage participants to speak concretely and 
from personal experience and to avoid abstract platitudes.  
This examination of images presented by the teacher and those generated by 
learners will lead into more critical self-examination in the following phase. However, 
before beginning Phase Two (or perhaps during the Phase One activities just described) 
the teacher may make an informal assessment of the adequacy of learners’ symbolic 
consciousness. The descriptions of pre-critical, critical, and post-critical consciousness 
and the criteria for the adequacy of symbolic consciousness provided in Chapter Three 
can serve as the basis for this evaluation. In terms of assessing the basic adequacy of 
learners’ manner of imagining, teachers might ask, Do learners exhibit a healthy habit of 
asking questions and rendering rational judgments about what they see and imagine? 
How well do they recover emotionally when their way of imagining things is disrupted? 
Concerning adequacy to Christian faith, teachers might ask, To what extent are learners 
able to distinguish consistently between symbols and their referents (especially God)? 
How active and open to revision is their imagining? Regarding adequacy to the 
postmodern context, teachers might ask, To what extent do learners demonstrate a 
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dynamic stability in their imagining in the face of the barrage of conflicting images in the 
popular media? How well have learners understood and assumed control of the dynamics 
of their imagining? When evaluating learners based on these questions, teachers should 
do so with an awareness of what can be reasonably expected for each particular age 
group.2  
 
Phase Two 
Following the viewing of the video clip and the ensuing conversation, the teacher 
might invite learners to reflect as a class, in groups, or individually on a series of 
questions about their imagining about community. These questions might include: Where 
do your images of community come from? What experiences might have given rise to 
them? Might different experiences have given you a different image of community? Does 
everyone envision community in the same way? Does anyone experience perfect 
community? How do your images of community (healthy and dysfunctional) affect your 
relationships with others? How do they affect your attitudes toward your faith 
community? Such questions encourage learners to objectify their mental images and 
imagining, thereby reactivating the openness in their imagining and preparing the ground 
for a potential change in the way they imagine.  
Exactly how the teacher challenges learners’ imagining will depend upon how 
they respond to the questioning and imaginative exercises in Phase One. Let us assume 
                                                
2 For example, lower elementary students could not be expected to execute rational judgments based on 
explicit criteria, though they could express their preferences for images and provide some justification for 
their choices, superficial though their justification might be. 
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that the undergraduate students with whom the teacher is working evince views on 
community that conflict with key aspects of the Catholic vision of community.3 Perhaps 
that vision, influenced by college culture, is characterized by community that centers 
around abusive drinking habits and random “hook-ups” (i.e, consensual, often alcohol-
facilitated sexual encounters with no subsequent development of a relationship). Given 
the students’ particular views on this topic, the teacher might play a clip from Boston 
College professor Kerry Cronin’s talk on “The Imperfect Art of Dating” or from a movie 
that highlights the destructiveness of this sort of distorted “community”.4 In the Cronin 
clip, the speaker relates the story of an undergraduate woman who for years bought into 
the hook-up-based ideal of community and eventually came to realize its inadequacy in 
tragic fashion. Because the young woman is highly relatable to other undergraduates, the 
disruption her story provokes is particularly powerful.  
Following this disruptive moment, the teacher might begin inviting learners into a 
new vision of community through several bridging images. The teacher might begin by 
affirming the humanness of a vision of community gathered around basic goods and 
practices like sharing food and drink. Pivoting upon this element of the learners’ vision of 
community, the teacher might suggest (through artwork or reading from Exodus 16) the 
image of the Israelites being sustained as a community by God’s gift of manna in the 
desert. In this image of community, the good of communal sharing of food remains 
                                                
3 Here I necessarily limit this example to one of the three approaches described in the method section of 
Phase Two, viz., disrupting unChristian imagining. (The other two approaches were teaching Christian 
symbols and enriching learners’ imagining about Christian symbols.) 
4 An appropriate clip from Cronin’s talk can be accessed on YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysvbS8vIXIA. 
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prominent, but here the food serves to focus the community’s attention on God’s 
generosity rather than facilitate mutual exploitation. Because it is typically best to employ 
multiple images, the teacher might then relate this image of the Israelite community 
sustained by God’s gift of manna to the contemporary Catholic community, which is 
sustained and constituted by God’s gift of the Eucharist. Again, the use of artwork or 
video helps learners to imagine this image more vividly.  
After the teacher has devoted some time to presenting a vivid image of the 
Eucharistic community, he or she can beneficially introduce Catholic doctrine into the 
discussion, perhaps highlighting the symbolic meaning of the Eucharist as both a meal 
that unites the community and a sacrifice through which Jesus makes that unity possible. 
Presented in this way, the discussion of doctrine can help to reinforce and clarify how the 
Eucharist ritually enacts the Christian community’s dependence upon God for sustaining 
a loving community comprised of sinful members and the community’s gratitude to God 
for this. The teacher might seize upon this opportunity to relate the symbol of the 
Eucharist to a central symbol of faith by describing the Eucharistic community as an 
incarnation of the reign of God. Following this discussion, the teacher might lead the 
group in enacting a stripped down version of the Mass, including only those elements 
(e.g., act of confession, sign of peace, presentation of gifts, consecration, reception of 
communion) that emphasize the community’s dependence on God for uniting and 
preserving the unity of the community. 
This discussion of the Eucharist provides an opportunity to address directly how 
symbols function in human cognition, living, and religion. Some learners in the group, 
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particularly those operating from critical consciousness, may be harboring assumptions 
that the Eucharist is merely an empty ritual or a display of magical thinking. The teacher 
can help such learners to see—perhaps especially through the simulation—how the 
symbols and ritual of the Eucharist hold together the multiple meanings of divine 
sacrifice and communal meal in a way explanatory language cannot. This sort of 
experience can also help critical thinkers to appreciate how the ritual not only symbolizes 
the community’s gratitude and unity but also effects that gratitude and unity among those 
gathered. 
Following these activities, the teacher may administer a traditional test to assess 
students’ understanding of Catholic teaching on the Eucharist and community. 
 
Phase Three 
Phase Three might begin with a discussion of the Mass simulation. The teacher 
could ask: What did you think of this ritual? Did any of the parts of the Mass take on new 
meaning for you? Why do you think you didn’t grasp this meaning from your previous 
experiences of the Mass? What has your experience of Mass been like in the past? What 
did it mean to you?  These questions present an opportunity for learners to learn from one 
another and garner encouragement as they begin to consider how they might imagine the 
Eucharist and community differently. Learners should also feel free to tell humorous 
stories about their experiences in Mass since the humor will likewise ease the transition. 
After learners have had some time to share their experiences, the teacher might push their 
reflection deeper by inviting them to discuss what their community would be like if they 
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intentionally engaged in the sort of ritual they just enacted on a regular basis. This 
question decisively pushes the conversation forward from recalling past experiences to 
envisioning something new and challenges learners to consider more actively the 
community-forming power of the Eucharist.  
This question also serves to set up a dialogical probing of learners’ imagining 
about community. The teacher might next invite learners to compare the image of 
community arising from the Mass simulation with their current image of community 
(e.g., drinking together, hooking up). For example, teachers might ask, How would your 
life be different if you participated in this ritual regularly and let it form your approach to 
your relationships? The next question is, Would this be a change for the better, the worse, 
or neither? In order to answer this question, learners require some basis for making the 
judgment. Undoubtedly they will have some (probably tacit) criteria that they bring to the 
issue, but their judgment will be sounder if they reflect upon their criteria deliberately. 
Therefore, if not discussed previously, this point in the learning experience presents an 
opportune moment to discuss the hermeneutical guidelines mentioned in Chapter Six 
(viz., the reign of God, continuity with the Christian tradition and community, and 
illuminating potential).  
Applying these criteria, learners can make reasonable judgments that go beyond a 
vague assessment of whether or not this Eucharistic image of community appeals to 
them. They can ask more robust questions like, Does this Eucharistic image of 
community cohere with Jesus’ vision of life in abundance and the reign of God? Is it 
consistent with the teaching and way of life embodied over the millennia in the Christian 
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community? Does it illumine my experience and help me to make sense of life? Can I 
expect this image to help me strengthen my relationships? Learners may require 
significant time and support to answer these questions meaningfully. Before feeling 
comfortable with a judgment, some learners might, for example, find it helpful to create a 
painting or song that explores the possibilities for this new vision of community or to 
diagram how the symbol of the Eucharist fits within their personal symbol system. It 
might help others to attend an actual Mass and experience it through this new lens before 
rendering a judgment, which the teacher should encourage them to do rather than 
demanding a premature judgment. 
Once learners have made a judgment concerning the value of this Eucharistic 
image of community relative to their old image, the teacher should invite them to make 
decisions based on that judgment. Learners might write in a journal, send themselves an 
email, or simply think to themselves how they will enact this image of community in 
their lives. Some learners may require persuasion to step from the realm of knowing into 
the realm of doing. Recognizing this need, the teacher might highlight the benefits that 
await those who enter more deeply into the mystery of the Eucharist and who work to 
forge a Eucharistic community. Alternatively, this persuasion might take the form of 
personal testimony of the teacher’s experiences of Christian community or a video clip of 
a church community that incarnates the Catholic vision of Eucharistic community.  
Finally, the teacher should propose concrete ways of putting this vision into 
action, like referring learners to local churches where they can experience this sort of 
Christian community. Learners should then have time to develop an action plan (e.g., 
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resume Mass attendance, bring a new friend to Mass each month, spend more time with 
friends who embody a Eucharistic image of community) and form an image that will help 
to anchor this vision of community in their imaginations. For example, a student might be 
captivated by the insight that Christians receive the “bread of life” so that they can feed 
each other and the rest of the world in their daily interactions. Hence, the image of 
themselves bringing food to a poor person might come to replace the image of drinking 
with friends as the focal image for their vision of community. When the teacher repeats 
the pedagogical process with this group in order to deepen their learning further (perhaps 
at the end of the semester), learners’ new focal images might provide the starting point 
for the exercises of Phase One. The teacher may conduct an assessment of learners’ 
growth either at the end of Phase Three or in Phase One of the next cycle.  
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Appendix II: Three-Phase Process Overview by Age Level 
 
In the following chart, I provide a suggestive overview of how a learning event focused 
on the Eucharist and conducted according to my three-phase process might be adapted for 
three different age groups. The notes in the adult column are a distillation of the model 
lesson described in Appendix I. 
 
 
 
Phase SCP 
movement 
Lower elementary Junior high school Adult 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase One 
 
 
Focusing 
activity 
Viewing and discussion 
of movie clip that 
illustrates dysfunctional 
community (e.g., 
Disney’s Lion King). 
Viewing and discussion 
of movie clip that 
illustrates dysfunctional 
community (e.g., 
Remember the Titans). 
Viewing and discussion 
of clip from TV show 
that illustrates 
dysfunctional 
community (e.g., “New 
Girl”). 
 
 
 
movement 
1 
Learners share 
experiences/images of a 
group of people getting 
along well and then 
discuss: How do people 
learn to treat each other 
lovingly? Why do 
people sometimes not 
treat each other 
lovingly? 
Learners share 
experiences/images of 
ideal community and 
then discuss: What 
would it take to form a 
community that’s like 
that all the time? What 
gets in the way? 
Learners share 
experiences/images of 
ideal community and 
then discuss: What 
would it take to form a 
community that’s like 
that all the time? What 
gets in the way? 
 
 
 
 
Phase Two 
 
 
 
 
movement 
2 
Key questions: Who 
taught you how to treat 
others lovingly? 
Optional diagnostic 
assessment of learners’ 
form/manner of 
imagining. 
Key questions: Where 
do your images of 
community come from? 
Does everyone envision 
community in the same 
way? How do your 
images of community 
(healthy and 
dysfunctional) affect 
your relationships with 
others?  
Optional diagnostic 
assessment of learners’ 
form/manner of 
imagining. 
Key questions: Where 
do your images of 
community come from? 
Does everyone envision 
community in the same 
way? How do your 
images of community 
(healthy and 
dysfunctional) affect 
your relationships with 
others?  
Optional diagnostic 
assessment of learners’ 
form/manner of 
imagining. 
 
 
movement 
3 
Viewing of clip from 
Disney’s Frozen in 
which one sister 
continues to treat the 
other lovingly despite 
Viewing of video clip of 
L’Arche community (to 
challenge learners’ 
vision of community as 
people like them who 
Viewing of Kerry 
Cronin clip (to 
challenge learners’ 
vision of community as 
mutual self-
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mistreatment (to 
challenge learners’ 
vision of community as 
people who are nice to 
them). Tell story of 
Exodus 16. Simplified 
discussion of 
Eucharistic community. 
Mass simulation. 
Opportunity for 
traditional assessment. 
make them 
comfortable). 
Discussion of Exodus 
16, Eucharistic 
community, doctrine of 
Eucharist (simplified). 
Mass simulation. 
Opportunity for 
traditional assessment. 
gratification). 
Discussion of Exodus 
16, Eucharistic 
community, doctrine on 
Eucharist. Mass 
simulation. Discussion 
of symbols’ function in 
human cognition, living, 
and religion. 
Opportunity for 
traditional assessment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 
Three 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
movement 
4 
Discussion of Mass 
simulation: Did you 
realize that we do 
basically the same thing 
every Sunday at Mass? 
Do you think people 
would be more loving to 
each other if they had an 
experience every week 
like we just did?  
Activities for facilitating 
judgment (e.g., role-
playing, artwork). 
Discussion of Mass 
simulation: Did any of 
the parts of the Mass 
take on new meaning 
for you? What has your 
experience of Mass been 
like in the past? What 
would you and your 
community  be like if 
you intentionally 
engaged in this sort of 
ritual on a regular basis? 
Would this be a change 
for the better, the worse, 
or neither? Activities for 
facilitating judgment 
(e.g., telling stories, 
role-playing, artwork). 
Discussion of Mass 
simulation: Did any of 
the parts of the Mass 
take on new meaning 
for you? What has your 
experience of Mass been 
like in the past? What 
would you and your 
community  be like if 
you intentionally 
engaged in this sort of 
ritual on a regular basis? 
Would this be a change 
for the better, the worse, 
or neither? Activities for 
facilitating judgment 
(e.g., telling stories, 
sketching personal 
symbol system, 
reflection on 
experiments in new 
roles). 
 
 
 
 
movement 
5 
Opportunity for 
decision-making 
(discussion, artistically 
expressing decision). 
Persuasive appeal by 
teacher (e.g., personal 
testimony, video of 
Christian community). 
Suggest an anchoring 
image of community for 
learners. 
Optional assessment of 
learners’ growth in 
form/manner of 
imagining. 
Opportunity for 
decision-making 
(journaling, discussion, 
artistically expressing 
decision). Persuasive 
appeal by teacher (e.g., 
personal testimony, 
video of Christian 
community). 
Opportunity to imagine 
an anchoring image of 
community. 
Optional assessment of 
learners’ growth in 
form/manner of 
imagining. 
Opportunity for 
decision-making 
(journaling, discussion, 
artistically expressing 
decision). Persuasive 
appeal by teacher (e.g., 
personal testimony, 
video of Christian 
community). 
Opportunity to imagine 
an anchoring image of 
community. 
Optional assessment of 
learners’ growth in 
form/manner of 
imagining. 
Repeat process, pushing for still more adequate imagining. 
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